Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of Frederick J. R. Heebee, of Louisiana, to be U.S. district judge, eastern district of Louisiana, vice Frank B. Ellis, retired.

At the indicated time and place persons interested in the hearing may make such representations as may be pertinent.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], and myself, as chairman.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

Certificate of merit issued by the American Red Cross to Howard E. Haugerud; article published in the Washington, D.C., Daily News of February 4, 1966, entitled "Dramatic Minutes on a Bridge"; article published in the State Department Newsletter of February 1966, entitled "Red Cross Cites Haugerud for Saving Policeman's Life"; and letters from the Vice President, Representative THOMAS E. MORGAN, Senator FULBRIGHT, Senator MONDALE, Senator MCCLELLAN, Representative FRASER, and Senator MCCARTHY, all in commendation of Mr. Haugerud.

Transcript of radio broadcast made by Edward P. Morgan on February 21, 1966, relating to hearings recently held by the Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the war in Vietnam.

By Mr. HARTKE:

Editorials entitled "Misplacing the Blame," "Let's Declare Just What We Mean in Vietnam," and "Coincidence Underlines a Point," published in the Post-Tribune, Gary, Ind., on February 3, 6, and 9, 1966, respectively.

THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST DEBATE

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the Toronto Daily Star, one of Canada's greatest papers, recently presented to its readers a discerning portrait of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the heading "The Man Who Leads America's Greatest Debate." Says the article, by Staff Writer Robert Nielsen under a Washington dateline:

> Questioning national dogma and offending conventional wisdom is a risky habit, especially at times of stress. * * * His prestige as one of that rare species, the philosopher-statesman, is grounded in a 23-year record of reasoned and often prophetic discourses as Representative and Senator.

As the article points out, Senator FULBRIGHT has been a prophet or a promoter of all the major constructive and moderating influences in world affairs, including foreign aid, coexistence, and restraining of nuclear arms rivalry.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article, which is such a deserved tribute to our distinguished colleague, may be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST DEBATE—FULBRIGHT GOES ON THINKING, AND SAYING THE UNTHINKABLE

(By Robert Nielsen)

WASHINGTON.—The Vietnam ulcer has begun to perforate and inflame the American body politic.

It is a time when conventional politicians talk of "honor" or "victory" or at least "firmness." But Senator JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT goes on doing what comes naturally to him—thinking unthinkable thoughts and uttering them when he believes they should be aired.

He is doing it this week as his Senate Foreign Relations Committee opens what amounts to a full-dress public inquiry into U.S. policy in Vietnam.

A few days ago FULBRIGHT mused aloud, in his soft Ozark drawl, on whether the United States had been wrong to commit itself in South Vietnam, and on whether a great nation could admit such a mistake and draw back.

Then he bored in on Secretary of State Dean Rusk with embarrassing questions about the origins of the war.

Questioning national dogma and offending conventional wisdom is a risky habit, especially at times of stress, and FULBRIGHT'S latest heresies have clearly earned him the displeasure of President Johnson, who shows an increasing preference for yes men.

Johnson snubbed FULBRIGHT at a meeting with 20 congressional leaders before announcing the resumption of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

OVEREDUCATED

The Senator had just begun an exposition of American policy in Asia since World War II when the President pointedly turned to Rusk and started a conversation.

FULBRIGHT has known worse rebuffs than that.

President Truman once called him "an overeducated Oxford s.o.b." (FULBRIGHT was a Rhodes scholar) for suggesting that the President should resign when the opposition party captures Congress in the midterm elections—as the Republicans did in 1946.

The late Senator Joe McCarthy tried to nickname him "Senator Halfbright." It never took, except among some rightwing patriots who are regurgitating their old scurrilities into FULBRIGHT'S mailbag these days.

But those who have disagreed with FULBRIGHT have usually found, in the end, that it is unsafe to ignore his deeply considered opinions.

As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which carries the main burden of the Senate's constitutional duty to give advice and consent to administration foreign policy, his words automatically carry weight.

His prestige as one of that rare species, the philosopher-statesman, is grounded in a 23-year record of reasoned and often prophetic discourses as Representative and Senator.

Although he is exceptionally mild mannered, and almost unfailingly temperate in language, FULBRIGHT has ample inner toughness for the role of Great Dissenter in foreign policy matters.

LAPSE

When the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles was being considered in 1961, FULBRIGHT did not fear to pit his detached scholarly judgment against the optimism of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and the State Department.

He wrote President Kennedy a long memo condemning the project on both political and moral grounds. After the fiasco, the President said to him within the hearing of others: "You are the only one here who has a right to say 'I told you so.'"

McCarthy's fear-and-smear tactics caused one of FULBRIGHT'S few lapses from moderate speech. He observed that democracy has "no apparatus to deal with the boor, the liar, the lout."

At a time when President Eisenhower was trying to pussyfoot around the rampant McCarthy, and when Congress was afraid of him, FULBRIGHT was the lone Senator to vote to cut off funds for McCarthy's investigations.

By the end of the same year (1954) his minority of one had become a majority of the Senate voting censure of McCarthy and breaking the latter's political power.

Arkansas lost an educator, and the United States gained a statesman, as a result of FULBRIGHT'S having got fired, for parochial political reasons, from the presidency of the University of Arkansas.

He made his mark in his first year (1943) as a freshman Representative, successfully moving a resolution favoring U.S. membership in a world organization with powers adequate to keep the peace. This was a forerunner to the establishment of the United Nations, and a decisive breakaway from American isolationism.

Yet when the U.N. Charter was being euphorically hailed in 1945, FULBRIGHT rose in the Senate to voice critical reservations.

The U.N. was being sold on the ground that it would not infringe national sovereignty, he noted. But unless it developed to the point where it limited the autonomy of nations in their dealings with others, it would prove ineffective.

The rule of law, backed by U.N. power to settle disputes, could not operate if the member nations retained absolute sovereignty.

PROPHET

Since then FULBRIGHT has been a prophet or a promoter of nearly every major constructive or moderating tendency in world affairs: Foreign economic aid, European union, the coexistence of capitalism and communism, "polycentrism" in the Communist world; restraint of the nuclear arms race.

Even without that record, his fame would endure from one simple idea he had in 1945: Conversion of surplus U.S. military supplies, left overseas after the war, into exchange scholarships.

At last count, more than 25,000 Americans had gone overseas on Fulbright scholarships, and 47,000 men and women had come to study in the United States.

FULBRIGHT, now 60, was more noted as an athlete and good mixer than as a scholar at Oxford University.

FULBRIGHT derives his authority from his habit of standing back coolly from the chaotic flux of current events, trying to detect the significant movements and then fitting them into their historical contexts.

His mind is richly stocked with political history, and he resorts frequently to the wisdom of the ancient philosophers, and of the 18th and 19th century thinkers.

In a sense he is still an educator. From his Senate forum he periodically lectures the American people about their qualities, both good and bad, especially as they relate to the difficulties of conducting an intelligent foreign policy.

"We have clung too long to our youth as a nation, during which our foreign policy consisted in a series of exhilarating and successful adventures. * * * But we live now in a far more difficult and more dangerous world, a world in which we must come of age. Neither God nor nature has preordained the triumph of our free society.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. President, I offer my resolution as a constructive alternative to the Johnson administration's proposal. That proposal, while abolishing the electoral college and thereby preventing presidential electors from flouting the popular will as expressed in the November elections, would freeze into our Constitution the winner-take-all system whereby a State's entire electoral vote would go to the ticket carrying that State. A bad consequence of the winner-take-all system is that the parties concentrate their campaigns on those States having the largest number of electoral votes to the exclusion of the other States. A ticket that can carry the major industrial States can win a majority of the electoral votes.

My proposal would give the people a more meaningful voice in selecting their national leaders by requiring presidential tickets to go after every congressional district or special district in order to be sure of winning a majority of the electoral votes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 141) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of the President and Vice President, introduced by Mr. SCOTT, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

TAX ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 490

Mr. PROUTY (for himself and Mr. JORDAN of Idaho) submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the bill (H.R. 12752) to provide for graduated withholding of income tax from wages, to require declarations of estimated tax with respect to self-employment income, to accelerate current payments of estimated income tax by corporations, to postpone certain excise tax rate reductions, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of a bill I have introduced to promote the safety of railway employees, S. 2180, the name of the junior Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] be added as a cosponsor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Under authority of the order of the Senate of February 21, 1966, the names of Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. MORTON, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. TOWER were added as additional cosponsors of the bill (S. 2956) to amend the National Labor Relations Act so as to make it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to discriminate on account of race, color, religion, or national origin, introduced by Mr. DOMINICK on February 21, 1966.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AMENDMENT

Under authority of the order of the Senate of February 18, 1966, the names of Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HART, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. McGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. Moss, Mr. MUSKIE, and Mr. SALTONSTALL were added as additional cosponsors of amendment No. 485, intended to be proposed by Mr. BARTLETT, to the bill (S. 2933) to promote international trade in agricultural commodities, to combat hunger and malnutrition, to further economic development, and for other purposes, submitted by Mr. BARTLETT (for himself and Mr. MAGNUSON) on February 18, 1966.

PUBLIC HEARINGS ON S. 1676, A BILL TO COORDINATE AND DISSEMINATE BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION UPON REQUEST, SCHEDULED WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, AND THURSDAY, MARCH 3, AT 10 A.M., ROOM 4200, NEW SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, this week on Wednesday and Thursday the Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, of which I am chairman, will hold hearings in which it is hoped that the growing population dialog will be further expanded.

These public hearings will start at 10 a.m. This week the hearings will be held in room 4200 of the New Senate Office Building.

On Wednesday contributions will be made by the following witnesses:

Dr. Donald M. Barrett, professor of sociology, University of Notre Dame, Norte Dame, Ind.; director of the Notre Dame Institute for Latin American Population Research, and a member of the Papal Commission on Population and Birth Control.

Prof. Albert P. Blaustein, professor of law and law librarian, Rutgers University, Camden, N.J.

Dr. Andre J. deBethune, author and professor of chemistry, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass.

Dr. Joseph D. Beasley, obstetrician and gynecologist, Department of Child Health and Pediatrics, Tulane University School of Medicine, New Orleans, La.

The subcommittee had hoped to hear from Dr. Joseph P. Martin of Cleveland, Ohio, but Dr. Martin is suffering from the flu. He will make his contribution at a later hearing.

On Thursday contributions to these extended hearings on S. 1676, my bill to coordinate and disseminate birth control information upon request will be made by a man who is highly qualified to discuss food and housing needs—Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman.

NOTICE OF WEATHER MODIFICATION HEARINGS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate and other interested persons, I want to announce that hearings have been scheduled by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 2875, the bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a comprehensive program of scientific and engineering research, experiments, tests, and operations for increasing the yield of water from atmospheric sources. The hearings will start at 10 a.m., Monday, March 21, 1966, in room 3110, New Senate Office Building, and continue until all of those wishing to be heard have had an opportunity to testify.

S. 2875 was introduced by our distinguished colleague, Senator ANDERSON, for himself and 20 other Senators, on February 4, 1966. The purpose of the bill is to implement recommendations recently released by the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Sciences.

Because of the widespread interest in weather modification and its possible effect on our water supply and resources, it is my intention to invite testimony from qualified scientific and engineering individuals to give the committee the benefit of their knowledge and experience. I trust that a complete record of both past activities and the possibilities for the future can be completely explored. It is time to move forward in this field with boldness and perseverance, and S. 2875 is a step in this direction. We must continue to do all in our power to meet this Nation's water needs.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINATION OF RUSSELL E. SMITH TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, DISTRICT OF MONTANA

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hearing has been scheduled for Thursday, March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in room 2300, New Senate Office Building, on the nomination of Russell E. Smith, of Montana, to be U.S. district judge, district of Montana, vice William D. Murray, retired.

At the indicated time and place persons interested in the hearing may make such representations as may be pertinent.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], and myself, as chairman.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINATION OF FREDERICK J. R. HEEBE TO BE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on behalf of the committee on the Judiciary, I desire to give notice that a public hearing has been scheduled for Thursday,

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

TRICKS

"History plays cruel tricks. It allowed us to believe that the triumphs of our past were the product of our vigor and resourcefulness alone. What we failed to perceive in our past was the presence of another element: The element of an improbable run of luck, the luck of a rich and unspoiled continent far removed from the centers of power politics and world conflicts."

Although he is a hero to liberal internationalists and a dirty word to the self-styled conservatives of the radical right, FULBRIGHT himself is palpably a conservative. He has a conservative's respect for tradition and an aristocrat's mistrust of mass impulses.

He has voted the straight Southern line against civil rights, without apologies and with inner discomforts that can only be guessed at, since he is certainly not a bigot.

He is forever counseling the United States to be prudent as well as conciliatory in foreign affairs, to beware of thinking it can police the world or remake the world in its image.

MODERATION

If FULBRIGHT is passionate about anything, it is moderation.

But his insistent desire to see things in their true proportions can startle his countrymen when it collides with national myths and obsessions—as when he rated Fidel Castro "a nuisance but not a grave threat" to the United States.

Now he is applying his system of measurement to Vietnam and if he turns out right it will not be said, as it often has been, that he was "right too soon."

In fact, he swallowed this week some of the humble medicine he suggested for the country, and admitted he had been wrong to endorse a 1964 congressional resolution authorizing the President to take all necessary steps to repel aggression in southeast Asia.

Johnson now is waving this blank check under Congress' nose, and FULBRIGHT evidently would like to write some conditions into it.

This will not restore him to the best graces of the White House, but then, FULBRIGHT has never depended on the favor of Presidents. Or even on the agreement of his colleagues in Congress.

His constituency is scattered across the country and many parts of the world, in centers of learning and especially among students and practitioners of international relations.

LOYAL

His following is select, influential, and loyal.

His own status is unique, and indicated by the fact that British Labor dissidents wired a protest to him, rather than Johnson, over the resumption of bombing.

Even if the Presidential frowns should be followed by thunderbolts, FULBRIGHT might take solace at having moved Walter Lippmann to this hyperbole:

"The role he plays in Washington is an indispensable role: There is no one else who is so powerful and also so wise."

NEBRASKA'S STATEHOOD DAY AND CENTENNIAL

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, 99 years ago today, on March 1, 1867, the free State of Nebraska was recognized as the 37th State in the Union. Today we celebrate our natal day.

One year from now Nebraska will be celebrating its 100th birthday. Groundwork has been laid for ceremonies and festivities marking the anniversary of a century of pioneer heritage.

A fondly remembered part of that heritage is the postal history of Nebraska as a State and territory. Nebraska's request for the issuance of a Nebraska statehood centennial commemorative stamp in 1967 is presently on the agenda of the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee to the Post Office Department. The Centennial Commission's Commemorative Stamp Committee has plans for restaging the first night airmail flight from North Platte to Omaha. The Pony Express run from Fairbury to Scottsbluff will be reenacted along the original route.

The centennial program, according to the Nebraska Centennial Commission, has a three-part objective. The first is to honor our heritage. It is only through examination of our past and adherence to proven ideals and principles that we can be true to the land and continue to have a heritage worthy of honor. It is remembered at this time that these sturdy pioneers made sacred the land called Nebraska by their great bravery and sacrifices. By principles based upon a strong democratic ideal and spiritual faith a heritage has been forged deserving our highest respect. We are unalterably committed to its preservation.

The second aim of our program is a celebration or commemoration beginning on our Statehood Day, March 1, 1967, and running through Thanksgiving Day, 1967. This period of time will be filled with activities of national and local importance and interest. It is indeed fitting that these 8 months be set aside to commemorate the work of many years which have given us such a great State today. This is the birthday party.

The third objective is a rededication to the future. With renewed spirits and confidence, Nebraskans will look to the future and join their fellow countrymen in preserving the heritage and realizing the promise of our great land.

The people of Nebraska extend the hand of friendship. Inscribed on our centennial seal is "Welcome to Nebraskaland—where the West begins."

In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe that through the individual effort of Nebraskans combined with the support of all the Nation, the Nebraska Centennial of 1967 will be a tremendous success with lasting effects on our fine State and our great Nation.

WAR ON HUNGER

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the March issue of the Farm Journal strongly endorses President Johnson's new food-for-freedom program.

The Farm Journal called rather urgently last October for efforts to meet the population food crisis in the world. That editorial appeared in the RECORD of January 14. In its new comment on the President's world food proposal the magazine suggests that the label "war on hunger" would be appropriate. It says:

We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words which the President used). They have the necessary ring of urgency.

As a past director of food for peace and author of a book entitled "War Against Want," I offer no specific label for the Nation's food program, but I would like to join Farm Journal Editor Carroll P. Streeter in his comment that there should be a "necessary ring of urgency" about the program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Farm Journal editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GOOD HUNGER PROGRAM

President Johnson's new food-for-freedom program, with its implications for U.S. farmers and for the hungry of the world has Farm Journal's full support. It agrees in intent with what we have been advocating for months, particularly in our war-on-hunger statement on this page of last October.

The food-for-peace label has apparently been tossed aside. The new one isn't much better. We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words which the President used). They have the necessary ring of urgency.

In essence the policy calls for expanding our food shipments from here to a practicable degree; trying to put more of them on a long time loan basis; going into the market to buy what the hungry need, not just dumping surpluses we want to get rid of; sending food only to those who will show real effort to help themselves; clamping down on feeding unfriendly nations (does Russian belong here?); and guardedly bringing back into production as fast as needed, but no faster, some of our 60 million acres of idle land. Nothing was said about charging more of this cost to something other than agriculture—a step we still urge.

If we really hew to these lines and not just talk about them, and if we move in the direction of more "freedom" for American farmers as well as freedom from hunger (a big "if" indeed), our "hunger" campaign will be on the right track at last. Let's see now if we do as we say.

FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE AS A DIET SUPPLEMENT

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, Secretary of the Interior Udall announced recently a dramatic breakthrough in the worldwide struggle against hunger when he revealed the development of a new process for producing a wholesome fish protein concentrate which can be used as a diet supplement throughout the world.

For many years the people of the United States have been actively engaged in an effort to provide food for the world's hungry people. The accelerating pace of modern life makes the problems of each country the concern of all countries, and hunger is the greatest common enemy in the world today. The statistics of world hunger do not need repeating. The President's recent message to the Congress on food for freedom clearly documented the problem.

It is enough for us to realize that more than half of the world's inhabitants are either chronically hungry or consistently undernourished.

The task of providing food for the world's starving millions has challenged American ingenuity, and America has responded in many ways. One response—the one cited by Secretary Udall—raises the intriguing probability that the har-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

vest of the future can come from the sea.

The bounty contained in the world's oceans has never been underestimated. Scientists and nutritional experts have long known that fish and fish products could go far toward erasing hunger in many countries of the world. The question has always been, how could this invaluable resource be exploited, how could we actually get these fish products into the mouths of the hungry?

An enormous amount of research has gone toward answering this question, and out of it has come at least one very hopeful product. That product is called fish protein concentrate, or fish flour. It seems to offer an exciting victory in the war against hunger.

Fish protein concentrate is an utterly new concept in the food industry. For years fishermen and fish processors have used many devices to preserve fish against rapid deterioration. They have salted fish, smoked it, dried it, canned it, frozen it. And they have been successful in part with each of these methods. But in every case they have been trying to preserve fish in a form very closely resembling its original state, and not trying to extract from fish the greatest possible amount of nutritional value.

The process which results in fish protein concentrate takes a different approach. It is aimed not at preserving fish in its original state, but rather at taking advantage of the tremendous amount of protein which is concentrated in even the least valuable type of fish.

Protein deficiency is the most prominent element of malnutrition in the world today. Meat is far too expensive in most countries to provide a staple diet item for the average person. Wheat yields ample protein, but wheat is virtually unknown in many lands. Vegetables of one kind or another are common everywhere, but they often supply only small amounts of a low quality protein.

Fish protein concentrate is designed to meet this worldwide need for protein with a food supplement which contains a high amount of high quality animal protein in a form which is safe, inexpensive, easy to transport, and palatable.

The idea of developing a fish flour has been current among fishery technologists for more than a decade. But it has always faced a tangle of questions: could a fish protein concentrate be developed economically? Could it be made acceptable in countries where fish is not a common or recognizable part of the diet?

In 1963 the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior began intensive research into these questions, and the National Academy of Sciences soon joined in the project. Work began with tests on various methods of removing the water and oil from the whole fish so that it yielded a dry, white powder containing most of the protein and minerals of the original raw fish.

On the basis of preliminary research in the laboratory, the Bureau was able to design a model scale FPC production plant which could manufacture 100 pounds of FPC per day. While research continued at the laboratory, construction of the scale plant was begun, and the plant was completed in the spring of 1965. This plant greatly accelerated the FPC study.

It was apparent early in the study that a protein product which would be made available to the poor of the world have to be manufactured at a very low cost. That meant using the whole fish as raw material—not a fillet, or a steak, but the whole fish. And this introduced the problem of wholesomeness.

With this and other considerations in mind, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries began through exhaustive tests to narrow down the focus of its quest. By last summer it had developed a process whereby Atlantic red hake, a cheap and plentiful fish, could be turned into a highly acceptable protein concentrate through treatment with isopropyl alcohol. The protein content of this powdery substance is extremely high—about 80 percent. The estimated price is very low—somewhere between 14 and 29 cents a pound, depending on the capacity of the plant which produces it.

In October of last year an Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences pronounced the concentrate "wholesome, highly nutritious, stable, safe, and capable of economic production and marketing." The Committee's report further said:

> The product blends well with other forms of food. The Committee has tested it as an ingredient in beverages, noodles, gravy, bread, and cookies. In percentages high enough to be of nutritional significance, the product is scarcely detectable, and in most forms, not at all.

A similar test, a flavor profile, was conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. It revealed that fish protein concentrate is not fishy in taste. FPC has been incorporated in noodles at levels up to 10 percent, in milkshakes at levels of 20 percent, and in dry beef gravy mixes at up to 20 percent. In no case was a fish flavor detected by a trained panel. FPC was even used in the making of tortillas, with no fish taste and no change in flavor.

On October 14, 1965, the National Academy's Committee recommended that the U.S. Government arrange for the production of 3,000 tons of fish protein concentrate within 2 years. The Committee recommended that an experimental pilot plant be constructed and operated which could produce 10 tons of concentrate per day based on the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries' process. These developments, culminating in Secretary Udall's recent announcement, make it clear that fish protein concentrate has been tested and proved to be a valuable, commercially marketable product. The question remains, how can it best be used?

Surely our first consideration should be America's foreign aid program. President Johnson has proposed a food-for-freedom plan designed to put America's skill and abundance at the service of the worldwide fight against hunger. Fish protein concentrate should become a key commodity in American food shipments to poor nations. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, working closely with the Department of State and the Agency for International Development, should distribute enormous amounts of fish protien concentrate which would have a strong effect on the world's nutrition. It should also make available to the countries of the developing world the fruits of this technical breakthrough so that each country could commence its own production.

The potential of fish protein concentrate as a worldwide nutritional supplement is clear. But let me point out that commercial production and distribution of fish protein concentrate could also have widespread benefits in the United States. In our own country nearly 13 percent of all households do not meet two-thirds of the food nutrient allowances recommended for their diets.

Another important beneficiary would be the U.S. fishing industry. Full-scale production of fish protein concentrate would enable fishermen to use fish which they now catch and discard because the fish are of insufficient commercial value. Fish protein concentrate would increase the present use of fish by 7 billion pounds per year in the United States alone. Commercial use of fish protein concentrate would also allow fishermen to work steadily the year round, catching marketable species of fish when they are available and turning to species suitable for fish protein concentrate during the remainder of the year. This new process could stabilize and diversify the fish market, and increase employment in fish processing plants.

But beyond the immediate advantages to the fishing industry, production of fish protein concentrate would also benefit other parts of our economy. A major FPC program would of course mean increased demands for ships and thus more work for shipbuilders. It would also open a new field of research into fish processing and the development of new processing techniques. And it could very well mean a whole new line of foods for domestic use—many major food companies in the United States have expressed interest in the use of FPC in everyday food such as cereal, bread, pastry, and even candy.

The potential contribution that fish protein concentrate can make both at home and abroad is clear, but it is essential that we plan now to take advantage of its benefits. I, therefore, propose a six-point action program to insure that fish protein concentrate is put to work quickly and effectively.

First. Our first objective must be to obtain approval by the Food and Drug Administration for the commercial marketing of FPC. The Food and Drug Administration has so far refused approval for domestic marketing of FPC because the product uses the whole fish, including the portions which are normally discarded. But exhaustive tests by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the National Academy of Sciences, and an independent testing firm all show that the new FPC recently developed is safe and wholesome.

In order to obtain FDA approval, a group of New England Senators has twice petitioned the FDA, and a formal

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

SENATOR ALLEN J. ELLENDER REPORTS FROM CONGRESS ON SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD excerpts from reports which I have made to the people of Louisiana during the year 1965 and part of this year, 1966, on the issue of Vietnam. I also ask unanimous consent that preceding each excerpt, the date of my report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the report of Feb. 27, 1965]

SOUTH VIETNAM

Hearings began last week on the important, $49 billion defense appropriations bill. The Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee went into executive session to receive testimony and justification from Defense Secretary Robert McNamara on this mammoth expenditure. As a member of the subcommittee, I questioned Mr. McNamara very closely as to our military posture and our military policies throughout the world. Like many other Senators and Congressmen, I am becoming extremely concerned about the effectiveness of these policies, particularly in Vietnam. It appears to me that we have gone in so deeply in South Vietnam, that we now find ourselves in over our heads. I am not at all sure that we can gain any victory in that God-forsaken corner of the world, and I fear we are on the verge of finding another South Korea on our hands which may be more costly. God forbid that we become engaged in a big war on the continent of Asia.

I become particularly concerned when I recall the history of the French effort to hold Indochina. That war lasted from 1946 to 1954, and in its latter stages we supplied the French with approximately $1.5 billion worth of American aid. The French at one time had as many as 350,000 men in action on the Indochina peninsula, of which about 175,000 were French nationals. The administration of the Government and the entire population were under their control; yet in 8 years, the French were decisively defeated and driven out of an area they had held for 100 years. This history does not bode well for the future of the American effort.

[From the report of Apr. 3, 1965]

The news from the international scene has been dominated in the last weeks by the worsening situation in Vietnam. Personally, I have long given up hope that any good can come from our Nation's involvement in that God-forsaken corner of the world. Based on my personal knowledge and my inspections of the Vietnam situation, I repeatedly warned and advised against the coming entanglement, beginning with the Eisenhower administration. My warnings were not heeded, however, and we now find ourselves hanging on the tail of an increasingly ferocious bear.

As it is, I am becoming more and more concerned about the course of events. It seems to me as if we have very little to win, if, indeed, we can win, and a great deal to lose. At this point, we can do little more than hope that Red Chinese forces are not brought into the fray, for we shall then have another full-scale Korea on our hands—a condition that I have tried to head off in every way that I could.

Once again we are carrying the entire burden, while our erstwhile allies sit back and give advice.

It does seem to me, however, that our authorities could take the necessary steps to provide effective security for our facilities and installations on Vietnamese territory. I have in mind particularly the recent bombing of our American Embassy in Saigon, which did great damage and took a number of lives. It is unthinkable that with the number of forces we currently have in that area that adequate security from such sneak attacks cannot be provided. I express the hope that strong steps will be taken to assure that such attacks do not occur in the future.

[From the report of May 8, 1965]

VIETNAM

I was invited to the White House last week to take part in a briefing by the President on the state of our affairs in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The President announced to us at that meeting that he would ask Congress to appropriate an additional $700 million to carry out our expanded efforts in Vietnam and to deal with the new difficulties we have run into with the Dominican Republic.

There is no doubt that ample funds are already available to the President within the Department of Defense to carry out these purposes. It is apparent to me that the administration is actually seeking a congressional vote of confidence in respect to the course our foreign policy is taking. The President is seeking quick congressional approval as indicative of a united front on the part of the American people.

As to Vietnam, I see no other course that might now be followed with any hope of success. Personally, I went on record as far back as 1954 against the involvement of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and advised President Eisenhower against it. Instead, he and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested that U.S. military advisers be assigned to Vietnam, and the pot soon began to boil and bubble.

President Kennedy augmented our forces by a substantial amount, and now, of course, we are engaged in what comes very close to being a full-scale war. I regret that this has come about, but now there seems to be no alternative but to push ahead and attempt to settle it in the shortest time possible, and with the smallest loss of life. From all reports the bombing we have engaged in north of the 17th parallel is having considerable effect, and I express the hope that some solution can be found without the necessity of sending larger numbers of American boys into action against the enemy. What I fear is the possibility of our becoming involved in another South Korea, or even greater intensity.

[From the report of May 15, 1965]

THE JOHNSON DOCTRINE

On another front, it seems to me that the President's leadership is more open to question. I refer to his statement when he signed the special congressional resolution making more funds available for the struggle in Vietnam. At that time, he indicated that congressional passage of the resolution indicated that the Nation and the Congress stood ready to do "whatever must be done" to protect South Vietnam from aggression. In other words, he apparently considers the congressional action more or less a blanket endorsement of whatever action he may take in the future in regard to southeast Asia. Yet, prior to this statement, many Members of both the House and Senate rose to express the feeling that their votes for the resolution should not be looked upon as an endorsement of all future action. Although these sentiments were issued a step ahead of the President, he has chosen to ignore them. Many Senators and Members of the House are very much opposed to any action which would draw the United States into a land war in Asia, and I share this attitude. As I have said before, however, if the Chinese Communists were to send masses of troops to Vietnam, I would favor using all the means at our command to deter the Chinese aggression and protect the lives of our American boys.

In connection with the Vietnam and Dominican Republic situations, recent Presidential statements have given rise to what is coming to be known as the Johnson doctrine. In short, this doctrine seems to mean that the United States will act as the policemen of peace, as New York Times Columnist Arthur Krock puts it, to protect nations and peoples all over the world. This goes far beyond the so-called Truman doctrine, which was the savior of Greece and Turkey, but which pledged only economic and financial aid in the worldwide flight against communism.

I expect that Congress is going to have a great deal to say in the future about the new Johnson doctrine, particularly if trouble continues to flare up in the far-off corners of the world and American troops ars dispatched to put out the fires.

I, for one, am not sure that the Nation is prepared to make the sacrifices that such a course of action will necessarily call for. Aside from that, it seems that we will be compelled to go it alone.

[From the report of May 29, 1965]

VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The news from Vietnam continues to be disturbing, although apparently conditions in the Dominican Republic are settling down somewhat. In Vietnam, it appears more and more as if we are heading toward a Korean-type situation of even greater dimensions. This, of course, is the one thing that I have bent every effort to avoid, beginning with 1956, when I first visited that beleaguered land after the French had withdrawn their forces.

We now have more than 50,000 American fighting troops stationed in South Vietnam, and we have been told that this number may be increased to 75,000 in the near future. This is the equivalent of almost three full divisions. In addition, our men are now being sent into direct offensive action, on their own, against the Vietcong, according to press reports. Reports are also being received concerning the buildup of Chinese men and material across the North Vietnam border. As far as I can see, none of this news bodes well for our Nation's hope for peace.

Fortunately, we have been able to withdraw a few of our boys from the Dominican Republic, and there appears hope that the multilateral peace force of the OAS will be able to maintain order and effect a settlement. No political agreement has been announced as yet, however, and I fear that if, as, and when agreement is reached, it is likely to prove of short duration. The Government of the Republic has already changed hands four times—more or less violently—in the 4 years since the assassination of Rafael Trujillo. In this connection, I was not surprised to hear President Johnson promise that even more economic aid will be sent to the Dominican Republic when the fighting is settled and agreement is reached. I can only remark that the same promise was made after Trujillo was deposed, and it cost our Government $103.9 million during the years 1962 through 1964. Before that time, our Nation extended $8.8 million in aid to the Republic, some of which was military hardware for internal security.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

retirement toward boosting this growing field of industry. I wish him good luck in this endeavor and I express the hope that he will be as successful in this new activity as he has been as a newspaper editor.

I ask unanimous consent that editorials commenting on Mr. Hart's retirement from the Dominion-News, of Morgantown, W. Va., and the Fairmont (W. Va.) Times be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Morgantown (W. Va.) Dominion-News, Feb. 26, 1966]

A CRUSTY EDITOR TAKES IT EASIER

Bill Hart's friend and fellow columnist, Drew Pearson, called him a "crusty editor."

Stronger terms have been used by Editor Walter H. Hart's enemies. Others, including former neighbors and friends in his native Preston, consider him a loyal friend and a major benefactor to this part of West Virginia.

There's not much neutrality when people talk about Bill Hart of 2-1 fame. A crusty editor is bound to have enemies as well as friends with a fair amount of switching back and forth depending on different situations.

He is of the old school of personal editors. He started as an eager boy reporter here 47 years ago. He advanced to editor in days when it was not uncommon for editors to use their editor's chair from which to mix personal and public affairs, especially in political matters.

Mr. Hart is a Democrat. He used his political influence on many occasions to obtain major benefits for his hometown and surrounding area. He was unrelaxing in seeking WPA projects and had a big hand in obtaining some of the most worthwhile ones in the country. Through the years he has fought for aviation in general and Morgantown's beautiful airport in the mountains in particular. Several physical assets in this area are permanent monuments to his crustiness and persistence.

As a crusty editor, he has often gone it alone in his crusades. Sometimes he's gone overboard. He says he should have been a Barnum. He has enlivened life hereabouts by his showmanship, especially his ability to bring Presidents, Presidents' wives, Cabinet members, and other celebrities to Morgantown for such things as the Hart-promoted "Fabulous Showcase" events at the airport.

A self-styled "least of these, my brethren" country boy, Bill Hart was hobnobbed with the great and near great in unabashed fashion. He has ordered candidates, including one great President-to-be, to do his bidding as a campaign strategist. He's as much at home in Washington as in Tunnelton or Morgantown.

He loves to travel and has seen much of the world. When it comes to airplanes, he's still an eager—thrilled and thrilling—young reporter.

Editor Hart has a family of which he is very proud and one of which our whole community is proud.

Today is the last day Mr. Hart's name appears in the editorial page masthead as editor. He is retiring from that post to take things a bit easier. All, that is, except yielding to that eagerness to get around, to see things, and report. His inimitable column, "It May Interest You," will continue in this paper, often from far-away places such as Saigon, Anchorage, Saudi Arabia and Cuba, but always reflecting his pride in West Virginia, most especially Preston County and Morgantown.

We wish Bill Hart the happiness he gets from freedom to travel and the opportunity to take it easier, when and if his unabated young reporter's eagerness permits him to relax.

Best wishes, 2-1 and flight chief.

[From the Fairmont (W. Va.) Times, Feb. 28, 1966]

ALL OUT FOR AVIATION

Relieved of the daily responsibilities of getting out a newspaper, Walter Lawrence Hart, of the Morgantown Dominion-News is going to devote almost his full time in the future to his "second love," aviation. He plans to travel extensively, and there is a possibility he will be given a Government office from which to operate.

Bill's interest in aviation goes back to the days of the Works Progress Administration, when he was a prime mover in the effort to obtain an airport for Morgantown. The late U.S. Senator Matthew Mansfield Neely, to whom Hart was close, had proposed an airport in the vicinity of Fairmont to serve this community as well as Morgantown and Clarksburg.

When local leaders gave the idea a cold shoulder, Hart and others acted quickly to obtain WPA assistance for a Morgantown airport. Those associated with the district office of the Federal agency here in those days recall his incessant demands for more men, more equipment, and more money—all of which he eventually got.

This connection with the world of flying expanded over the years. Hart is now actively associated with Drew Pearson and Jack Alexander in a charter-freight airline whose eastern base he may get changed to Morgantown if the runways there will stand the load. He has close ties with the Federal aviation regulatory bodies and for years has practically commuted between Morgantown and Washington in pursuance of his interests.

A confidant of the mighty, the Morgantown editor has taken an active role in politics. He was one of the first to know of Senator Neely's decision to run for Governor back in 1940. Unfortunately Bill's last political "scoop"—a prediction that Arch Moore would run for the U.S. Senate this year—did not pan out, but his average is still high.

As editor, he has been the most vigorous booster of what he proudly calls the Morgantown Trading Territory or, more recently, Mason-Dixonland. He has been an effective exponent of many community projects.

Bill Hart's influence as an editor in Morgantown has been substantial. He now turns to larger fields, and the cause of aviation will gain an ardent full-time supporter.

FARM LABOR'S LOT INCHES UP

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, over the years, the New York Times editorial board has taken great interest in farm labor problems. Its editorials in this field have been factual and thought provoking.

The Times' most recent observation—its February 15 editorial—urges that Federal minimum wage legislation and other protective laws which have benefited American labor for the last 30 years be extended to American farmworkers.

As chairman of the Senate Migratory Labor Subcommittee, I endorse the Times' editorial position and urge prompt passage of S. 1864 through S. 1868. These bills were introduced during the last session of Congress and would establish a minimum wage for workers employed on our Nation's larger farms, prohibit harmful child labor outside of school hours for some children under the age of 14, provide National Labor Relations Act coverage for farmworkers employed on our Nation's larger farms, establish a voluntary recruitment program for farmworkers administered by the Secretary of Labor to aid the farmer in finding qualified employees and the farmworker in finding employment, and establish a National Advisory Council on Migratory Labor to coordinate existing programs affecting migratory farmworkers and to recommend to the President and Congress such new programs as may be needed.

I wholeheartedly concur with the Times' conclusion that legislation in this field is "as fundamental as any in the war against poverty."

I believe that the Senate should have the benefit of this informative editorial and, therefore, ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 15, 1966]

FARM LABOR'S LOT INCHES UP

In the year since Congress banned the mass import of low-wage farm labor from Mexico, the man-months of work done by foreign workers on American farms has declined by 83 percent. Seasonal job opportunities were thus created, Secretary Wirtz estimates, for at least 100,000 more domestic workers. This year even tighter limits on imported farm labor will be enforced.

Throughout the year farm interests sought to kill the restrictions by warning that crops would rot and prices skyrocket. Yet critical labor shortages were few; harvests were huge and the price of most fruits and vegetables declined.

Despite the wage increases offered by growers to attract an adequate flow of domestic labor, farm wages remain abysmally low by industrial standards. The Wirtz report indicates that the farm average is $1.14 an hour and that in 11 States it is still under $1 an hour. This compares with a $2.82 average for factory workers.

Farm laborers should be placed under the Federal minimum wage and the other protective laws that the rest of American labor has had for 30 years. It is time for President Johnson to push forward energetically on a front as fundamental as any in the war against poverty.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The clerk will continue to call the roll.

The Chief Clerk continued the call of the roll.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

[From the report of June 5, 1965]

In South Vietnam, the undeclared war continues to go badly. The decisions of our policymakers have not borne fruit, and the casualties mount day by day. The bombing raids across the border into North Vietnam apparently have not been successful in halting the aggression in the south, and I fear we are being drawn more and more deeply into a second Korean conflict, one that will be more costly than the Korean war. Another pipeline to suck up American men and materiel is being constructed, and no one can predict when we will be able to close down the Vietnam pumping station.

We now have more than 50,000 American fighting men stationed in South Vietnam, and we are told that thousands more are on the way.

As one who has watched and studied southeast Asia very closely since 1954, when the French were driven from Indochina, the senior Senator from Louisiana has a right to feel bitter and frustrated. I have visited that area on many occasions over the last 10 years, and on each return trip from there I carried the same message: namely, that our Nation should not become involved, on its own, in a section of the world where we had no direct interest and which lay far outside our sphere of influence.

I told the late John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, that preparations for war should not be encouraged by the establishment of American military advisory groups in South Vietnam.

These military advisers do little more than keep the pot boiling. At their request, thousands of Americans were sent there to train the natives how to use our military hardware. Today we are sending thousands to do the actual fighting, while our rich allies of Western Europe gave us only their moral support. Some are critical of our actions. Despite my advice and on-the-scene experience, the advisers were sent in.

I advised President Kennedy to withdraw our military; instead, their number was increased. I suggested that steps be taken to make certain that the enormous amounts of economic aid to South Vietnam were distributed fairly and equitably; that President Diem be persuaded to mollify the dissident groups in his country, and satisfy their just grievances. No firm action along these lines was taken by our representatives.

In spite of all my efforts, we entered the morass of southeast Asian politics with one eye closed and the other on an idealistic vision of what we hoped might somehow and someway be brought about. Now our eyes have been opened, and we have been brought down to earth. I only hope it is not too late, and that some way can be found to avoid an all-out war on the Asiatic mainland.

[From the report of July 17, 1965]

SOUTH VIETNAM

In such a situation as now faces our Nation in South Vietnam, where we have gone in so deeply that the quicksands of southeast Asian politics are threatening to pull us under, we have no other recourse than to close ranks and support the policies of President Johnson and his advisers. The present and past administrations have taken a gamble and now it is too late to retreat. I for one do not believe that these so-called protest demonstrations against our foreign policy by beatniks, college students, and even teachers, do much good. They may very well do a great deal of harm, for the press and other news media play up these demonstrations to such an extent that foreigners are led to believe that a majority of our people are not supporting the President. In point of fact, only a very small minority is doing the demonstrating, making the noise, and "teaching in." In my estimation, it would be better if we had more "study-ins" and fewer "teach-ins."

[From the report of July 24, 1965]

VIETNAM

To turn to a subject far removed from the District of Columbia, I was interested to hear Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's comments after his recent inspection tour of Vietnam. The situation, he said, has deteriorated "in many aspects," since his last visit of 15 months ago. These sentiments, of course, are in marked contrast to his somewhat rosy early estimates of our Vietnam difficulties. On prior visits much optimism was expressed by him and many statements were issued to the effect that we had the situation well in hand.

Unfortunately, his most recent statement more closely approximates the true conditions to be found in that unsettled corner of the world. Long ago, I predicted that we were embarking on a course of folly by becoming deeply involved in the civil strife then building up in Vietnam.

It was my view that the presence of our so-called military advisers would serve to keep the pot boiling and cause both North Vietnam and Red China to provide more and more aid and assistance. I also pointed out to our officials on both the Vietnam and Washington levels, as well as to the Vietnam leadership, that the administration of the tremendous amounts of economic aid we were making available left a great deal to be desired. I did not feel that our aid was being made available to all Vietnamese citizens on an equitable basis, and because of this, a large portion of the populace was being alienated from the Government. My advice went unheeded, and today not even a Solomon could provide satisfactory answers.

As a corollary to Vietnam, I am informed that further tax reductions, which the administration's economic advisers had "in the works" for next year, may have to be set aside because of increased outlays for defense. In testimony before a congressional committee Tuesday, Gordon Ackley, the new Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, indicated that a possible increase in the exemption now allowed each taxpayer and his dependents, from $600 to $1,000, was being considered by the administration.

In my view, and in light of the mammoth tax reductions in income and excise taxes the Congress has so recently enacted, further proposals for tax reductions should be greeted very skeptically by the Congress. Especially is this true when rising defense expenditures are facing the Nation, as pointed out by Mr. Ackley, and when the Federal Government is headed into greatly expanded and more expensive activities in social welfare and related fields.

It is estimated that every $100 increase in the $600 exemption allowed for taxpayers and dependents will result in the loss of $2.5 billion in revenue for the Treasury. Thus, an increase of $400 in the exemption would bring about a Federal revenue loss of $10 billion. I doubt very much that such a tax reduction can be justified at this time, or in the near future.

[From the report of July 31, 1965]

THE PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM ADDRESS

I listened very closely to the President's address to the Nation on the Vietnam situation last Wednesday at noon. As predicted, President Johnson did not reveal much new information or startling decisions. As a matter of fact, I was one of a small group of Senators summoned to the White House early Wednesday morning for an advance briefing on the President's address. He is very much worried, and as many of you know, he inherited much of the trouble that now prevails in Vietnam.

The main point of his remarks was that many more troops would be sent immediately to Vietnam, raising our total force there from 75,000 to 125,000 men. He stated that more may be sent later, and in answer to questions, indicated that the American people could look forward to conflict in southeast Asia for many years ahead—perhaps 6 or 7. As you may recall, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara recently stated our engagement there may last as long as 5 or 10 years, while Ho Chi Minh, leader of North Vietnam, has been reported as predicting that American forces may be fighting in South Vietnam for as long as 20 years.

To compensate for this drain of American troops, the President stated that the draft would be increased from 17,000 to 35,000 young men a month. I was pleased to hear the decision had been made not to call up the Reserves or to declare a state of emergency at this time, although those possibilities have not been ruled out for the future. Mr. Johnson said that he had instructed Secretary McNamara to request more defense funds from the Congress to support the increases. Further requests would be made in the budget presentation next January, he said.

I was also glad to hear President Johnson assure us that he had asked General Westmoreland, the commander of our forces in the area, what he needed to get the job done. The President said that the general had answered his request, and that all the needs of our fighting men would be supplied. Over the past few months, I have received correspondence from some of the families and friends of our men in Vietnam, which indicated that the equipment and supplies they were receiving left something to be desired. If we are going to fight what amounts to a full-scale war in Vietnam, it seems to me that we should make every effort to see that every possible advantage is working on our side. It appears to me that we are going to need all the odds we can get.

No doubt the Congress will approve the request for funds needed to support our efforts in South Vietnam. In a situation such as this, we in Congress can do little else, in all good conscience, than support our President. He is acting on far more accurate information than Congress has at its command. I only hope that the information given the President represents a true picture of the situation, which seems to grow from bad to worse with each passing day. So far, the results of plans pushed forward by our military experts in the Pentagon have not been reassuring. It strikes me that we seem to be making some of the same mistakes made by the French generals in the years before 1954, when they were defeated at Dienbienphu and driven out of Indochina. From my study of that long, drawn-out guerrilla war, it is obvious that one of the primary faults of the French was that they greatly underestimated the fighting potential of their enemy. The Vietminh defined the terms of war very differently than do the leaders of any modern army. And, just as was the case 10 or 15 years ago, the Vietcong is now in a position to impose their own definitions.

But make no mistake about it, I hold no brief with those in our society who seek to divide the national purpose and weaken our resolve to do what must be done in the defense of freedom and in opposition to communism. I wish only that some of our so-called allies could be persuaded to bear the burden with us. And I also hope and pray that ways and means can be found to settle this conflict by negotiation, as the President also hoped for in his remarks Wednesday.

[From the report of Aug. 7, 1965]

MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNAM

Turning to a subject far removed from our labor legislation, President Johnson last week sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to the Congress with a request for an additional $1.7 billion for defense expenditures. The request, of course, is necessitated by our involvement in the Vietnam conflict. It is

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

one more step in which I predict will be a long series of increased expenditures to carry on the war in Vietnam. At this point there is actually no way of telling for how long we may be heavily involved in that strife-torn section of the world.

As I said last week, I am sure the Congress will approve this request without much opposition, for no other course is open to those of us who have responsibility in these matters. As you may recall, several months ago the Congress was asked to approve a request for an additional $700 million for expenditure in Vietnam for economic aid and other purposes. What I fear is that because we are now sending more and more American forces to carry on the actual fighting, the South Vietnamese will be more and more prone to let us carry the entire burden. Since there is no stable government in South Vietnam, I do not see how it will be possible to force young Vietnamese to carry on the fight.

[From the report of Sept. 24, 1965]

HOPE IN VIETNAM

On our eastern front in Vietnam, it seems that at long last the tide of the battle may be turning. Our large commitment of U.S. men and materiel is beginning to bring more and more pressure upon the enemy, and of course, something would be seriously wrong if victories could not be entered on the ledger to at least partially balance the many defeats we have had to bear at the hands of the elusive Vietcong.

Unfortunately, the end is as yet nowhere in sight, and I fear that a great many more lives will be sacrificed before another American peace can be imposed on the rice paddies and jungles of South Vietnam.

While the news of our military victories is good, there is other recent news that is deeply disturbing to me. Now that the American commitment to South Vietnam has been made very plain by the President's statements and by the dispatch of more than 100,000 American troops, it is no doubt very obvious to the Vietcong that they cannot expect to gain a military victory against such odds. So it will be only natural for them to seek other avenues for action.

The recent student riots and demonstrations which have occurred in various Vietnamese cities against the Government seem to open up one of these avenues. The Vietcong must know, as well as you and I do, that a stable government is absolutely essential for any Western victory. I suspect, therefore, that more and more civilian political action, such as these student riots, will be organized and directed against the incumbent Government. At the present, it seems to me that a revolt of the civilian populace is by no means out of the question, and it holds dangers far more severe than any defeat of American forces. It must not be forgotten that the Vietnames people have very little feeling of national unity, and feel very little sense of allegiance to any Saigon government. I express the hope that if we manage to pull through the very dangerous monsoon period, which will end in October, we will not find ourselves out of the military frying pan only to land into the fire of civilian upheaval.

[From the report of Jan. 15, 1966]

THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

While on my tour of the State, I also found that the Vietnam conflict was the subject of much intense interest and much speculation as to the probable outcome. Upon returning to Washington, I found much interest centering on the role the United States is playing in the attempt to bring that beleaguered nation out of its difficulties. There is much difference of opinion both within and without the Senate as to what our future course of action should be. Frankly, your senior Senator is very much concerned about the situation in which we now find ourselves, and about the pitfalls that lie along both sides of the path we are following.

There is no question that it is now vital that our Nation act decisively to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam. The prestige and power of the United States has been laid on the line, and to withdraw under present conditions would do us untold damage not only on the Asian Continent, but all over the world. Our Nation has never run from a fight, and now that we have been drawn so deeply into this one, it seems to me that we have no choice except to stick it out until some sort of honorable resolution can be achieved. If our adversaries will not agree to meaningful peace talks, they should be hit harder, and the industrial and political centers of North Vietnam should be bombed by our forces if necessary.

As we are carrying out a military campaign in Vietnam, however, I firmly believe that a second front should be opened in Western Europe. In other words, if a victory or a cessation of the fighting is important for the future protection of the free world, we should make it plain to our so-called allies in Western Europe that we expect some meaningful assistance from them in carrying the burden. By meaningful assistance, I mean more than the moral support that has been offered until now. We should impress upon our friends that the United States cannot be expected to bear the entire load in southeast Asia, as we are already doing in Korea, and at the same time, maintain thousands of troops on duty for their protection in Western Europe. If offers of meaningful aid are not forthcoming, I advocate beginning the withdrawal of the thousands of troops we now have garrisoned across the Atlantic. This seems to my mind to be the commonsense approach, and one that is long overdue.

In the past, we have been too easy going in our relations with our erstwhile allies. As you may know, I have complained about this to past and present administrations on numerous occasions, and I have recommended that a much stiffer line be taken by the negotiators in our State Department. Until now, the line has always been taken that the United States is the richest and most powerful nation on earth, and therefore we should be willing and able to carry on alone, no matter what the cost and sacrifice. The fact that the Western European nations have also become rich and powerful during the past two decades, due in large part to our own generosity toward them, seems to be almost completely forgotten.

Now, however, the shoe of his commitments at home and abroad is beginning to pinch Uncle Sam's foot a little bit. We are waking up to the fact, or we should be, that our Nation is simply not rich enough, or powerful enough, to act as the policeman and protector of the entire world. We need assistance from those who are directly benefiting from our protection. We have been holding an umbrella or military might over Western Europe entirely too long. If we cannot obtain help when it is needed, from those we have been sheltering in the past, I say that it is time to begin folding up the umbrella.

[From the report of Jan. 22, 1966]

MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNAM

Also in connection with southeast Asia, the President has sent to the Congress a special request for another appropriation to carry on the struggle in Vietnam. The special amount requested for this fiscal year is $12.7 billion, over and above the special appropriations made for that purpose last year, and above the billions of dollars provided in the regular Department of Defense appropriation bill.

The amount of this latest request—$12.7 billion—provides a good measure of the increased role we are playing in the Vietnam conflict. Although the Congress has been informed that only about half the sum asked for is to be actually expended this year, I have no doubt that more and greater expenditures can be expected in the future.

Of course, our boys fighting in the rice paddies and jungles must be supported in every manner conceivable, and I am certain that the Congress and the country will do everything possible to see that their needs are met. You may rest assured that I shall do everything in my power to render whatever assistance is needed in order to bring the conflict there to a speedy end. Not only should our servicemen be supported, but as I stated last week, if the enemy continues to refuse to enter into meaningful negotiations for peace, their industrial centers should be hit by our forces until there can be no mistaking our intention to win an honorable peace in Vietnam.

Also included in the supplemental appropriation request is the sum of $415 million to be spent as an addition to this year's foreign aid program. Two hundred and ninety million dollars of that amount is earmarked for supporting assistance to southeast Asian nations. South Vietnam is to receive $275 million of this supporting assistance, while Laos and Thailand are to be the recipients of another $15 million. One hundred million dollars is also requested as an addition to the foreign aid contingnecy fund.

I was surprised to see included in the supplemental request the sum of $25 million for support to the Dominican Republic. It seems as if the President is now learning what it will cost if we continue our attempts to police, pacify, and bring prosperity to every corner of the world.

Before leaving the subject of southeast Asia and Vietnam, you will recall that last week I advocated that the administration and the State Department toughen our policy toward our so-called allies in Western Europe. On the question of assisting us to carry our worldwide burdens, particularly in southeast Asia, where we have no real economic interest, I pointed out that the struggle to protect and defend the free world is as much their struggle as it is ours. I further stated that I could see no real reason why our Nation should continue to maintain thousands of men garrisoned in Western Europe. The defense against aggression that these troops have provided has turned out to be an umbrella, beneath which Western Europe has found peace and prosperity. Also, the maintenance of these thousands of men has proved to be a substantial drain of our U.S. gold supply, and the recipients of this drain have been the coffers of our allies.

Last week I did a little checking into the record, and found that as of December 31, 1960, our military had 352,000 men stationed in Western Europe, plus 9,916 U.S. employees, and 311,000 dependents. The number stationed abroad rose by 54,000 during the period of the Berlin crisis, and then dropped somewhat after that. But the fact remains that as of September 30, 1965, the United States maintained 331,000 troops on guard in Western Europe, supported by 11,344 civilian employees, together with 288,000 dependents.

To my mind and in light of the current situation, this state of affairs is almost inexcusable. Our so-called allies have benefited from the military umbrella we have been holding over them for many years. They were able to reduce their military spending and build their own economy with the expenditure each year of many millions of dollars by our soldiers, their dependents, and our civilian employees. Now when we go to them for assistance, we find that nobody is home. That is why I stated last week that unless we can secure some meaningful

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

assistance from them as we try to find a way out of the current conflict, we should make it plain to them that we will begin folding up the umbrella.

[From the report of Jan. 29, 1966]

OUR ALLIES AND VIETNAM

Last week I called attention to the fact that over the last 5 years the United States has maintained a garrison of well over 300,000 troops on the other side of the Atlantic in Western Europe. As a matter of fact, the number of servicemen stationed in that section of the world at the end of 1960 was 352,000. By September 30 of 1965, the total had decreased by only 20,000 men under arms—to a figure of slightly less than 331,000.

I also pointed out that in addition to these fighting men, we maintain a sizable contingent of dependents and supporting personnel. For instance, as of September 30 of last year, there were almost 288,000 dependents of U.S. servicemen in Western Europe, in addition to over 11,000 U.S. civilian employees working for the Pentagon.

The idea behind these figures is simply this. The economies of the Western Europe nations—our so-called allies—have benefited tremendously from the presence of these American troops on their shores. These benefits have been realized in two ways. First, our troops have provided protection against possible Russian aggression, and because of this protection, our allies have been able to throw the resources at their command into the building up of their own economies. They have not been required to devote large-scale national efforts to develop and maintain military establishments as we have done. Because they have been so successful in developing their peacetime economies, with the assistance of both our massive foreign aid program and our military presence, they are today giving our American industry and businesses real competition in the marketplaces of the world.

In the second place, and equally important to my way of thinking, the great amount of money we have been required to send abroad to support and maintain these troops, dependents, and civilian employees, has been spent for the direct economic benefit of the host nations. It has also been to the direct economic benefit of our own Nation. As an illustration of this fact, I have recently obtained figures indicating what it costs our Government to maintain these hundreds of thousands of troops, the supporting civilians, and their dependents. That figure amounts to approximately 2.4 billion annually. To be specific, in the last fiscal year—fiscal year 1965—the total expenditure amounted to $2,390 million. That figure includes only Western Europe, and does not include the maintenance and upkeep of the sizable garrisons we maintain in Greece and Turkey; it does not include the cost of supplying and maintaining the 6th Fleet, which is constantly on patrol in the Mediterranean and Atlantic; nor does it include the major procurement costs of the planes, ships, and guns with which our fighting men are equipped.

I have also obtained figures concerning our balance-of-payments deficits for fiscal year 1965. By coincidence, last year's balance-of-payment deficits amounted to $2.3 billion, almost exactly equal to our Western European support cost of $2.4 billion. Not all of our military expenditures contributed to our balance-of-payments problem, because some of the dollars were returned to our shores. But our administrators readily admit that a large portion of our Western European expenditures do show up on the balance sheets to keep our international accounts in the red.

It is estimated that during the first half of fiscal year 1966, that is, from July to December 1965, our deficit in payments amounted to approximately $1.3 billion. I have been assured that stringent policies are being followed by the administration, and that the situation should improve considerably in the coming months. That may or may not be the case, for rosy predictions have been made in this area before, and have turned out to be sadly wanting. That is why I advocate now, as I have in the past, that definite steps be taken to secure Western European assistance in the Vietnam conflict. Commonsense requires it, and our own self-interest demands it. We can no longer afford to police and protect all the world, with no help other than lipservice from those we have been protecting and defending in years past. Our allies must be made to realize that the struggle for freedom is as much their struggle as it is ours. It is only realistic to expect them to bear a fair share of the burden.

[From the report of Feb. 19, 1966]

MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNAM

Last week the Senate laid aside the question of repealing 14(b) in this session of the Congress, and has moved on to other matters. The first important legislation to be taken up by the Senate after the Lincoln's Day holiday was the supplemental military authorization bill to carry on our efforts in Vietnam.

This legislation would authorize additional appropriations during the last half of fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of planes and ships, and for research and testing of new devices and techniques to enable our forces to deal more effectively with guerrilla fighters. The bill also contains the sum of $1.2 billion for the construction of bases and facilities in southeast Asia.

I have been closely following the difficulties our forces have been experiencing in receiving the necessary supplies and hardware shipped from the States. A large part of these difficulties has to do with the lack of adequate port facilities for the unloading of ships and the handling of vast amounts of cargo which we are pouring into Vietnam. It is my hope that the sums authorized in the bill, and which will be provided by the Congress in a separate appropriation measure, will do a great deal to solve this vexing problem in the near future. I have on many occasions stated my belief that our boys who are fighting and dying in the jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam should be supplied with all of the weapons and armaments that are necessary.

I have received reports from time to time that shortages have occurred among several items of clothing and military hardware used by our troops. I have looked into the matter through the Department of Defense, and have been assured that where such shortages do exist, they are being filled as rapidly as possible. Plant production of some items, such as special jungle boots and clothing, for example, have not yet reached what our authorities consider an adequate level to supply the need.

It is my hope and expectation that this current legislation will make it possible to fill any shortages of any items which might be needed by our fighting men. As you may know, the Subcommittee on Military Preparedness, headed by Senator STENNIS, of Mississippi, is looking into this problem, with the view of seeing to it that any deficiencies that come to light may be immediately corrected.

In connection with the military construction authorization, I was very disappointed several weeks ago when it was announced that several items authorized and funded by the Congress for military construction in this country would be indefinitely delayed because of mounting Vietnam expenditures. Several projects scheduled for construction in Louisiana were placed in this category.

I am glad to note that the supplemental military authorization bill contains the sum of $6 million for the rehabilitation and construction of barracks at Fort Polk. In addition, the regular military construction bill for the next fiscal year contains $861,000 for the construction of living quarters at Fort Polk, plus $700,000 for the construction of troop housing and other facilities at Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier Parish.

You may recall that when the President first sent this special spending request to the Congress earlier in the year, the total amount asked for was $12.8 billion. The bill taken up by the Senate last week dealt with only $12.3 billion of that original request. The other portion—$415 million—is in the category of economic assistance, and must be acted upon by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate before the funds can be appropriated.

Of the $415 million total requested for supplemental economic assistance, $275 million has been programed for Vietnam; $175 million is to be used to finance the import of various agricultural and industrial commodities into South Vietnam. The other $100 million will go to finance the special counterinsurgency and rural construction program that is being developed.

One of the most interesting items in this special appropriation request is the sum of $21 million for the importation of rice into Vietnam. It appears that under the onslaught of war, the production of rice has been greatly curtailed, and where the Vietnamese at one time were able to export this commodity, it now must be brought into their country.

It is for this reason that President Johnson recently announced that he had instructed Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to increase our rice acreage allotment by 10 percent this year. More and more of this staple commodity will no doubt be required in the weeks and months ahead. As I recently pointed out, it was not long ago that we were forced to purchase 150,000 tons of rice from Thailand for shipment to South Vietnam. As long as the requirement must continue to be met, and financed by the U.S. Treasury, I would much prefer that the expenditures be made on our home soil, for the benefit of our American farmers.

[From the report of Feb. 26, 1966]

RIGHT TO DISSENT—VIETNAM

Today, the Nation is doing battle in a far corner of the world. While some of us may not agree entirely with that battle or its aims, it is nevertheless important that we present a united front to the enemy. A noisy minority speaking against our position cannot help doing more harm than good, it seems to me. They cannot help but give comfort to the enemy. Legitimate dissent must be tolerated if we are to maintain our free society, but in many cases the bounds have been overstepped.

As you no doubt know, much debate over our Vietnam policy is now taking place in the halls of Congress and its committees. My fear is that many Senators fail to understand that we are already in action in South Vietnam. It is no longer a question of getting into the fight—we are already in it. In other words, we are committed and must now back up our commitment.

I have no doubt in my own mind that many of the statements now issuing from Congress or from congressional committees will do no good to our cause in the fighting. I feel that some Congressmen and Senators—although certainly they are not doing it willfully—are giving a lot of relief and a lot of propaganda material to Hanoi. In my opinion, this may result in postponing the end of the action—whether by military victory, a cease fire, or negotiation. In other words, as

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

long as the pot of American public opinion is kept stirred up and boiling, the leaders of Hanoi and Red China can continue in their hopes that the escape valve will be opened in time to let the Vietcong win the war. I believe that too much dissension and difference of opinion, especially on the part of those not directly responsible for making and enforcing the decisions, can be very misleading to the enemy. The result will be longer war, and the killing and wounding of more of our soldiers. I for one do not want to see that.

TEACHER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST SLASH IN SCHOOL MILK PROGRAM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I have received dozens of letters from school administrators, teachers, parents and children opposing the administration's plans to cut the special milk program for schoolchildren by 80 percent. As time passes I become more and more convinced that this cut simply cannot be justified.

Here is what one Wisconsin schoolteacher says about the cut:

I am teaching in my 29th year and I feel that one of the finest things the Government has ever done for our boys and girls is the milk program. It makes me sick to read that this is to be dropped. In the same paper you can read of large amounts being spent for recreation programs for our rich to enjoy. It doesn't seem fair to me to deny our children milk which they need and enjoy and then spend it for recreation.

Mr. President, as one who has long fought against pork barrel public works projects which often are justified on the grounds that they will enhance recreation benefits, I say amen to this statement. We must allocate our resources efficiently if the taxpayer is to get the most out of his tax dollar. I know of no program of greater proven worth than the school milk program. Every penny spent means greater health for our Nation's children. We cannot forget this greatest of our natural resources.

This Wisconsin teacher goes on to give a concrete example of what the school milk program means to her pupils. She says:

My little 6- to 8-year olds must eat before 7:30 to meet the bus. Dinner is served at 11:30 and the last ones aren't home until 4:45. The milk break at 2 p.m. is exactly what they need. It is economical so everyone has it, except three Amish pupils. It is not only for low-income families whose children do not have the milk these little bodies need * * *. It is not only low-income families who have parents that do not buy milk for their children so I feel that all children need the milk.

Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks by quoting one last sentence from this excellent letter. I think it speaks for itself:

The breakfast program (proposed by President Johnson) may be fine but it can never do so much good to so many children for so little money.

PROCEDURES FOR THE REMOVAL, RETIREMENT, AND DISCIPLINING OF UNFIT FEDERAL JUDGES

Mr. HART. Mr. President, it is admitting to no weakness in our Federal court system that we seek to determine the adequacy of the procedures dealing with the removal, retirement, and disciplining of unfit judges.

Rather the junior Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS], whose subcommittee is conducting hearings in this area, seeks to determine "whether the Federal judiciary has the necessary statutory tools to police its own house fairly and efficiently, and, if not, to explore the possibility of enacting remedial legislation."

Senator TYDINGS displays both courage and energy in opening up this admittedly sensitive subject. All of us are the better for his willingness and leadership.

Fortunately, there have been only rare instances where a man of questioned ability or integrity has presided over a Federal court. But the infrequency of having such a man on the bench does not obviate the need for a solution to deal with the problem when it arises.

As Senator TYDINGS points out in his opening statement at the committee hearings, many influential judges themselves feel that present corrective measures are inadequate and that this inquiry is needed.

We are well aware of the tremendous backlog of cases that confronts our Federal courts today. The delay before many are brought to trial can be as much as 3 years. The division of this workload leaves no room for one judge who is unfit. And, it goes without saying, that in administering justice, there is no place for such a judge.

Certainly, I consider Senator TYDINGS' explanation of the problem and scope of the inquiry as one to which we should direct our attention.

Mr. President, at this point in my remarks, I ask unanimous consent that Senator TYDINGS' February 15 opening statement at the hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOSEPH D. TYDINGS AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY ON PROCEDURES FOR THE REMOVAL, RETIREMENT, AND DISCIPLINING OF UNFIT FEDERAL JUDGES, FEBRUARY 15, 1966

Today the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery holds its initial session of hearings on the availability of and need for procedures to govern the removal, retirement, and disciplining of unfit Federal judges. An inquiry of this nature has been contemplated for several months and today's session will be only the first step in a lengthy and careful examination.

The purpose of these hearings is to determine whether the Federal judiciary has the necessary statutory tools to police its own house fairly and efficiently, and, if not, to explore the possibility of enacting remedial legislation. These hearings do not indicate any lack of confidence in the Federal bench. Indeed, the subcommittee recognizes that our Federal judiciary, as a whole, is characterized by men of remarkable integrity and ability. We believe that, given the proper tools, the judiciary has the capacity to handle the problems created by the tiny handful of judges who because of physical or mental disability, senility, alcoholism, laziness, or misfeasance, do immeasurable harm to the efficient administration of justice.

Anyone even casually familiar with the Federal courts knows that their dockets are crowded and becoming more so as the amount of judicial business increases year by year. The situation is already critical. In certain districts the average litigant may wait for more than 3 years after joinder of issue before his case goes to trial. This is not merely a matter of administrative concern, for justice delayed is justice denied. To remedy this state of affairs, we in the Congress are constantly asked to provide more judgeships for various Federal districts and circuits, and we often hear proposals to place further limitations on the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in order to halt the constant increase in caseload.

But these measures cannot be enough. It makes no sense to keep adding more judges, or to deny litigants access to the Federal courts, if the backlog is caused to any degree by inefficient or unfit judges.

The workload in many districts is such that the court is crippled if even a single judge does not carry his share of the burden. I think that everyone agrees that ideally such an unfit judge should be replaced without delay, but only after a careful, impartial evalution of his fitness. Yet one thing that recent events have made clear is that there is at present no fair and effective procedure for dealing with these cases when they arise.

The subcommittee cannot ignore the charade that occurred recently in the western district of Oklahoma. For reasons that have not yet been made clear, the Judicial Council of the 10th Judicial Circuit, composed of able and conscientious appellate judges, reached the conclusion that Chief Judge Stephen S. Chandler of the western district of Oklahoma was "either unwilling or unable" to perform his judicial functions adequately. It therefore ordered that Judge Chandler be assigned no more cases and take no further action in cases pending before him. It based its action on section 332 of the Judicial Code, which gives a judicial council authority to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit."

Judge Chandler has challenged this action in a petition to the Supreme Court, and has refused to obey the order with regard to the cases already pending before him. Just last week, more than a month after the order was originally issued, the judicial council agreed to rescind one part of the order and to allow Judge Chandler to dispose of those cases already pending before him.

I do not wish to comment at this time on the legal issues involved in the dispute between Judge Chandler and the judicial council. Nor can I comment on the question of Judge Chandler's actual fitness to continue on the bench, since the facts have not yet been brought out. An examination of the procedures used, however, leads me to believe that, regardless of the outcome of the Chandler case, the judiciary needs better tools to deal with this sort of problem.

The judicial council's abortive action in the Chandler case created havoc in the western district of Oklahoma. Look at what happened: A judge was ordered to cease the performance of his judicial functions yet he was apparently given no notice that action was about to be taken against him, no charges were specified against him, and he was given no opportunity to present evidence or argument in his defense. The judge refused to relinquish jurisdiction over cases pending before him, although he had been ordered to do so and although the other judges of his district had divided his cases among themselves.

The Chandler case is an unfortunate incident. It is unfortunate in that a judge has apparently behaved in such a way that some of his colleagues are convinced he is no

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

longer fit to serve on the bench. It is unfortunate in that the procedures used—apparently the only ones available to the judicial council—did not allow Judge Chandler to obtain a complete and fair hearing of the charges against him. It is unfortunate in that the judicial council's order and Judge Chandler's intransigence created inexcusable confusion for litigants and attorneys in the western district of Oklahoma. And finally and perhaps most important, it is unfortunate in that the wrangling and recriminations that have occurred have exposed our fine Federal judicial system to disrepute and even ridicule.

The Chandler case has brought to the attention of the Nation a situation that has troubled many observers for a long time. In October, long before the judicial council's action regarding Judge Chandler, I announced that the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery would conduct a study of the problems posed by judicial unfitness. We have done a great deal of research on this subject, and today we hold our first session of hearings.

The purpose of today's hearing is to outline and explore the difficulties that are presently experienced in handling the infrequent instances of unfitness in the Federal judiciary. Historically the only method of actually removing a Federal judge from office, so that he is deprived of his title and his right to salary, has been impeachment. This has created several difficulties, which our witnesses will explore with us in some detail tomorrow and at later sessions. First, constitutionally, impeachment lies only for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." It is uncertain whether senility, insanity, physical disability, alcoholism or laziness—all of which are forms of unfitness that require remedial action—are covered by the impeachment process.

The second difficulty lies in the nature of the impeachment machinery. Even in the early years of the Republic the inadequacy of this process was recognized. "Experience has already shown," Jefferson said in 1819, "that the impeachment the Constitution has provided is not even a scarecrow." It is a cumbersome, archaic process which requires one House of Congress, the House of Representatives, to act as a grand jury, and the other House, the Senate, to sit in judgment as a court. The House can perhaps do its share of the work effectively through the Judiciary Committee, but what of the Senate? We all know that the Members of the Senate are hard pressed to fulfill the many demands of the office. If we were required to do nothing but listen to testimony in an impeachment case for several weeks, the legislative calendar would be completely disrupted. Obviously, few Senators would be able to give so much of their time, yet I submit that an impeachment trial before an empty Senate Chamber would be little more than a farce. It would hardly comport with modern standards of justice. No conviction of a criminal defendant would be tolerated if it came after a trial at which most of the jurors were not present to hear the testimony.

Impeachment is perhaps the sole method of removal of Federal judges that may be constitutionally employed by the Congress, for the principle of an independent judiciary, free from interference by the legislative or executive branches, is central to the concept of a government of separated powers. But this is not to say that impeachment is the only constitutionally permissible method of removing a Federal judge from office. It should be borne in mind that a judge is to serve "during good behavior," while impeachment lies only for "high crimes and misdemeanors." It may be that the framers intended to permit other methods of removal not inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers. The scholarship on this question is disappointingly sparse, and I hope that one of the effects of our study will be to stimulate some scholarly reexamination of the arguments for and against the exclusivity of impeachment as a removal procedure.

Aside from impeachment and the disputed method employed by the 10th Circuit Judicial Council in the Chandler case, there is only one other provision which allows remedial action to be taken in the case of an unfit judge. This is a very limited provision which permits the judicial council of a circuit to certify the disability of a judge to the President, in which case the President may appoint an additional judge, in effect to take the disabled judge's place.

Many people—including, let us emphasize, many influential judges themselves—feel that this array of weapons is inadequate to deal with the problem of judicial unfitness, and that is why we are beginning this inquiry today. It is not our intention to conduct an exposé of the Federal judiciary. Such an exposé would undoubtedly find little to expose. We intend, rather, to ascertain whether there are now adequate procedures for dealing with those rare but damaging cases of judicial unfitness that do occur. If, as of many of us expect, we find that existing procedures are inadequate, we shall attempt to remedy the situation.

The area of judicial fitness presents many difficult questions of law and policy. I suspect that we shall be at this job for some time.

POOL FORGE'S 250TH ANNIVERSARY

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, it is fitting that we take note of the 250th anniversary this year of the founding of Pool Forge—the first iron forge in Pennsylvania. This humble establishment was started in 1716 by Thomas Rutter on the banks of the Manatawny Creek in what is now Douglass Township, Berks County.

Pool Forge was the forerunner of the many Pennsylvania forges which were so vital to early settlers and provided much of the ordnance in our struggle for independence. These early ironmasters with their charcoal burning furnaces contributed a great deal to our Nation's early growth. We owe much to these men of ability and courage who literally started with the ground they walked on and the forest around them. Their primitive methods are long gone, and the focus in metals has moved from iron to steel.

Today Pennsylvania plays a mighty role in all parts of the metals industry. In this same county of Berks, metal products range from basic iron and steel items to highly specialized steel alloys and beryllium alloys for use throughout the Nation. In this time of vastness and complexity, we would be wise to keep the realization that here is one small beginning—one small forge which is not only important as part of our history, but is a vivid reminder of the pioneer spirit we must keep with us. Courage and ability never grow old, and although we work at different tasks today, we have need of the same incentives as that which built Pool Forge.

GARY—A LOGICAL CHOICE FOR A DEMONSTRATION CITY

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, a massive demonstration cities program which would "offer qualifying cities of all sizes the promise of a new life for their people" was proposed by President Johnson on January 26. In line with this recommendation, I was pleased to join a number of colleagues in cosponsoring the demonstration cities bill, S. 2842, which was introduced by the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS].

Both the President's message and the legislation proposed to achieve its goals have aroused widespread interest among urban dwellers, city officers, and the press. Recently the editor of the Gary Post Tribune, Mr. Dale E. Belles, Jr., wrote an editorial in the form of an open letter to the President, Secretary Weaver, Senator HARTKE, Representative MADDEN, and myself, which sets forth the reasons why Gary, Ind., would be a logical community to be chosen as one of the "demonstration cities."

Although Congress has not yet acted on this significant measure, I agree with Mr. Belles that it is not too early to begin giving consideration to the qualifications of prospective cities for this selection. Because Mr. Belles' editorial quite accurately reflects the spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm of civic leaders in Gary, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AS WE SEE IT—WHY GARY IS A LOGICAL DEMONSTRATION CITY

TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON; SECRETARY ROBERT C. WEAVER, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT; SENATOR BIRCH BAYH; SENATOR VANCE HARTKE; REPRESENTATIVE RAY J. MADDEN.

GENTLEMEN: We have read with interest and excitement the President's message of January 26 to the Congress on demonstration cities.

We are convinced that Gary should be one of those demonstration cities.

Here, in part, are the reasons:

A. On the positive side—

1. Gary has shown through the combined governmental and civic launching of programs for new industry, downtown revitalization, and improved educational and recreation facilities that it shares the President's view that "1966 can be the year of rebirth for American cities." It was beginning to demonstrate before the Presidential program was outlined that it meets its requirements of being one of "those cities who help themselves" and where there is "a serious commitment to the project on the part of local * * * authorities."

2. Gary, through its long use of federally assisted housing programs, has, as the President said, "built a platform" from which further experimentation in development can be launched. It is preparing to launch its third urban renewal program, this one the largest undertaken here to date, having learned something of both "the strengths and weaknesses" through past experiences.

3. Gary's City Council during the past year has formally adopted a previously promulgated metropolitan plan, sharing with the President the view that it "should be an instrument for shaping sound urban growth—not a neglected document."

4. Gary's City Council, with urging of civic leadership, adopted last year probably the most liberal open housing ordinance of any city in the Nation, exhibiting its realization of the presidential point that "at the center of the cities' housing problem lies racial discrimination."

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

B. On the opposite side, not negative exactly, but showing need—

1. Gary is the core of an industrial area where increasing steel and other production insures growth, but has reached the point where help is needed to make sure that "the powerful forces of urban growth" do not "overwhelm efforts to achieve orderly development."

2. Gary is still beset with what the President terms "crowded miles of inadequate dwellings—poorly maintained, and frequently overpriced" in which many of its Negroes still live. While twin attacks, through the housing ordinance and the newest urban renewal program, have been launched, help will be essential.

3. Gary's mass transportation facilities are deteriorated and inadequate. Its major street system, cut up by railroads, is unsuited to carrying the necessary load. Some plans have been drafted, but a coordinated effort, preferably with Federal help, is needed.

4. Gary's parks, once a point of civic pride, and its indoor cultural and recreational facilities have been outgrown or become outmoded. Assistance is needed in pushing through plans already under consideration for meeting these needs both for the present and the anticipated population.

5. Gary's "one industry" image is gradually being altered, but making it one of the major "demonstration cities" could step up the program of intended diversification which could help make it a better city for all its people in the future.

It is anticipated that as the broad outlines of the President's proposals are solidified into legislation, Gary governmental and civic effort will combine to furnish detailed evidence of how Gary meets the specific guidelines he seeks to establish.

Meanwhile, we feel it our duty to make this advance nomination of Gary as one of the demonstration cities hoping it may become one of those "great urban areas" which, as the President says, can become "the masterpieces of our civilization."

Sincerely,

DALE E. BELLES, JR.,
Editor.

CHEAPER AIR TRAVEL

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, for over 30 years, in a succession of increasingly responsible positions in the Federal Government, one of my fellow North Carolinians has distinguished himself by successfully tackling difficult assignments in the public service.

An article by Burt Schorr in the February 28 issue of the Wall Street Journal recognizes the excellent job that Charles S. Murphy is doing as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board. I request unanimous consent that this article be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHEAPER AIR TRAVEL—CAB CHAIRMAN MURPHY NUDGES CARRIERS TOWARD THAT GOAL

(By Burt Schorr)

WASHINGTON.—It may take some months to measure the success of the Civil Aeronautics Board's policy statement recently aimed at reducing air travel costs.

As the Board hoped, the other domestic trunklines appear to be matching United Air Lines' proposed 25-percent excursion fare discount. But there's always the possibility that these reductions won't achieve the goal of lowering fares without hurting the carriers' ability to finance their big orders for new aircraft. New air travelers may not be lured into otherwise empty seats in numbers sufficient to compensate airlines for the revenues they stand to lose.

Yet even if such an eventuality demands further fare tinkering by the CAB, the excursion plan already makes this point clear: Under its new Chairman, Charles S. Murphy, the CAB has demonstrated an ability to move carriers further along the path to lower fares than they would have ventured on their own.

And in accomplishing this, the Board seems to have ruffled fewer carriers feathers than might have seemed possible only a few months ago.

Moreover, this maintenance of cordial relations between the CAB and the airlines places the Board in a good position to seek more bargain flying for the public when it deals with several important route assignments now pending, including new service between southwestern and northwestern points.

Finally, the energetic attack on the fare problem—a potentially controversial issue as airline profits soar through the second year of the air travel boom—appears to have quashed any congressional criticism that the CAB isn't performing its assigned regulatory function. During an earlier period of carrier prosperity in the 1950's, Capitol Hill censure caused a marked stiffening of CAB fare policies, with unpleasant consequences for airlines.

Board watchers are inclined to credit the CAB's adroit fare maneuvering to the helmsmanship of Chairman Murphy, who took his post last June 1. Undoubtedly Mr. Murphy's effectiveness has been enhanced by Washington's knowledge that he enjoys the esteem of President Johnson. The Chief Executive's personal interest in air fares hasn't been publicized, but in fact he has followed the subject attentively. What Mr. Johnson reportedly was anxious to have—and what Mr. Murphy seems to be delivering—is a CAB fare policy designed to reduce travel costs without crippling the airlines' ability to pay for the $4.3 billion in new aircraft they will put in service between now and 1970.

LONG EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNMENT

With a Government career dating back to 1934, Mr. Murphy is considered wise in the workings of the Federal bureaucracy as it operates under the Democratic Party. For 11 years he was assistant legislative counsel to the Senate. (One job there: Helping draft the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 which created the CAB.) From that post, he moved to the White House, advancing in 1950 to a key job as special counsel to President Truman. Immediately prior to his CAB appointment by President Johnson, Mr. Murphy was serving as Under Secretary of Agriculture.

"Murphy knows how to get things done," comments one industry representative who deals frequently with the Board. "His background in writing the Aviation Act, his Senate and White House jobs, and the backing of the President give him prestige the rest of the Board can't ignore."

Mr. Murphy's influence was evident in, for example, the Board's recent 3 to 2 decision endorsing Frontier Airlines' 90-day experimental offer of a general 50-percent discount for standby seats on certain lightly patronized flights. Other carriers, including United and Western Air Lines, had vehemently opposed the innovation, but the Chairman, supported by his two fellow Democrats, Robert T. Murphy and G. Joseph Minetti, agreed with the Denver-based local service airline that "the only way to test the fares is by actual experience." What wasn't made public, however, was how one of the supporting Democrats almost joined Republicans Whitney Gillilland and John G. Adams in voting "no," then reconsidered out of a desire to "cooperate" with the new Chairman.

The Chairman's hand was apparent last July, too, when the Board rejected a 3-percent fare increase proposed by United to offset a bigger baggage allowance. At the time, United, Eastern Air Lines, and several other carriers were still earning well below the CAB standard for a reasonable rate of return on invested capital. Nevertheless, guided by its new Chairman, the Board held that the "favorable earnings" of the carriers provided "an excellent opportunity for reductions in fares, or improvements in service without fare increases."

The Board's fare campaign intensified in the following month with the first in a series of hold-the-line orders suspending proposed new jet fares. Here the Board broke with the long-accepted practice of allowing jet fares to include a surcharge that pegged them about 10-percent higher than propeller fares on the same routes. Hereafter, the Board said, it would allow new jet service at propeller rates only.

The airlines were dismayed at the threatened revenue loss—up to $200 million annually by one reckoning. There was much grumbling, too, that carriers fortunate enough to have already filed fares for most of their shorter-range jet service were barely affected by the surcharge ban. Summing up industry frustrations, United Chairman W. A. Patterson fumed about "a very impetuous conclusion reached very hastily."

It wasn't until this month's policy statement that the CAB finally assured the carriers it would be willing to allow jet surcharges after all; United, and any other carriers filing reductions comparable to the 25 percent excursion fare discount, could resume setting jet ticket charges higher than propeller fares.

Actually, CAB insiders maintain, the Board had this in mind all along. "The surcharge issue merely happened to be the first fare question to come along," explains one. "By issuing the suspension orders, the Board had time to think over the fare issue and also force carriers to come up with counterproposals."

CONVINCING THE CARRIERS

It developed, though, that counterproposals were slow in coming. So, in a series of speeches and private discussions with airline executives, Mr. Murphy sought to convince the carriers that the Board wasn't out to wreck them. This kept lines open between Government and industry despite rising tensions in Wall Street and airline executive offices over what sort of fare policy the CAB eventually would settle on.

Thus, shortly before the Board's definitive statement, one Washington-based airline vice president was pleased to find Chairman Murphy demonstrating "a very enlightened and progressive attitude. Rather than aiming to reduce airline earnings, he and the Board say carriers should pass along to the public the benefits of improved air technology * * *. When you get down to it, the carriers have the same objectives."

The recent rash of youth-fare discounts, allowing 50 percent off on standby seats, were another sign that airlines were beginning to attune themselves to broad thinking. Then came January's fruitful meeting of representatives of the 11 domestic trunklines to discuss alternatives to the surcharge ban. United first broached its plan at this Washington conference. "Everybody recognized that the Board has a problem with carrier earnings," says one executive of an extremely profitable airline who participated. "And the industry accepted the challenge of dealing with it."

The Board's success so far contrasts markedly with CAB handling of the fare question back in the early 1950's, a period when the airline industry also was enjoying a boom.

Early in 1952, the domestic trunklines sought to add $1 to all one-way domestic ticket charges and eliminate a 5-percent

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

guideposts have serious drawbacks. First, it is not excessive profits but the visibility of these profits which the guideposts fear will lead to inflationary wage demands. And since the accumulation of profits or the failure to cut prices can never be as visible as wage demands made during controversial contract negotiations, the burden of public pressure is always on labor.

Second, the wage-price guideposts are presented as though they derive from "natural" and impartial economic criteria, when in fact they mask very important political judgments about the kind of society America will be. Implicit in the guideposts is the assumption that the proportions of America's wealth enjoyed by various sectors of the population should remain constant. Since the share of the gross national product which goes to the wealthiest 20 percent of Americans is about 10 times that going to the poorest 20 percent, we cannot agree that this assumption is in accord with justice.

The wage-price guideposts could be a step to a more rational, democratic system of economic planning, in which social as well as economic criteria played a part. But if they merely to become guarantees for General Motors' prosperity, then labor's revolt is fully justified.

THE ROLE OF THE VIETCONG

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, 2 weeks ago, I urged the President to openly acknowledge a central fact in the Vietnam struggle, the political-military fact that the Vietcong should be accorded an independent status at the future peace conference. I also argued that it would be detrimental to our own purposes and to the stability and morale of the South Vietnamese if any further concessions were made to the Vietcong at this time. Specifically, I argued against giving the Vietcong a role in a coalition government before negotiations and before free elections, but only as a result of negotiations. Max Lerner, in two articles, supports my position on this issue, and also agrees with my view that the United States must announce that it will accept the results of a genuinely free election in Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD Mr. Lerner's articles of February 21 and 23 which appeared in the New York Post.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Post, Feb. 21, 1966]

VIETCONG ROLE

(By Max Lerner)

With the ending of the televised Fulbright hearings, the great debate on the Vietnam war has reached the end of its first phase in a dead heat.

The Fulbright forces succeeded in showing that the war has moved by a succession of unanalyzed steps to unintended consequences. There can be little doubt that the casualty lists hurt, that the war is unpopular and is likely to get more so and that the problem is not how America shall win but how America shall extricate itself without scuttling its Vietnamese allies and abdicating its national interests.

The proadministration forces in turn have shown that no one knows how this can be done, least of all the Fulbright witnesses and the commentators like Lippmann on whose analysis they lean. When Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Dean Rusk got their innings, they may not have triumphed, but they didn't come of second best. Rusk made the legal case he was expected to make. But he was best on the psychological and political factors, as in his discussion of the historic Oxford Pledge in its bearing on British unpreparedness in World War II, just as Taylor was best on the role of the French homefront in the French defeat in the Indochina war.

When the Fulbright forces, grasping for a straw in an effort to find an alternative military strategy, plumped for the enclave theory, Taylor had little difficulty in showing how frail a reed it was. It is hard to advocate an outright military withdrawal from Vietnam. But it doesn't solve anything to propose a policy that will abandon the Vietnam forces and villages to the Vietcong and strip the American soldier of both his mobility and his morale. The whole enclave theory is an attempt to dress up a military withdrawal in the guise of something less inglorious.

That is the point at which Senator ROBERT KENNEDY came in with his proposal to give the Vietcong a share in whatever government is set up in South Vietnam after peace negotiations. That is further than FULBRIGHT has gone, with his proposal that we recognize and deal directly with the Vietcong.

The trouble with the Kennedy proposal is that it fails to distinguish between the Vietcong role the the negotiating table and the Vietcong role in the postwar Government of Vietnam. To recognize that the Vietcong must have a role at the negotiating table is crucial. To give them a role in the Government of Vietnam would be fatal.

The current administration refusal to deal with the Vietcong is obviously an effort to shore up the position of the Ky regime in Saigon. But Ky, whose rigid refusal to sit at any negotiating table with the Vietcong is clearly for homefront consumption, has said he is a realist and is learning to be a politician. A realist learns to accept the inevitable. The inevitable is that the Vietcong, as a major combatant, must be at the negotiating table. They insist on doing so as the only legitimate government of South Vietnam, which is impossible for us. America insists on their coming to the table, if at all, as an instrument of Hanoi—which is impossible for them. Why not have them there in a third role, as representing neither Hanoi nor Saigon but only the actual territory they occupy and in fact administer?

Neither Hanoi nor Peiping will agree to this straight off. Both are convinced the antiwar forces in America will give them the political victory they want even though the Vietcong are suffering considerable punishment and can have no hope for military victory. But if Johnson and Rusk are willing to have the Vietcong at the negotiating table as a third party, to represent the territory they actually hold, then Washington can offer Moscow a solution the Russians in the end can back up without sacrificing their role as Hanoi's champions.

But there is no reason to sign away South Vietnam now by offering to include the Vietcong in the postwar government. The nature of the peace arrangements is something for the negotiating conference to decide. Any coalition formula which will include the Vietcong is bound to result in a Communist government that has excluded or liquidated its non-Communist partners. The experience of Poland and Czechoslovakia after the Yalta agreements is witness to what happens.

One cannot exclude the possibility that the people of South Vietnam will want some day to vote in a Communist regime. But it ought not to be imposed on them by a peace treaty. In fairness to them, there should be a moratorium of perhaps 2 years, during which the economy and society of South Vietnam will have a chance to rebuild themselves with aid from American and other sources. A postwar government should have a chance to strengthen the political fiber of the nation and show the people what can be accomplished in peacetime.

At the end of that period, the Vietnamese should have a chance to ratify or reject what such a regime has done and become. If at that time it chooses a coalition popular front or a straight Communist government, that will be its own concern. Neither Hanoi nor the Vietcong are today confident they would get the suffrage of the people. If they were confident, they would welcome the chance to come to the negotiating table and agree to such a solution.

[From the New York Post, Feb. 23, 1966]

THE KENNEDY TANGLE

(By Max Lerner)

The disarray surrounding Senator KENNEDY's proposal on the Vietcong peace role was partly due to the clumsiness of trying to stage a debate through press conferences and TV shows on one side and press secretaries on the other; this is where the British system of straight parliamentary confrontation between the Government and its opponents would have served the Nation better. But partly also it was due to the fact that few public figures (and Senator KENNEDY is no exception) have had a chance to think their way through the touchy problems of a peace conference and what would follow it. Compared with this the Vietnam jungle is a grove.

Too much of the general Vietnam debate thus far has been on the strategy and politics of the war, not enough on what happens when the shooting stops. Senator KENNEDY had a hectic couple of days, backing and filling, in getting his position clear, and so did Maxwell Taylor; as for HUBERT HUMPHREY, his troubles may still lie ahead. A confused time was had by all, but out of it may come some unraveling of the tangle.

I am not talking of the advertised agreement between KENNEDY and the White House, subscribed to by both sides. On the crucial issues I doubt that there is any real agreement.

Examining the peacemaking process phase by phase, the first concerns the way in which the Vietcong will be represented at the conference. Here KENNEDY does well to hold his ground. I agree with him that the Vietcong, simply because of the area they control, must be at the conference as "an independent entity."

The next phase has to do with the Vietcong role in a coalition government. KENNEDY originally talked as if the "share of power and responsibility" for the Vietcong was something for America to back, and something to emerge—however gradually—from the conference. He now talks more warily on both scores. He doesn't expect a coalition government to be shaped "automatically," but wants the administration not to shut the door on it. Certainly this door, like any other door, should not be shut. But it still leaves the question of whether the Americans are to put their influence behind it. To say that America should accept a solution agreed upon by the conference is to omit the patent fact that the South Vietnam governmental delegation will oppose a coalition agreement bitterly. To get the agreement KENNEDY envisages will mean American pressure.

Then there is the problem of elections. KENNEDY now seems to talk of a coalition government as including only "what they (the Vietcong) win in free elections." He also talks of a "permanent coalition" as a possibility, presumably without such elections. Such a "permanent coalition" would quickly eliminate the chances that free elections would ever be held. To prevent this, KENNEDY speaks of an international control authority to watch out for Communist at-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

roundtrip discount. The year of the filing proved to be the peak year for postwar traffic; return on overall domestic trunkline investment skyrocketed to 15.3 percent. (Following a later general fare investigation completed in 1960, the Board concluded that 10.5 percent was the proper average rate of return for domestic trunks. Last year, by comparison, the figure probably exceeded 12 percent, after eliminating the effect of the investment tax credit.

The CAB permitted the $1 increase to stand on an "interim" basis, but it refused to allow abandonment of the roundtrip discount and ordered a general fare investigation. In turn, the carriers withdrew their proposal to end the discount and urged the Board to halt the investigation. Finally, in May 1953, despite having spent a year in preliminary work on the investigation, the CAB acceded to the airline request by a 3–2 vote.

PRODDING FROM CONGRESS

It was this leniency that moved the House Judiciary Committee, under Representative EMANUEL CELLER, Democrat, of New York, to include the CAB in an investigation of several regulatory agencies 3 years later. By this time, however, several changes in Board membership (a term is 6 years) had produced a majority considered less friendly to carrier interests. Stung by CELLER committee complaints that the Board had "waltzed around" the fare question and was guilty of "scandalous abdication of responsibility," the CAB hastened to atone by ordering the prompt start of a general fare investigation.

In fact, airlines entered a lean period just as the investigation was getting underway; but their clamor for fare increases was resisted until sagging return on investment, which reached a low of 1.5 percent in 1961, confronted the Board with the prospect that airlines might not be able to pay for the flood of new jets they'd ordered some years earlier, and it agreed to a series of fare increases.

Perhaps the expanded use of promotional fares like the ones the Board now is encouraging might have filled many of the empty seats of the early 1960's. This in turn could have reduced the need for higher fares and kept air travel available to the broadest possible segment of the population.

True or not, the concept is one airlines can expect to see tested again in future Board rulings while Mr Murphy is in charge. At a recent press conference the Chairman said of the airlines, "It seems to me they have to go out and hustle for business." He added the promise that "the Board will help as best it can to try to see that traffic is generated."

Around the end of this year the CAB is expected to decide the Northwest-Southwest case, the last major assignment of routes remaining on the continental United States air map. Competing carriers would do well to show the Board "who is able to do more for the public" in the way of lower fares, one CAB source suggests, and several of the applicants are indeed taking this tack. Similarly, route awards expected next year in the New York-Florida proceedings, as well as those later in the transpacific case involving service to Hawaii, offer further opportunities for reduced air charges.

Chairman Murphy gets high marks from CAB staff members and airline representatives for his patient absorption of complex issues. And those who have witnessed his talent for conciliating diverse views say it is impressive. Both qualities should be in great demand in the coming critical period of domestic airline growth.

THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM: A HISTORY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to call attention to a recent book by Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan entitled "The Fulbright Program: A History."

Walter Johnson is Preston and Sterling Morton professor of history at the University of Chicago. He has been a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships since 1947 and has provided continuity and leadership in promoting educational exchange programs. From 1950 to 1953, he served as chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships.

Francis J. Colligan is Director of Policy Review and Coordination for the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs at the Department of State. Mr. Colligan has also been associated with the exchange program since 1947 and during the years from 1948 until 1957 he was executive secretary of the program.

Both Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan have done a truly remarkable job in describing the postwar development of U.S. exchange programs. They have been able to do this because they have been active participants. At the same time, their participation has not destroyed their critical faculties and the book which they have produced is, I believe, a fair treatment of the successes and the failures of what has become known as the Fulbright program. I am glad to note for the record that the successes have far outnumbered and outweighed the failures. Members of the Senate I know receive many communications from their constituents requesting information about the availability of Fulbright grants and other questions regarding the program. This study by Messrs. Johnson and Colligan will be helpful not only to Members in answering inquiries but to individuals and institutions in the United States that have been involved in the program.

As author of the original legislation in this field, which was in the nature of an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, I wish to take this occasion to say that the program could never have succeeded had it not been for the hard work and perseverance and support of men like Walter Johnson and Francis Colligan. Throughout 20 years of this program, they have been aided by many other people in the academic and business community too numerous to mention. Any program can fail if it is not properly administered and supported by the American public. This program, I am glad to say, has had this support.

THE PRESIDENT'S WAGE-PRICE GUIDEPOSTS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, for the past several months, considerable discussion has been devoted to the validity of the administration's wage-price guideposts and their effectiveness as a tool of economic policy.

Implicit in this debate is the recognition by those—in favor and opposed to these guidelines—that sound planning is necessary to assure the steady, continued growth of the Nation's economy—without inflation.

The longrun best interest of the country is not served by either rising prices or wages. Both business and labor are well aware of the benefits that have accrued to them as a result of the economy's current, and unprecedented, period of prosperity—benefits in the form of increased profits and nearly full employment.

And, though both business and labor have said—albeit for different reasons—that the present guidelines are unrealistic, clearly each of them recognizes that some guarantee of a stable economy is needed.

In understanding both viewpoints, an article in the February 18 issue of the Commonweal should be considered as part of this discussion on economic policy.

Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the magazine article to which I refer be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LABOR'S JUST COMPLAINT

The labor unions have begun to complain about the President's wage-price guideposts—and well they might. The best possible evidence for their argument has now been supplied by an unexpected source: General Motors Corp. All General Motors did was tell the world how much money it made in 1965; and labor's case was made.

The wage-price guideposts are based on the theory that wage increases must be tied to the increase in overall national productivity, so that demand does not outstrip supply, causing price rises and inflation. But wage demands are obviously related to corporative profits; and so the guideposts proposed that increase in profits be likewise limited by the rate of increase in national productivity. When profits are rising faster than productivity, the excess should be returned to the public in the form of price cuts, lest workers have grounds for inflationary wage demands.

A few spectacular cases of pressure from the Government have generally convinced the public that the guideposts have been more severely enforced against business than labor. But these few cases involved industries where prices were being raised. Totally ignored has been the obligation of industries with rising profits to cut prices. The results? Throughout 1965, labor unions were urged to limit their demands to a 3.2-percent increase in wages (in keeping with the 3.2 percent annual increase in national productivity). And, in fact, labor gains did stay between 3 and 4 percent. But meanwhile corporations enjoyed a 20-percent increase in profits.

Now General Motors, the Nation's largest company, reveals it has done even better. Its profits after taxes in 1965 jumped by 23 percent. In 1964, screams of anguish went up when the United Auto Workers obtained a contract from General Motors which went only slightly beyond the wage-price guideposts. Who's complaining now?

The wage-price guideposts have merits. Their existence is an admission of the need for national economic planning. But the

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

tempts at seizing the government. But this would end with no effective government at all, from which only a totalitarian group could benefit, whether Communist or military.

We need to clear up the question of when the elections ought to come if they are best to serve the interests of a stable and democratic Vietnam. KENNEDY speaks of free elections to settle the "immediate composition" of the government. That is too soon, as anyone must know who understands the political immaturity of the southeast Asia area and the chaos that war has wrought. They should come after a waiting period to give a government, whether of one party or a coalition, a chance for stability. And lest the government-in-power rig the elections, this is where an international control commission should function: in making sure the elections are honest, and the votes honestly counted.

I am glad KENNEDY opened the floodgate on these themes. But the KENNEDY name is so important in world opinion that he would have done better to wait until he was clearly ready.

SCHOOL MILK AND LUNCH PROGRAMS SHOULD NOT BE CUT

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have received a large number of telegrams, calls and letters urging me to do everything possible to restore the proposed cuts in appropriations for the special school milk and school lunch programs.

There are many places where the budget can, and should, be cut this session but these are not among them. Both of these programs have had widespread support over the years, both in Wisconsin and across the country. They have been built up over many years through cooperative arrangements with the States.

These programs are important to the dairy industry and they are important to the health of our schoolchildren.

I have received a large number of letters from school administrators, schoolchildren, dairy farmers, cooperatives and others. I ask unanimous consent that a representative sample be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN SCHOOL FOOD SERVICE ASSOCIATION,
Madison, Wis., February 18, 1966.

Hon. GAYLORD NELSON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NELSON: I wish to thank you again for the generous time you gave to me and Mr. Langkop when we visited with you recently. We are very much concerned over the administration's budget proposals for the school lunch and special milk programs for 1966–67 and were very grateful for an opportunity to visit with you concerning the matter.

I am sending to you herewith a copy of a bulletin which I have requested the American School Food Service Association to issue to State directors of school lunch programs, State presidents of school food service associations, and State legislative chairmen concerning the administration's budget proposals for the school lunch and special milk programs for 1966–67. I want to keep you as fully informed as I possibly can, since I am sure you will be receiving inquiries and letters from many people in Wisconsin, and it may also be helpful to you to get our side of the picture when the budget comes up for consideration in hearings and on the Senate floor.

I believe the material I am sending to you is quite self-explanatory, but I should like to add some further explanation as to what the program might look like in Wisconsin if the President's budget proposals were to become effective.

There are now only 6 school districts of grades kindergarten through 12 or 9 through 12 which do not have the school lunch program in Wisconsin. There are, of course, a number of small rural districts operating one-room or two-room schools which do not have a lunch program since building facilities would not permit. Thus you can see that the program has been quite universally accepted and incorporated into the daily school activities in nearly all of the schools of the State.

There are 105 school districts involving 151 schools with an average daily attendance of 24,009 pupils which have a milk program only. In September these schools served 345,008 half pints of milk; in October, 452,541, and in November 379,654. The reimbursement from Federal funds in November, for example, was $10,187.

There are 467 school districts involving 2,511 schools which have both the school lunch and special milk programs. The average daily attendance in these schools is 644,488 pupils. In September these schools served 7,660,488 half pints of milk; in October, 8,830,621; and in November, 7,494,993. The reimbursement from Federal funds in November amounted to $276,395. In these schools the children also had the benefit of a balanced noon meal which included a half pint of milk. The figures given you above are concerned only with the extra milk which was consumed in these schools during recess, milk breaks, or additional milk with the noon lunch. In September these schools served 6,011,450 lunches with milk; in October, 6,161,321; and in November, 5,310,818. Therefore, in November, for example, there were 12,805,811 half pints of milk consumed in these schools in addition to other dairy products which were served as a part of the meal.

The point I am trying to make is that the special milk program would virtually be dead if it were limited to schools which do not have a lunch service.

Although the chart shows a net reduction of $19 million in the budget for the school lunch program (approximately 10 percent of this year's appropriation) the situation is actually worse than it appears. Section 11 funds are used in granting high reimbursement rates to schools in especially needy areas. The funds appropriated for this section are apportioned among the States primarily on the basis of need for serving lunches free of charge to children who cannot afford to pay. From a national standpoint the $6.5 million budget is but a token of what would be required if the need were to be met. The city of Chicago alone would require the total appropriation. Consequently, the funds appropriated for the current year ($2 million) were apportioned among the States to start experimental programs to determine what effect a high reimbursement rate and a reduced price to children might have on participation, number of free lunches required, etc. Wisconsin got $11,700. We were able to start four small projects beginning in February—one in Westboro; one in Pine Lake, near Rhinelander; one at Neopit and one in Keshena. Thus you can see that the $4.5 million increase in the budget for such purposes will have but little bearing on the program as a whole.

Appropriated funds available for reimbursement and section 6 commodities for the current year total $152,915,000 (not including the $45 million transfer from section 32 funds for this purpose). Appropriated funds for identical purposes next year would be $129,415,000. Thus there is actually a reduction of funds for the regular program of 15.4 percent and not 10 percent as it would appear on the surface.

Along with the 15.4 percent reduction in funds, it is quite evident that surplus commodities will not be available in the kinds and quantities we have had in the past. Several valuable items have disappeared from the surplus list. We have received only 202,173 pounds of cheese for schools this year. Last year we used 821,770 pounds. There are virtually no Government purchases being made for price support purposes. Butter has reached the same position. Section 709 of the Agricultural Act of 1965 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to go out on the market and buy butter, cheese, and powdered milk in any quantity needed to fulfill requirements of the program regardless of price or surplus situation, but he has not done so until February 10 when he announced he would buy a limited quantity of butter to meet the needs of the school lunch program. He made no offer to buy cheese, however.

If the administrations proposals prevail, it will mean an increase of perhaps 5 cents per lunch in charges to children. Children attending schools where there is a lunch program would be required to pay the full cost of the milk, unless the district were to subsidize it somehow. There would be no milk reimbursement for such schools, excepting for the milk served to needy children who would be unable to pay. This would be an inconsequential amount, I'm sure.

Schools which have a lunch program are now being reimbursed at the rate of 4 cents per half pint of extra milk served, and the schools which do not have a lunch service are paid 3 cents per half pint. All schools are paid a uniform rate of 4 cents per lunch with milk. No reimbursement is paid for lunches served without milk.

This letter has grown somewhat lengthy and I apologize for it. Anything you can do in behalf of adequately funding both programs in the coming fiscal year will be very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

GORDON W. GUNDERSON,
Chairman, Legislative Committee, ASFSA.

MILK INDUSTRY FOUNDATION,
Washington, D.C., February 11, 1966.

Senator GAYLORD NELSON,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NELSON: We solicit your support for continuance of the special milk program which in fiscal year 1965 was used by 92,005 schools and child care institutions where 2,966,800,000 half pints of milk were consumed. By comparison, 70,132 schools participated in the national school lunch program and used 2,876,150,103 half pints of milk in fiscal 1965.

This usage of milk aggregated nearly 3 billion pounds. Had this milk not been so used, there can be little doubt that it would have been acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation in the form of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese since approximately 5.7 billion pounds on a milk equivalent basis was actually acquired. The direct cost at the present support price would have been $103 million, the exact amount Congress appropriated for the special milk program for fiscal 1966. In addition, there would have been the cost of acquiring, handling, packaging, and transporting the products which would have been made from the 3 billion pounds of milk used in the school lunch and school milk programs.

While commercial consumption has shown a gain during the past year and some further gain is expected this year, it now appears that

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

an estimated 3 to 4 billion pounds of milk in the form of nonfat dry milk, butter, and cheese will be acquired under the price support program in 1966.

In the light of these circumstances it makes extremely good sense to continue the special milk program. Nearly 22,000 more schools and child care institutions use this program than use the school lunch program. More children are benefited by having a nutritious energy-giving food in the form of milk.

At a time when our Government is spending millions of dollars to rehabilitate school dropouts, is enlarging the food stamp program and carrying on a war against poverty, it is inconsistent to curtail a program that adds to the health, energy, and vitality of children who are in school and thereby helps them to stay in school. This is especially true with respect to the 22,000 schools and institutions which, because of lack of facilities, funds or for other reasons do not have a school lunch program.

We of the Milk Industry Foundation, a trade association of milk processors having members doing business in every State of the Nation, including, of course, your State, respectfully request your help in maintaining the Special Milk Program at a level where all schools and child institutions wishing to participate may do so.

Sincerely,

ROBERT H. NORTH,
Executive Director.

NEW RICHMOND PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
New Richmond, Wis., February 18, 1966.

Hon. GAYLORD NELSON,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NELSON: The proposal in the Federal budget and in the Congress to cut back in the the appropriation for the special milk program in schools and to assign the administration of the fund to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare instead of the Department of Agriculture has come to my attention. My personal feeling about this proposal, and its tie-in effect with other programs, are expressed as that of a parent, a taxpayer, and a school administrator.

1. Since the milk purchased by the reduced appropriation is to be distributed to needy children, there is an obvious tie-in with programing under the Education Act of 1965.

2. School lunch and special mik programs have stood for years as evidence that a federally aided program can do an effective job with a minimum of Government interference.

3. The Education Act of 1965 is becoming a monument of regulation, detail, restriction and administrative putter work. What was promoted as a first time opportunity for education innovation on a national scale has become restrictive to a point that programing is going to evolve into a number of neatly wrapped educational packages. Innovation, as I understand the implication of the term, will not happen.

4. Any remote tie-in of the milk or lunch program to the restrictiveness of Public Law 89-10 will tend to render that program ineffectual.

5. To spend billions in an emotion-packed great-experiment program and at the same time cut back in a program that has proved itself nutritionally, educationally, and economically sound for years, would be difficult to defend, I'm sure.

Your serious effort to restore the funding for the milk program to its original strength, and retain the administration of the program to the Department of Agriculture, will, I'm sure, receive the enthusiastic support and endorsement of your constituents.

Sincerely yours,

SHERMAN R. GROVES,
Superintendent.

MILK PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC.,
KENOSHA, WIS., *February 16, 1966.*

Senator GAYLORD NELSON,
Senate Office Building, Room 404,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR NELSON: The Wisconsin Council of Agricultural Cooperatives strongly protests the proposed unprecedented 1967 budget cut of $82 million for the special milk program for schoolchildren. We urge that the special milk program budgets be restored to $103 million, the current appropriation; preferably funds for this program should be authorized at $115 million.

The proposed reduction of $19 million in the school lunch program should also be restored by Congress.

A reduction of the size proposed is tantamount to complete elimination of the special milk program. Complete elimination would divert about 1.5 billion pounds of milk now consumed as fluid milk into manufactured dairy products.

USDA reports indicate the price for milk eligible for fluid consumption was $4.63 per hundredweight in 1965, compared to $3.33 for milk used for manufacturing. The difference in the two prices is $1.30 per hundredweight. The 1.5 billion pounds of milk times $1.30 per hundredweight would mean a loss of $19.5 million in dairy farmers' purchasing power.

The special milk program is one of our most effective vehicles for insuring good eating habits and at the same time improving diets of all children. Certainly this important aspect of the program should not be based on ability to pay.

Does the administration realize how much milk consumption in schools will decline if the cost per half pint is increased? A study in Chicago schools revealed that an increase of 1 cent per half pint on white milk and chocolate milk reduced consumption by 40 percent. This fact alone should give cause for serious reconsideration of the proposed action.

We urgently request that you do your utmost to combat efforts to reduce the special milk program appropriations. The program, as we know it, has the support of not only dairy farmers but the general public as well. Our younger generation would be dealt a disservice by the U.S. Congress if appropriations for this program are dropped below the current level.

Sincerely yours,

MILK PRODUCERS CO-OP, INC.,
E. MACHT, *Sales Manager.*

AUTO SAFETY

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a brief on auto safety prepared by the Honorable Heward Grafftey, Member of Parliament of Canada, Mr. C. Alexander Brown, and Mr. Rheal Casavant, also of Canada, for consideration by the Federal Government of Canada.

This brief concerns the rising accident and death toll resulting from auto crashes in Canada. Although we usually think of auto safety in the American context, Canadians also use many cars designed in the United States. It is only natural for Canadians to be concerned with the safety of American automobiles.

I call to the attention of my associates the material prepared by Messrs. Grafftey, Brown, and Casavant. It is pertinent to our problems with auto safety.

There being no objection, the brief was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FULL TEXT OF BRIEF ON TRAFFIC ACCIDENT DEATHS AND INJURIES IN CANADA

INTRODUCTION

Significant new developments in the understanding of the complex casualty of motor vehicle fatalities and injuries have prompted us to set down our knowledge and understanding of this problem, together with three recommendations for remedial action that could be taken at the federal level, for presentation to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Industry.

This brief has been endorsed by:

C. E. Dionne, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa.

Stanley Knowles, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa.

Guy Marcoux, Member of Parliament, M.D., House of Commons, Ottawa.

John Matheson, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa.

Wilson Southam, television producer, Champlain Towers, Ottawa.

This brief has been prepared and presented by:

Heward Grafftey, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, Ottawa.

C. Alexander Brown, writer, 135 Woodridge Crescent, Ottawa 14, Ontario.

Rheal Casavant, television executive, 195 Fontaine Street, Hull, Quebec.

BRIEF ON AUTOMOBILE SAFETY

In the past 10 years 35,031 people have been killed in automobile accidents in Canada, and 948,850 injured. It is estimated that by the end of 1965, 4,800 more will die and 150,000 will be injured. If the present trend continues between the beginning of 1966 and the end of 1970, 26,000 more Canadians will die on our roads and more than 1 million more will be injured.

Accidents are now one of the leading causes of death and injury in this, as in many other countries. It is estimated that about half of all cars in North America between the time they are first driven and the time they are scrapped become involved in at least one injury-producing accident.

To the present time nearly all efforts to correct this situation have been directed at drivers. In spite of this, the toll of death and injury continues to increase and there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that to continue to expend most of our efforts in educating, cajoling, and penalizing the driver will yield adequate results. The problem of highway death and injury must be attached in other areas. In modern times, the techniques of epidemiology have been successfully "extended from its original restriction to the communicable diseases to a broad application of mass diseases of man; to cancer, diabetes, congenital anomalies and many others. It is not so generally appreciated that injuries, as distinguished from diseases, are equally susceptible to this approach, and that accidents as a health problem of populations conform to the same biological laws as do disease processes and regularly evidence comparable behavior."

Epidemiological approach

Applying the terminology of epidemiology to automobile accidents, the roads are the environment, the driver is the host, and automobiles are the agents. Drivers (the host in our terms) are susceptible to human error. Therefore, there will always be acci-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

on insurance regulation in 1964 while insurance companies paid the States $737.6 million.

DISTRICT SIXTH HIGHEST

The States that spent the least, in relation to their income from the insurance industry, were in order, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Missouri, Idaho, Michigan, Connecticut and Minnesota. None budgeted more than 2.15 cents of the insurance tax dollar for insurance regulation.

The District of Columbia, which budgeted 6.24 cents, ranked sixth highest. Maryland and Virginia, which spent about 3 cents each, ranked 33d and 34th, respectively.

States without any examiners at all, according to the subcommittee's survey, were Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Yet Arizona and Mississippi alone had the prime responsibility for checking on the financial stability of 404 insurance companies chartered in their States.

New Hampshire and Vermont had only one examiner each; Maine and Montana, two; Oregon and Wyoming, three.

NINE EXAMINERS HERE

The District of Columbia, with 50 companies chartered here and another 630 doing business, had 9 examiners. Virginia had 10 examiners for 846 companies, 95 of them homegrown. Maryland, with 57 companies chartered in the State and another 752 in business there, had 12 examiners.

New York had 342 examiners for 736 companies.

"No State insurance department, none of the 50 States, is going to be any stronger than the weakest examiner they have on their payroll," one witness testified before the subcommittee.

In some of the States that have no insurance examiners of their own, private accounting firms are hired to make the checks.

DODD said he had no illusions about getting a perfect system of insurance regulation. But, he said, "what we are getting now is not even within shouting distance of this ideal."

[From the Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1966]

THREAT OF NEW FEDERAL CONTROLS IS RAISED—SENATOR DODD URGES STATES TO ACT IMMEDIATELY

(By Alexander Picone)

A short while back we allowed as how the substandard risk automobile insurance market, a relatively insignificant segment of the business, could turn out to be the "Achilles heel" of State regulation, unless the companies and the State regulatory authorities pay more attention than has been given to date to the cleansing of this obviously unpleasant fringe of the business. It is a full-blown threat as of now.

Since 1960, some 58 high-risk auto insurance companies went under leaving over a million persons without insurance. This, plus other developments, has provided ammunition for those who would prefer stronger Federal supervision of the business, if not complete takeover by repeal of the McCarran Act.

STRONG EFFORT

It is useless to go on carping and editorializing, but sincere executives must make every effort—and do it now—to prevent even the smallest black mark from spotting the image of effective State regulation.

Perhaps, there are some insurance executives among us who do not want State regulation to continue. If this view is widely shared by people within the industry then efforts should be started to determine where such defections exist.

The Senate Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee, of which Senator THOMAS J. DODD, Democrat, of Connecticut, is chairman, has the continuing responsibility of studying the effectiveness of the system of State regulation of insurance.

In a speech last week on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Mr. DODD, who has been called the congressional watchdog of the insurance business, revealed that nearly 1 of every 10 high-risk auto insurance companies had failed in the last 2 years, leaving more than half a million persons without protection. He said the situation was appalling and added that it may be time for the Federal Government to pass legislation unless the States take immediate and sufficient action. The words "immediate" and "sufficient" should be underlined. And, any action taken on a State level would be futile unless the companies cooperated fully and wholeheartedly.

POINT STRESSED

The Senator from Connecticut also stressed a point which should, by now, be imprinted on the minds of all insurance people. It is this: "The legislative history of the McCarran Act clearly indicates that Congress was making only a conditional delegation of authority to the States, to be reconsidered if the States should demonstrate an inability to properly serve the public interest."

The Senator was kind enough to stress the excellent record of some State insurance departments and to assert his personal support of State regulation as best suited for supervision of the insurance industry "because it is at the level most aware of the local and regional needs of the consumer." The Senator, like most public figures, is subject to a multitude of pressures, political and otherwise, and he may be forced to take steps that are contrary to his personal convictions.

The bald fact, as the Senator sees it is that State regulation, in toto, is not adequately protecting the consumer, and at all costs, he must be protected.

Mr. DODD, in his speech before the Senate, raised these questions, questions which every responsible person in the insurance industry should be prepared to answer:

"Can a form of regulation be adequate which allows virtually 9 percent of the high-risk automobile insurance companies in the Nation to fail over a 2-year period, leaving considerably more than half a million persons without insurance?"

"Can a form of regulation be adequate which generally doesn't maintain examiners sufficient in number to carefully analyze the financial standing of thousands of insurance companies?"

"Can a form of regulation be adequate in which at least six of the States have three or less examiners and at least nine States have no examiners at all?"

"Can a form of regulation be adequate which is operated on a marginal budget of usually less than 4 percent of the premium taxes and fees collected from insurance companies by the States?"

FEDERAL CONTROL

Although no system of supervision can hope to achieve perfection, Senator DODD said, "we know that no type of Federal control would tolerate a failure rate of the magnitude of that presently occurring in high-risk automobile insurance."

Complete Federal regulation of insurance may be undesirable, Senator DODD said, "but we have a critical problem in the high-risk automobile insurance area today, one which needs serious attention. If the States do not immediately and sufficiently respond, the Federal Government will be left with no alternative but to itself respond.

"There are alternatives not amounting to outright Federal control which would protect the public from these many insolvencies. An approach similar to that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in banking or a Federal Guaranty Fund are possibilities which have merit.

"The time may be at hand to begin exploring the feasibility of these and other possible legislative solutions to this very serious problem before the American public suffers any further injustices," the Senator said.

As we said earlier, the time for carping has passed, indeed editorializing is of little help. What must be so evident is the fact that the insurance commissioners should appoint a competent all-industry committee and staff to cooperate with the State regulatory authorities and solve the high risk problem and other problems affecting the private insurance concept and State regulation of insurance. The integrity of the private insurance business is on trial and we must have faith that both the commissioners and the companies will cooperate and come through with needful solutions.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evaluation for the armed forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is my judgment that the Senate is about to start a session of the Senate which will result in a series of votes, probably before the day is over, which may be as important to the future of this Republic as any series of votes ever cast in the history of the Senate.

Mr. President, I believe that at least, irrespective of how we feel about the issue, the American people are entitled to have the attendance of their elected representatives in the Senate on this very critical occasion and, therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask for a live quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

[No. 40 Leg.]

Aiken	Fulbright	Pastore
Bass	Inouye	Prouty
Bayh	Jackson	Russell, S.C.
Bible	Javits	Russell, Ga.
Boggs	Kennedy, Mass.	Saltonstall
Burdick	Long, Mo.	Smith
Clark	Mansfield	Talmadge
Cotton	McIntyre	Tydings
Dodd	Mondale	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Monroney	Young, Ohio
Fannin	Morse	

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] is absent on official business.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to request the attendance of absent Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sergeant at Arms will execute the order of the Senate.

After a little delay, the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

Allott	Hayden	Murphy
Anderson	Hickenlooper	Muskie
Bartlett	Hill	Nelson
Bennett	Holland	Neuberger
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Pearson
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Pell
Cannon	Jordan, Idaho	Proxmire
Carlson	Kennedy, N.Y.	Randolph
Case	Kuchel	Ribicoff
Cooper	Long, La.	Robertson
Curtis	Magnuson	Scott
Dirksen	McCarthy	Simpson
Dominick	McClellan	Smathers
Douglas	McGee	Sparkman
Eastland	McGovern	Stennis
Ervin	McNamara	Symington
Fong	Metcalf	Thurmond
Gore	Miller	Tower
Gruening	Montoya	Williams, Del.
Harris	Morton	Yarborough
Hart	Moss	Young, N. Dak.
Hartke	Mundt	

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). A quorum is present.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall speak briefly in support of my amendment, which I shall offer at the end of the statement. I may at a later hour offer a second amendment.

Mr. President, the major thesis of my case against the pending business of the Senate is that the bill goes far beyond what its proponents claim for it. The pending bill is a policy bill. The pending bill greatly enlarges American foreign policy in Asia. The pending bill is pregnant with a policy that will lead to the escalation of the war in Asia. The pending bill, in my opinion, greatly endangers the development of world war three. Therefore I think that the policies inherent in the bill should not be adopted by the Senate without restrictions being placed upon the bill.

It is my view, as I expressed in some depth last Friday, that this bill greatly weakens our system of checks and balances.

It is a bill that would greatly enlarge the discretionary power of the President. It is a bill that would give determination by way of the exercise of what I consider to be, for the fiscal year 1966–67, almost unlimited discretionary power on the part of the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I think that the bill should be defeated.

When we finally come to the rollcall on the bill, I shall vote against the bill, and when I vote against the bill, I shall not be voting to let down American boys in southeast Asia. But I shall be voting to try to save the lives of many who, in my judgment, will be sent into Asia as a result of the passage of this bill.

It is, of course, to be understood that I expressed in some detail last Friday my answer to the oft-repeated—but unfounded—charge that those of us who oppose the President's policies in southeast Asia have no substitute plan.

We have a substitute plan, a plan that we have expressed in great detail.

Mr. President, let me say that I support the position of General Gavin. I support the enclave approach which would afford an opportunity for other nations to come in and live up to their obligations under the United Nations Charter to enforce the peace in southeast Asia.

Mr. President, with those preliminary remarks, I now proceed with my formal statement in support of my position in opposition to the bill.

What is printed in the hearings is enough to destroy the claim that there is little difference between the Gavin-Kennan proposal for Vietnam and the administration objective. The administration objective in South Vietnam, which is quite different from any alleged commitment, is one of clearing the country for them of the Vietcong, and restoring General Ky to full control over the people and territory of South Vietnam. Only then will we be prepared for any elections. That is what was in the President's Honolulu speech, and here is the military funding that will be needed to carry it out.

We are going to go to elections when we destroy large numbers of Vietcong. We are going to go to elections when we have "pacified" the country and put Ky in power. We are going to go to elections when we can be sure that Ky is going to win the election. However, if we had elections controlled by Communists, then we would have much to say and to deprecate.

Much of the talk of the leaders of our Government about elections in South Vietnam spells out the word "hypocrisy." I think we are highly hypocritical in regard to our allegation that we seek elections. I think we also seek controlled elections in Vietnam, in that we only want them when we control the country.

I point to Secretary McNamara's statement on page 105 of the hearings in response to a question by Senator SMITH, for this colloquy shows the pregnancy of this bill with new foreign policy.

I read from the hearings:

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, are there any plans to escalate and step up the offensive in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, there are preparations being made, and they are reflected in this fiscal 1966 supplement, for substantially increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units there. Whether or not we will carry out such higher rates of activities and actually deploy all of those additional forces is a decision that only the President can make, and no such decision has yet been made. His instruction to us is to be prepared to meet such higher deployments and such higher rates of activity should the need for them arise.

Senator SMITH. If there aren't any ammunition shortages in the Vietnam fighting and if there aren't any plans to escalate and step up the fighting in Vietnam, then why have you recently opened a half dozen or more ammunition plants directed to start operations on increased ammunitions?

Secretary MCNAMARA. To be prepared to support higher deployments and higher rates of activity. We have laid out over the period of the next 18 months—through June 1967—possible levels of deployment, and possible rates of activity which are higher than present levels of deployment and rates of activity, and in order to be prepared to support them, we are requesting funds to procure the ammunition for such higher deployments and higher rates of activity.

Elsewhere, Secretary McNamara was pressed by Senator MCCLELLAN to describe and define our military strategy and tactics in Vietnam. The Senator's question appears on page 112 of the hearing record and it was:

Are we going to continue fighting what appears to be a holding action?

I read further from the hearings:

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that we would characterize our present military strategy or present tactics as holding actions. On the contrary, we are taking the offensive, seeking to find and destroy the enemy bases and forces, and we propose to continue to follow that strategy and tactic, using whatever forces are required to accomplish it in order to convince the Vietcong and particularly the North Vietnamese who are directing their operations, that they cannot win in the south, and therefore, must cease their attempt to subvert and destroy the political institutions of the south.

Senator MCCLELLAN. That is why it occurs to me that it is primarily a holding action. We are just going to hold on and show them they can't win.

May I have order, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair has attempted to secure the cooperation of Senators. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MORSE. I continue to read:

Secretary MCNAMARA. No sir. As I have said, our military strategy which is associated with the political objective of preserving the right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own destiny is to find and destroy the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces operating in South Vietnam.

A few sentences later, the Secretary added:

If the circumstances change, if the North Vietnamese add greater force, if the military risk associated with our present policy increases beyond the limits we presently see, it might be desirable or necessary in the future to modify that strategy (deleted).

This, of course, is quite in keeping with the Honolulu speech of the President at the Honolulu airport on February 6, when he said:

We will leave here determined not only to achieve victory over aggression, but to win victory over hunger, disease, and despair.

Today's press informs us once again that General Ky intends to reunify both North and South under his command. Despite his many statements to that effect, they have never been rejected by the American Government. We finance and support Ky; we maintain him and his coterie of ruling generals in command in South Vietnam. They are our responsibility. When Ky declares it to

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

be the policy of his government to "go North" he is reiterating what President Diem declared the policy of his government to be in 1955, a policy for which he claimed American support.

Mr. President, in the Washington Post this morning, on page A–13, we have a story under the headline "Ky Says Saigon's Task Is To 'Liberate' North."

The article reads:

South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky believes his country has the "noble and supreme task" of "liberating the North and reunifying the fatherland."

Ky made the statement in a speech on February 21 during a public seminar in Saigon, but word of it became available in Washington only yesterday.

In calling for reunification of the North, Ky said "we cannot betray the 4,000 years of our history, and * * * we cannot betray the sacrifices in bones and blood made by our ancestors and our sons and brothers, and * * * we cannot let the millions of the North Vietnamese people continue to endure these sufferings under the yoke of Chinese colonialists and their North Vietnamese puppet administration's lackeys."

Ky has made similar statements in the past, but this appeared to be the first of its kind since his Honolulu meeting last month with President Johnson. Ky's talk of "liberating" the North is directly at odds with the Johnson policy.

Mr. Johnson has repeatedly said that the United States is not threatening the existence of the North Vietnamese regime and is not attempting to alter its Communist form of government.

BILL AUTHORIZES COMBINED WAR FORCE FUNDED DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

The bill provides for the increased scope of the war in three ways. First, it provides for the funding of all military forces serving in South Vietnam out of U.S. Defense Department appropriations.

Second, it authorizes the construction of new military bases throughout southeast Asia at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

And third, it provides for an increase of nearly half a million men in the armed services of the United States.

The first of these—the funding of all military activities in Vietnam out of our Defense budget—contemplates a total and direct reversal of the policy of the United States as set forth at the time the Southeast Asia Collective Defense treaty was presented and ratified.

I read section 401(a):

Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in connection with support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.

The bill provides a blank check on American defense spending for expanding this war into Laos and Thailand, and when we get through paying and equipping the armed forces of South Korea and the Philippines I think we will see the war spread to those countries, too.

Under this bill, and in this title, we are making the Vietnam war an American war. No longer is there any pretense that military aid to the forces of South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand is aid to separate and independent military identities. Their forces are to be funded out of our American military defense spending, and I predict that this provision, which is totally unlimited as to amount and as to countries, will serve to further destroy the integrity of such neighboring countries as Thailand and any other country that is included in it.

ASIAN DEFENSE FORCE UNDER SEATO REJECTED

As I recited to the Senate on Friday, this kind of organization was specifically rejected in 1954 and 1955 when Secretary of State Dulles presented the treaty to the Senate, and when it was ratified by this body.

He told the Foreign Relations Committee that he did not like to use the word "SEATO" in connection with the treaty, because the "O" stood for "Organization" and no organization was intended or contemplated. He said:

We are trying to get away from the word because it implies a southeast Asia treaty organization comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That organization is designed in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty to build up a defensive force on the continent of Europe which itself would be sufficient to resist attack by the Red armies.

As I point out, that is not now the purpose under this treaty. We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the U.S. Military Establishment to form an army of defense in this area. We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power. That we made clear to our associate in the treaty, and that is our policy.

So that we do not intend, Mr. Chairman, to have under this treaty any such local combined forces as have been created in Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty, and which goes by the name of NATO.

It was on that basis, and with those assurances, that the treaty was ratified by the Senate. In this bill, we not only reverse that policy by creating a local combined force, including major elements of the American Military Establishment, but we are going to pay the entire cost for all the countries that contribute to it. I know that so far, we are told that Ausrtalia and New Zealand are paying their own way, but there is no reason to expect they will continue to do so, once the U.S. Defense Department pays for everyone else.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Dulles presented the treaty to the Senate, he told the Foreign Relations Committee that he did not like to use the word "SEATO" in connection with the treaty, because the "O," as he said, stands for "organization," and no organization was intended.

That is very critical in this debate, Mr. President. That is why I said last Friday, and will not review it in detail, in my judgment the Secretary of State is quite mistaken in his now contention that SEATO is a justification for a course of action. But of course the Secretary of State, when he testified before our committee, forgot what he told the Foreign Relations Committee in both 1962 and 1964 and in executive session in regard to SEATO. He seemed then to have been aware of what Secretary Dulles had said.

EXPANSION OF BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The second way in which the bill authorizes the expansion of the war is in the authority it gives the Secretary of Defense to penetrate further into that area of the world.

Look at the language of section 302. The bill authorizes certain construction in support of military activities in southeast Asia, and for other purposes. Section 302 reads:

The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States, and in connection therewith to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities and equipment in the total amount of $200 million.

Do not tell the American people again, I say to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of Defense, and to the President, that the United States seeks no military bases in South Vietnam or in southeast Asia.

Mr. President, stark realism ought to warn us: "We spend these huge sums of money for the building of American bases in southeast Asia, and we will be there for a long time."

In fact, at the present time, as I pointed out in my speech last night here on the floor of the Senate, we are finding ourselves becoming more and more involved in political controversy with Japan for we are maintaining huge bases in Okinawa, and we are maintaining our naval bases in Japan.

Even the majority party in Japan is split over our course of action. Even the majority party of Japan wishes more favorable negotiations for our use of those bases to the economic advantage of Japan. There are many in the majority party who believe that we should get out now, and of course the other parties in Japan campaign on that controversy as one of their major issues in opposition to the Government of Japan.

When we spend these huge sums of money for the building of American bases abroad, the tendency is to postpone and postpone and postpone getting out. In my judgment, in view of what is going to develop in southeast Asia, it is my great concern and my fear that the construction of these bases, contrary to the enclave theory of a General Gavin, will result in America's presence in southeast Asia for many years to come.

I believe that now is the time to reject that policy. I believe that now is the time to reject a bill which has that policy included in it, and also, to reject a bill which, in my judgment, gives to the Secretary of Defense and to the President of the United States the discretionary power which this bill would give them. For, as section 5 provides:

The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States.

As Senators know, I am always concerned about giving broad discretionary power to any administrator of the Government because that always increases

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

the danger of going further and further down the road—a road on which we have already traveled too far—of government by executive supremacy.

I deplore the extent to which Congress has already delegated what I consider to be entirely too much discretionary power to the executive branch.

Therefore, I say that it is a great mistake to approve the policy of building these installations in southeast Asia. That is why I say that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States should no longer repeat what they have been saying so frequently, that we seek no military bases in southeast Asia.

This section refers to installations and facilities "vital to the security of the United States." Who is to say what is vital to the security of the country?

WHAT IS VITAL IN ASIA?

Why not the Congress rather than, as in the provisions of this bill, the Secretary of Defense. It is he who is authorized by this bill to establish the outposts of American military command that will thence have to be defended by all the resources of this Nation that may be required to defend them. And these so-called vital interests are not in the Western Hemisphere, for the short title of the bill explains that it refers to military activities in southeast Asia.

Mr. President, one of the great differences between sincere men in this debate from its inception, which started two and a half years ago, is that the Senator from Alaska and I have stated time and again on the floor of the Senate in our speeches that, in our judgment, South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy.

I repeat that assertion today.

In my judgment, we cannot justify the slaughtering of a single American boy in South Vietnam. I am perfectly willing to let history be the judge. To those who are talking about protecting our boys over there by enacting this bill, let me say in rebuttal that we who are urging defeat of the bill, are urging its defeat so that it will force upon the administration a change of policy which will prevent the killing of American boys in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, that is one of the precious checks which the Constitution gives to Congress; namely, the check on the purse strings. All this talk that if we exercise this check we will be endangering the lives of American boys is entirely unreal.

If we exercise the check, we will have to change the policy. We will have to return to such a program as General Gavin has been advocating. We will have to fall back on a program which prevents escalating the war and sending our forces farther and farther into South Vietnam, eventually into North Vietnam—and, in my opinion, ultimately into China, where they will be killed by the hundreds of thousands.

That is the issue at stake here.

Let the American people understand that that is the issue. Let the American people answer Congress on that issue as we go forward across the Nation in the months ahead in this historic debate at the grassroots of America over our foreign policy.

As long as we remain free, the American people have the ultimate check upon Congress. In my judgment, we have reached the point now so that American foreign policy can be changed only by the American people. I am satisfied that it is not going to be changed by Congress.

I do not accept the premise of the opposition that we have vital interests in southeast Asia which call for unilateral American military action. The world has some vital issues in southeast Asia. The world has some obligations vis-a-vis southeast Asia.

When I speak of the world, I mean those nations which have pledged themselves, over their own signatures, to preserve the peace—but not the United States unilaterally. Every signatory to the United Nations Charter has an obligation to preserve the peace of the world. Do we not see the great difference?

One of the great differences which exist between us as sincere men is the honest difference of opinion as to whether we have any right, legally or morally, to set ourselves up as the policemen of the world, to carry out what we consider to be the policy that we believe the world should adopt. That is why we are having so much difficulty, in so many places around the world, in getting more than token support, more than lip service to our foreign policy in Asia.

As the war escalates, and more human beings on both sides of the war are slaughtered, we will find rising opposition and resentment to our country's policy. That is why I have been pleading that we should come to grips with the great moral issue involved, too, in connection with the war. For, in my judgment, our policies cannot be reconciled with the glorious, historic record of our Republic in support of historic ideals. For I consider that we have walked out on those ideals.

Since when, and in what act of Congress, is southeast Asia defined as vital to the security of the United States, justifying any unilateral action that may be needed on our part to defend it? The most that can be cited is the SEATO treaty, which, however, does not define the area as vital but refers to a "common danger" to all SEATO members that has never been seen by our SEATO partners.

The resolution of August 1964 cites southeast Asia as an area where the United States regards "the maintenance of international peace and security" as vital to our interests. The continued intrusion of large-scale American military forces, bases, and navies into this area, as provided by the bill, will destroy what little international peace and security is left to the people of Thailand, Laos, Malaysia, and eventually Burma and Cambodia, for the war that is lapping at their shores will engulf them, too, if it is allowed to proceed on its present course.

According to Secretary McNamara's testimony on pages 52 and 53 of the hearings, about $975 million of existing and new military construction money is to be spent in South Vietnam, the remaining $666 million elsewhere in the general area. Senators cannot authorize a Defense Department to exercise this kind of discretion and then not see it exercised. This is how the war has been enlarged and under this provision it will continue to be enlarged.

On the basis of my observations in my many years in the Senate, if the military is given the funds it seeks, it always finds ways to spend those funds. If mere men—I care not who they are—with all the human frailties that characterize each one of us, gets this kind of power, the danger is that they became drunk with power. The best way to stop intoxication is to keep liquor away from the potential intoxicant. The best way to avoid the growing danger in this country that leaders of this country will become more drunk with power is to deny them the authorization for the exercise of the power.

That is the policy involved in the bill.

Sometimes it is said that the resolution of August 1964 justifies this course of action. The resolution of August 1964 cites southeast Asia as an area where the United States regards "the maintenance of international peace and security" as vital to our interests. The continued intrusion of large-scale American military forces, bases, and navies into this area is what I am concerned about, for they bring an enlargement of the war, not peace or security. We ought to reject the policy of this bill that permits another enlargement of the war at the discretion of the President.

NEW MANPOWER INCREASES PROVIDED IN BILL

The third way in which the bill authorizes an escalation in the war is in the manpower increases for American Armed Forces it provides.

I call the attention of Senators to the tables furnished by the Secretary of Defense which appear on pages 14, 15, and 16 of the hearings. There we see that the plans of the Defense Department call for increases in active duty military personnel by a net total—these are increases—of 452,843 men to be financed by this measure. That increase is planned to be realized by the end of fiscal year 1967. Three hundred and forty-seven thousand of these men are expected to be added by June of 1966.

Surely Senators who continue to delude themselves that this pending measure merely finances what has already been done and what is now being done have simply not read the hearings. The purpose of the new authorization is substantially to increase our ground and air operations in southeast Asia and to provide both the manpower and the material to do it. Our immediate objective is to eliminate the Vietcong forces from South Vietnam and to establish General Ky as the unchallenged authority throughout South Vietnam.

It seems to be well understood that General Westmoreland wants at least another 200,000 men in South Vietnam to step up the work of seeking out Vietcong forces and destroying them. Assuming that we can do that without North Viet-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

nam raising the ante on its side, those 400,000 troops will have to remain in South Vietnam as occupation forces for the indefinite future.

In fact, I think with the adoption of this bill the American people ought to understand that we are going to have large numbers of American soldiers in southeast Asia for a long, long time to come. I only raise the caveat that, in my judgment, when the American people fully come to understand that that is inherent in our policy in southeast Asia, they will repudiate any administration that sponsors such a plan, and they should.

RESPONSE FROM OTHER SIDE UNKNOWN

The most amazing thing about this bill is the ease with which Congress has accepted its authorization for a larger war without even asking what we expect the other side to do in response. There is not a word in the hearings of what the administration expects the Vietcong, North Vietnam, China, or Russia to do in response to our projected buildup.

Our leaders are, in effect, whistling in the dark. They are engaging in wishful thinking that China will not come in, or that Russia will not come in, or that North Vietnam will not commit her army. But they have been so wrong so many times in regard to what was going to happen in Asia that I think time will prove them wrong again. I do not think the people of the United States or any other Western nation will be permitted to maintain a foothold in Asia. No matter how many years it will take to throw us out, we will be thrown out, but at the cost of a shocking holocaust.

Is it assumed that North Vietnam, that Russia and China, will do nothing? If that is the assumption, on what is it based?

Or is there evidence that North Vietnam will increase its own military strength in the south? Or will the Soviet Union pour more equipment into North Vietnam to be used in the south? We are preparing another escalation in the war, I say to my colleagues, and we are doing it in this bill without so much as a hint as to what the response of the opposition may be.

I have quoted Secretary McNamara's statement on page 115, wherein he said that if the North Vietnamese add greater force, if the military risk associated with our present policy increases beyond the limits we presently see, it might be desirable to change our strategy of not seeking to destroy the Government of North Vietnam. But as to the possibilities and expectations of the administration as to what the response of North Vietnam will be, I find nothing in the hearings. Nor are we given any hints about possible reactions and responses from the two great Communist powers, China and Russia.

We have already been through the experience of the failure of the bombing of the north to force Hanoi to the bargaining table. We were all assured a year ago that air raids on North Vietnam would quickly demonstrate to her the potential destruction the U.S. Air Force and Navy could visit upon her and bring her to the sensible conclusion that in the face of such overwhelming power she should seek the best peace she could get at the negotiating table.

We listened to testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan. We heard the general point out that Hanoi and Saigon are, in fact, two hostage cities, and that an attack on one will mean, in all probability, an attack on the other.

I most respectfully express the view that I am at a loss to understand how my colleagues who support this bill think that we can go forward with a new policy that is authorized under the bill and not have it result in a great escalation of the war on both sides, by the United States and by North Vietnam, and I think eventually by China, too, with Russia not for long standing on the sidelines as a noncombatant.

Mr. President, I am very much of the opinion that there is no hope of our reaching a peace table. We may eventually reach a surrender table, only to have the war continue in a different form. But there is no hope for a peace table under the policies in this bill.

I repeat that we were all assured a year ago that air raids on North Vietnam would quickly demonstrate to her the potential destruction the U.S. Air Force and Navy could visit upon her and bring her to the sensible conclusion that in the face of such overwhelming power she should seek the best peace she could get at the negotiating table.

The Vice President is now abroad in the country trying to sell that policy. He is going to be answered, although it is interesting that he does not want to come before a public meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee or apparently even an executive meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee to try to defend the action he took on the trip that took him into southeast Asia.

But, Mr. President, come or not come, policies that he is now advocating, thinking that people can be bombed to a peace table, must be answered and will be answered, because he has drawn the issue. We will meet him on the issue because in my judgment he, too, must be repudiated.

The Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY] has brought out with crystal clearness the alternative that ought to be followed in recognizing that we must not take the position that we are going to dictate the terms, who will be invited to the negotiating table, and as to who will comprise that interim government that is going to be necessary for that period of years until at long last the people of North and South Vietnam will be in a position where they can really exercise the precious privilege of self-determination.

All of the proposals for bombing the enemy to a negotiating table have thus far failed, in my judgment, and will continue to fail, if we are talking about a peace table.

That expectation proved false. The reaction of Hanoi was just the opposite. The Defense Department and Secretary Rusk contend now that she has increased her support to the Vietcong.

What does Secretary McNamara or Rusk think will be the response of Hanoi to the increased deployment of troops and increased air activities provided for in this bill? Senators do not know. If the administration has any opinion, it has not revealed it.

I cannot vote for these continued expansions of the war that jeopardize, and do not conserve, more of our Armed Forces than are already there.

This bill does not support the men in Vietnam. It calls for the sending of hundreds of thousands more, for military objectives that are well beyond the capacity of our existing Vietnamese force to achieve.

For these reasons and the reasons I have already expressed in the series of speeches I have made in opposition to this bill heretofore in the Senate, when the roll is called on the bill itself, I shall vote against it.

HANDWRINGING IS NOT ENOUGH

Mr. President, I have one closing comment with regard to what we are reading in the newspapers today, the wire reports, about, may I say respectfully, the handwringers who conclude that the bill is not a proper vehicle for any limiting language. They should be asked what is the proper vehicle.

The only measure on this subject is the foreign aid supplemental and subsequent to that, the appropriation. Will they take the position that maybe those bills, after they have authorized this policy, are the proper vehicle for placing some restriction on this administration?

Or are we always going to hear from them that the proper vehicle has not come along while the whole world slides deeper into war?

Now is the time to place the restriction on this administration. Now is the time for Senators who voted for the resolution in August 1964, to go on record as to the degree they want it modified because this is the first opportunity they have had to pass upon any policy in regard to America's program in southeast Asia.

I will say to them that they will never have a better chance, never a more appropriate chance to take a stand on whether or not they reaffirm the position that they took in August 1964, or now believe that that resolution should be restricted.

Therefore, it is with sadness in my heart that I say that I am keenly disappointed that Members of this body who have been making so many speeches in so many places expressing the view that they did not agree when they voted on the resolution of August 1964, to all the things that this administration has done in southeast Asia under it.

Apparently they are willing today to vote without any restriction to a whole line of expanded policy in southeast Asia. In my opinion they do a great injury by following that course of action without voting restrictions now.

As I announced last night, I would have offered my amendment yesterday had I not said that I would accommodate a group of Senators on two occasions to see if they could reach an agreement on a possible modification of the resolution of August 1964. Therefore I withheld offering the amendment.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

I offer the amendment now. I send it to the desk. It is the amendment which proposes to add a new section. at the end of the bill, as follows:

SEC. 402. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia", approved August 10, 1964 (78 Stat. 384), is hereby repealed.

I say to the Senate that I have checked in regard to the applicability of this amendment as an appropriate amendment to the pending measure and I have been advised that it is in order.

Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON in the chair). The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

SEC. 402. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia", approved August 10, 1964 (78 Stat. 384), is hereby repealed.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I am somewhat in a dilemma with respect to the amendment proposed by the Senator from Oregon.

It had been my intention to offer as a substitute an amendment that would reaffirm all of the original powers and all of the original purposes of the joint resolution of August 10, 1964.

There is no doubt in my mind that a substantial majority of the Senate would support such an amendment.

It is evident that there would be so much explanation, and hemming and hawing on the part of those who have delayed action on this authorization for so many days, that this debate would be prolonged for several more days if not weeks.

I have concluded, after careful consideration, that the defeat of the proposal of the Senator from Oregon by the Members of the Senate would have the same effect as the adoption of the substitute proposal that I envisioned. I say that, Mr. President, because when his amendment has been defeated, this will leave the original joint resolution of August 7, 1964, commonly called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, unimpaired, in full strength and vigor, and with Congress, except for two Members of the Senate, who voted against the 1964 resolution, solemnly and solidly behind the President in the steps that he has taken in southeast Asia.

Whatever we may call it, no matter how much those who hesitate to take a formal position in this matter may obfuscate the issue, when we defeat the amendment of the Senator from Oregon—and I can understand why he deplores the positions of some of those who have been associated with him in this fight—the effect will be a reaffirmation of the President's power.

I stated when I brought the bill to the floor that I did not regard this authorization for weapons, medicine, and facilities—including port facilities—as being either an affirmation or a rejection of our policies in Vietnam and that the bill did not set policy in the slightest degree. I have done my best to keep policy determinations out of the bill, because I thought it was more orderly to have them considered in some other way. But the question of policy has been injected into the debate now, and I wish to make it perfectly clear that so far as the senior Senator from Georgia is concerned—and I hope the President will take the same view—the vote on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon will be, in effect, a reaffirmation of the joint resolution passed in August 1964.

I have not reached my conclusion hastily. I opposed the original proposal to send American military advisers or a training mission, together with a quantity of military equipment and materiel, to South Vietnam, as vigorously as I could. I am not now in favor of intervention throughout the entire world. By instinct and inclination, I must confess that I am an isolationist. I do not believe that the might and power of the United States can bring about the millennium. I do not believe that any number of treaties, however solemnly drafted, however well-intentioned, will absolutely clear up all the strife among the peoples of the world, of different nationalities, different races, and different creeds. There is nothing in all history to suggest that they will.

But I am in favor of striving for peace, because this is indeed a laudable aim to work for. Nevertheless, as a realist, I am not in favor of contributing American money and American blood in unlimited quantities for a goal that I do not believe is attainable.

When the joint resolution of August 1964 was brought forward, I saw how broad it was in its terms. I cannot plead ignorance. I understand that some Senators say that they did not know exactly what they were voting for when they voted for that joint resolution. I knew how broad it was. For that reason, I suggested that Congress reserve its power in this matter by a provision that the resolution could be terminated by a concurrent resolution, in which the executive branch of the Government does not participate.

That provision was written into the joint resolution, I think that the Senator from Oregon would have been better advised if he had tried to secure adoption of a concurrent resolution instead of offering an amendment to this bill for supplies and equipment.

I am a congressional man. I have stood here for more than 30 years and deplored—almost wept over—the slow erosion of congressional power that has placed this body in a position inferior to the other branches of the Government. The whole genius of our Government was to provide three coequal branches—legislative, executive, and judicial.

But, Mr. President, I cannot plead ignorance. I knew that the joint resolution conferred a vast grant of power upon the President. It is written in terms that are not capable of misinterpretation, and about which it is difficult to become confused. I read one or two sentences:

Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

The language could not have been drawn more clearly. Personally, I would be ashamed to say that I did not realize what I was voting for when I voted for that joint resolution. It is only one page in length; it is clear; it is explicit. It contains a very great grant of power. I would be the last to deny it.

I stand here today supporting the pending measure with all the power of my being, not because I believe that the United States should be the policeman of the world, but because we are confronted with a condition. We are not discussing possibilities and theories and contingencies. We are confronted with a condition where more than 300,000 of the flower of the young manhood of this Nation are 9,000 miles away from home, on foreign soil and waters. I have just enough of the old clan spirit of the Scotch-Irish—indeed, of the European people—to come to the defense of those of my own blood when they are in danger anywhere throughout the world.

As I see this matter in its simplest terms, I am not going to quibble over how those men got there. I am not going to involve abstract constitutional arguments. I intend to try to help them.

I regard this situation as being similar to one in which a man has become involved in quicksand. He has slowly sunk until only his eyes can be seen. Along comes his brother with a rope under his arm. The unfortunate man says, "Brother, please help me out of the quicksand."

The brother asks, "How did you get in the quicksand? What did you want to walk over there for? You ought to have had more sense. When are you going to get out of the quicksand?"

Mr. President, I am not going to go through all of that. I am going to throw the rope. I intend to do all within my power without splitting hairs, without legalisms, and without theorizing to support these men who are there in Vietnam, not of their own volition. They did not order themselves there. But they are there because they were ordered by authority established under our form of government.

I am not afraid of the constitutional issue that is involved here. There is no question in my mind about the constitutionality of all that has been done. I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of some of it, but there is no question whatever as to the constitutionality of it.

There have been over 125 instances in which American men have been ordered to take action or maintain positions abroad through pure Presidential order without the support of the kind that was afforded to the President of the United States in the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Wilson sent the marines into Vera Cruz to satisfy American honor. As I recall it, Buchanan sent troops into foreign lands. He sent them to attack and charge and carry the forts at Canton in China because of an insult to the U.S. flag.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

There was a day when the American people cheered when Theodore Roosevelt said: "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead." That was in the days when we were not so completely international. That was in the days when people were proud to be American citizens. That was in the days when an American citizen felt that he had a right to look to his country to protect him. That was before we got all of this infection that is today making this county quiver and hesitate and raise a fictitious issue.

There should be no question as to the constitutionality of this situation. There is nothing mandatory in the Constitution about declaring war.

In an effort to separate governmental powers and establish a system of checks and balances, the Constitution of the United States provides that the power to declare war is in the Congress. However, that same Constitution, in enumerating the powers of the President of the United States, provides that he is Commander in Chief of all the Armed Forces of the United States. Every person knows that the Commander in Chief has a right to order the forces wherever he may will. Congress then, to shift back to the system of checks and balances, has ways of exercising its responsibility. One way is the power of the purse. It can deny the President the funds. But I hope that we never have another instance in which an attempt is made to deny funds in the middle of an undertaking that has been approved by Congress. That can only mean hardship to the young men serving in our Armed Forces. It would not really punish those whose actually ordered them there.

The Constitution grants the Congress a great many powers that it does not exercise. One is that Congress has the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.

A substantial argument could be made that we are undertaking to punish offenses against the law of nations in the fight in Vietnam.

We have waged war without a declaration of war time and again. Not only has the Commander in Chief waged war without any formal declaration of war, but Congress has also done so.

I have a very errant and varied appetite in reading. I suppose that I have accumulated more useless information from books than has any other living person. I spend hours each day in reading. However, one sometimes comes up with something that is helpful.

When this question of constitutionality was raised a few months ago, I remembered that I read an old book that was entitled "Our Naval War With France." I sent to the Congressional Library for the book.

If ever there were a case in which Congress waged a war for 3 years, it was in the naval war with France. In proportion to our strength in that period we put more of our resources and men into that war than we have put into this war in South Vietnam.

I am not going to read at length from this book. It is fascinating to me, but it would be very boring to most people to read about the battle between the privateer *Bette* and the man-of-war *Excalibur*, and how one boarded the other. I get a vicarious pleasure from that type of reading.

As recounted in this book, when our representative to France had been insulted, the President sent a message to Congress and said:

> I will never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation.

Our people had much more confidence in themselves when we had about 3½ million people scattered along the Atlantic seaboard from Canada to Florida than we have today when we are unquestionably the greatest power on earth.

I continue to read:

> Congress had already begun to act, and during the spring and summer of 1798, adopted a number of warlike measures. The first of these was an act, passed April 27, to provide additional armament for the protection of American trade; and on the 30th, another, organizing the Navy Department.

We had no Department of the Navy until 1798. It had been in the Department of the Army.

I continue to read:

> Acts soon followed directing the construction and purchase of more vessels, authorizing the capture of French vessels, suspending intercourse with France, establishing the Marine Corps, and making other necessary provisions for hostilities. Inasmuch as under the Constitution of the United States treaties are the supreme law of the land, these measures of defense, being in conflict wth existing treaties with France—

That refers to the treaties—

> were deemed unlawful. Therefore, to avoid this difficulty, as well as to get rid of troublesome obligations, the treaties were abrogated by the act of July 7, on the ground that they had already been violated by France.

Here Congress was abrogating treaties of immunity and friendship with France. In that case, we walked right up to a declaration of war.

It will be recalled that our Government summoned George Washington from his well-earned retirement to Mount Vernon, and said:

> We are about to fight these French. We want you to come and take command of the armies.

What George Washington said should cause some people to be ashamed of themselves. He said:

> I must not conceal from you my earnest wish that the choice had fallen upon a man less declined in years and better qualified to encounter the usual vicissitudes of war. Feeling how incumbent it is upon every person, of every description, to contribute at all times to his country's welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when everything we hold dear and sacred is threatened, I have finally determined to accept the commission of Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States.

Mr. President, the book continues about how they established the Marine Corps. I could read the reports of 100 naval engagements. We sent American frigates to the Bay of Biscay; we sent them into the Mediterranean; we sent parties into the harbors at Martinique and Guadalupe and Cap-Haïtien in Haiti, where the French were then stationed, and cut out their ships and attacked their forts; and we had a good many people killed and we killed many Frenchmen over a period of 3 years. But nobody declared war and nobody urged that we declare war.

I remind you, Mr. President, that there were men in that Congress who had served in the Constitutional Convention. They had some idea of what was intended by that document, the Constitution of the United States.

Oh, I realize it is considered as outmoded, in some quarters. Some persons think the Constitution has no place in today's scheme of things. But as long as I am in the Senate, I shall refer to the Constitution as a guide for my actions. I have taken an oath to do so, and I make no pretense to great piety, but I shall not welsh.

Here is another paragraph:

> To supplement the activity of the Navy in the defense of the country, private enterprise was stimulated by issuing letters of marque. The act of June 25, 1798—

That was an act of Congress, my fellow Senators, not an act of the President of the United States—

> The act of June 25, 1798, ordered that merchant vessels might "repel by force any assault" committed upon them by French cruisers or privateers, capture the aggressors and recapture American vessels which had been taken by the French.

It goes on to say:

> The act of July 9 authorized the President to grant the owners of private armed ships * * * special commissions * * * and such private armed vessels, when duly commissioned, shall have the same license and authority for subduing, seizing, and capturing any French armed vessels * * * as the public armed vessels might by law have.

That law was passed by the Congress of the United States. This was no quick, overnight affair. It lasted for over 3 years. I do not wish to bore Senators, but there are many references to many acts of Congress while the United States was waging war for 3 years without any formal declaration.

I do not favor any declaration of war in this case. Whom would we declare war against? If we can only declare it against the Vietcong, it would have been just as sensible in other eras to have said, "We declare war against Francisco Villa, or we declare war against Sandino"—I believe that was the bandit down in Nicaragua we fought for some time.

It just does not make sense to declare war against the Vietcong.

Should we declare war against the North Vietnamese? We do not recognize North Vietnam. They are not in the United Nations. And we do not know what effect such a declaration of war would have.

A declaration of war against North Vietnam might bring into play mutual defense treaties between and among North Vietnam, Communist China, and

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

the Soviet Union. So I am not in favor of declaring war. I see nothing to be gained by it, and I perceive that we might lose a great deal. It would be a very, very foolish step to take.

Mr. President, the issue of constitutionalism comes with a hollow sound from anybody except the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Alaska. They voted against the Tonkin Bay resolution; and therefore they can certainly offer or urge any argument they wish against this matter free of any criticism.

We gave the President of the United States power in that resolution. If we want to take it back, the best way is through a concurrent resolution.

But I knew what I was doing. I did it with some qualms, but I am not here today to plead ignorance and say I did not know what I was doing, or that I did not know the power would go so far, when the resolution said he could use any steps—any steps—that might be necessary to protect our vital interests in the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

So we may criticize the President, but with the exception of 2 Members of this Congress—535 Members—we are absolutely changing face when we do it, because we voted him even greater powers than he has employed.

I do not discount the possibility that Red China and even the Soviet Union might be brought into this war. I had that in mind when I was originally urging that we not become involved in any way. I appreciate the fact that the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], who was then Assistant Secretary of State—I had forgotten all about the incident until last summer, when I returned from my illness, he mentioned it here on the floor—was sent down to Georgia to tell me a mission had been sent to South Vietnam, and that we were going to send material. I told him then, "I think you have made a mistake, but the Commander in Chief can commit our flag, and I will support the flag, even though I think it is going to be a long struggle and costly in blood and treasure."

I feel that way today. I think the sooner we come to some decision there, the better off everybody will be. I do not favor all this timidity, whether it is in the executive branch of the Government or in the Congress. If we are going to keep men there, I am not in favor of having them picked off by handfuls here and there, in order to keep down the casualty lists, when we know over a period of years it is going to amount to massive numbers. If it is our policy to keep them there—and it is our avowed policy—I say, "Visit such punishment on the North Vietnamese as will bring about a conference, and let us come to some determination of this issue. Let them have an election in South Vietnam. If they want a Communist government and can vote for it without intimidation, I think they have a right to have it, under our doctrine of self-determination."

However, self-determination is somewhat like the Constitution; it becomes less deserved in our system as we go along, because it seems that we support authoritarian regimes and republics alike, if we happen to be allied with them by treaty.

Mr. President, I must say that I was more than mildly surprised and perplexed by the timing of this assault, particularly the vehicle which was selected for it. This is an authorization bill, and I have tried to point out that it did not specifically involve policy, although I concede that money is going to be spent in Vietnam.

If Senators wish to punish the President by starving 300,000 American boys and leaving them in Vietnam, they should not only vote for the resolution of the Senator from Oregon but should also vote against the authorization. Senators have this power. But, I have an idea, if they do, that they will hear something from the American people. Every State in the Union has men in Vietnam. The people back in the "boondocks" and in our towns, and those living in the fords of the creeks, have a high value of life. It is a matter of grief when one of those coffins, with the American flag draped over it, comes back home to a small town. It is not a matter of higgling and haggling about policy or Presidential power. It is a matter which strikes right into the homes of a whole community.

We have been placed on notice that this authorization would be sought. Last August there was brought before the Senate and clearly explained a $1.7 billion supplemental appropriation for the same purposes involved here.

It passed by an 89-to-0 vote. At that time, it was declared on the floor of the Senate that the $1.7 billion would be just the downpayment, that additional authorizations and appropriations would be required early this year. Now we run into difficulties—right in the middle of the war—with a maze of technicalities, legalisms, surmises, false premises, more than I have ever seen hurled at one bill, much less a relatively modest authorization of this kind.

Mr. President, it has been stated on the floor of the Senate, in flights of hyperbole, that this measure is an open-ended invitation to war. I suppose this could be said about every annual appropriation bill enacted for the Defense Department from year to year, if it could be said, with accuracy, of the pending bill. If this is an open-ended invitation to war, then every appropriation bill for the maintenance of our Armed Forces is also an open-ended invitation to war. I, for one, am not willing to go about curbing the President's power by punishing American boys in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss this matter at further length, although I am full with it, because I have been torn by conflicting emotions, as I am sure most Senators have, concerning this issue. But I am not badly torn when it comes to the issue of supporting American soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen, because I have some familiarity with the lives they must live and their obligations. I know that they do not control their own comings and goings, that it is impossible to do so in any military establishment. I cannot conceive of a higher duty on the part of Congress than to support those who have been brought into the Armed Forces, who have been taken out of their businesses, taken away from civilian pursuits, paid a minimum salary, and then there is haggling over whether we are going to support them or not.

To me, it is utterly incomprehensible. I cannot understand it.

We have taken a calculated risk in Vietnam. We took it when the first man landed. We had it when a contingent landed there yesterday. We took a calculated risk when we operated our airpower in the south. We took a calculated risk when we operated our airpower in the north. I hope that we will take a calculated risk in undertaking to put a "stopper in the bottle" at the port at Haiphong and cut off their supplies to those trying to conquer South Vietnam.

I do not believe that we are ever going to bring this war to a termination until that is done.

Mr. President, sometimes I believe that the American people do not realize the tremendous might and strength of our military organization. However, our enemies know it. There was no doubt about it in the mind of Mr. Khrushchev when he received that letter on Cuba. He knew more about the strength of this country, and respected it more, than those who may tremble now at the thought of a confrontation.

It did not take Mr. Khrushchev long to send an answer, although I am not satisfied with the termination of that episode. I believe that in our exultation and celebration of that victory, we gave the victory away. We are now in the position of babysitting for Castro, when we should have destroyed him when we found the long-range missiles there.

That is my own view. As an individual I can express it, although I realize that it is not a majority view, either of Congress or the American people; but I just do not know when we will ever have another reason for doing it.

Congress had passed a resolution shortly before, declaring that the introduction of any offensive weapon into Cuba was an act of aggression against the United States. But now we are babysitting for Castro, who is 90 miles away from our shores, while fighting other communism 9,000 miles away. The human and logistical costs are staggering to contemplate. There is no doubt in my mind that if we had wiped out Castro, there would not be any similar probings along the perimeter of the Iron Curtain for the next 8 to 10 years. There will be, even if we bring the Vietnamese situation under control—as we will, eventually. There will be further probings on the part of communism in their quest for world domination, because they are not going to stop. But firm action against Cuba would have stopped them for a

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

long time. It would certainly have slowed down the Communists.

Mr. President, if there ever were a time when Congress should have at least an appearance of unity—whether we have any unity or not—it is today. Upon the unity of the American people in this Vietnam war depend the hopes of bringing it to an early conclusion. I do not doubt that Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow know what is going on. With every little sign of dissent, every criticism, every attack on American foreign policy, they will say, "Well, we are catching hell out there in Vietnam, but look what is going on back in the United States. We will hold on for a while longer. They will tire, and they will withdraw. Thus we will gain a victory."

So I say, Mr. President, it is time for an appearance of unity. And I hope that this issue will not be brought up recurringly on every bill that comes along. It should have been fought out when the Tonkin Gulf resolution was before the Senate. If an issue were to be made of the situation, it should have been made then.

Mr. President, generally I do not approve of appeals to emotion, because I do not believe they serve any useful purpose; but I should like to tell the Senate of a letter I received from a Georgia widow, with a son who is a corporal in the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines. He had served his hitch in Vietnam and was returned to the United States in December 1964, but was shipped back to Vietnam in August of 1965. She wrote me to ask if it were right for a person who had finished one tour of duty there to be sent back so quickly. She informed him she had written to me, and she sent me his answer. This is from a man who had already served one hitch in Vietnam and had been sent back. This is the reply to her letter she received from him:

DEAR MOTHER: I can't approve of what you did; I could not come home any way but the right way, and that is when my time is up, or else I'm wounded or dead, and I believe it will be because my time is up.

He had faith in himself. I do not know whether he is still alive and serving there.

The letter continues:

The other two ways I don't like. I'd love to be home, but there are times a man can't do what he would like to do, but has to do his part, and I believe this is my part. I hope you understand it isn't because I don't want to see you, but rather it's because I have a duty to do here. Come October I'll be home.

There may be a finer or higher sense of duty than that, but it has not been reflected here in this body.

Robert E. Lee is one of my heroes. I say that unashamedly. He was a great man, though he was the head of the rebel armies. He said that "Duty" is the most sublime word in the English language. The spirit of that American fighting in Vietnam is the most sublime spirit. Would to God it could permeate some of those in this Chamber, because we cannot win by haggling over an authorization bill at this time.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, we have listened to a very eloquent plea by the Senator from Georgia for action on the bill. I know we are going to do it very shortly. The Senator from Georgia, who made his plea, has pointed out the authority involved under the Constitution, and our duty in the Senate. He expressed himself very fully on this subject. He and I spoke on the floor over 2 weeks ago, when we brought the bill out of the Senate Armed Forces Committee by a unanimous vote. We believe there should be prompt action because the boys in Vietnam should be supported, and they need this authorization and the appropriation to support them.

I am opposed to the amendment of the senior Senator from Oregon for two reasons. First, I do not think it is in order in connection with the bill presently before us, and second, I oppose it on its merits. This is no time to pull the rug out from under the President.

S. 2791, which authorizes $4.8 billion in supplemental fiscal 1966 defense appropriations, provides necessary funds so that our men in Vietnam will have the equipment, food, and clothing they need to carry out their assigned tasks in the best possible way. It was reported out of the Armed Services Committee by a unanimous vote, even though some committee members may not entirely agree with our Vietnam policy.

Whether that policy is right or wrong was not considered central to consideration of this bill. It is a separate issue which, as I stated at the time the bill was reported, should be considered separately.

Of course there should be free and open discussion of our role in Vietnam. Certainly no one denies the right of an individual to raise questions regarding the wisdom of our policies there; we know there are important differences within this body on the issue. But S. 2791 is not the proper place to debate the fundamental question raised by the Senator from Oregon.

We must be aware that the issue presented by the Senator from Oregon is not a matter of withholding from the President some new authority he has requested. It is a question of withdrawing from him authority which the Senate, with but two dissenting votes, freely gave to him in August of 1964, and withdrawing it at a most awkward time. The implications of such an action are therefore very serious, and the consequences could be far reaching and lasting.

The legal basis for our participation in the Vietnam conflict has been questioned here and elsewhere. I find it significant and gratifying that recently the house of delegates of the American Bar Association by a unanimous vote of 279 to 0 upheld the legality of our involvement and said it was consistent with the United Nations Charter.

There are different opinions in this body regarding Vietnam, but I think we all applaud the recent statement of President Johnson as he received the National Freedom Award in New York:

We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor the result.

His statement of our purpose is worth repeating:

Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. Our men in Vietnam are there to keep a promise made 12 years ago. The Southeast Asia Treaty promised—as Secretary John Foster Dulles said for the United States—"that an attack upon the treaty area would occasion a reaction so united, so strong, and so well placed, that the aggressor would lose more than it could hope to gain." But we keep more than a specific treaty promise in Vietnam. We keep the faith for freedom.

None of us likes the situation in which we find ourselves in Vietnam. Everyone is troubled by it. We know that an increasing number of Americans is being exposed to danger and that some of our boys are being wounded or killed. We all want peace in that troubled area, but we must face the facts. We are in Vietnam—we are there because of our belief that people everywhere should be free to determine their own way of life, free to make the basic decisions regarding their government. We know there is no easy way out. As George Kennan, in analyzing our policy, said recently in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

A precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present circumstances a disservice to our own interests and even to world peace greater than any that might have been involved in our failure to engage ourselves there in the first place.

Given the situation and the responsibilities of the President as Commander in Chief and the chief agent of our foreign policy to exercise leadership in this crisis, can we shoot down his authority, restrict his actions, and indeed in effect repudiate the earnest efforts he has made to bring peace to that troubled area? I think we cannot, and I think we should not.

Whether or not one has misgivings about our policy in Vietnam, it seems to me inappropriate at this time to take the action recommended by the senior Senator from Oregon. What would be the consequences of such an action? What would be its effect on the morale of those serving us there? What would be the effect on our allies and on the Government of South Vietnam? How would Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and other neighboring countries react? Such an action would bring satisfaction to our enemies, consternation to those countries who, like us, are dedicated to the preservation of freedom, and would strike a crippling blow at the morale of our fighting men presently in Vietnam.

This is a time to show the world that individual differences over particular actions do not prevent us from presenting a united front, from supporting our Commander in Chief.

Senators and other Americans ought to continue to discuss the situation in Vietnam, to raise questions about policies, and offer constructive suggestions. That is one thing, but to shoot from under the President at this time his authority which we almost unanimously gave him in 1964 is, to me, unthinkable.

Of course, we expect the President to use sound judgment and to confer and consult with his advisers and the Congress as he goes about the difficult task

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

of ending this conflict. He has kept us informed so far and has asked our views and I see no reason to think he will stop doing so.

I am confident that when the vote is taken on the Morse amendment it will be defeated by an overwhelming margin. That will reveal our unity of purpose, that will give hope to our servicemen and to the people of South Vietnam, and will dismay our enemies who may have been deluded into thinking discussion meant fundamental disagreement. It will remind the world of our concern for our fellow man as he fights to remain free and to live in peace and rebuild his economy and the social and political life of his country. At this difficult time we cannot repudiate our President or imply that we have no confidence in his future actions. Passage of the Morse amendment would be misunderstood around the world with irreparable damage to our prestige and that of our President. I shall vote against it, and hope that it will be overwhelmingly defeated.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to say to the Senate and to the people of this Nation that I do not believe the solidarity and unity of this Chamber has ever been better represented in a time of peril than it has by the two spokesmen we have just heard, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who is the chairman of the committee, and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], who is the ranking Republican member of the committee. I salute them and commend them.

I would like to be associated with every point that they made. I would like to be especially associated with the point that the Senator from Georgia made when he said every dissent, every division, every expression of doubt, every expression of uncertainty is encouragement to our adversaries. They are looking for that kind of encouragement. They know that they cannot beat us on the field of battle, but they are looking here for encouragement to carry on their activities.

I hope that we get an overwhelming vote.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I will only state what I said some time ago when I said I hoped that this amendment would be offered, because I wanted to speak against it and vote against it.

Senators have complained in some instances that they have not had an opportunity to express themselves. If anyone does not have confidence in the President, if he wants to withdraw from the President as our Commander in Chief under the Constitution, the authority given the President to take whatever steps he finds necessary to resist aggression, then that Senator should vote for the amendment. If the motion to table is made, he should vote against the motion to table.

As far as I am concerned, I am voting on the merits of this matter. I understood the merits of the matter when I voted in August of 1964. I understand very well that we cannot fight a war by having 535 commanders in chief. There must be one Commander in Chief. We must unite behind that Commander in Chief and have faith and confidence in him, just as we have in the men that we send there to defend our national honor and the freedom of the world.

I will vote against the amendment and I hope that anyone who lacks faith and confidence in the President will vote against the motion to table in the event it be made.

Mr. President, I have an editorial here that I wish to put in the RECORD from WTOP in Washington. It is a very fine statement making clear the fact that those who wish to urge a policy of weakness and urge that we should not be firm and strong in our commitments, and those who wish to further erode the strength of our position, should seek to address themselves to the President individually and personally rather than through the press and the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the WTOP editorial be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Editorial broadcast on Feb. 23 and 24, 1966, over WTOP radio and television]

PRENEGOTIATION STRATEGY

Perhaps the wisest thing that has been said in the most recent flap about Vietnam came from U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldburg following a White House conference. The Ambassador was asked about Senator KENNEDY's statement to the effect that the Communists might be allowed to participate in a coalition South Vietnamese government. His response was that enough has been said on the subject already.

There has been a great to-ing and fro-ing here in Washington the last couple of days about Senator KENNEDY's argument that it might be necessary to admit dissident groups—meaning the Vietcong, mostly—into "a share of power and responsibility" in Saigon.

There have been any number of attempts at clarification, with the result that Senator KENNEDY appears to be edging closer to the White House view on how the Communists might become entitled to share power in South Vietnam. But in the midst of all the declarations on the subject, a fact emerges which needs attention.

It is that the United States cannot decide publicly before negotiations start just what our final bargaining positions will be. The situation allows a considerable number of options, depending on a number of circumstances when and if the Communists decide to talk to us.

We have offered unconditional negotiations. We have agreed to have the Vietcong represented, in fact if not in name. We have said—before Senator KENNEDY raised the issue—that we will accept the consequences of self-determination among the people of South Vietnam, whether we like those consequences or not. Surely this is as much as we ought to concede in advance of talks about the terms of a peace agreement.

This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I feel moved to speak because I think there is a point of view which has not been expressed.

Those of us, like myself, who will vote against the Morse amendment and want to table it, and who will vote for the bill to give the President additional funds, are not again writing a blank check.

I do not, and I cannot accept the vote against the Morse amendment as being a reaffirmation. Reaffirmation is the word used by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. He made a most moving speech, with which I agree in substance, as well as the speech of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL].

I cannot accept the fact that this will be a reaffirmation of the resolution of August 1964. The fact is that as the President has handled this situation he leaves us no other alternative. He has left no alternative for those who disagree with his policies except to vote against an authorization on another occasion. As I agree with his policies to date, I shall vote for this authorization. But if tomorrow I disagree with his policies the President leaves us no alternative but to vote against an authorization, and I shall do so.

Why is that so? It is a fact that the President has, in my judgment, the constitutional authority—as the house of delegates of the association of the bar found, as the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] said, as Commander in Chief and the official charged with foreign policy of the Nation—to intercede in Vietnam or any place with the Armed Forces of the United States where the interests of the United States are in such imminent danger. He can come to the Congress for the necessary authority which is, generally speaking a declaration of war.

I thoroughly agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] that a declaration of war would be most inadvisable at this time and I have said so in debate on the floor of the Senate.

The President was not satisfied with that. He not only ordered U.S. troops to Vietnam under aforementioned Presidential authority but he came to the Congress for a resolution and asked us to join in the policy. That resolution was not juridically necessary and it has no juridicial force. But in terms of policy it is critically important. It committed us to Presidential policy as of that time.

That is what the Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant. Having associated ourselves with this policy then, we now have a right to be consulted once again.

The Senator from Oregon told us the only logical thing he could do, considering his point of view, was to give us the opportunity to repudiate the policy the President set, and he is right. If we voted for the amendment of the Senator from Oregon, and the other body did, as it is also required to act, we would no longer be the President's partners in a policy sense.

It is a fact, whether we like it or not, that by virtue of having acted on the resolution of August 1964, we are a party to present policy. But we are a party that should be consulted now as well. We must be given an opportunity at the initiative of the President, to reaffirm our support for a new situation and also to set limits to his commitments of U.S. power. Our August 1964 resolution is

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

analogous, in my mind, to a power of attorney that one gives to a lawyer or someone else for a particular purpose: buying a house, a withdrawal of money from a bank account, and so forth, which power is also on very general terms.

I agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] that we are not engaged in legal tautologies. I understood perfectly that the President would get a grant of enormous authority. I said so. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] said so. The Senator from Georgia, I am sure, understood that very clearly. I know that he is an excellent lawyer; of course he did.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator knows that we were approving the use of the President's constitutional power.

Mr. JAVITS. Exactly.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We put Congress behind the President. We put the imprimatur of congressional power on a power that he could have exercised anyway. The late Senator Borah answered an argument that the Congress could make the President bring home certain troops then stationed in Europe:

> We could not make the President do it. He is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States; and if in the discharge of his duty he wants to assign them there, I do not know of any power that we can exert to compel him to bring them home. We may refuse to create an army, but when it is created he is the commander.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is exactly correct. The logical sequel to that is that if the President has abused his power to commit our forces, Congress still has a remedy. That remedy is to deny him the money. Then he can no longer exercise the power, and he must withdraw our forces. That is exactly what the Senator from Oregon is telling us.

The Gulf of Tonkin action has no role with reference to the action subsequently taken. At that time we were reacting to an attack upon American personnel and equipment. Our ships were in the Gulf of Tonkin. Since that time, and specifically from February to June of 1965, we have been engaged in combat operations. We are no longer advising; we are in direct combat operations in South Vietnam with organized American forces. I respectfully submit that this is an entirely different policy decision from the decision which authored the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Therefore, I am speaking today to explain why I back the actions of the President to date and to give notice why I may refuse to back him tomorrow.

Incidentally, I think there is a rather broad feeling pretty much along this line throughout the country. That is why the President has been making all the statements he has made—and quite properly—about his willingness to negotiate without conditions and about the limited purpose and the limited means he proposes to use to attain that purpose. But it is extremely important that the President should at no time mask his purposes. Consistent with the national security and with the way this matter is being handled, the President has a duty to the country and to Congress to at no time mask his purposes. We ought to know at all times exactly what his purpose is, if we are called upon to support that purpose. I think the President would do well to associate himself with Congress. Personally, I believe he is making a great mistake in not again coming to Congress and asking for a resolution of support. By coming to Congress again with a resolution, he would thereby give us an opportunity to support his present policy in a formal and direct way, and not force us to express approval or disapproval through other legislative means.

Therefore, when I vote in favor of this authorization bill, I am not reaffirming the joint resolution of August 1964 nor rejecting it. New policy support should necessitate a new resolution. Without such a resolution, I am left with no alternative but to protest against future Presidential actions in Vietnam through the authorization and appropriations process, that is, through the back door. And on behalf of the people of my State, I shall protest should any policy go beyond limited military means and objectives.

The final question, then, is, why do I support the President as far as he has gone? I do support him, and I shall vote that way, and shall know what I am voting for when I vote. The President has expressed a willingness to negotiate unconditionally. I believe, as I have said in a previous speech, that if we actually get a chance for peace talks, the President will, as Averell L. Harriman indicated, recognize the National Liberation Front of the Vietcong as a party to the negotiations. I am against the idea that they should be included in a coalition government before negotiations.

A second element of the President's policy, as I understand it, is that he is applying limited means to a limited purpose. In other words, he is not asking Congress for general mobilization. He assures us that he is not prejudicially draining down the forces of the United States that are charged with responsibilities around the world; but that he is utilizing forces which are available to the United States for this purpose, and that the purpose is solely to bring about sufficient pacification of major population concentrations in South Vietnam to enable that country to proceed to free elections and self-determination.

I think this is a very exciting day. It indicates the complete maturity of our country when not only the President, but also Senators like the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], can say that if in free elections, after a reasonable pacification period insuring the elections will really be free, the Vietnamese decide they want a Communist government, that is what they will have. We certainly will not stand in the way of free elections. This is an extremely important and most mature declaration of policy on the part of very important people in our country.

There is one ambiguous point in the President's declaration to date. The difficulty is that the President seems content to carry around in his pocket a worn copy of the August 1964 joint resolution. The President may further wrongly assume that a vote for this authorization bill is an endorsement of any future actions.

Perhaps that is the real essence of the argument of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and of the previous arguments which I have heard him make—and he knows that I have the highest respect for his judgment in the matter. I have debated as an administration defender in this particular matter. I speak in the role of a liberal, although the general liberal community is considered to be unafavorable to what the Government is doing in Vietnam. I do not agree with that because it seems to me to be anomalous that the liberal community of the United States should not recognize a struggle for freedom, as this one is, in my judgment, within the conditions I have described. Nonetheless, that is so.

So I have engaged in these debates. And I recognize the problem of escalation. We are always faced with the problem that if we put in another 100,000 men, the other side will put in another 100,000; then it will be increased 100,000 beyond that. Then we shall move into Cambodia, into North Vietnam, and into Laos; or we may take some other overt action against Communist Chinese installations, and the fat will then be in the fire.

But I do not conceive of that at all within the authority which I would be voting the President by supporting the bill to authorize $4.7 billion in additional appropriations. I do not believe, from everything that he has shown to date, that the President will construe our action in that way. I believe we are making a pact with him based exactly on what he has said. I make the urgent plea in terms of penalty, of being a grievous, deep offense in this country, that if the President wishes to espouse another policy which goes beyond the present deployment of our forces, the President, because he has now opened the door by the joint resolution of August 1964, should again come back to Congress for a new declaration of policy.

If there is any escalation beyond that point, then all of the arguments which have been made with reference to the escalation become relevant and pertinent.

I believe I have stated the situation thoroughly. It is my judgment that if the President sticks to his peace offensive, if he sticks to the limited purpose which he has described to us, and the means which he has described to us, those missions will accomplish that purpose.

This particular appropriation, it seems to me, has as its base the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, found at page 55 of the hearings.

I believe that to be so important that I hope my colleagues will indulge me as I read it into the RECORD.

Senator ELLENDER asked:

> Now, you have asked, for an increase in the number of personnel generally, in the amount

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

of 510,521 as appears on page 12 of your statement, that is your exhibit appearing at page 12. How many of those will be directly connected with our operations in South Vietnam?

This was Secretary McNamara's answer:

Secretary McNAMARA. First, Senator ELLENDER, we haven't asked for 510,521 to be added to the original 1966 program, but, rather, that amount less the military jobs transferred to civilian jobs, plus another adjustment, with the result that the net increase we are asking above the original 1966 total is 452,843.

Senator ELLENDER. Well, they are Americans who are going to be employed either in the Army, or the Navy, or the Air Force as well as personnel to take care of the administrative portion of our operations.

Secretary McNAMARA. The net total is 453,000, not 510,000.

Senator ELLENDER. At the bottom of your exhibit, you have a total of 510,521, you deduct 74,300 and add 16,620 to give you the figure——

Secretary McNAMARA. That is correct, sir. It is 453,000.

Senator ELLENDER. Well, of that 453,000, how many of those will be used in South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA. Well, these are additions to the total U.S. military force and it is not possible to say that any of those in particular will be used in South Vietnam, but, in the net, all of them are being added because of the South Vietnam conflict.

Mr. President, we have a right to assume that the order of magnitude we are talking about in this supplementary appropriation is approximately 450,000 personnel. The exact number is not material.

I am satisfied, as one Senator, that this kind of deployment in South Vietnam is enough, and that we will not have to go in for a general mobilization. We should not prejudicially drain the personnel available for our responsibilities around the world; We can do the limited job in South Vietnam described by the President with the presently projected force level.

With my eyes wide open, I am prepared to support that kind of effort. My reason is twofold: First, we must show that wars of national liberation, so-called euphemistically by the Communists, do not work. Even if they were to work, I do not believe in the domino theory. It will not be Malaya, Burma, or Thailand tomorrow, but it may very well be 8 or 10 Latin American countries, or 4 or 5 African countries, or 3 or 4 countries in the Middle East.

The Communists will try this approach wherever they can because it will be a formula that works. We shall have shown our inability to deal with it.

In terms of averting World War III, it is so critically important that we show our ability to deal with these guerrilla wars, that I believe that every American boy who falls in Vietnam is as much a hero as any boy who fought the Kaiser in World War I or Hitler in World War II.

Before I conclude, I shall read a letter which made my hair stand up. I believe that it will have the same effect on everyone else.

My second point is that in our great struggle with communism, the difference between the Soviet Union and Communist China is that the Communist Chinese think that in order to prevail, they must exterminate a good part of mankind.

The Soviet Union believes, and I think this is fairly clear from their policy, that they can outcompete the free world.

We very much prefer the latter kind of policy and welcome the competition on these grounds. We are ardent rooters for the latter because we think we can do mighty well ourselves. However, the Soviet Union is now engaged in this struggle in Vietnam up to its neck. Why? Because it is still placing its leadership of the Communist world on a higher priority than it places the effort to arrive at a detente or coexistence with the United States and the rest of the world.

I want to change that priority. The only way to avoid world war III and to change that priority is to show the Communist Chinese that the Soviet Union scheme of peaceful competition is better than the risks of war.

I consider that what has been done in South Vietnam, regardless of whether I would have gone there in the first place, or whether it is the best place for the confrontation—and there will be a lot of argument about that—is now a fact. The situation is there. It makes little sense to rehash past mistakes.

I believe that we must ultimately find a way to get along with Communist China. The alternative is ever-increasing risks of war through miscalculation. The coexistence idea must prevail, rather than the extermination idea which prevails presently among the Communist bloc.

It is for those reasons that I shall support the request for the appropriation now, without any assurance that I would do so tomorrow.

Mr. President, it is also for those reasons that I shall oppose the amendment of the senior Senator from Oregon.

I think it is most unfortunate that, because of the disputes and the differences and the unhappiness in many quarters, especially in very articulate quarters, in the newspapers, the press, the radio, and television, there is some feeling that the boys who are fighting in Vietnam are not quite earning the kind of gratitude, understanding, and appreciation from the American people as did those who fought in World Wars I and II. This is a very unhappy and most unfortunate situation.

I hope very much that whatever may be our view upon this situation—and I certainly have frankly expressed mine—that we will give recognition to those who are encountering the terrible dangers involved in this struggle. We have extended such recognition from our hearts for the patriotism of so many others around the world.

Mr. President, I should like to close by reading a very brief note. I sent a letter of condolence to this family which lost a son, a lieutenant, in the action in Vietnam.

The family wrote me as follows, the letter being signed by the members of the family:

DEAR MR. AND MRS. JAVITS: Thank you for your letter of comfort in this tragic time. We have lost our only child, a wonderful, loving, devoted, dedicated son. He has left us with beautiful memories. Our hope is that all involved in the struggle for the freedom for which Joseph sacrificed his life will be channeled in the right direction because that sacrifice must not have been in vain.

The letter is signed, "Sincerely, Joe and Pat De Gennaro."

Mr. President, if I can help as a Senator, as a human being, I shall do everything that I can.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, it is my intention, at an appropriate time, to move to table the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. While the Senator's amendment is in order, of course, under the Senate rules, I feel that it is inappropriate and inadvisable in connection with this bill at this time.

S. 2791, the pending business, is a military "nut and bolts" measure. The questions involved in it are clear and tangible. Regardless of the Tonkin Bay resolution we will have to dispose of this measure sooner or later. It is a bill which should stand alone and, in my judgment, should be considered on its own merit. I do not believe that any Member of the Senate wishes to delay the bill, as such, unduly. Difficulty has arisen here primarily because S. 2791 has been given in the minds of some a significance which it does not possess. There are many views, for example, on the precise meaning of the Tonkin Bay resolution which the distinguished Senator from Oregon seeks to rescind by his amendment. They cannot be resolved, in my judgment, through the vehicle of S. 2791 and so I shall move to table. If the Senator's amendment is tabled, it will have the effect of keeping in force the Tonkin Gulf resolution as passed by the Senate on a rollcall vote of 88 to 2 in 1964.

The prevailing constitutional situation will be unchanged. The significance of the Tonkin Gulf resolution will remain unchanged. It will still be as it is now, for each Senator in his own conscience to decide. The President believes that this resolution gives him some additional assurance, some authority in addition to that embodied in his constitutional position as Commander in Chief. Obviously that is the case or he would not have asked for the resolution in the first place. But among Senators, I know, there has been a wide divergence of view as to what, if any, constitutional significance attaches to a resolution of this kind. Those divergencies will remain. Indeed, that has been the case with all these so-called hand-upholding resolutions beginning with the Eisenhower administration.

Insofar as the leadership is concerned, however, a vote to table is most of all a vote to get on with the main business of S. 2791. It is also a vote to keep the Tonkin Gulf resolution in effect with whatever constitutional force it may have, even as a vote against tabling, as the distinguished Senator from Oregon has indicated, will result in its rescinding provided that the other House also agrees.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

To that extent, the issue is clear even though this is not the appropriate way, in my opinion, to consider this matter. As long as it has come before the Senate, however, a choice will have to be made. We are in too deep now. The situation is one of the utmost delicacy and the risk of misinterpretation is very great. It is, in short, a situation which each Senator will have to face up to on the basis of his own convictions.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH in the chair). The Senator from Washington is recognized.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished leader, is it his interpretation that his motion to table shall have the effect of reaffirming the Tonkin Gulf resolution?

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator was on the floor, he will recall that I said, in the course of my brief remarks, it meant that the Tonkin Gulf resolution would still be in effect.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, my only concern is that I think, after this long debate on the floor, it would be unfortunate if we came out of our deliberations with muted decisions. While a bill of this sort is not necessarily the place to offer this kind of amendment, I think the country is entitled to know the position of the Senate on Vietnam. I am very pleased that the majority leader makes that interpretation in offering his motion to table.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Washington, and again call to his attention what I previously said:

> Insofar as the leadership is concerned, however, a vote to table is most of all a vote to get on with the main business of S. 2791. It is also a vote to keep the Tonkin Gulf resolution in effect with whatever constitutional force it may have, even as a vote against tabling, as the distinguished Senator from Oregon has indicated, could well result in its rescinding, provided that the other House also agrees.

I yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, this entire matter had long discussion before the majority leader came in and his question as to whether or not there would be a vote directly on the Morse amendment or on the motion to table came up. There was some apprehension that a vote on the motion to table might leave some misapprenhension or misimpression abroad.

In all kindliness, I say to my distinguished friend the Senator from Oregon that I wish to make clear that the position of the minority—and I think I speak for most of them—is that we completely separate ourselves from the views expressed by the distinguished Senator from Oregon, both in committee and on the floor, and that if those views are something of a symbol in southeast Asia, we wish to do what we can to destroy that symbol as a reflection of the views of the American people.

So when we vote for the motion to table—and the majority leader informed me this morning that he intended to make that motion—I wish to say for my part, to my fellow Senators and to all the wide world, that what we are trying to do is get on with the serious business, the undramatic business of this struggle in Vietnam and wind up as quickly as possible, and to supply the American troops with whatever is necessary to do a complete and final job.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I am happy that the majority leader has moved to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I will move.

Mr. McGEE. Will move to table it. I, too, however, express concern over how the vote on that matter will be interpreted. People sometimes have difficulty, I think, understanding a parliamentary move on the floor of the Senate. As a matter of fact, if I may say so, there is sometimes some disagreement among Senators as to what their votes mean. It is no wonder that beyond our shores, there is occasionally confusion as to the meaning of an action taken by the U.S. Senate.

For that reason, I think we should be under no illusions about what will be said about a Senate vote this afternoon to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. If that motion is indeed agreed to, as I am sure it will be, I trust that it will be understood that this is in no sense a diminution of the Tonkin resolution, that this is in no sense a backhanded slap at an existing policy position. I think we should make it unalterably clear, especially to the aggressors, that this has no significance for them that could be equated with a retraction or withdrawal or some other form of weakness. I think it is important that we make that clear because there are those who press against their restraints as they seek a sign of weakness, as they probe for soft spots of which they can make the maximum psychological use.

I personally believed that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was very clear at the time it was passed. I did not think I was confused about it, and do not think I am now, but I do respect those who are raising questions, and I think as we vote on the motion which will be made by the majority leader to table the rescinding proposal of the Senator from Oregon, that we still should make clear on the RECORD that we are taking two actions. Those who believe with him that we should rescind the August 1964 resolution should stand up and be counted. I think that is their free right to expression, and I think it is a part of our system. I think it is a part of the risk that we have to afford in our kind of society.

But for the others, I desperately hope than an overwhelming vote to table will mean exactly what it says, that there is no intention on the part of the Members of the Senate to in any way detract, by that vote, from the President's position in southeast Asia. I think that must be made unequivocally clear, that no aggressors should take comfort in it, that no psychological warriors may seek to exploit it beyond its real meaning.

If we take those precautions, I think we will be, in a sense, sustaining, in effect strengthening and reaffirming the role of the President himself as Commander in Chief.

This is a technique used many, many times in our history by our Commander in Chief. I only hope that the parliamentary maneuver does not lend itself to a negative interpretation, or to a weakened response. Let the aggressors, I say, stand on notice that the Senate is, indeed, with the President on the question of aggression.

I wish to thank the majority leader for yielding to me at this time.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I wish to make a few brief remarks about the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon which I shall oppose because it has no current relevance. I have taken no time on the bill, and do not intend to do so. However, first I should like to take this opportunity to commend the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and the Committee on Foreign Relations, for the great contributon he and the committee have made to the dialog concerning the issue which now confronts the country.

Far too little credit has been given to the chairman of that committee, and to the committee itself, for the great contribution to the public education they have made.

I have had occasion twice to be back in my own State. I have no notion, no judgment, and no guess as to whether it changed the viewpoints of the people in the country on balance; but I do know that it was the first time in the history of our involvement in South Vietnam that the people of this country have had an opportunity to hear the experts representing diverse viewpoints intelligently discuss the subject on television in their homes.

I read a number of columnists who declared that no one learned anything as a result of the hearings. Well, Mr. President, of course Mr. McNamara did not learn anything. He did not pick up any new facts, and neither did the chairman of the committee nor those in the Congress and of the press who have made it their business to study the issue. But the general public learned a great deal.

Tragically, Congress has permitted almost 2 years to pass by without adequately discussing what is involved in southeast Asia. In my opinion the lack of debate and discussion is what has caused the confusion and misunderstanding in this country.

The contribution to this debate of the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee has been of great value and significance, and I wish to commend the chairman and the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield just briefly?

Mr. NELSON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I appreciate what the Senator said. I have already said publicly that I believe one of the

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

most serious mistakes I have made as chairman was in not accepting or urging the Senate to accept the amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin in August 1964. I do not believe it is proper, and do not wish to take the time to explain the circumstances of that particular moment, but, nevertheless, I believe it was a mistake and I commend the Senator from Wisconsin for having more foresight than I had at that time, and I think many other Senators, as to the possible significance of that resolution.

He did offer a very sensible, limiting amendment to that resolution, and I regret that we did not have the kind of discussion of it in public at that time that we have had recently. But I do commend the Senator from Wisconsin for his foresightedness and regret that I did not have as much.

Mr. NELSON. I believe that the Senator advised me at that time that his interpretation of the resolution was the same as the purpose of my amendment, and that therefore the amendment was unnecessary.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought it was.

Mr. NELSON. I also wish to commend those who have participated in this debate on both sides of the aisle.

Although very frequently I do not agree with the Senator from Oregon, I should like to say that he has made a most valuable contribution to this discussion—and he will continue to do so.

One thing, however, that disturbs me very much is the argument I have heard advanced in the press, by columnists, by distinguished Members of Congress, and people in the executive branch, that we should not be debating this issue because what we say here, in our free country, will be misunderstood by some Communists in some other country, Communists who do not know what free speech is all about and never will.

Mr. President, this is the greatest parliamentary body in the world. It is the oldest parliamentary body in the world. Its function and purpose is constructive debate. The strength of this Nation is measured by its capacity for intelligent debate, not by its ability to goosestep. I hope we do not undermine that source of our power. I have heard it implied here and elsewhere lately that free speech and dissent should stop because it may be misunderstood in Communist countries. This is a dangerous parallel to the theory that was recently used by the Russian court in sentencing two writers to jail, not because of what they said in Russia but because they published books in this country which the Russians thought would be misunderstood in America and damage Russia. On that theory the Russian court sentenced the writers to jail.

Over here, we have people saying that we should stop debate because someone else who cannot understand the debate might misunderstand our resolve and damage America.

Mr. President, freedom is what democracy is all about. If some foreign dictator does not understand it, that is too bad. I have no intention of giving up my freedom of speech because some Communist does not understand what free speech is all about—and never will.

Regarding the Tonkin Bay resolution, let me comment briefly. It has been repeatedly stated by those who unqualifiedly support the Tonkin Bay resolution that there were only two Senators who had any reservations about it.

Mr. President, I had reservations about that resolution and I made them clear. I was in the Chamber on August 6, August 7, and August 8, and participated in the dialog concerning the resolution, as did several other Senators, who also expressed grave reservations about the resolution. Their remarks were intended to interpret that resolution and demonstrate congressional intent.

I discussed the subject on three different days with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I am a little weary of having my vote interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of escalation. The record will show it was not such an endorsement.

The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee was in the Chamber—the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], as the spokesman for the administration As a U.S. Senator, I was entitled to accept his advice, counsel, and interpretation of that resolution as an expression of the intent of the administration.

Mr. President, I shall not read the whole dialog, but I will read a part of it from the RECORD of August 6 and 7, 1964, as follows. Addressing myself to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee:

But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not interpret the joint resolution in that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.

Skipping some of it, I addressed the chairman once more, as follows:

In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the RECORD:

"On page 2, line 3, after the word, 'That' insert '(a)'.

"On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"'(b) The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President—

This was the amendment to the Tonkin Bay resolution—

to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is "limited and fitting". Our continuing policy is to limit our role—

Listen to these words—

to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict'."

This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitutional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated.

* * * * *

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.

I would think that ought to be a sufficient answer to those who have repeatedly insisted that the Tonkin resolution was a blank check. It was not. I had reservations. So did others. I was assured that we were not changing our role in southeast Asia. We have changed it. Obviously we cannot turn back the clock. But I trust that, for the sake of the historical record this may correct those gross misinterpretations of the record which have been so frequently uttered on the floor and elsewhere in recent months.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed extracts of the statement to which I previously referred.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

But I am concerned about the Congress appearing to tell the executive branch and the public that we would endorse a complete change in our mission. That would concern me.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not interpret the joint resolution in that way at all. It strikes me, as I understand it, that the joint resolution is quite consistent with our existing mission and our understanding of what we have been doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.

(August 7, 1964)

INTERPRETATION

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have read the RECORD. There was some colloquy on the floor yesterday. I noticed that every Senator who spoke had his own personal interpretation of what the joint resolution means.

One Senator yesterday stated for the RECORD that he understands the resolution to mean that there will be no more privileged sanctuaries.

Another Senator interprets the resolution to mean that it would authorize the Chief Executive to eliminate any aggression, future and present. Some Senators interpret this language to mean aggression against South Vietnam; others interpret it to mean aggression directly against our military forces.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Another Senator interpreted the joint resolution to mean that it is the sense of Congress that no change is suggested by Congress in the present mission in South Vietnam—the mission that has been ours for 10 years, which is to supply advisers, technical advice, and materiel, for the purpose of attempting to encourage the establishment of an independent, viable regime, so that we can withdraw our forces; and that it has not been our mission in the past 10 years to substitute our military forces for the South Vietnamese forces, nor to join with them in a land war, nor to fight their battle for them, nor to substitute our Government for theirs.

This 10-year-old limited mission can be legitimately defended as a responsibility of ours to assist free and independent nations; and it can be legitimately questioned, too, because of the geographic location of that mission.

In any event, I am most disturbed to see that there is no agreement in the Senate on what the joint resolution means. I would like to see it clarified.

NELSON'S AMENDMENT

Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the RECORD:

"On page 2, line 3, after the word 'That' insert '(a)'.

"On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

" '(b) The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is 'limited and fitting'. Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict.' "

This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitutional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in that connection, I certainly agree with what the Senator from Wisconsin has said. He is right to have made it. I have stated that I understood, from the information that was given to us, a specific incident was presented as the reason for that resolution. It was that a direct attack had been made on our ships on the high seas—this is what we were told—where they had a right to be.

We were told it was an unprovoked attack. In other words, we had not done anything that properly could be considered as provocation. These facts are difficult for a committee or any of us to check. I think we were told things happened at night and things were moving rapidly, and so on.

I had no reason to doubt the factual situation. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to prove what happened. In any event, the Senator from Wisconsin has certainly stated very clearly what the situation was. We all know the President has, without any resolution, the right to respond to an immediate attack. He has the right to take actions of a temporary nature, one might say, to protect our interests. Then at some point, if hostilities continue, if the Constitution means anything, a declaration of war should be sought.

I will leave it to Senators, the manager of the bill, the administration, whether or not we are now at war. This bill and other events would indicate we are. I have discussed this matter with some of those who have responsibility in this area. They are reluctant to do what I have suggested. I am not at all sure, if we continue along the course we are following, it will not be necessary to impose powers and disciplines and controls upon our economy sooner or later. We cannot carry on this kind of conflict and call it a skirmish. So this is a matter I think the administration should be giving thought to.

I have a few remarks to make generally about the situation, in addition to the pending measure, but I want to join the Senator from Wisconsin in paying tribute to the Senator from Oregon for the analysis he presented to the Senate last Friday, particularly with regard to the legal basis for our involvement in Vietnam. I think he did the finest job of research, of putting together and pulling together the various aspects concerning Vietnam, particularly the shifting basis upon which the administration has presented its case. First they said that action was not based on SEATO, then that it was, and so on. I shall not take the time to elaborate; I only recommend a reading of the Senator's speech by anyone who is interested in following the origin and legal basis of the Vietnam situation. It is difficult for people who do not make it their business to follow these matters to understand the issue. I think this fact lies at the root of much of the confusion in the country as to why we are involved, how we got in that war. To them I recommend a reading of the analysis made by the Senator from Oregon.

I wish to say a few words generally about the southeast Asia situation and a few words about the pending measure.

In a book written in 1898 called "The Mysterious Stranger," Mark Twain, one of our greatest writers, for whom all Members here have admiration; I do not know of anyone who does not—who had a genius for understanding human nature and presenting it in printed form, wrote the following on war. I read a paragraph:

> There has never been a just one, never an honorable one—on the part of the instigator of the war. I can see a million years ahead and this rule will never change in so many as half a dozen instances. The loud little handful—as usual—will shout for the war. The pulpit will—warily and cautiously—object—at first; the great, big, dull bulk of the Nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try to make out why there should be a war and will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is unjust and dishonorable and there is no necessity for it." Then the handful will shout louder. A few fair men on the other side will argue and reason against the war with speech and pen, and at first will have a hearing and be applauded, but it will not last long; those others will outshout them, and presently the antiwar audiences will thin out and lose popularity. Before long you will see this curious thing: the speakers stoned from the platform, and free speech strangled by hordes of furious men who in their secret hearts are still at one with those stoned speakers—as earlier—but do not dare to say so. And now the whole Nation—pulpit and all—will take up the warcry and shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man who ventures to open his mouth, and presently such mouths will cease to open. Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing fantasies and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them, and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception. (Mark Twain, "The Mysterious Stranger," 1898.)

Past experience provides little basis for confidence that reason can prevail in an atmosphere of mounting war fever. In a contest between a hawk and dove the hawk has a great advantage, not because it is a better bird but because it is a bigger bird with lethal talons and a highly developed will to use them. In China this is the year of the horse; in America it appears to be the year of the hawk.

Without illusions as to the prospect of success, we must try nonetheless to bring reason and restraint into the emotionally

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

charged atmosphere in which the Vietnamese war is now being discussed. Instead of trading epithets about the legitimacy of debate and about who is and is not giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy, we would do well to focus calmly and deliberately on the issue itself, recognizing that all of us make mistakes and that mistakes can only be corrected if they are acknowledged and discussed, and recognizing further that war is not its own justification, that it can and must be discussed unless we are prepared to sacrifice our traditional democratic processes to a false image of national unanimity.

That is largely what these hearings the Senator from Wisconsin referred to were all about.

The issue underlying our vote on the military supplemental authorization now before the Senate is not whether, but how, to bring about an early and honorable end to the war in Vietnam. I emphasize "underlying" because later I shall state clearly that this particular bill should not be interpreted as a policy statement. I know that it may be and the Senator from Oregon stated it will be, but I shall refer to the statements of the chairman of the committee who introduced it.

Since I have properly been held responsible for some things that I said in regard to the 1964 resolution, I think we are entitled to rely on the statement made by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee as to the effect of this bill.

There are vigorous differences of opinion as to whether an early and honorable peace is more likely to be gained by intensifying the war or by reducing its scale, but no responsible participants in the debate have advocated either expanding the conflict into a general war with China or an unconditional and disorderly withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. Divided though we are, therefore, with respect to means, there remains a powerful consensus in support of the objective of an early and honorable peace.

The Harris survey contained in the Washington Post on February 28 reports a growing consensus for peace along with a growing division as to how to achieve it and a mounting uneasiness as to the continuation of the war. The Harris survey reports that the American people "are becoming split between those who favor an all-out military effort to shorten the war and those who prefer negotiation to the risk of escalation." The survey reports that no more than 10 percent of the American people favor immediate withdrawal and only about 16 percent favor an all-out war against North Vietnam, leaving the great majority of our people in between, hopeful, that is, of an early and honorable end of the war but divided as to how it can be achieved. According to the Harris survey, this great majority who agree on the goal of peace are almost evenly divided as to how to attain it, with 33 percent favoring an increased military effort and 34 percent favoring an accelerated effort to bring about negotiations.

Discounting extreme points of view, as I think we can and must, the practical choice before us is between a policy of accelerated war confined to Vietnam but nonetheless aiming at total victory within South Vietnam and a policy of de-escalation aimed at neogtiation and an accommodation among the parties to the South Vietnamese civil war.

My own view is that the second course is the wiser by far. I am in agreement with Mr. Kennan, General Gavin, and General Ridgway, all of whom have indicated that they favor a military policy of "making do with what we have" in South Vietnam until an honorable peace settlement can be negotiated.

I might say that General Ridgway did not appear. He had been ill, but he wrote me a letter which I made public. I shall put it in the RECORD. It endorses in full the statements and the theories of General Gavin.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a suggestion?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator obtain the letter and put it in the RECORD? I think it is important to put it in the RECORD.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I shall. I overlooked bringing it with me.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter from General Ridgway may be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That letter was from General Ridgway, who was the Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower at the time of the 1954 tragedy.

I shall try to explain why I believe that a policy of accommodation is preferable to a policy aimed at military victory, even a military victory confined within the limits of South Vietnam. I shall try also to suggest what seems to me to be the central requirement for an accommodation in southeast Asia.

History seldom if ever tells us exactly what we must do in specific situations, but it does provide guidance as to the kinds of policies that are likely to succeed and the kinds that are likely to fail. The experience of nations in the last 150 years leaves one in no doubt that generally policies of accommodation make for more durable peace settlements whereas policies of total victory make for renewed conflict, usually generating greater problems than they solve. I commend to the attention of my colleagues the following examples:

In 1815, the great powers of Europe, led by the great conservatives, Lord Castlereagh of England and Prince Metternich of Austria, granted terms of peace to a defeated and helpless France which can only be described by 20th-century standards as astonishingly generous. They did so despite the fact that France had conquered most of Europe and kept it in turmoil for a quarter of a century. Under the terms of peace, the French lost no territory at all that had been theirs before the Great Revolution, were subjected to a limited occupation of only 3 years, and were compelled to make limited reparations and then were given assistance in paying them, with the result that France's financial obligations were liquidated within 4 years of the end of hostilities.

Three years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, France was brought into the concert of Europe as a full and equal great power. The conservative statesmen who made this generous peace did not do so out of love for a revolutionary and aggressive France but out of respect for the power and dynamism of the French nation. Wanting above all things peace and stability, Castlereagh and Metternich gave France a peace that she could endure. Castlereagh said that he had come to Vienna not to collect trophies but "to bring the world back to peaceful habits." He was admirably successful. Not only was France reconciled with the nations that defeated her but never again after 1815 did France engage in major aggression and never again did she pose a major threat to the peace of Europe.

Another example of a highly successful peace based on accommodation came out of our own War of 1812. The Americans won a great victory over the British at New Orleans, but the victory did not win the war because the Treaty of Ghent which ended the war had already been signed when the battle was fought. England at the time was at the peak of her power. Napoleon had already been defeated, the British fleet was unchallenged on the seas, and undoubtedly, had they wished to do so, the British could have defeated the young American Nation militarily and might even have brought it back into the British Empire.

They had the generosity—and the wisdom—not to do so. Had the British tried to use their overwhelming power to reconquer America, they would probably have encountered fierce national resistance by an aroused American people fighting for their own homes, their own towns, and their own farms. The British themselves had supported the Spanish in their successful guerrilla war against Napoleon and, powerful as they were, the British knew how hopeless it would be to try to subjugate a patriotic people determined to defend their independence.

The Treaty of Ghent simply restored the status quo between America and England as it had existed before the war. There were no victor and no vanquished, and the issues that had set America against England remained unsolved. But what diplomacy did not resolve history did. Never again did England and America go to war; and in the 20th century, confronted with new circumstances and new dangers, they have become each other's closest allies. It all began with the unpromising Treaty of Ghent.

By contrast with the conflicts of the 19th century, 20th century warfare has been marked by total victories and total defeats. The total victories of 1918 and 1945 both generated more problems than they solved, sowing the seeds of new, unforeseen, and greater conflicts. These conflicts were generated by the totality of things—by the totality of violence in two

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

world wars and the totality of the victories that ended them.

The harshness of the treaty of Versailles was more in its implementation than in its provisions. For many and complex reasons, the vindictive provisions of the treaty, those pertaining to reparations and the occupation of Germany, rather than the promising parts of the treaty, those pertaining to disarmament and the League of Nations, were most vigorously implemented in the 1920's. The failure of the belligerents of World War I to reconcile in the 1920's was the most important single factor behind the rise of Hitler in the thirties. In short, the vindictiveness of World War I became the major cause of World War II.

The cold war of the last 20 years was spawned by the total victory of 1945. The total destruction of German and Japanese power created a vacuum which was soon enough filled, quickly and eagerly by Russia and belatedly and reluctantly by America. Had the generals who tried to kill Hitler in 1944 been successful at that time or earlier, a negotiated peace might conceivably have saved Germany from partition. It was the total defeat of Germany that resulted in her division, and that division, the product of a total victory, became the paramount issue in a new, great, and still unresolved conflict, a conflict which could rise up, indeed, and cause us trouble now.

As we consider now whether we wish to bid for victory or accommodation in southeast Asia, we would do well to consider the wisdom of a tragically prophetic letter written by Lord Lansdowne to the Daily Telegraph of London on November 29, 1917. He wrote:

> We are going to win the war, * * * but its prolongation will spell the ruin of the civilized world, and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it, but what will be the value of the blessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them?—Lord Newton, "Lord Lansdowne: A Biography" (London: Macmillan, 1929), page 467.

The debate between those who would accelerate the war in Vietnam and those who would reduce its scale is as fateful and significant as any we had in the last two decades. There is a deceptive appeal about proposals for expanded military action; they are simple and clean cut and they seem to promise quick and easy solutions to difficult and painful problems. Proposals for accommodation, on the other hand, as the Senator from New York has discovered, are complex, ambiguous and easily misunderstood. History, however, suggests that the military solution that seems so promising today is likely to result in disaster tomorrow, whereas the course of accommodation, which always seems so difficult, is the only course with demonstrated promise of being able to bring about a lasting and honorable peace.

The essential principle of an accommodation in southeast Asia is that it must apply not just to Vietnam but to all of southeast Asia. Vietnam, after all, is only one of many small and weak nations on the periphery of a powerful China and, as has been pointed out innumerable times, what happens in one such country may well happen in another.

This premise underlies the domino theory, which holds that if one country falls to the Communists so must another and then another. The inference we have drawn from this is that we must fight in one country in order to avoid having to fight in another, although we could with equal logic have inferred that it is useless to fight in one country when the same conditions of conflict are present in another, that the failure of subversion in one country might simply result in the transfer of subversion to another. Some of us can really see no reason why there should be consideration of only one aspect of the so-called domino theory.

History and logic and commonsense suggest that a viable settlement in Vietnam must be part of a general settlement in southeast Asia. Unless we are prepared to fight a general war to eliminate the effects of Chinese power in all of southeast Asia, we have no alternative but to seek a general accommodation. This is what really causes uneasiness among most of us. The central issue is the contest between Chinese and American power; and the prospect for a lasting peace depends far more upon the resolution of that issue than it does on the matter of who is to participate in a South Vietnamese Government and by what means it shall be formed. If the issue between Chinese and American power in southeast Asia can be resolved, the future of Vietnam should not be too difficult to arrange, although it would involve some difficulty, of course; but if the issue of Chinese and American power is left unresolved, even a total victory in South Vietnam is unlikely to solve very much. As long as China and America are competitors for predominance—particularly military predominance—in southeast Asia, there can be no lasting peace or stability in that part of the world.

Just as history suggests the advisability of accommodation, it also offers guidance as to the kind of accommodiation which might make for lasting peace in southeast Asia. In the past when great powers have competed for predominance over smaller and weaker nations, the one workable alternative to the victory of one or the other has been neutralization. In such arrangements, it is the fact of neutralization rather than the political or ideological complexion of the small countries concerned that has made for stability and peace. Neutralization is not a foolproof method of resolving great power conflicts, but it is a demonstrably more successful one than total victory.

Switzerland is an example. The Swiss Federation was established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as a perpetually neutral state. To this day, despite the fact that she is surrounded by great powers, Switzerland remains both neutral and at peace.

Belgium was established as a perpetually neutral state under the guarantee of the great powers by a treaty signed in 1839. The treaty was violated in 1914, but the more astonishing fact is that for 75 years Belgium remained both neutral and at peace despite the ambitions of the great powers and despite her strategic location between France and Germany, the latter having been one of the most powerful nations in that area. Belgium might well have been the victim of great power ambitions, but neutralization made her instead the beneficiary of great power rivalry and also served as the means of regulating that rivalry. The solution lay quite simply in the fact that, hopeful as was each great power for its own hegemony, it was no less fearful of the hegemony of the other and neutralization was judged to be the acceptable price of its prevention.

Austria is the outstanding contemporary example of accommodation by neutralization. Ten years after World War II Austria was divided and occupied by the great powers. The State Treaty of 1955 laid the basis for the independent and prosperous national existence that Austria now enjoys and at the same time resolved a major issue between Russia and the West without upsetting the European balance of power.

Applying historical experience, it seems to me that the crisis in southeast Asia can only be resolved on a lasting basis by the neutralization of the entire region as between China and the United States. China is profoundly fearful of American bases on her periphery; she demonstrated that by intervening in the Korean war in 1950 only when American troops approached her Manchurian frontier. Fearful as she is of American military power in southeast Asia, China might well be willing to purchase its removal by the exclusion of her own. It would seem to me highly advisable that, by one means or another, we indicate to the Chinese that we are prepared to remove American military power not only from Vietnam but from all of southeast Asia in return for a similar prohibition on her part.

A general neutralization agreement for southeast Asia could be enforced in two ways. First, a degree of automatic enforcement would arise from the prospect that the reintroduction of Chinese military power would be followed by the reintroduction of American power. Secondly, a neutralization agreement could and should be placed under the guarantee of the major powers with interests in the southeast Asia, notably the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, India, and Japan.

It is quite likely that the Chinese are not at present prepared to enter a neutralization agreement. As long as the United States is expending more and more lives and more and more money in an ever widening but inconclusive war in Indochina, the Chinese can logically hope that the American people will sooner or later find the effort intolerable and force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from southeast Asia.

As a matter of fact, that is what in effect happened in the Korean war. The American people got tired of the Korean war. The policy of growing involvement that the United States is now

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

following in the apparent belief that it will persuade the Chinese of our determination to remain in southeast Asia may in fact have the opposite effect: it may persuade them, however wrongly, that the American people and their Government will sooner or later withdraw their support from an insupportable commitment and abandon southeast Asia to the unchallenged hegemony of China.

Mr. Charles Taylor, a correspondent for the Toronto Globe and Mail, one of the few Westerners who have been allowed to report from Peiping—and who was here in Washington at a meeting a few days ago—recently wrote of the Chinese:

> It is a matter of faith with them that the United States can never win a land war in Asia and that for all its awesome power, the United States lacks the resources to fight several revolutionary wars at the same time and will eventually be engulfed without direct Chinese intervention.

Mr. Taylor quotes the Peiping Review as saying:

> If South Vietnam alone is enough to keep the U.S. aggressor forces tied down so hopelessly, one can easily visualize what is in store for Yankee imperialism once it gets itself entangled in other parts of Asia.

What then can we do to induce China to pay the price of a neutralization agreement? What we can do, it seems to me, is to confront her with the perfectly credible prospect of being confronted with that which she most fears, which is to say, with permanent American military bases on her periphery.

We can make the threat of permanent bases credible by reducing the cost of sustaining them to a level which the Chinese will know we can sustain indefinitely. This, I think, is the implication of views put forth by such eminent individuals as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Generals Gavin and Ridgway, each of whom has suggested that we confine our military efforts in Vietnam to "making do with what we have," or holding easily defensible fortified bases somewhat like Guantanamo or Gibraltar, which has been held for some 200 years, I believe, by the British.

If we were to entrench ourselves in powerful bases on the coast of Vietnam or inland where appropriate, bases which could be held with minimal loss of life and at moderate cost, the Chinese would be confronted with a perfectly credible threat of permanent American bases on their periphery. Knowing that we could remain in these bases indefinitely, they would have a powerful inducement to seek an agreement for the neutralization of all of southeast Asia. At the very least, such a policy would convert a situation in which our enemies believe themselves to be wearing us down to one in which we, at supportable cost, would be wearing them down.

The present policy of gradually expanding warfare is costing the United States a tragic toll in lives, large and growing sums of money, and a worldwide loss of prestige, including mounting disaffection on the part of those very allies to whom we are supposed to be proving our high determination. In addition, according to late information, the present policy seems to be costing our Government the confidence of growing numbers of the American people.

I think that is reflected in the polls that I mentioned earlier.

A policy of holding impregnable bases, on the other hand, aimed at a general solution based on the neutralization of southeast Asia, would reverse the American position in all of these respects, creating the long-term prospect of a stable peace and the short-term prospect of nothing more than drastically reduced military engagements.

Mr. President, I want to say a few words more directly about the pending bill. Although I think the pending bill has a significance as to our overall policy, it authorizes money to carry on the war, and is not a policy statement. I am dubious of this legislation because passage of the measure may be viewed as an endorsement of the present policy in Vietnam for the reasons that I have just offered—which policy I do not endorse.

I state again, as I did yesterday, that I accept wholly the statement made by the able and distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services when, in presenting this bill to the Senate, he said that nothing in this legislation can properly be construed as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments.

I think that we are entitled to rely upon that statement from the Senator. We have had this debate about policy. I hereby state that I do not mean by voting for this bill that I endorse the military or political policies that are being followed, as I understand, at the present time in escalating the war in Vietnam.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an observation?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this is an appropriate place to make the observation that the principle that the Senator from Arkansas seems to be relying upon is that when there is ambiguity as to what the policy of the bill is, then legislative history is made by turning to the statements of the Senator in charge of the bill. That, of course, completely falls when the administration itself states what its policy is in the hearings on the bill and in the bill itself.

In my judgment, there is no question as to the policy of this administration in the bill. Therefore, there is not anything that the Senator from Georgia can say to change that policy. The policy is set out with complete clarity in the bill itself and in the statements of the witnesses of the administration.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I recognize, as I have said in discussing the matter with the Senator privately, as all of us have, that this is a very difficult situation in which we have an authorization for an appropriation. An appropriation is normally not inclined to be considered as a statement of policy. It is normal that legislation, according to our rules, should not be included in an appropriation bill.

I say that we are faced with an extremely difficult situation. I am very reluctant to vote for this measure for the reasons the Senator has stated. The alternative proposed by the Senator from Oregon would result in a situation which would force a decision on the floor as to whether the Senate should reaffirm policies which I do not wish to reaffirm, speaking for myself. We are merely delaying the decision to a better day so we can make the decision under more favorable circumstances and determine what our policy should be.

I think it is unfortunate that in the beginning of this session these questions have arisen in connection with an authorization for the armed services.

This gives at least some color to the pleas that we are interfering with the supplies of our soldiers. This opens up opportunities for all kinds of irrelevant and very damaging debate, irrelevant, I think, to the real essence of policy.

What I am trying to say is that insofar as this bill is concerned, I accept that statement in the same way the Senator from Wisconsin said he relied upon the statement of the Senator from Arkansas. I thought I was telling him, as far as I knew at the time, the truth of the matter I was trying to interpret what the administration told us in presenting that 1964 resolution.

So as a matter of legislative history, for whatever it is worth—and I must say in many cases it is not worth much—that is the limit of our power. I know we do not have the votes to change the existing resolution which has been under discussion; and, therefore, I think it is the better part of wisdom to follow the course upon which I suggest.

It is not a happy choice. It is very seldom, any more, that one has a good choice between what he likes and what he does not like. The choice always seems between the lesser of two evils. At least about 99 percent of the time, that is the kind of choice we have here.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I should like the RECORD to show my complete agreement with the position taken by the Senator from Arkansas. I shall vote against the Morse amendment and I shall vote in favor of the bill.

I do both with a heavy heart, most reluctantly, as the least unacceptable of all available choices. But I wish to make it very clear indeed that my votes, both against the Morse amendment and for the bill, do not indicate an endorsement of the policy which I fear the administration is following.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has expressed very well what I feel. We are holding it in abeyance for a better day, a better opportunity, where the matter of our involvement in Vietnam as a matter of national policy can be discussed as freely as possible and without being entwined into our flag, which flies over the Capitol.

Nobody wants a white flag on the Capitol, and I do not like this kind of discussion in connection with it. It makes it very difficult, really, for us to discuss

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

a matter of high policy under these circumstances.

That is why I think it is the better part of wisdom, in effect, to defer to a better day a full-fledged discussion, and I hope a proper decision on this matter of policy.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I understand the argument of the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Pennsylvania. Where they lose me is when they assume they are going to be in a better position to discuss policy when they get 450,000 more American boys over there. That is the policy they are approving in this bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator knows very well that I do not approve of 450,000 more men over there, or even 450,000. As I understood General Gavin's statement—and I have tried to associate myself with it here today—he said we should make do with what we have there. He did not develop, as far as I have attempted to develop today, the next steps.

As I see it, this is implicit in what he did say on how to go about treating a state of mind on the part of the Chinese so they will negotiate. This is the first step. All of the discussion of what the final solution will be is for the future. It is all right to speculate about it, but the No. 1 problem now is how we get them in a mood even to have a discussion.

It is obvious now that this constant escalation from 20,000 to 200,000 has by no means brought them along closer to negotiation. If anything, I think the Chinese reason that we are foolish enough to expend our manpower and our treasure and our material at such a furious rate that we will grow tired of the effort. As large as we are, because of our many other commitments, we will reach the point where we cannot afford it, and that is the way we will sooner or later give up the ghost.

That is in effect what both General Gavin and Mr. Kennan said: We should look at this more in perspective with regard to our overall commitments, and not concentrate so much upon just Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator said, I suspect inadvertently, "to bring the Chinese to negotiate." Did he not mean "to bring the Vietcong to negotiate"?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean the Chinese. I think the Chinese are involved in this. I think the Senator from Pennsylvania will agree that the great concern that underlies much of what has been said is the possibility or even the probability that the course we are pursuing will lead to a conflict with the Chinese.

We also know that much moral support and external physical support to the Vietcong in the way of equipment, and so forth, comes from the Chinese; and the proximity of this area to China—it is as close as Cuba is to the United States. Of course, North Vietnam adjoins China.

The Senator will remember what consternation arose in this country when we discovered Russia's presence in Cuba. Why would it not be somewhat similar, when we are so close to China?

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is probably correct. It is my view, however, that the end of this war is going to come first through some arrangement with the Vietcong that Hanoi is prepared to support; whereas China is, I believe, just sitting back watching American boys get killed while they do not have a single soldier involved. I would question whether the Senator would be able to force Hanoi to continue to fight if they did not wish to do so.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I should be happy to settle it with the Vietcong if we could, if they are so disposed.

There is another matter about the Vietcong. The Vietcong have been deceived twice, as the Senator knows: By the French in 1946 and I guess you might say all of us in 1956, after failing to go through with the Geneva accords.

I do not know whether they will be disposed to make a settlement or not. I think the Chinese could have great influence upon them. One thing which leads me to approach it this way for purposes of discussion is that we constantly hear, as an excuse for this bill, about the buildup in Thailand. We have heard that discussed at nearly every meeting of the committee: "You know, the Chinese have already given orders and subversive organizations are being started in northeast Thailand, and that is the next one on the course."

That is part of the justification for this bill. It is assumed that even if we wipe out the Vietcong, next we are going to be over there in Thailand. It is that domino theory in this connection.

So that is what has led me to believe and to think along the lines that if we settle South Vietnam, we will not have settled very much, because we have Cambodia, Laos, Thailand. All right, they are all very weak. We should try to begin looking at the problem on a broader basis, in order to get some kind of a settlement that might be useful. I do not wish to have a succession of these conflicts, and I know nobody else does.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. GORE. Could it not easily be reasoned that the spread of insurgency to other areas in southeast Asia is the result of the buildup of an American expeditionary force?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is quite correct. Implicit in what I am saying, if I did not make it clear, is that the thing that would be of great value as an incentive to the Chinese and the North Vietnamese in leading to a settlement would be a withdrawal of our military.

To put it another way, our presence itself is the principal reason for much of the activity, the insurgency, the energy, and the willingness of the enemy to sacrifice. I often think of what consternation struck us as we realized that Russia had a real presence in Cuba. This country was ready to do anything. We would not have hesitated if the President had ordered an invasion. As the Senators know, we would have approved it, and everyone would have applauded.

President Kennedy picked a better method, a much wiser method that had never occurred to most of us, as a matter of fact, a very ingenious method, which in my view was a form of accommodation. He allowed Russia to save her face and to get out without humiliation.

And what has happened? The Cubans are Communists, but with the Russians gone, we do not hear any more speeches on the floor of the Senate about Cuba. Very few. Senators will remember at what white heat everyone's tempers were around here, and the great speeches that were made denouncing Castro, and so on. I have hardly heard Castro mentioned in recent years; only incidentally, when we receive these circulars from some organized group of emigres, and we feel sad about them and all that.

But the country is not concerned about Cuba at present. It has simmered down, and that is what George Kennan says this country ought to do, simmer down about Vietnam and look for some form of solution.

I think the Senator is quite right: As long as we are there, to them it is like the presence of the French. As long as the French were there, there was bound to be agitation to get them out.

I know this may not sit well with my fellow Americans, to be compared with the French. I know we are there under the best of motives. I do not question the motives; all I question is the wisdom.

I do not believe that our motives are bad. Our motives are of the best. We wish to help them. But that has no effect upon the wisdom of what we are doing, or whether what we are doing is designed to achieve our purpose, or whether the purpose we set out with is achievable.

I applaud the efforts concerning pacification and improving the life of these people. It is possible that they think we are like the French, that our administration looks the same as that of any foreigners. We look like the French. Of course we do not talk like them, but we have similar characteristics. It reminds me of the article I read, which was placed in the RECORD the other day, that we are sleeping in the same beds as the French but dreaming different dreams. We look too much like colonialists from a western country, perhaps. I do not believe that our motives are bad. I believe that our motives are high. I believe it is a question of wisdom as to policy, particularly when we believe it is within our power to accomplish what we say is our objective.

Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. YARBOROUGH, and Mr. GRUENING addressed the Chair.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota first, and then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. McGOVERN. When the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] presented the bill on February 16, he had this to say about it:

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

This bill cannot possibly be construed as either an endorsement of or as an attack upon national policy. It involves more the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and a member of our family and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not throw it to him to enable him to assist himself out of the water this would be a callous and heartless attitude for us to take.

As I interpret that statement by the Senator in charge of the bill, it is open to question whether we were right in getting so deeply involved in this struggle but that, nevertheless, because of those policies which may be open to question, we have our troops in there, over their heads—as he states—in the water, and we have no other reasonable or acceptable course other than to throw a rope to them in the form of needed equipment. Is that the Senator's understanding of what we are doing with regard to this bill?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Our forces are there, and I believe that as I have already said to the Senator from Oregon—I do not know whether the Senator from South Dakota was in the Chamber—there is a distinction between the necessity to authorize an appropriation for the Army and a statement of policy or endorsement of policy. I read another part of the same Senator's speech that this was not interpreted to be a statement of policy, but the Senator from Oregon has made the point that it is impossible to insulate these two. If we totally reject what is going on, one of the ways to stop it is to cutoff the money; but this is a drastic thing to do and, furthermore, the Senator has to admit it is utterly unrealistic to think that we can.

I notice that the Senator from Oregon has a quizzical look on his face, so let me assure him that I mean he does not have the votes—and the Senator knows that he does not have them. Therefore, we are faced with the facts in this case. I like to argue theory in other forums, but in the Senate we have to recognize the facts and vote accordingly on an issue which could if pressed have the effect of reaffirming a policy I do not wish to reaffirm. This may not be a very gallant or straightforward way in ordinary business, but in politics, I believe it is perfectly logical and necessary, certainly in this instance.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. GRUENING. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have only one more page to read, but I yield at this time to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I desire to ask this question of the Senator from Arkansas. Does the Senator know the approximate speed of our bombers which were used over North Vietnam before the pause? How fast were they going—how many miles per hour?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. These are the best we have—supersonic, I believe—1,200 to 1,400——

Mr. YARBOROUGH. One thousand five hundred miles per hour?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that neighborhood; yes. These are the best we have.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. How close were they bombing to the Chinese border—approximately 30 miles?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Somewhere around that figure, I believe.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. So that with a speed of 1,500 miles an hour and the border 30 miles away, we were dropping bombs only 1 minute from Red China; is that not correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Less than 1 minute——

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Less than a minute——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Much less than a minute I believe, is it not?

Mr. YARBOROUGH. In the opinion of the Senator from Arkansas, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and having studied this resolution, when we bomb within less than 1 minute of the Chinese border, could not the neutral nations of the world believe, in the Senator's thinking, that we are tweaking the tiger's tail and trying to lure him into a war?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It certainly could be interpreted as such. This is one of the explanations which I have been curious about. I do not like ever to challenge anyone's veracity without having anything to base it on and, therefore, I cannot do it; but I have often wondered what were our ships doing up there, so close to that seacoast? It has been stated that we were approaching them on the radar at night, so I do not know, but I certainly believe that is subject to some kind of interpretation.

Let me ask the Senator, did he say tweaking whose tail?

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I asked whether the neutral nations of the world might not think we were kind of stomping the tiger's tail——

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator must mean the dragon's tail, in this case. Dragon's tail, is it not? The Senator must be thinking of a "tiger in your tank." [Laughter.]

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I invite the attention of the Senator from Arkansas to page 35 of the February 21 issue of U.S. News & World Report, on page 35, under the subhead of "U.S. Goals in Vietnam." The article states, under a Honolulu dateline, that there are 12,000 villages and hamlets in Vietnam, that the Government holds a thousand and that the other 11,000 are held by the Vietcong. The article states that our aim this year is to recapture and pacify 900 out of South Vietnam's 11,000 hamlets held by the Communists—900 of the 11,000 this year, 1,500 in 1967, and, hopefully, to accelerate the rate in future years.

My question for the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is: As a result of the recent hearings, how do we intend to pacify these villages and hamlets? Do we intend to burn these villages down and destroy them? Or how can we pacify them?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I stated a moment ago that I believe the objectives which have been announced are, for all practical purposes, practically impossible for foreigners to achieve. This is one of the things I have in mind. As the Senator stated, if we burn these villages down, that would be a difficult way to pacify them, naturally. We would have to rebuild them. But even if we did rebuild them after burning them down, that would not necessarily create a viable structure for these people who differ from us in so many ways. They could not help regarding us as anything but similar to their former colonial masters. When we have poured in 200,000 troops with all the services that go with it, we are completely disrupting their economy.

We all read about the same things in the newspapers, that the whole economy of Vietnam is being thrown into chaos by the infusion of so much money, so rapidly, by our troops and by our construction there. It is creating an almost intolerable situation. So we do, more and more, have to take control of this country. We have to do that, to try to keep them in there. The bill before the Foreign Relations Committee for economic aid is to try to control inflation. I am not sure whether it will control or enhance it. It is questionable. This is a very, very difficult thing. I cannot think of anything quite comparable in our experience. We can think of the Philippines, if we like, at least it is somewhat near there, but we did not do the job there. Magsaysay did it with very little economic aid. We did not do it ourselves. I do not believe that we could have done it. But, he did it.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arkansas for his comments. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, the article published in the U.S. News & World Report on page 35, in the issue of February 21, 1966, entitled "U.S. Goals in Vietnam."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. GOALS IN VIETNAM

HONOLULU.—Here's what the United States and South Vietnam are hoping to accomplish in this year's fighting:

Recapture and pacify 900 out of South Vietnam's 12,000 hamlets held by Communists.

Consolidate control of 1,000 Government-held hamlets—making a total of 1,900 hamlets firmly under Government control.

Build 2,050 new classrooms.

Construct 500 miles of road, 148 bridges, 57 dams, and 120 miles of canals.

In 1967, the aim is to pacify 1,500 more hamlets. After 1967, it is hoped, the rate of pacification will snowball—with the country brought entirely under control of the Government within 5 to 7 years.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I first would like to say I find myself in complete accord with the fears, doubts, and questions which the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has expressed. I may not take the same position on the bill as he has, but I realize the dilemma which faces us.

I wish to comment briefly on the colloquy had between the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Oregon.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

and the fact that we have a certain amount of comfort in accepting the assurance by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that voting for the bill is no compliance with or acceptance of the present foreign policy or future policy. That may be true.

As the Senator from Oregon pointed out, no Member of the Senate, not even the chairman in charge of the bill, can make a commitment that the President makes. We find that commitment in the very letter of transmittal, in which it is stated:

> In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of authorization and appropriation, the Congress has provided continuing support for our national decision "to prevent further aggression" in southeast Asia. The quoted words come from the joint resolution of Congress—Public Law 88-408—approved on August 10, 1964.

That was the basis for the resolution. Of course, that resolution was drafted in the White House. So there we have it in black and white.

If we vote for the bill, we are approving the policy which the Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Alaska, the Senator from Oregon, and other Senators do not approve of. There it is in black and white. One may find comfort in the words of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee [Mr. RUSSELL], but there it is. If we pass this bill, the administration has served notice that we approve the policy.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not agree with that. I do not accept that.

Mr. GRUENING. It is there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is there, yes; this business of our relations with the executive has been a difficult one. No government of any importance that I know of, a country as big as this one, has the same relationship between the legislative and executive. In England and in all other large parliamentary bodies the executive is a part of the legislative, and they work problems out between themselves, and they have their own method of resolving their differences. They have the very important power that when they disagree with the executive they can change him. We cannot do it. We have to accommodate to it. In many ways our President has much greater power, regardless of the Legislature, than is true of the executive in other countries. People do not recognize that fact.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. I have about concluded my statement.

Mr. MORSE. This is the last time I shall interrupt.

I would like to go back to the time of what happened at the Tonkin Bay incident. I judge, from the way the Senator from Arkansas has expressed himself, that he is not too sure just exactly what happened at Tonkin Bay.

The Senator from Oregon is not, either.

There is one thing we ought to make very clear in the RECORD. It is that the administration told us that our ships were 70 or 75 miles away. I was one who pressed them on this, because I had been informed in advice from the Pentagon building that our ships were a much, much shorter distance away than 75 miles. We learned subsequently that the ships were only 13 or 14 miles away from the place where bombing took place by the South Vietnamese ships, which we had completely equipped. The testimony also brought out that our officials in Saigon had constant information as to what they were doing.

History has already recorded that our ships were sufficiently close in proximity to those South Vietnamese vessels that were bombing islands three or four miles off the mainland of North Vietnam that we were in fact giving coverage. At least, our destroyers were close enough to come to the assistance of those ships if they got into trouble.

The Senator will recall that in the Foreign Relations Committee—and the record will show it—I said to the administration witnesses, "What do you suppose we would have done if Russia had had destroyers 75 miles from Key West and started bombing Key West?" We know what we would have done. We would have sunk those Russian ships.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator forgets that we are "good guys." It makes a lot of difference.

I have about concluded.

I should like to make another comment about the House committee report with regard to the urgency of the bill. I do not think there is any reason at all to apologize for the discussion that has taken place, since the House report states that there is no urgency for the bill. I have stated that and placed it in the RECORD, and I shall not do so again. Furthermore, the House is only acting on the bill today.

According to the House Committee on Armed Services, which, as we know, is composed of gentlemen who can hardly be considered unsympathetic to the material needs of the armed services, there is no urgency about this supplemental authorization. In the words of the report of the House Armed Services Committee:

> If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items involved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction, may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization.

The accusations which have been leveled at us have been perfectly unjustifiable. There has been direct reference to the debate which has gone on about this question, as well as the hearings. I do not take with very good grace the criticism that has been leveled at members of the Foreign Relations Committee or any other Members who have taken part in the debate. Some strong words were used on the floor of the Senate in an attempt to try to show that the delay in passing this bill was injuring our Armed Forces, which is nonsense.

There are shortages of certain materials in Vietnam, but no evidence has been offered to show that this is due to a present lack of money. Whatever shortages there may be are due to congestion in the ports, to the lack of warehousing or transportation, or to poor planning, but not to lack of money. If I understand the situation correctly, this money might just as well be carried in the regular Defense Department authorization which will soon be before us and which will, of course, require well over half of the total taxes paid by the 190 million people of the richest Nation in the world.

I intend, with great reluctance, to vote for this bill. I hope I have made it clear that my vote will not indicate support of present military policies. I shall vote for the bill because, although available evidence, including the stated reservation of the House Armed Services Committee, indicates that this supplemental authorization is not necessary to meet the present material needs of our Armed Forces in Vietnam, the merest possibility that a delay in funds might conceivably handicap our fighting men obliges me to support it. However unwise the policy that put them there, our men are in Vietnam and fighting, and one cannot take the chance—even a very remote one—of denying them anything they may need. The only item mentioned in which there might be a delay in issuing contracts is for helicopters. I am unwilling to vote against this bill because—and only because—of the dim and remote possibility that it may actually serve some useful purpose for our fighting men.

EXHIBIT 1

FEBRUARY 11, 1966.

Gen. MATTHEW RIDGWAY,
U.S. Army (Retired), Mellon Institute, Pittsburgh, Pa.

DEAR GENERAL RIDGWAY: I regret that you do not feel in a position to testify before the committee concerning the situation in Vietnam. Many of the members of the committee, and I particularly, had hoped that you would give us the benefit of your vast experience and knowledge in military affairs.

I can certainly understand your desire to restrict your activities in the next few weeks and I hope that you will be fully recovered from your illness soon.

You have no doubt read press accounts of General Gavin's testimony before the committee on Tuesday. His testimony was extremely well presented and his comments will, I am sure, be very helpful to the members of this committee and the public generally in gaining a better understanding of the issues facing us in Vietnam. If you have any comments on his testimony or on Vietnam generally, the committee would be glad to have them, either for publication or for the information of the members only. If you do not care to make any comments, I will certainly understand.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

PITTSBURGH, PA.,
February 19, 1966.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Your gracious letter is deeply appreciated. While it is dated February 11, it was only delivered to me here on the 18th.

I welcome the opportunity you kindly offer me to comment on General Gavin's testimony, and I have no restrictions to request as to the disposition you may wish to make of my comments. If, in your judgment, they merit distribution among the members of your committee, or inclusion in the records of the hearings, I shall be happy.

On December 13 last, General Gavin wrote me, enclosing a copy of a draft of a letter he had written for publication in Harper's magazine, saying that since I was mentioned in it, he "thought it appropriate for me to see it," even though "you may not be in agreement with the sentiments expressed in it."

On December 17, I replied that I thought "the letter—will have a substantial impact on all thoughtful persons who read it and on those in official circles in Washington—executive and legislative—concerned with the problems with which it deals." At the same time I wrote Harper's magazine that my own views accord completely" with those of General Gavin, as stated in the draft sent me. I added that I was then considering publishing an article on the Vietnam situation. Actually I had been working on the draft of one prior to receipt of General Gavin's letter, and for some time now that draft has been undergoing review by a prospective publisher.

When General Gavin's letter was published, I was disturbed to see the distortions to which it had been subjected, and which had read into his statements thoughts I assume he had never entertained. I telephoned him verifying the correctness of my assumption, and was gratified to have him state his intention of making all this clear in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the following day.

I watched all of General Gavin's testimony before your committee. I thought it revealed great depth and breadth of view, and I was deeply gratified, not only by his complete candor in responding to all questions and the temperate language in which his answers were couched, but equally so by the clarity of his presentation. I thought it dissipated the cloud of misinterpretation and misrepresentation by which others had obscured the meaning he had intended. Again I found myself in basic agreement with his stated views.

In conclusion, having sat before the TV screen throughout all of the hearings, may I state, sir, my respectful opinion that you conducted them in the finest traditions of the Senate, and that you and your colleagues performed a signal service to our people. Out of these hearings I hope will accrue increasingly strong support for the middle course which I believe the President to be following, in rejecting the counsel of extremists in either direction, while continuing to seek an honorable solution which will put an end to hostilities without prejudice either to our vital interests, or to the fulfillment of our pledges.

With my highest respect, I am,

Sincerely,

M. B. RIDGWAY,
General, U.S. Army, Retired.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I shall necessarily be brief because, regrettably, the condition of my throat is such that I cannot speak for as long as I should like. However, I am happy to have an opportunity to make a few remarks.

I think I express the views of the majority of the Members of the U.S. Senate when I say I am relieved and pleased that the Senate is finally going to have an opportunity to vote on the amendment which has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Oregon to repeal the Southeast Asia Resolution of 1964.

While I do not agree with the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon and his conclusions with respect to most matters having to do with Vietnam, nevertheless I recognize him, as does every other Senator, as a man of great courage and a man of great forthrightness. He has presented to us the real problem with which we are all concerned, and now we have a chance to vote up or down the real issue at stake.

I have listened with interest to the remarks made by a man for whom I have great respect, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], with respect to the fact that he did not think this was necessarily going to be a vote on the key issues of what we are doing in Vietnam, whether we should be there or not, or whether we are giving support to the resolution as passed in 1964.

I quote from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of August 6, 1964. The distinguished Senator from Arkansas said:

It should be made equally clear to these regimes—

Meaning the Communists—

if it is not yet sufficiently clear, that their aggressive and expansionist ambitions, wherever advanced, will meet precisely that degree of American opposition which is necessary to frustrate them.

That is what the distinguished Senator said that day.

When one reads what the President said when he sent to Congress the present request for supplemental funds, it is in almost precisely the same language. I quote from the first page of the message:

We are currently engaged in a major effort to open a road to a peaceful settlement. Whether the present effort is successful or not, our purpose of peace will be constant; we will continue to press on every door.

But until there is a response—and until the aggression ends—we must do all that is necessary to support our allies and our own fighting forces in Vietnam.

This is the purpose of the present request. It has been made so that we can meet whatever force they apply against us and meet whatever force they apply against South Vietnam.

That is what I understand the distinguished Senator from Arkansas said the Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant when he led the debate for it in 1964.

At this point in my remarks, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the record the full text of Public Law 88–408 of the 88th Congress approved August 10, 1964—the joint resolution and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia together with the President's message to the Congress dated August 5, 1964.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Public Law 88–408, 88th Cong.]
H.J. RES. 1145

Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964.

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attacks on Armed Forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreement signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 5, 1964.*

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, let us recall that we had a united Congress and a united nation. The resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives by a vote of 414 to 0 and the Senate by a vote of 88 yeas to 2 nays. I am confident that we have that support today and that the Congress will overwhelmingly defeat the Morse amendment.

Let us also be very clear on this issue: Public Law 88-408 previously referred to declares that the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

I am confident that the Congress approves and supports the determinations of our President, as Commander in Chief to take all necessary steps to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States, to prevent further aggression, and that the United States is prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocal state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. I might point out that South Vietnam is a protocal state and did request our assistance.

Now is the time to again demonstrate our support for administrative policy and get on with the business at hand to let our fighting men know that their country is united in its efforts and their efforts for the cause of freedom.

The time for action is now.

The time to show a unified nation to the free world is now.

The time to stand up against Communist agression is now.

The time to give full support to our fighting men abroad is now.

The time to give full support to our President in the interest of our own national security as well as promoting the cause of freedom is now.

Whether Senators agree with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas or the distinguished Senator from Alaska on this point, of course, what we are doing is carrying out the spirit of the resolution.

I would hate to think that anybody was going to delude or kid himself into believing that when we vote to table this amendment which has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Oregon that we are not in fact voting to keep on the books the resolution which we passed in August 1964, which we did, as the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said, to let us meet every aggressive act with precisely the correct response so that we can preserve freedom in South Vietnam.

I would not want the people deluding themselves over the fact any more than I would want members of the Finance Committee to say that when we reduce taxes from 50 to 40 percent, "I really mean that I voted for 45 percent."

When the 50 percent is eliminated, there is left standing the result. There is no middle ground. The act will speak for itself. It will be a law on the books.

I have only spoken on the floor one time this year with respect to the entire question of our policies in southeast Asia. But I believe that the discussions which were held and the debates which have developed have been very useful. Certainly they have been legal. Certainly they have been lawful in every sense. But I do think this kind of debate can be carried on so long that it begins to hurt. I think there is no doubt that it has now begun to hurt, not only in the United States but elsewhere.

There was an article in the Washington Post on February 27, by Mr. Ward Just, of the Washington Post Foreign Service, which I would like to read in part:

SAIGON, February 26.—Senior U.S. officials here are dismayed and angered by congressional criticism of the war in Vietnam. This view is shared, it is understood, by virtually every top official in the U.S. civilian and military command.

These officials believe that what one senior diplomat called "organized congressional criticism" of the U.S. position here has damaged morale in the Armed Forces, sowed doubt in the minds of Vietnamese leaders, and encouraged the enemy to believe that the United States cannot stay the course.

He goes on to say:

An American delegation which journeyed to Ankhe, headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division, earlier this week was told that the criticism of the war effort "cannot help but hurt morale" among American soldiers.

I do not want to go so far as to bring in personal matters, but I wish to relate from personal knowledge and personal experience that I know these continued criticisms directed against the policies we are following in Vietnam have greatly disturbed and dismayed some of our own servicemen out there.

Obviously, there is no question that some some of our allies have been worried about what our course of action is going to be. Certainly the South Vietnamese want to know whether we really mean what we say, whether we will stand by our commitments, whether we are going to stay and help them defeat communism or put our tail between our legs and get out because it has become difficult and hard and is costing us materiel and men.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I would like to finish my discussion and then I will be happy to yield.

I think that by a vote here today the vast majority of the Senate can prove and establish beyond the hint of a doubt the fact that we uphold the hand of the President.

Certainly we do not like to be out there. I wish that my two sons were home and I wish that the sons of other parents were home. Nobody wants to be tied down there.

When our President took over, there were approximately 25,000 men there. When the preceding President took over there were about 1,000 men there. Do we put our tail between our legs and run, and say we signed a treaty but it does not amount to anything? I do not think we can do that.

We have had to meet aggression with aggression. The President has said over and over again that this is a limited war with limited objectives. We have not struck Red China. We have not struck some of the strategic targets in Vietnam. This is the course we are endeavoring to follow, hoping we can somehow bring these people to the negotiation table.

I would like to read an article by Max Freedman, a fine liberal columnist with whom I do not always agree. I do respect him, and I do think that he is one of the greatest columnists of all time.

He wrote an article last night in which I thought he put his finger right on the nubbin of the problem. He said:

> Until North Vietnam is ready to accept the fact that she cannot impose her will by military force and organized subversion on South Vietnam, the road to peace will remain closed.
>
> The war, rather than diplomacy, holds the key to peace. For, in the judgment of highly placed officials in Washington, it will be impossible to persuade Hanoi that the President's promises and assurances will be fulfilled while they are regarded, as they now are, as no more than a skillful effort to weaken and divide the Communist military campaign.

Mr. President, I never in my life have known of anyone getting into a fist fight when he was a young man or a little boy who was able, while losing, to say "Let us stop now; let us negotiate; let us sit down and show how reasonable we can be."

The only time you can get a man to negotiate is when you are beginning to hurt him a little; when he is beginning to suffer a little. Then you can say to him, "Let us negotiate," and he will listen to you. He will not listen to you when he feels he is winning. This is the situation, expanded many times, that we find today in Vietnam.

Until the Communists know that we intend to stay there, until they know that we mean business, until we show that we are united, until we show that we are not going to be driven out, and until we show that we will live up to our commitments, we are not going to get them to negotiate.

Every time someone gets up and talks about the tide changing and people losing heart, it encourages the enemy. That is how the Vietnamese Communists won before. As General Maxwell Taylor said before the Foreign Relations Committee, that is how they won in 1954. He said the Communists won in Paris, not out in Indochina. That was so because the French people had lost heart, because they were divided, and because they gave up.

Certainly, this is not the intention or the desire of the American people. Certainly, it is not the intention or desire of anyone in Congress. I do not believe that we ought to give that impression, or that we are even considering such a thing. I do not really believe that we are. However, some of the debate in this Chamber is being interpreted in that way.

Let us have no illusions about this particular vote. While I disagree with the conclusions of the Senator from Oregon, I believe he is absolutely correct in stating that when we vote, there will be no mental gymnastics which we can follow. No one can say that what we do will not in effect be a reaffirmation of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which was passed in August 1964.

If any Senator does not like that, he ought to vote for the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Oregon. By our vote to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon, we shall be voting to reaffirm the decision we made when we passed the joint resolution of August 10, 1964. When I vote, I want to reaffirm it, and I believe the great majority of Senators have the same feeling.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I have listened with growing amazement to the comments of my good friend from Florida, comments which, to my way of thinking, impose a dilemma on those of us who in many ways object to the acts of our Government in Vietnam, although not necessarily, yet, to the policy as enunciated by the President.

I should merely like to state for the record that I have not the slightest intention of having my vote on this question interpreted as the Senator from Florida would like to have it interpreted. I do not believe for a moment that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution added as much as one inch to the powers of the President. He had all those powers without adding another. They were his right as Commander in Chief.

I do not intend to vote in favor of the Morse amendment, and I do not intend, no matter what the Senator from Florida may say, to have my vote interpreted in any other way but the way I stated it a few moments ago in a colloquy with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].

I am opposed to a policy which would escalate this war. I shall vote against the Morse amendment. I shall vote for the bill. Nothing that the Senator from Florida can say will change my own interpretation or the interpretation of the people of Pennsylvania of the way I shall vote.

Mr. SMATHERS. All I say is that the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, is in simple, understandable English. It is on the books. There it is. It will stand as the law of the land, it seems to me, until it is removed. If any Senator wishes to challenge it, he can offer a proposal to change it, as the Senator from Oregon has done. The Senator from Oregon does not like the joint resolution; he wants a change. I have not seen any other amendments or proposals to change the joint resolution of 1964.

So when we vote on the motion to table the amendment of the Senator from Oregon, it seems to me that we can arrive at only one conclusion: that we are affirming the resolution of 1964. I shall vote to table the amendment. I want to reaffirm the position we took in August, 1964. I want to uphold the hand of the Commander in Chief. I want to uphold the hand of the President. I want to uphold our boys in the fight they are making, because I believe it is right to do so. I do not believe we should quit. We should not run away. We will not run away.

I do not believe we should cut and run merely because the struggle is getting difficult, and no others want to make the sacrifice we are making.

The Senator from Illinois, I think, wishes to comment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It occurs to me that now and then we should refresh ourselves a little on the power of the Commander in Chief. The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief, and that is a reflection of the experience that George Washington had with divided authority under the Continental Congress. The closest that the Constitutional Convention ever came to putting a limit on the powers of the President was when they toyed with the idea of a limitation to the effect that the President could not take command of an army in the field. But that proposal was dropped in the Convention, so there is no limit whatsoever.

In the joint resolution of 1964, Congress was only affirming the power that the Commander in Chief had to use the Armed Forces of this country. Every time we support or approve action by the President, we are in effect supporting his capacity as Commander in Chief under a constitutional power that cannot be modified, unless the Constitution is changed.

So we ride along with the joint resolution of 1964. I see no reason why it should be modified or changed, or why we should be Indian givers and pull it back, now that we are in the thick of things. We gave the President the power with our eyes open. We knew what we were doing. Now to smash it up, to impair it, or to diminish it in any respect would be about as foolhardy an act as Congress could undertake.

Mr. SMATHERS. I totally agree with the Senator from Illinois. I should like to have his comments concerning what would be the reaction around the world should we now withdraw our endorsement. What would be the reaction around the world were we at this particular moment to say to the President

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

that we now rescind the endorsement which we gave him in August, 1964?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I doubt whether that reaction could be measured. It would be almost fantastic in its dimensions.

I said to the Senator from Oregon earlier today—and I said it with the utmost of candidness—that as I listen to the international radio monitors and hear his name mentioned and his speeches quoted from time to time, and reported by short wave from Peiping, and out of Hanoi, I believe he has become something of a symbol. He may laugh about this, but I have read pages and pages in the international monitors, and the Senator from Oregon has become a symbol.

I said today that, in my judgment, we shall have to destroy that symbolism, if we are to indicate to the world that we mean business—and we do mean business.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I do not propose to let any despicable Communist or group of Communists anywhere in the world determine whether the senior Senator from Oregon will carry out what he considers to be his trust in the Senate and to say whatever he thinks needs to be said in trying to bring about a policy that he believes will be in the best interests of his country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Oh, surely; I would be the last to impeach the motives of the Senator from Oregon. I am only stating what I think is a fact.

The name of the senior Senator from Oregon has become a symbol, and they have tied this viewpoint to his name. That does not represent, in my judgment, the feeling of the Senate or the feeling of the people of this country.

We must destroy that symbolism. Otherwise, they will go on with the idea that if they stay at it long enough we will throw our hand in and withdraw. Of all the things that we could not countenance for one single moment, that would be it.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader for his contribution. I totally agree with him.

Mr. President, I should like to make a very brief reference to the comments of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] with respect to the new Harris poll, by which he concluded that the people were in effect leaving the position taken by the President of the United States.

I do not think that anyone who reads that poll can accurately arrive at that conclusion. I submit that if one reads the second column in which it states the basic stand on U.S. policies he will see that it states: "Disagree. Carry war more to the north." In January, 12 percent wanted to do that. In February, when the poll was taken, 16 percent wanted to do that.

What is happening is that the President is losing some of the people who were supporting him in his limited war with limited objectives, and they want to go further.

The next question asked was: "Agree, but increase the military effort." Thirty-three percent were in this category in January and 33 percent were in the same category in February.

In the next category, "Agree, but do more to negotiate," 39 percent of those interviewed in January thought we should do more to negotiate. However, after the President has made such great efforts to negotiate, the percentage is now 34. This is not disagreement. This is an understanding and appreciation that we have explored every possible avenue open to us with respect to negotiating this matter. We are still trying to negotiate the matter. As we read the poll, it appears that the middle group is beginning to move into the "hawk" group, and that is where the President loses the percentage.

As I stated at the outset, I firmly believe that the vast majority of the people of the United States, as well as the vast majority of Senators and Representatives, totally and completely support and endorse the program of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. They uphold his hand. They support and approve the manner in which General Westmoreland is conducting our efforts out there. They applaud the sacrifice being made by our young men.

When we have an opportunity today to vote on this particular measure and vote resoundingly to table, there is no other conclusion that can be reached than that we are voting to affirm that resolution which we agreed to in 1964 concerning the course of action in which the President is leading us.

I yield the floor.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon wanted the floor. The Chair notes that so many Senators wish to express themselves on this important piece of legislation that it is extremely difficult for the Chair to observe the order in which the floor has been sought, particularly when a Senator seeks the floor and then yields temporarily.

The Chair will try to make note of this in the future. The Senator from Oregon had previously asked for the floor. I was going to recognize the Senator from Kentucky, but then thought of the commitment that had been made to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appreciate the difficulties that you are having. My remarks will not be long.

I recognize after this long debate the limitation of adding very much to it. I did want to speak now because I spoke on this matter at the time the joint resolution was agreed to in August 1964, and I took notice of the effect that the 1964 resolution could have.

In questions I directed to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I asked if the 1964 Bay of Tonkin resolution would ultimately be used to approve any action that the President might take, including the bombing of cities and ports in North Vietnam, and to undertaking a course of action which could lead to a war that might involve China and become world war III.

I cannot say that I was not conscious of the implications of the resolution when I raised those questions that day, August 6, on the floor of the Senate. However, in voting for the resolution I expressed my concern at the time that because we were approving great powers to the President of the United States, he had the duty to immediately and assiduously search out the possibility of negotiations, and, if necessary, refer the question to the Geneva powers or, indeed, to the United Nations for settlement.

I spoke in the Senate again in March 1965, and pointed out that I believed the President had placed preconditions upon our willingness to negotiate. I asked him to assert clearly that the United States would negotiate without preconditions.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, before the Senator leaves that matter, will he yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. GORE. Of course, the resolution and its contents and the context in which we agreed to the resolution is not the important thing. The important thing is what we do from here.

Mr. COOPER. That is the point that I was going to make.

Mr. GORE. Since so much emphasis has been placed upon that, I should like to read a portion of some material.

Mr. COOPER. I do not want to speak so much on the 1964 resolution. I have already said that I understood its implications at the time we agreed to it. I wanted to speak with reference to the present day, and what can be done looking to the future.

Mr. GORE. I shall be brief, if the Senator will yield further.

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. GORE. The Senator will recall that on the night before the resolution came to Congress, at the time that our forces were responding to the attack, President Johnson spoke by radio and television to the American people.

I should like to read a portion of the speech of the President. I shall not take the time to read that entire address. However, this is it, in part:

> But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain support facilities of North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

I call this specifically to the attention of the Senate and the country in order to indicate the atmosphere in which the Senate acted.

I read further from the speech:

> Yet our response for the present will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risk of spreading conflict. We seek no wider war. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries, and, indeed, to all.

In the message to Congress the next day, there appeared this sentence in the message of the President:

> As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Then 2 days after this resolution was agreed to, to indicate, I think, that the President did not then interpret this resolution as being tantamount to a declaration of war, he said in a public speech to the American people:

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions, and engulf much of Asia, and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem in Vietnam.

I thank the Senator for yielding. I wished to read these statements of the President of the United States, both before the resolution was passed and 2 days after it was passed, to indicate that the legislative intent was not then, in my opinion, what it has since been interpreted to be.

Mr. COOPER. I agree that circumstances have changed. But they have changed because of the continued increase in forces, which has been matched by the other side.

I said I did not wish to spend too much time discussing the resolution of August 6, except to say that it could have put the Senate upon notice that the progression of events which have occurred might occur. And that although we could not give the President any authority that he did not already possess, we did approve such action as he might take in the future, as I saw it, according to the second paragraph of the resolution.

But that is past, and we come now to this day, and another legal question is raised—a stale question, perhaps, by now—in which we are asking, "If we take action today, and pass the bill are we further approving the policy of the President of the United States?"

Many say, "I am not," and of course that is their view and their opinion and state of mind.

I do not think the action we take today will affect the President's powers in any way. Even if we should rescind the August 1964 resolution, we are now engaged in a war, and have been engaged since we passed the resolution. About 33,000 troops were fighting in Vietnam then. Even if we rescind this resolution today, it could not reduce the powers of the President, as Commander in Chief, to carry on a war in which we are presently engaged.

As I see it, the only constitutional power Congress has to stop the President's action is to deny him funds. The other things we can do are merely expressions of approval or disapproval.

But I am bound to say that the action we take here in approving this authorization bill, will, in my view, at least, be a measure of approval. It is a way of saying to the President, "To this point, at least, we do give a kind of approval to your course of action." That is my understanding of it. Others, of course, have their own positions.

But now I should like to go further. We are all trying, as we can, to give the President advice in some way. This debate is the best evidence that we are speaking because we are concerned.

Otherwise, there would be no debate on the matter. The bill would have been passed two weeks ago. While the debate is an indication of concern about the policy in Vietnam, it is also an indication of concern about Vietnam's consequences.

We cannot withdraw honorably, we cannot surrender, and we cannot afford to deny the young men who did not choose that battlefield, this measure of support.

So I would say at this point the most important thing that we can accomplish in this debate is to try to look ahead, and advise the President as to what our views are in the hope that they will influence a restrained course of action.

I followed the debate in the Foreign Relations Committee, and it was a very effective debate. I have followed the debate on the floor.

The debate has indicated our concern with policy, and I believe it grows out of the fear that the war is going to be moved up, step by step, until finally we may find ourselves in a major war with China, unlimited in area and unlimited in weapons and forces. No one can say that will happen, but it is a concern.

I noted in the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, that the chairman of the committee and others—including my friend, the able Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], whose questions were so incisive—the fear there were no limits which were being placed by our country upon the expansion of the war. I remember the chairman said that he could see no limits except surrender by one side or the other.

I would agree that if North Vietnam and China intervened and intervened and intervened, there might be no limit. But I wish to say today I think there is a limit which is within the control of the United States and its President—one which is within our control for trial.

I think that the administration must decide whether or not it can maintain a situation where negotiations are possible. Because if one thing was made clear by the debate in the Senate and in the Foreign Relations Committee—and I am not a member of the committee—it is the firm opinion that this war should be settled by negotiation and not by a total war.

Then the question is, "How can we maintain such a situation where negotiations may be possible?"

If force is met by force, there will be escalation, until finally there is likely to come such an engagement of forces, both on our side and on the other side, when there will be no possibility of decision except for war and surrender.

I do not think that it would be the United States which would surrender and I do not want to see the enlargement of the war. The President has the power to limit the situation so negotiations will still be possible.

This means that the battlefield must be kept at its narrowest scope consistent with the actual security of our forces.

I was one of those who believed that bombing should not be resumed, but that is now past. So I would urge today, that the battlefield ought to be confined to South Vietnam.

If we move north, and extend bombing north, and extend it north again, we may reach that point where our troops are wholly committed and engaged and settlement would not be possible, except as war determines. And, at some point, China may consider that it must make its decision about entering the war.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. I am very much in agreement with what the Senator from Kentucky has said, but what disturbs me is that we seem to have two schools of thought in the Senate, as we seem to have two schools of thought in the country. We have characterized the situation as the "dove" concept and the "hawk" concept. There are those ready to blockade Haiphong, to bomb Hanoi, to go the full distance if we are in war. Their logic is let us try for all-out victory. Then there are some who feel that possibly we should accept the enclave theory.

Mr. President, I listened carefully to General Gavin and I believe that by the time he finished testifying it was rather uncertain exactly what he meant by "enclave." So much so that I believe a Senator asked him the question categorically whether he was in agreement with the administration policy, and I believe that he answered in the affirmative.

The Senator from Kentucky has stated that we should make sure it is within the power of the President. Indeed, it is within the power of the President to keep this conflict within reasonable limits, if that is at all possible, consonant with the security of our boys. But, Mr. President, would it be to the interest of this Nation to announce publicly what the limits are? Is that not exactly the question?

Mr. COOPER. I have not said that we should. I am talking about actual limitations on the battlefield, not announced limitations.

Mr. PASTORE. I know the Senator has not said that.

Mr. COOPER. I have said, though, that the Senate should make known—by our own statements and our advice—what our position is, with the hope that it would influence the decisions of the President of the United States.

Mr. PASTORE. Well now, if the Senator will indulge me for another moment, I believe this issue preoccupies every American, particularly Members of Congress, we have responsibility in this premise for this conflict in Vietnam, and I believe it overrides every other matter and every other issue that can come before Congress in this session. We have 205,000 American souls committed in that part of the world—and they had no decision, no choice, in going there. They were commanded to go, and out of a sense of duty to their country, and their patriotism, they are there now.

What disturbs me is this: I have listened to many briefings. We have been invited to briefings in the White House. We have faithfully attended these brief-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

ings. We have been briefed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and many other officials, including the President of the United States.

Only a short while ago, the Vice President came back from a tour of that area and he briefed us as well.

The one thing that comforts me—if anyone can gain any comfort at all from this very confusing and complex situation—is the fact that from all the conversations I have heard from men in high places in the Government who have the power of decision, they have talked in a restrained manner. They have talked in terms which are restrained.

I attended one meeting where certain Senators were pushing for greater efforts. The Secretary of Defense then made it abundantly clear—and this has been reiterated time and again by the Secretary of State—that we have no desire to overthrow the government of Hanoi. Further, we have no desire to bomb the industrial complex of North Vietnam, because we feel that whatever ammunition and arms are coming in, now being supplied by North Vietnam, are coming in from other places. The only bombing we can engage in is that bombing which has to do with transportation of men and materiel—lines of communication, and the defeat of the forces of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese who are in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I do not know how more clearly the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State can tell Congress and the American people that all that we have in Vietnam is a limited political objective, and that our whole push is a restrained offensive.

I know that there are many people who say that we should never have gone twice in the first place. A long time ago, in 1954, in 1961, in 1962, and in 1963, with the fall of Diem, that may have been a debatable question; but the fact remains that we are there now.

I have never heard a responsible person say that we should get out. It was refreshing to hear my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], state today that he adopts the Gavin theory. That is going a long way, for the Senator from Oregon. I do not say that facetiously, because the Senator has been consistent. If any man in the Senate has been consistent, it has been the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE].

I have not agreed with him, but he has been consistent. When he goes so far as to say that he would be willing to accept the Gavin philosophy, then, in fact, he is saying that we cannot get out. We cannot get out, but let us be careful how far we go.

I believe that that idea palpitates in the hearts of every Member of the Senate, every Member of Congress, and every American. No one wishes to see a massive engagement with Red China. No one wishes to see a nuclear or a thermonuclear bomb used again by America in Asia. I hope that never happens, under any circumstances.

I would hope that this Government, out of all of these debates, out of all of the confusing and divergent points of view, at some point will show and indicate to the mothers of America, whose sons are in Vietnam, that there is some sense of unanimity in America, at least in Congress—on this issue.

All I am saying is that the man who is calling the "shots" is the President of the United States. He is the man who has the responsibility to make the decision. I do not believe that he is going to change overnight. I do not believe that he is going to change overnight, because he has stayed awake long into every night trying to figure out what his next step should be.

We cannot go on debating and delaying forever. I do not care what the Senator from Oregon says, I do not care what the Senator from Arkansas or the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations says, the fact is, we cannot change or take away from the authority of the President, whether we vote for this resolution or not, or amend it. We are committed. We are committed, and we are going to vote this money for our boys in Vietnam. These men who met yesterday talked it out, but they knew in their hearts that there was nothing they could do—even though they disagreed with the policy—to impede the passage of this proposed legislation.

We have been told time and again by our American military leaders that this money is necessary and that this equipment must be sent to our boys. Therefore, let us not delude ourselves about that. We are going to vote for this money, with or without an amendment.

All I am saying to my colleagues is this: There is the situation. It is there. We are committed. We are committed heavily. No matter how much we talk, the President of the United States has the responsibility of making that decision, and he will make it today, he will make it tomorrow, or he will make it next week.

I say only this, that I pray to God that some light from on high will illumine the President's mind to make a decision which will be good for the American people and good for peace in the world.

I thank the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I also thank the Senator from Rhode Island for a fine speech, but I did not answer his question.

Mr. PASTORE. Well—sufficiently—I usually ask a question as a reason to make a speech.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am going to close my remarks in a few minutes. Let me point out again that I am not questioning the authority of the President. I believe that nothing we do in the Senate in the way of a resolution or amendment can take away his authority as Commander in Chief, except to deny him the funds and thus nullify or vitiate his authority. But, we can advise, and that is what we are talking about, and should do.

The President has stated again and again that our objectives in the war are limited. I do not doubt his sincerity in making this statement, which he has made many times. However, there is a vast difference between the pronouncement of limitations, honest as they are, and a course or policy which could lead to their nullification.

What I have been pointing out is that if while we admit our objective is limitation we still take steps which extend the conflict—then we will reach that point where there can be no settlement possible except by the outcome of war.

There is the possibility now of limiting the war to South Vietnam. I am not talking about enclaves, but I am talking about limiting the war to the territory of South Vietnam. I belive with this limitation, and with the development of the strength of our forces and our supply system—which is much better than the supply system from the north—it would be much more difficult for the north than for us if the north introduced more troops.

So the war could be limited to its narrowest scope, to South Vietnam. The limitation would avoid escalation in forces and weapons, and help avoid possible internvention of China as we approach her borders, either physically or by bombing.

I think this is a power which is in the hands of the administration. That is my reason for speaking today.

Mr, MORSE. Mr. President, I shall take but a few moments to make a few replies to some of the arguments which have been made today on the other side of the issue. In fairness to my record, I think I owe it to myself to make these replies.

Before replying to some of the arguments of the opposition, I wish to have the attention of the Senator from Arkansas for a moment.

There is no substitute for scholarship in meeting issues and in presenting to the Senate information and data in support of a position taken by a Senator. When we go back to reflect on the debate of today, we shall recognize that the Senator from Arkansas, as is typical of him, being the great student that he is, made a speech today that is characterized by scholarship.

The eloquent remarks of the Senator from Arkansas took us back to the history of some of the wars of mankind and the policies that were followed in the ultimate solution of those wars. He pointed out that when the solution was one of surrender, there was never a peace which lasted very long; and when there was, as he used the term, a solution of accommodation, and there were long periods in which at least the combatants in such wars lived in peace.

That is a lesson to learn in the contest in which we are now involved. That is why I find myself, and have right along, holding to the position which the Senator from Arkansas so eloquently expressed today—that we must find an accommodation.

My great concern with the course of action we are following is that it is a course of action which seeks surrender. Surrender will never give us peace. The course of action we are following is based primarily upon a unilateral approach by the United States in the situation in southeast Asia which is not going to give

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

us peace, either. That is why it is important that we work out an accommodation that will make it possible for others to come in and settle the war for us.

We cannot settle the war, and we will never settle the war successfully, if we are going to measure success in terms of peace.

As I have said so many times, I have not any doubt that we can bring about such devastation in Asia by our military might, fighting an enemy at the present time which has no navy, no air force, no heavy equipment. I have been heard to say so many times in the last few years that we can continue to shoot fish in a barrel—and that is what we are doing. We can bring about great human destruction by our military might. What makes us think that will lead to peace? What makes us think that will lead to the type of accommodation the Senator from Arkansas talked about today?

That is going to lead us to a world which for decades to come will be in turmoil, and the primary responsibility for that turmoil will be the unilateral course of action we are following, for the most part.

Our great chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee made one of the greatest contributions in recent weeks toward the offering of an intelligent solution of a great crisis that any Senator in my many years in the Senate has made in a critical situation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to express my appreciation to the Senator. His great contribution has stimulated us to think about this problem in a way that we otherwise would not have. I am pleased indeed he feels that way. My position is implicit in other statements I have made, and I have only tried to carry on to fortify them. I am pleased that he approves of it.

Mr. MORSE. What the Senator has said is typical of the generosity of the Senator from Arkansas. I appreciate his remarks, but I want him to know I appreciate something much more, and that is his friendship.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Let me now say that I do not question in the slightest the sincerity, the high motivations, the dedication to our country, and the loyalty to our country of all my colleagues in the Senate, whether or not they hold views contrary to mine.

We have had great differences of opinion in the last 2½ years over the matter of foreign policy, and those differences will continue. The vote is not going to settle them today. The vote will temporarily in this body stop discussion, but it will settle nothing in this great contest which is reaching the grassroots of this country. The American people are going to make clear to our Government, as the French people made clear to the French Government, that our continued participation in this war will not continue to have public support.

The vote today will not more settle anything than did the vote on the Tonkin Bay resolution.

Only time will be the judge of what I have said. But so far as this Senator is concerned, short of a declaration of war I am going to continue to oppose our foreign policy in respect to this war. That foreign policy must change.

IS FREE DEBATE UNPATRIOTIC?

I turn to the first point that was made against me this afternoon. I say "against me" because it certainly was an argument to which I hold the opposite point of view.

I do not question the sincerity of those any more than I question the sincerity of the Senator from Illinois who made the statements that the Senator from Oregon is quoted in Peiping, Hanoi, Moscow, and quoted in other Communist areas of the world.

I do not intend to let a bunch of Communists silence my lips. If I can be influential in changing the foreign policy of my country in the interest of preserving freedom and giving a greater assurance of a legacy of freedom to be handed down to future generations of American boys and girls, no Communists in Hanoi or Peiping are going to stop me.

These issues are fundamental and basic and our differences are honest and sincere. The argument that those of us who are trying to get changes in this bill are letting down our boys in southeast Asia loses me completely.

I say respectfully that in my judgment we do not protect those by waving the flag into tatters. Those of us who try to follow the program so brilliantly and eloquently outlined by the Senator from Arkansas this afternoon, and which, in my humble and inadequate way, I have been urging on the floor of the Senate for a long, long time past, are not letting down these boys in Asia.

We are trying to stop increased killing of our men which, in my judgment, we are going to become guilty of as a nation if we follow our present policy and if we authorize the new policy that is inherent in this bill.

Mr. President, if the stamp of approval is put on this policy this afternoon, in my judgment, we are on our way to a further escalation and expansion of this war that is going to call for many more thousands of men in southeast Asia.

I pointed out on Friday, I pointed out last night, and I pointed out earlier today in my speech that this administration, in its own statement of policy through its Secretary of Defense, in his testimony before our committee, admits that this bill will authorize an additional 452,843 military personnel within this period of 1966–67. There is already talk of 800,000 additional men, if we find there is an escalated speedup in South Vietnam because of what may happen on the part of the program of our enemies.

My good friend from Arkansas and I disagree on how to implement this matter. I will come to that later. I wish to point out that when those of us trying to follow the program of the Senator from Arkansas do so, we are trying to create a situation where this country will not have to be sending, in round numbers, 500,000 additional men over there. We cannot send 500,000 additional men over there without enlarging the war and increasing the killing of larger numbers of them. Those of us who oppose this war feel we have no business there there on that scale.

The Senator from Rhode Island is correct. The Senator from Oregon from the beginning has taken the position that we had no business getting involved there and creating the situation we created. We cannot pull stake and get out.

I have said over and over, and I am sure ad nauseam to some Senators, that if we just pulled stakes and got out, mankind would then probably be confronted with the greatest human massacre ever known because through whichever side is stronger over there, it would be a blood bath. That is why there has to be a position taken where there is power to stop the blood bath.

But we have the defensive position where other nations, noncombatant nations, can come in to enforce a peace. That is what is needed and that is what the enclave theory is going to provide for.

What was one of the main points of the arguments of General Gavin, as the Senator from Arkansas has said? We have to make use of what we have. We should not follow a program of expanding. We should take these positions that will protect the Vietnamese and our soldiers.

That does not mean, as he pointed out, that we are going to retreat. When asked in the hearing he made clear he is advocating no retreat, but a holding operation. He is not going to permit the Vietcong to advance.

Of course, this strategy will help provide for the accommodation that the Senator from Arkansas is pleading for because it brings to an end the extension of the war and this bill will extend it further and in an alarming degree as I shall point out in just a moment.

Then, it provides an opportunity for other nations that are not combatants to take advantage of what is their clear obligation to come in with peacekeeping approaches, including peacekeeping forces, if necessary; separate the combatants, stop the warmaking.

Then, the interesting thing is that if it gets into that situation where people start coming to their senses and the nations start coming to their senses, there will be the beginning of negotiations.

Of course, General Gavin pointed out that if we follow the course of action we are now following, with more and more bombing into North Vietnam, it will be only a matter of time before we shall be bombing urban centers. Urban centers, he said. Once we begin the bombing of urban centers, the situation cannot be controlled. Once we get into the situation of bombing cities, let us face it: we cannot bomb Hanoi today, without bombing a large number of Russians, for there are many Russians in Hanoi. They are there giving technical assistance and advisory assistance for the defense of Hanoi and other defense centers of North Vietnam.

Then the great danger will be that when we begin to bomb urban centers in North Vietnam, as was pointed out by the Senator from Texas [Mr. YAR-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

BOROUGH], we shall be only seconds away from the Chinese border. When we begin to drop bombs within 30 miles of China proper—and we have already done so—think of what a miscalculation can do, what a mistake can do, what the dropping of a bomb on China can do.

There are no risks of an escalated war? There are no risks of a war with China? It is beyond my power of comprehension to assume that there is no danger of war with China. We are living 24 hours of the day and night under the danger of a war with China, which can be caused even by a miscalculation.

So many of us are urging that the program of a great military strategist of our country, General Gavin, be followed. It was not so long ago, when he was in uniform, that we recognized how fortunate we were to have such a brilliant mind exercise strong influence in the development of American military strategy. His being out of uniform in no way, so far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned, diminishes his intellectual ability. I shall continue to heed him.

We find General Gavin's views buttressed by those of former Ambassador George Kennan, who in effect said the same thing—that we ought to make use of what we have; we ought to take a holding position; we ought to take a defensive position, where the Vietcong cannot advance, but where we will not advance and carry on the war at an expanded rate. He is a witness whom we ought to heed.

As my chairman knows, I think we have just started to listen to the witnesses we ought to hear. As he knows, I have submitted to the committee a list of witnesses who I think ought to be called in a public hearing, for the American people are entitled to have their foreign policy discussed in public hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations. We have yet to hear our first China expert. We have yet to hear our first constitutional law authority. We have yet to hear our first international law authority.

But I am not going to be deterred from urging the type of approach that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, has urged in his eloquent, brilliant, and scholarly speech this afternoon, when he said we ought to make an approach to accommodation, if we want peace. If we want to annihilate the enemy, let us stop talking about accommodation; but also just forget about peace, because that course of action will result in a heritage of intense Asiatic hatred toward future generations of American boys and girls. All we are doing is condemning our future generations to massive burdens and possible destruction—if that does not occur even while we are still alive, in our generation.

What makes us think that the United States will be allowed to maintain a foothold of domination anywhere in Asia? The Asiatics will throw us out, if it takes 50 or 100 years to do it. We ought to be thinking further into the future. I respectfully say that, in my opinion, not very much thought is being given to it at the present time by very many.

CONGRESSIONAL CHECK THROUGH PURSE STRINGS

The second argument that was advanced against me this afternoon, related to the constitutional check of Congress through the purse strings. My good friend from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] said he recognized that we have the control of the purse strings. That is a check. I am merely asking, "Why don't you use it in this bill?" The Senate has before it an authorization bill for more than $4 billion. It will move on to an appropriation. It will be passed; and as I said earlier this afternoon, merely provide the military with the money, and the military will spend it. They will find ways to spend it. What I seek to do as of now, until we can try to work out a program of accommodation such as the Senator from Arkansas has spoken about, is to stop increasing the money we give the military.

But it is said that we will be letting down the boys. Of course not. The purpose of the check is to force the President to change his foreign policy. The regular Defense Department funds are not affected. But this bill is for an increase, and that is what should be checked.

That is what I am pleading for. I am saying that we should not give the President this additional authority and money. We have this checking authority; in my judgment, we should use it. Deny the President the money. That will not be letting down the boys; it will be saving the lives of thousands of them, because we will change the President's policy, and he will be forced to move into a defensive position which will not in any way weaken the security of our country.

So I am a little at a loss to understand how in one breath my opposition can talk about the purse strings being a check, and then with the next breath say, "Of course, we should not exercise this check against the President, because, after all, he is the Commander in Chief. He is in charge; therefore, we should give him what he wants."

I have been arguing that the time has come to stop giving the President what he wants. In my judgment, the President is leading us into the increasing danger of massive war that can lead to world war III.

The checking principle of the Constitution means exactly what it says. The responsibility of Congress is to exercise the check. Go ahead and give the President everything he wants. If we continue to do so, then stop talking to me about using the purse strings as a check.

Here and now, in this bill, are the time and place to exercise that check. If we are ever going to exercise the check of the purse string, now is the time. Do not forget what the Secretary of Defense has said. I have quoted it before; I shall do so briefly again. If there is any question as to the policy contained in this bill, so far as the authority to extend the war in southeast Asia is concerned, the Secretary of Defense gave his answer when Senator SMITH asked the question:

> Mr. Secretary, are there plans to escalate and step up the offensive in Vietnam?

Secretary McNamara replied:

> Well, there are preparations being made, and they are reflected in this fiscal 1966 supplement, for substantially increasing our deployments.

What does that mean? It means our manpower. Secretary McNamara later in the hearings stated:

> The figure I have given in round numbers—
>
> Four hundred and fifty thousand men—
>
> increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units.

That means obtaining the money so that we can expand the policy and the air battles and the airpower. That is the policy. I am merely asking that we check the President and not give him that authorization.

As to all the talk about not going to supply the material for these boys, I simply say that me must not expand the operations. As the Senator from Arkansas pointed out in his comment, we already have too much of a backlog and delivery problem to even take care of the manpower that we presently have over there. It will take many months to build the installations called for in the bill in order to accommodate the ships and the delivery of materiel.

Mr. President, we are not going to be letting any boys down unless we continue to expand this war while they are in a situation in which we cannot even deliver to them all of the supplies as rapidly as we want to deliever them at the present time.

We have already overextended ourselves. We have already gone too far both in sending manpower and in the rate of the hostilities that we are conducting.

HOW BIG A WAR CAN WE WAGE WITHOUT DECLARING WAR?

I come very briefly to the constitutional argument. We again hear about the resolution of the house of delegates of the American Bar Association.

It is only a resolution. The Committee on Foreign Relations wired the American Bar Association and asked for a memorandum in support of the resolution. The committee asked for a documentation that would support the conclusion. No documentation has been received.

However, I have been advised as to what happened. The house of delegates of the American Bar Association is characterized by a good many characteristics of a political institution.

I have been advised by one who sat there during the meetings that there were emotional and political speeches. I repeat that, in my judgment, this war is an unconstitutional war and it has been from the very beginning.

Mr. President, on last Friday I set forth at some great length in the RECORD the material discussing the constitutional debates on article I, section 8, of the Constitution, when the declaration of war section was written into the Con-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

stitution, and when the debates were had as to whether there should be a declaration of war and power to make war.

It will be found that I quoted from Hamilton. I quoted from the Federalist Papers. I quoted from the Constitutional Fathers, which quotations made it perfectly clear that what they were seeking to do was to prevent the President of the United States from having the power of the King of England to make war. They sought to vest that power in the Congress of the United States.

There has not been one word uttered in this debate that changes what the Constitutional Fathers said and obviously intended.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that material from my speech of last Friday be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

In "The Federalist" Hamilton wrote:

"The President is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this respect his authority will be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It will amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy, while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have from time to time quoted one constitutional authority after another in regard to this matter. I quoted great American writers such as Professor Commager, of Amherst University, who talked to me at length the other morning on the long-distance telephone. He told me—and I say this with immodesty, I know—that I was correct in the many statements that I have made on the history of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and as to what happened in the Constitutional Convention. He told me how right I have been in the position I have taken that, under the Constitution, a declaration of war is necessary if we are going to send American boys constitutionally into battle.

The argument was made this morning by my good friend, the senior Senator from Georgia, that on a number of occasions a President alone had sent men into battle. That does not make it constitutional.

The interesting thing is that we can add all of the mistakes and all of the wrongs, one on another, and never end up with a summation of right.

A continuation of practices that have no constitutional basis does not make the practices constitutional. Let us not forget that, as a result of some of the examples that were cited of sending the Marines to certain places, we are still paying the price. We are still paying the terrible price, the loss of confidence in us, and the loss of prestige because we misused the Marines at the times a President sent them in.

In Latin America, this has been referred to as an example of shocking American military intervention.

I do not want to see my country continue that. I want to see my country get back inside of the Constitution. However, Mr. President, I have discussed my views with regard to the international aspects of this matter with a recognized international lawyer such as Ben Cohen, who has, because of his brilliancy in the field of international law, represented the United States in a considerable number of international conferences.

Mr. President, over a year ago, I had printed in the RECORD that great treatise of Ben Cohen in respect to the international law aspects of this problem, using him as my authority.

I called him on yesterday and talked to him about it again. He again verified the position I have been taking in regard to the international law aspects of this problem.

I have used the writings of the great Edward Corwin on our Constitution and on the power of the Presidency, sustaining my position.

I have used the writings of Prof. Roger Fisher, of Harvard.

Mr. President, as I have said now for 2½ years, in my judgment, we have been following an illegal course of action in southeast Asia in respect to our Constitution. There is no doubt about our frequent violations of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. President, as an old law teacher, I know the importance of documentation.

On last Friday I had printed in the RECORD a memorandum of law, prepared by a group of American lawyers, which holds a view different from that of the American Bar Association, together with a letter of transmittal from that group, submitting the memorandum to the President of the United States under date of January 25, 1966. I do not endorse every proposition in it; but it poses the issues that are still unsettled and unsolved.

I ask unanimous consent that, at the close of my remarks, this material be printed in the RECORD. It appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of February 25, 1966, at pages 3996 to 4004.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I come now to the Tonkin Bay resolution.

I do say to my friend, the Senator from Alaska, that I shall always be proud, as I am sure he will be proud, to have our grandchildren read that we did not vote for the resolution in August 1964. I would not vote for a renewal of the resolution because, in my judgment, it sought to recognize a power that a President of the United States does not have.

There was some talk earlier today by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] who talked—about the Lebanon resolution, and about the Cuban resolution, and also, I think, about the Formosa resolution.

Mr. President, the Cuban resolution—let me say it again—the Cuban resolution differs from all the other resolutions, because it did not give the President any power to make war.

The majority leader knows why it did not. I will refresh his memory by reminding him that the Senate accepted the proposal I made to modify the Cuban resolution. It would not contain any language giving war power to the President as did the Formosa resolution and the Labonon resolution. That is not in the Cuban resolution. The Senator from Oregon was responsible for its being taken out. And only because it was taken out, the Senator from Oregon voted for that resolution. I voted against the Formosa resolution; I voted against the Lebanon resolution. I have voted against every resolution that has been presented in the Senate which seeks to give the President the power to make war, because, in my judgment, we cannot give him that power. Congress must declare war.

MAJOR MILITARY EFFORTS HAVE FOLLOWED WAR MESSAGES, NOT PRECEDED THEM

Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk here today about the power of the President as Commander in Chief. The President, as Commander in Chief, does not have the power to make a war. The President, as Commander in Chief, has the power to respond immediately to the self-defense needs of our Nation. The President had the power, as Commander in Chief, to respond immediately to any attack that was made upon us on the high seas in Tonkin Bay. The then President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had the power to respond immediately after Pearl Harbor to the self-defense needs of this Republic. But he recognized that he also had the obligation to ask Congress for a declaration of war.

Last Friday, I put in the RECORD the war message of Franklin Roosevelt following Pearl Harbor and the war message of Woodrow Wilson on April 2, 1917, before a joint session of Congress, when he gave his reasons as to why he thought the Congress, under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, should declare war against the German Imperial Government.

I wish to take a moment, if the Senators will bear with me, to find that declaration, because once again, I wish to read the first paragraph of that great war message of Woodrow Wilson.

I do not have to refresh the memory of the Senators as to the understanding of that great American historian. Prior to entering politics, he was one of the great historians of the time. He was more than a historian; he was one of the great scholars of American political science, one of the great professors at Princeton University.

I read the first paragraph from the message of Woodrow Wilson on that historic night in April 1917:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

He knew his constitutional history. He knew his constitutional law. He knew

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

that as President of the United States, he was without constitutional authority to make war against the German Imperial Government without a declaration of war by the Congress. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to rest my case on this issue with Woodrow Wilson.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I should like to say, in connection with the allusion of the Senator from Oregon to the Tonkin Gulf resolution, that it is difficult to understand why it was not clear at the time when that resolution was drafted at the White House, sent to Congress, and approved by a great majority, that it, itself, was a violation of the very kind to which the Senator is addressing himself.

The Tonkin Bay resolution, in its opening paragraph, spoke of the attacks on naval vessels, and said they "have thereby created a serious threat to international peace."

"A serious threat to international peace." But article 33 of the United Nations Charter, to which we are a signatory, said that, "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security"—those very same words—"shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation," and it names eight alternatives: negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.

That resolution was a violation of the United Nations Charter and its purpose. We were as violative of that charter as we have charged the other people of being.

Mr. MORSE. As the Senator from Alaska knows, I completely agree with him. I am just not going to give into the United Nations aspects of this tonight, because if I started, in justice to the subject, it would take a long time. But as the Senator knows, I have argued here for two and a half years that we have violated at least 13 articles of the United Nations Charter in our course of conduct in southeast Asia, and we have violated section after section of the Geneva accords.

It is no alibi to say that we did not sign them, and then at the same time say we are in there, in part, because the North Vietnamese are violating them. We cannot have it both ways, Mr. President.

Mr. GRUENING. If the Senator will yield further, of course we gave unilateral approval, and, through Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, said we would adhere to 12 of the 13 articles.

Mr. MORSE. I agree with the Senator. I made my case on that last Friday, as I have made it many times heretofore.

I only wish to say now, Mr. President, that from the beginning, when we took this little Vietnamese exile by the name of Diem out of Washington, D.C., and out of Paris, who had never fought the French, militarized him, and set him up as our first puppet President of South Vietnam, we violated the Geneva accords. The Geneva accords do not provide for two governments in Vietnam. The 17th parallel was nothing but a line of demarcation separating the military forces of the Vietminh and the French. That is what that 17th parallel was for.

The accords then provided for 2 years to work out, under the direction and jurisdiction of an International Control Commission represented by India, Canada, and Poland, arrangements for an election in July 1956, that would establish a government and a reunification of all Vietnam.

That is what the Geneva accord called for. Who divided Vietnam? The United States. That is our record. Of course, we are going to hear about that when we get into the councils of the world. There does not seem to be much enthusiasm for getting into an open world debate on Vietnam in the Security Council; but I am still hoping it will come, and if it does not come, then I wish to repeat very quickly here, my President ought to get before the General Assembly of the United Nations and make a plea to the world for that General Assembly to take over its peacekeeping functions in South Vietnam, and stop the danger of this war escalating into a holocaust.

FLOOR MANAGER DOES NOT CONTROL POLICY

Then, Mr. President, there is another point on which my good friend, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and I may not see eye to eye, although I fully understand his point of view. I believe that the situation of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], is quite different on this bill from the situation of the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the Tonkin Bay resolution. There is no ambiguity in this bill, to justify any legislative history, as there was in the Tonkin Bay resolution.

For the Senator from Georgia from Georgia to say that it does not involve policy does not erase the record of the administration as to what the policy of the bill is. It contains new authority which makes it possible to escalate the war. The Secretary of Defense says so, that it is a decision for further escalation, to be made by the President. He has not made it yet, but we are going to give him all the materiel, all the manpower, and all the money for the escalation of the war.

Mr. President, that is what I am protesting. It is that policy which should be stopped.

Now is the time to check the President. He must not be placed in a position that he can exercise his discretion to escalate the war and send increasing numbers of American boys to their deaths in southeast Asia.

As I stated earlier, in my judgment, southeast Asia is not worth the life of a single one of our boys. It is not our unilateral responsibility. It is the responsibility of the nations of the world, who have committed themselves to keep the peace, to start living up to their obligations.

Therefore, I dismiss the point by saying that nothing which the Senator from Georgia has said can make legislative history for the simple reason that unless a bill is ambiguous, then anything the Senator in charge of the bill states is superfluous. We know what the intent is. It is that intent which I am protesting. That is why I do not believe that the statements of the Senator from Georgia help my friend the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], one iota in regard to the policy which is spelled out in the bill.

Mr. President, first, a vote for my amendment would be a vote to make clear to the President that those who vote for the amendment disapprove of the continuation of the exercise of the power he has been exercising under the Tonkin Bay resolution.

A vote against the bill would constitute a check on the purse strings, in order to deny to the President the authoriy that the bill would give him to expand the war. For it is an expansion of the war which I believe is so dangerous. It is an expansion of the war which I fear would lead us to a war with China and eventually with Russia.

Mr. President, it is a risk we should not take. That is why I say that we should take the General Gavin program, the so-called holding operation, and then use that time period in order to urge other nations to come in and enforce the peace.

I make this plea to the chairman of my committee: A vote for the authorization bill will be a vote which will not strengthen those in the American population who, in my judgment, in increasing millions, wish the United States to follow a course of action whereby the war will not be escalated.

A vote against the bill, in my opinion, would strengthen those within American public opinion who, in increasing numbers, are urging a change in our course of action in the operation of our foreign policy in southeast Asia.

A vote for this bill on the part of any Senator who has great reservations about the Tonkin Bay resolution, who has great reservations which many have expressed, in terms of fear as to what may happen in Vietnam, even by miscalculation, or direct planning on the part of the administration to expand the war, would be a vote to weaken those in American public opinion who, in increasing numbers, in my judgment, are insisting that our foreign policy in southeast Asia be changed.

The only alternative left the American people, if Congress will not carry out, in this instance, its power of check through the purse strings, would be for them to take the issue to the polls. I shall be one who will urge them to take to the polls, because I believe that every procedure available to the American people, under our constitutional system,

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

should be exercised with them to check the expansion of this war, to increase thereby the possibility of finding a peaceful solution or, as the Senator from Arkansas has said, an accommodation which will lead to peace.

Mr. President, I wish to put into the RECORD the conclusion of that great report of my majority leader which sets forth, for those who will read it, the warning signs of where we may be going in southeast Asia if we follow the authorization of this bill, if we give to the administration the authority to expand the war, which this authority would give to the administration, dependent only upon the decision of the President of the United States.

Mr. President, speaking most respectfully of my President, and I make no personal comment, I will not vote to give to this President, or to any President, the kind of discretionary power which the bill would give to him. As the Secretary of Defense states, the President gave instructions to submit this bill to provide for all these authorities which will result, if they are exercised, in an escalation of the war, all dependent upon the discretionary decision of the President of the United States.

Mr. President, we should not give it to any man—no man; and if we give it to any mere man, with all the frailties that every man possesses, we will weaken our system of constitutional checks, and we will enhance the growing danger in this country of a government by men and not of law. We would also increase the danger of a government by executive supremacy, instead of a government which would preserve the precious system of three coordinate and coequal branches of government.

Mr. President, I rest my case.

EXHIBIT 1

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM,
New York, N.Y., January 25, 1966.

Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

Mr. PRESIDENT: Following the issuance by the Department of State in March 1965 of a memorandum captioned "Legal Basis for U.S. Actions Against North Vietnam," our committee, in consultation with leading authorities in the fields of international law and constitutional law, undertook to research the legal issues, culminating in the memorandum of law (here enclosed).

Our committee's memorandum of law has been endorsed, among others, by Profs. Quincy Wright, of the University of Virginia; Wolfgang Friedmann, of Columbia University; Thomas I. Emerson, of Yale; Richard A. Falk, of Princeton; Norman Malcolm, of Cornell; D. F. Fleming, of Vanderbilt; David Haber, of Rutgers; Roy M. Mersky, of the University of Texas; William G. Rice, of the University of Wisconsin; Chancellor Robert M. MacIver, of the New School for Social Research; Profs. Robert C. Stevenson, of Idaho State University; Alexander W. Rudzinski, of Columbia; Darrell Randell, of the American University in Washington, D.C.; and Profs. Wallace McClure and William W. Van Alstyne, both from Duke University and the World Rule of Law Center.

For the reasons documented in our memorandum our committee has reached the regrettable but inescapable conclusion that the actions of the United States in Vietnam contravene the essential provisions of the United Nations Charter, to which we are bound by treaty; violate the Geneva accords which we pledged to observe; are not sanctioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; and violate our own Constitution and the system of checks and balances which is the heart of it, by the prosecution of the war in Vietnam without a congressional declaration of war.

The principal argument advanced in the State Department's memorandum is that our Government's action in Vietnam is justified under article 51 of the United Nations Charter sanctioning "individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations." However, South Vietnam is indisputably not a member of the United Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva accords of 1954, is merely a temporary zone. Moreover, since the Geneva accords recognized all of Vietnam as a single state, the conflict in Vietnam is "civil strife" and foreign intervention is forbidden. We do well to recall that President Lincoln, in the course of our Civil War to preserve the union of the North and the South, vigorously opposed British and French threats to intervene in behalf of the independence of the Confederacy.

In addition, the right of collective self-defense under article 51 is limited to those nations which are within a regional community which history and geography have developed into a regional collective defense system. The United States—a country separated by oceans and thousands of miles from southeast Asia and lacking historical or ethnic connections with the peoples of that area—cannot qualify as a bona fide member of a regional collective defense system for southeast Asia.

The State Department's memorandum also contends that the actions of the United States "being defensive in character and designed to resist armed aggression, are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the charter and specifically with article 2, paragraph 4." Yet article 2, paragraph 4, declares in clear and unambiguous language that "all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The State Department's memorandum also attempts to justify our Government's actions in Vietnam on the ground that the "North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva accords." But this statement ignores our Government's antecedent violations of the pledges we made. On July 21, 1954, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith in a declaration confirmed by President Eisenhower, pledged that our Government would not "disturb" the Geneva accords and would "not join in an arrangement which would hinder" the rights of peoples "to determine their own future." However, the United States departed from these pledges when, on July 16, 1955, the Diem regime announced with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, thus violating the central condition which had made the Geneva accords acceptable to the Vietminh. And the United States also chose to ignore the ban on the introduction of troops, military personnel, arms, and munitions into Vietnam, and the prohibition against the establishment of new military bases in Vietnam territory—provisions set out in the Geneva accords. It is an historical fact that the refusal to hold the elections prescribed by the Geneva accords, coupled with the reign of terror and suppression instituted by the Diem regime, precipitated the civil war.

In the light of the foregoing, more fully detailed and documented in the enclosed memorandum, we submit, Mr. President, that the State Department has incorrectly advised you as to the legality of U.S. actions against Vietnam.

We further submit, Mr. President, that the frequent citation of the pledges given by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam. President Eisenhower has stated that his administration had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever." President Kennedy insisted that the war in Vietnam was "their war" and promised only equipment and military advisers. Hence the historical facts fail to support the point advanced. Beyond this, these Presidential pledges do not even have the status of treaties, not having been ratified by the Senate. Manifestly, the obligations assumed by our Government under the United Nations Charter, with the advice and consent of the Senate, transcend any Presidential pledge undertaken vis-a-vis the South Vietnamese regime.

Our Government has often urged that our presence in South Vietnam is solely to preserve freedom for its people and to uphold the democratic process. Yet the series of regimes supported by the United States in South Vietnam have been authoritarian in character, quite without popular support and largely indifferent to the welfare of the local population. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 30, 1964, commenting on the consequences of massive American involvement in Vietnam, stated, "Well, that means we become a colonial power and I think it's been pretty well established that colonialism is over. I believe that if you start doing that you will get all kinds of unfortunate results: you'll stir up antiforeign feeling; there'll be a tendency to lay back and let the Americans do it and all that. I can't think that it's a good thing to do.

As we have stated, our committee has also come to the painful conclusion that our Government's action in Vietnam violates the clear provision of our Constitution which vests in Congress exclusively the power to declare war—a power not constitutionally granted to the President. The debates in the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia make explicitly clear that warmaking was to be a purely legislative prerogative and the President was not to have the power to wage a war or "commit" our Nation to the waging of a war, although the Executive was intended to have the power to repel sudden attacks.

In pointing out that the President lacks constitutional power to make war, our committee does not imply that a declaration of war by the Congress is desirable. Rather, we mean to point out that the failure to abide and conform to the provisions of our Constitution inevitably lead to tragic situations.

In alerting the American people to the unconstitutionality of the war being waged in Vietnam, we are following the example followed by Abraham Lincoln who, in a speech made on January 12, 1848, before the House of Representatives opposing the war undertaken by President Polk, set out the reasons which impelled him to vote for a resolution which declared that "the war with Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President."

Our committee conducted its research because of a deep sense of responsibility as members of the bar and because of our dedication to the principle of world peace through law. It was the American lawyers who conceived and nurtured this principle, and after holding conferences on four continents (San Jose, Costa Rica; Tokyo, Japan; Lagos, Nigeria; Rome, Italy), finally convened the First World Conference on World Peace Through Law at Athens, Greece, in July 1963.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

In the proclamation of Athens, the declaration of general principles for a world rule of law, among other things, declared that "all obligations under international law must be fulfilled and all rights thereunder must be exercised in good faith."

Mr. President, we submit that our Government's intervention in Vietnam falls far short of the declaration of principles at Athens, Greece, in July 1963, and is in violation of international agreements. The rule of law is the essential foundation of stability and order, both between societies and in international relations. When we violate the law ourselves, we cannot expect respect for the rule of law by others. Our present unilateral intervention is an offense, we submit, against the spirit of American institutions.

As lawyers, we feel that the national interest is best served—indeed it can only be served—by (a) a commitment that our Government will be bound by and implement the principles of the Geneva accords of 1954, and that the main provisions thereof be the basis for the establishment of an independent, unified neutral Vietnam; (b) an invocation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter to assure peace in southeast Asia; and (c) a declaration that there will be no further bombing of Vietnam, that we will agree to a cease-fire, and publicly declare that the United States is willing to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front—a point endorsed by leading Senators and Secretary General Thant and mandated by article 33 of the United Nations Charter requiring that the "parties to any dispute * * * shall first of all, seek a solution by negotiation * * * or other peaceful means of their own choice," and that all elements of the South Vietnamese people should be represented in that country's postwar government.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT W. KENNY,
Honorary Chairman.
WILLIAM L. STANDARD,
Chairman.

AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, IN LIGHT OF OUR CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS, AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

(Prepared by Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, Hon. Robert K. Kenny, Honorary Chairman)

Executive committee

William L. Standard, Chairman; Carey McWilliams, Vice Chairman; Joseph H. Crown, Secretary.

Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, 38 Park Row, New York, N.Y.

AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM

The justification of American involvement* in Vietnam has troubled lawyers in the light of the literal language of our Constitution and the United Nations Charter. Though the United States initially entered South Vietnam only to advise, American troops, now numbering 125,000,[1] have moved from a passive to an active combat role. American forces have mounted repeated air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Is such action, raising the threat of large-scale war, consonant with our Constitution, our obligations under the United Nations Charter, the provisions of the southeast Asia collective defense treaty?

Observance of the rule of law is a basic tenet of American democracy. Hence it is fitting that American lawyers examine the action pursued by our Government to determine whether our Government's conduct is justified under the rule of law mandated by the United Nations Charter, a charter adopted to banish from the earth the scourge of war.

We shall explore and assess the grounds advanced to justify the course of conduct pursued by our Government vis-a-vis Vietnam. In section I, we examine American policy in the light of the United Nations; in section II, in the light of the Geneva accords and the southeast Asia collective defense treaty; and in sections III–IV in the light of our Constitution. Mindful of the grave importance of the issues, we have exercised the maximum diligence in the preparation of this memorandum which is fully documented.

I—THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on behalf of the United States on June 26, 1945, by the President of the United States, and was ratified on July 28, 1945, by the Senate.[2] Thus, the United States became a signatory to the Charter, along with 55 other nations (there are now 114), obligating itself to outlaw war, to refrain from the unilateral use of force against other nations, and to abide by the procedures embodied in the Charter for the settlement of differences between states. In essence, the obligations assumed by member nations under the United Nations Charter represent the principles of international law which govern the conduct of members of the United Nations and their legal relations.

The Charter of the United Nations is a presently effective treaty binding upon the Government of the United States because it is the "supreme law of the land."[3] Indeed, the Charter constitutes the cornerstone of a world system of nations which recognizes that peaceful relations, devoid any use of force or threats of force, are the fundamental legal relations between nations. The following provisions of the Charter are relevant:

(a) "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" (ch. I, art. II(4)).

(b) "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations or shall decide what measures shall be taken * * * to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Ch. VII, 39.)

It is thus plain that signatory members of the United Nations Charter are barred from resorting to force unilaterally and that only the Security Council is authorized to determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace (apart from the question as to whether or not the General Assembly has any residual authority by virtue of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution for this purpose when the Security Council is unable to meet its responsibilities[4]).

It may be recalled that in 1956, Israel justified its attack on the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula "as security measures to eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen 'Commando' bases in the Sinai Peninsula from which raids had been launched across the Israeli frontier." Starke, "Introduction to International Law," fourth edition, London, 1958, at page 83 et seq.

When Great Britain and France introduced their troops into the Sinai Peninsula, under claim of a threat to their vital interests, the "preponderant reaction of the rest of the world was to condemn this action as inter alia, a breach of the United Nations Charter." Starke, "Introduction to International Law," fourth edition, London, 1958, at pages 85–88.

When the Soviet Union suggested a joint military operation with the United States to restore the peace in the Middle East, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected this proposal as "unthinkable" (New York Times, November 6, 1956). Dulles declared:

"Any intervention by the United States and/or Russia, or any other action, except by a duly constituted United Nations peace force would be counter to everything the General Assembly and the Secretary General of the United Nations were charged by the charter to do in order to secure a United Nations police cease-fire."

At a news conference on November 8, 1956, President Eisenhower, answering an announcement of the Soviet Union at that time, declared that the United States would oppose the dispatch of Russian "volunteers" to aid Egypt, saying that it would be the duty of all United Nations members, including the United States, under the clear mandate of the United Nations Charter to counter any Soviet military intervention in the Middle East. The President said:

"The United Nations is alone charged with the responsibility of securing the peace in the Middle East and throughout the world." United Nations Action in the Suez Crisis. Tulane Studies in Political Science, volume IV entitled "International Law in the Middle East Crisis."

To the fundamental, substantive and procedural requirements and conditions vesting sole authority in the United Nations to authorize utilization of force, there are only two exceptions set forth in the charter. The first exception is found in article 51 of chapter 7:

"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security."

Article 51 of the charter marked a serious restriction on the traditional right of self-defense. As was stated by Prof. Philip C. Jessup in his work, "A Modern Law of Nations," published in 1947 (at pp. 165–166):

---

*For a historical background, see Robert Scheer, "How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam" (A Report to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Post Office Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif., 93103); sample copy free.

[1] President Johnson, in his news conference of July 29, 1965, stated:

"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." (Presidential Documents, vol. 1, No. I, p. 15, Aug. 2, 1965.)

[2] See Historical Note under title 22, United States Code, sec. 287. By the act of Dec. 20, 1945, c. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (22 U.S.C. 287–287e), Congress enacted "The United Nations Participation Act of 1945," empowering the President to appoint representatives to the United Nations and to render various forms of assistance to the United Nations and the Security Council under specified terms and conditions.

[3] The treaties to which the United States is a signatory are a part of the fundamental law, binding upon all officials and all governmental institutions. Art. I, sec. 2, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution confers power upon the President to make treaties with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate. Art. VI, clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides that treaties so made, together with the Constitution and the laws of the United States made pursuant thereto, are "the Supreme Law of the Land." *Missouri* v. *Holland*, 252 U.S. 416, 432–434; *Hines* v. *Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63; *United States* v. *Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 230–231; *Clark* v. *Allen*, 331 U.S. 503–508.

[4] The constitutional validity of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted in 1950, is disputed.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

"Article 51 of the charter suggests a further limitation on the right of self-defense: it may be exercised only 'if an armed attack occurs.' * * * This restriction in article 51 very definitely narrows the freedom of action which states had under traditional law. A case could be made out for self-defense under the traditional law where the injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place. Under the charter, alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened." [5]

The traditional right of self-defense, even prior to the adoption of the United Nations charter, was limited. As stated by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case,[6] and as adopted in the Neurenberg Judgment in 1945, any resort to armed force in self-defense must be confined to cases in which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwehlming and leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation." [7]

In expressly limiting independent military action to instances of armed attack, the founding nations explicitly and implicitly rejected the right to the use of force based on the familiar claim of "anticipatory self-defense," or "intervention by subversion," or "pre-emptive armed attack to forestall threatened aggression," and similar rationale. Such concepts were well known to the founding nations if only because most of the wars of history had been fought under banners carrying or suggesting these slogans. More importantly for our purposes here, however, the United States was aware of these precepts before the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter and consciously acquiesced in their rejection as a basis for independent armed intervention.[8]

It has been authoritatively said that the exceptional circumstances stipulated in article 51 are "clear, objective, easy to prove and difficult to misinterpret or to fabricate".[9] The wording was deliberately and carefully chosen.[10] [11]

Hence article 51 can under no circumstances afford a justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam, since the Saigon regime is indisputably not a member of the United Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Vietnam is merely a temporary zone not even qualifying politically as a state (See Section II infra), even if it be assumed that an "armed attack," within the meaning of article 51, has occurred against South Vietnam. For, as has been shown, article 51 is operative only in the event of "an armed attack against a member of the United Nations." Hence, neither the right of individual self-defense nor the right of collective [11] self-defense can become operative.

It has been claimed that United States intervention in Vietnam is sanctioned under article 51 on the ground (1) that South Vietnam in an independent state; (2) that South Vietnam had been the victim of an armed attack from North Vietnam and (3) that the United States, with the consent of South Vietnam, was engaging in "colletcive self-defense" of that country, as claimed by the United States in a communication to the United Nations Security Council in March 1965 (U.N. Chronicle, vol. 2, p. 22). To sustain this claim, all three elements must be satisfied.

This claim is untenable, however, on several grounds. First, South Vietnam was not recognized as an independent state at the 1954 Geneva Conference (see sec. II, infra). Even if it had become a de facto state in the course of events since 1954, the infiltration from North Vietnam cannot be deemed to constitute an "armed attack" within the purview of article 51.

Since the Geneva Accords recognized all of Vietnam as a single state, the conflict whether of the Vietcong or Ho Chi Minh against South Vietnam is "civil strife" and foreign intervention is forbidden, because civil strife is a domestic question—a position insisted upon by the United States in its civil war of 1861. Ho Chi Minh can compare his position in demanding union of Vietnam with that of Lincoln, when Britain and France were threatening to intervene to assure the independence of the Confederacy (and with the added point that the national elections mandated for 1956 in the Geneva Accords were frustrated by South Vietnam with apparent support of the United States; see sec. II, infra). Nor should it be overlooked that Lincoln had very little support from the people of the South, who generally supported the Confederacy, while Ho Chi Minh has a great deal of support from the people in South Vietnam organized in the National Liberation Front whose military arm is the Vietcong. There is, therefore, a basic issue whether the hostilities in Vietnam constitute external aggression (by North Vietnam) or "civil strife." Here it should be noted that the United Nations is authorized to intervene where civil strife threatens international peace, as the United Nations did in the Congo, in accord with article 39 of the charter—but individual states are not permitted to intervene unilaterally.

The third element requisite for the invocation of the right of collective self-defense under Article 51 presupposes that the nations invoking such right are properly members of a regional collective system within the purview of the United Nations Charter. The point here involved is: Can the United States validly be a genuine member of a regional system covering southeast Asia. Article 51 and Article 53, dealing with regional systems, were interrelated amendatory provisions intended primarily to integrate the inter-American system with the United Nations organization (see fn. 8, 13, 15). The concept that the United States—a country separated by oceans and thousands of miles from southeast Asia and bereft of any historical or ethnic connection with the peoples of southeast Asia—could validly be considered a member of a regional system implanted in southeast Asia is utterly alien to the regional systems envisaged in the charter. The "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty"—connecting the United States with southeast Asia, architectured by Secretary of State Dulles, is a legalistic artificial formulation to circumvent the fundamental limitations placed by the United Nations Charter on unilateral actions by individual members. However ingenuous—or disingenuous—the Dulles approach, SEATO is a caricature of the genuine regional systems envisaged by the U.N. Charter. A buffalo cannot be transformed into a giraffe however elongated its neck may be stretched. The Dulles approach to collective defense treaties employed legal artifice to circumvent the exclusive authority vested in the United Nations to deal with breaches in the peace. Articles 51 and 53 were intended to make a bona fide integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security—but these envisaged regional systems which historically and geographically developed into a regional community—not contemplating a regional system which fused a region like southeast Asia with a country on the North American Continent. SEATO is not a regional agency within the letter or spirit of the U.N. Charter as to authorize the United States to claim the right of collective self-defense even if there had been an armed attack on a member of the United Nations geographically located in southeast Asia. If artifices like SEATO were sanctioned, the path would be open for the emasculation of the United Nations organization and the world system of international security assiduously developed to prevent the scourge of war.

Hence article 51 cannot be properly invoked for (1) South Vietnam does not have the political status of a state; (2) even if South Vietnam were deemed a de facto state, the infiltrations do not constitute an "armed attack" within the purview of article 51; and (3) the United States cannot claim the right of "collective self-defense" in respect of a regional system involving southeast Asia.

Apart from article 51 (inapplicable to the situation here), the only other exception to the renunciation of the "threat or use of force" by member states is found in chapter VIII of the charter dealing with regional arrangements. Article 53 of said chapter contains two paragraphs of particular significance:

(a) "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this article." (Ch. VII, art. 53(1).)

Paragraph two of that article provides:

(b) "The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter."

With respect to regional arrangements therefore, it is clear that no enforcement action may be undertaken without the authorization of the Security Council of the United Nations, save and except in only one instance; against any state which, during World War II, was an enemy of any of the charter,[12] to wit, Germany, Italy and Japan.

[5] In support of his views, Professor Jessup noted:

"The documentary record of the discussions at San Francisco does not afford conclusive evidence that the suggested interpretation of the words 'armed attack' in article 51 is correct, but the general tenor of the discussions, as well as the careful choice of words throughout chapters VI and VII of the charter relative to various stages of aggravation of dangers to the peace, support the view stated." (Jessup, "A Modern Law of Nations," p. 166.)

[6] See, Louis Henkin (professor of law and international law and diplomacy, Columbia University), 57 "American Society of International Law Proceedings," 1963, at p. 152. Moore's "Digest of International Law," vol. II, p. 412.

[7] Henkin, ibid.

[8] Hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., July 9–13, 1945, at p. 210.

[9] Henkin, ibid.

[10] "* * * at the conference itself, every word, every sentence, every paragraph of the charter's text was examined and reconsidered by the representatives of 50 nations and much of it reworked." (Report to the President on the results of the San Francisco Conference [by the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, i.e., the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945], hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., at p. 41.)

[12] The reason for this exception appears clear. When the charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, peace treaties had not yet been finally signed by the allied nations with each of the enemy states. Reparations, sanctions, territorial changes, had not then been finalized. And so, in order to permit necessary flexibility in these respects, this sharply limited exception, permitting action against an enemy state in World War II by an allied government, was spelled out.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Since Vietnam was manifestly not an "enemy state" within the purview of article 53(b), enforcement action under SEATO is unauthorized and cannot be justified in view of the express restrictions set out under article 53(a) of the United Nations Charter.

In summary, the United Nations Charter obligates all of its signatory members to refrain from the threat or use of force, and only the Security Council (apart from the residual authority (see footnote 4) granted the General Assembly under the "uniting for peace" resolution) is authorized to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and to determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace. To these salient provisions, there are only two exceptions: the first, the right to self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations; and, the second, the right of nations to enter into appropriate "regional arrangements," subject, however, to the provision that no enforcement action shall be taken under such arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, the only exception to the latter requirement being with respect to measures against an enemy state, as defined in the charter.

We have shown that none of the aforestated exceptions can be invoked by the U.S. Government with respect to its conduct in Vietnam. It follows therefore that the fundamental requirements of the United Nations Charter with respect to the renunciation of force and the threat of force are directly applicable to the actions of the United States.

One other noteworthy charter provision is article 103 which subordinates all regional and treaty compacts to the United Nations Charter.

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail." (Ch. XVI, art. 103.)

This supremacy clause was drafted to meet the predictable reassertion of dominance by the great powers within their respective geographic zones or hemispheres. Because of the unhappy history of a world fragmented by such "spheres of influence," the supremacy clause and the restrictions on the use of force under regional agreements emerge as limitations upon the superpowers even within their own geographic zones. It is significant that the United States not only accepted these limitations, but actively supported their incorporation within the charter.[13]

Article 103 makes clear that the obligations of the United Nations Charter prevail vis-a-vis the obligations of the SEATO treaty. Indeed, article VI of the SEATO expressly recognizes the supremacy of the United Nations Charter (see sec. II infra). Moreover the frequent citation by President Johnson of the pledges given by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and himself to aid South Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. intervention in Vietnam.[14] In the first place, these pledges or commitments do not even have the status of treaties, for these Presidential pledges have not been ratified by the Senate. And even if these Presidential pledges had been solemnly ratified by the Senate, any obligations thereunder must yield to the obligations imposed under the United Nations Charter by virtue of the supremacy clause embodied in article 103. Nor would the illegality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam be altered by the circumstance that the Saigon regime may have invited the United States to assume its role in the Vietnam conflict. The supremacy clause of the charter manifestly prevails and cannot be annulled by mutual agreement of third parties.

It is by virtue of the supremacy clause that the Secretary General of the United Nations has called the world's attention to the emasculation of the authority of the United Nations resulting from actions taken by regional agencies without reference to the Security Council.

We believe that any fair study of the United Nations Charter will affirm the observations of Prof. Lewis Henkin, of Columbia University, when he speaks "of the law of the charter":

"So far as it purports to prescribe for the conduct of nations, it consists, basically, of one principle: Except in self-defense against armed attack, members must refrain from the threat or use of force against other states * * * the rule of the charter against unilateral force in international relations is the essence of any meaningful concept of law between nations and the foundation on which rests all other attempts to regulate international behavior. It is a rule which all nations have accepted and which all have a common interest essential to law." [15]

It appears difficult to escape the conclusion therefore, in the light of the aforesaid, that the action of the U.S. Government in Vietnam contravenes essential provisions of the United Nations Charter. The U.S. Government has decided for itself to use armed forces in South Vietnam and to bomb North Vietnam without authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. The failure of the United States to honor its obligations under the United Nations Charter is a regrettable but inescapable conclusion which we as lawyers have been compelled to reach. We, as lawyers, urge our President to accept the obligations for international behavior placed upon us by our signature of the United Nations Charter.

II—THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS AND THE SEATO TREATY

Officials of the U.S. Government have nevertheless asserted, on different occasions, that the actions of the United States in Vietnam are consistent with the U.S. duties and obligations under the United Nations Charter and sanctioned by the treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).[16] The conduct of the U.S. Government has been justified as support of a legitimate government defending itself against insurrection from within and aggression from without. We have demonstrated above that even if this latter position were accepted on its face, unilateral conclusions and actions taken by the Government of the United States upon the basis of such conclusions are violative of the firm obligations under the

---

[13] Hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong. 1st sess., supra, n. 6, at p. 306.

On May 15, 1945, Secretary of State Stettinius issued a statement at the San Francisco Conference regarding the Act of Chapultpec vis-a-vis the United Nations Organization which declared (so far as here pertinent), hearings on U.N. Charter, op. cit., p. 306;

"As a result of discussions with a number of interested delegations, proposals will be made to clarify in the charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world organization.

"These proposals will—

"1. Recognize the paramount authority of the world organization in all enforcement action.

"2. Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, remains unimpaired in case the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Any measures of self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council under the charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

"3. Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means."

The first point is already dealt with by the provision of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals (ch. VIII, sec. C, par. 2) which provides that no enforcement action will be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. It is not proposed to change this language.

The second point will be dealt with by an addition to chapter VIII of a new section substantially as follows:

"Nothing in this chapter impairs the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, in the event that the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The third point would be dealt with by inclusion of a specific reference to regional agencies or arrangements in chapter VIII, sec. A, par. 3, describing the methods whereby parties to a dispute should, first of all, seek a peaceful solution by means of their own choice.

The U.S. delegation believes that proposals as above outlined if adopted by the Conference would, with the other relevant provisions of the projected charter, make possible a useful and effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security.

This applies with particular significance to the long-established inter-American system.

[14] President Johnson, in his news conference of July 28, 1965, declared:

"Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation" (Presidential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15). President Eisenhower has stated that his administration had made no commitment to South Vietnam "in terms of military support on programs whatsoever" (the New York Times, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 1).

[15] Henkin, in 57 "American Society of International Law Proceedings," 1963, supra, n. 6, at p. 148. See also in further explication of Professor Henkin's succinct conclusion: Statements of Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State, the testimony of Senator Millikin, and the testimony of Mr. Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organization and Security Affairs, in hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., supra, n. 8, at pp. 34–147, 210, 95–100 and 304–307; Jessup, "A Modern Law of Nations" (1947); Proclamation of Athens and Declaration of General Principles for a World Rule of Law, adopted by the First World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 6, 1963; Francis T. P. Plimpton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, State Department Bulletin, vol. XLIX, No. 1278, Dec. 23, 1963, pp. 978–979.

[16] Geneva Conf. Doc. No. IC/42/Rev. 2, in 1 "American Foreign Policy"; 1950–55 Basic Documents 750; New York Times, July 24, 1954, p. 4.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

United Nations Charter. However, we do not let the matter rest with this assertion, but proceed to an examination of the validity of the claims made by the U.S. Government in support of its conduct in Vietnam.

The Geneva agreement, under which the war between Vietnam and the French was terminated, effected the division of Vietnam into north and south, at the 17th parallel. The said "agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam," entered into in Geneva on July 20, 1954, provided that the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel was only "a provisional military demarcation line," on either side of which the opposing forces could be "regrouped"—"the forces of the Peoples Army of Vietnam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south" (ch. I, art. 1).[17]

The Geneva agreement makes plain that to division of the 17th parallel was to be temporary and a step in the preparation for a general election to elect a government for a unified nation. Pending such election, "civil administration in each regrouping zone [was to] be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there" [art. 14(a)].

The day after the aforesaid cease-fire agreement was entered into, representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Vietminh), Laos, France, the Peoples Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom affirmed The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problems of Restoring Peace in Indochina, July 21, 1954.[18] The declaration emphasized that the north-south division was solely a means of ending the military conflict and not the creation of any political or territorial boundary. Article 6 of the declaration stated:

"The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and shall not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."

This constitutes a recognition of the historical fact that Vietnam is a single nation, divided into two zones only temporarily for administrative purposes pending an election. This being so, the action of the North Vietnamese in aiding the South Vietnamese, to the extent that it has taken place, neither affect the character of the war as a civil war nor constitutes foreign intervention. It cannot be considered an armed attack by one nation on another.

The United States is in fact a foreign nation vis-a-vis Vietnam; North Vietnam is not. The latter by the Geneva Agreement was to participate in an election not to determine whether North and South Vietnam should be united, but to select a government of the nation of Vietnam, constituting all of Vietnam—north, south, east, and west. It was the refusal on the part of the Diem regime and the subsequent "governments" of the south, supported by the United States, to participate in such elections that opened the door to the present conflict.

It was also stated in the declaration that the clear objective of settling political problems and unifying the nation was to be by means of free general elections. Article 7 of the declaration provided:

"The Conference declares that so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, national elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an International Commission."[19]

The reference to "national elections" reinforces the evidence of the historical status of Vietnam as a single nation. To present the picture, as the United States repeatedly has done, as though North Vietnam were an interloper having no organic relationship to South Vietnam is to ignore both the applicable legal principles and treaties and the facts of history.

Although the United States participated in the discussion leading up to the Geneva accords, it did not sign the final declaration. Instead, the U.S. Government, through its Under Secretary of State, Walter Bedell Smith, made its own unilateral declaration[20] on July 21, 1954. In this declaration, the United States took note of the Geneva agreements and declared that the United States would "refrain from threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force."

Referring to free elections in Vietnam, the United States declaration stated:

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly,"[21]

Thus the United States recognized the fact that Vietnam was a single nation. Nevertheless the justification of United States policy today ignores this admitted fact. The United States persists in its denial that it is intervening in a civil war. It seeks to justify the bombing of North Vietnam by the United States on the basis that North Vietnam is a foreign aggressor in South Vietnam.

Nor is this all. The United States further pledged "that it will not join in any arrangement which will hinder" the reunification of Vietnam, and concluded with the hope that:

"The agreement will permit Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of the area to determine their own future."

No election was ever held pursuant to the Geneva Accords, although both the International Control Commission (composed of India, Poland, and Canada) and the United Nations announced readiness to supervise such elections. South Vietnam announced that it did not regard itself obliged to take part in the elections because the participation of North Vietnam would render such elections not free, a position apparently supported by the State Department.[22] In 1955, following the Geneva Accords, then Prime Minister of State Diem repudiated the Geneva Agreements and refused to held the elections. Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his Memoirs, suggests a further reason for Diem's refusal to hold elections pursuant to the Geneva Accords:

"I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo Chinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the fighting possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.[23]

The consequences of the repudiation of the Geneva Accords were delineated by Senator ERNEST GRUENING in a speech to the Senate on April 9, 1965:

"That civil war began—let me repeat, because this is crucial to the issue—when the Diem regime—at our urging—refused to carry out the provision contained in the Geneva Agreement of 1954 to hold elections for the reunification of Vietnam. That was one of the underlying conditions of the

---

[17] It is relevant to note that at the time this provision was agreed upon, the Vietminh occupied all but a few "islands" of territory to the north of the 17th parallel as well as approximately two-thirds of the territory south of that line. See map showing areas of South Vietnam under Vietminh control at end of May 1953 in Henri Navarre, "Agonie de L'Indo-Chine" (1953–54) (Paris, 1956), p. 37. Thus, by the cease-fire agreement the Vietminh gave up substantial areas of territory in what is now called South Vietnam.

An article in the New Republic, May 22, 1965, p. 29, by the Honorable Henry W. Edgerton, senior circuit judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, brilliantly delineates the provisional character of the "Government" of South Vietnam and casts doubt on the juridicial claim to the existence of that Government.

[18] See "Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conference" June 16–July 21, 1954 (London) (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmd 9239), 1954 (referred to as "Geneva Accords"). The French-sponsored Bao Dai regime, which was not endowed as yet with any real political substance, did not sign the Geneva Accord; not until 1956 did France relinquish control over South Vietnam; the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on Oct. 26, 1955, but French troops were not completely evacuated from the country until Nov. 1, 1956.

[19] Note that article 7 stipulates that the elections were to be antecedent to and a necessary condition for the "fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions" and that the elections were to be held "in order to insure * * * that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will." This particular portion of the Geneva Accord has frequently been quoted out of context, with the key phrases in reverse order, in order to justify the refusal to hold elections on the grounds that the necessary conditions did not exist.

[20] See "Extracts From Verbatim Records of Eighth Plenary Session," Geneva Accords.

[21] Nowhere in its own declaration did the United States recognize the political partition of Vietnam; insofar as it referred to the country, it designated it as "Vietnam," not "South Vietnam" and "North Vietnam."

[22] See, Question No. 7, "Questions and Answers on Vietnam," Department of State publication No. 7724, August 1964, p. 8. See also footnote 19, George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, professors of government at Cornell University, in their article, "The United States in Vietnam," which appeared in the June 1965 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, note (op. cit. p. 31):

"When on July 16, 1955, the Diem government announced, with American backing, that it would defy the provision calling for national elections, it violated a central condition which had made the Geneva Accords acceptable to the Vietminh. Regardless of what sophistry has been employed to demonstrate otherwise, in encouraging this move the United States departed from the position taken in its own unilateral declaration. And France in acquiescing abandoned the responsibility which she had unequivocally accepted a year earlier."

(Citing—Allan B. Cole, ed., "Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions," a documentary history, 1945–1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.) 1956, pp. 226–228; and Donald Lancaster, "The Emancipation of French Indo-China" (Oxford, 1961), pp. 370–372.)

[23] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953–1956" (London, 1963), p. 372.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Geneva agreement. The civil war began and has continued with intensified fury ever since * * *. For over 800 years, before the conquest by France, Vietnam was a united country. After defeating the French in 1954, the Vietnamese went to the conference table at Geneva, agreeing to a settlement only on condition that reunification elections be held. Yet, nowhere in President Johnson's speech of April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University is there held out a hope of ultimate reunification of Vietnam. He conditioned the ultimate peace 'upon an independent South Vietnam instead'."

In view of all of the aforesaid, the assumptions and justifications for our governmental policy in Vietnam do not appear to have support, either in law or in fact. The conduct of the U.S. Government in Vietnam appears plainly to violate the terms of the Geneva Accords and to repudiate solemn pledges to "refrain from the threat or the use of force" to disturb the Geneva Accords.

Moreover, nothing in the provisions of the southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty would appear to justify the conduct of the U.S. Government in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty was signed in Manila some 7 weeks after the signing of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. The SEATO Treaty became effective in February 1955, following the treaty ratification by eight member states—the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippine Islands.

By the preamble and by article I of the SEATO Treaty, the parties acceded to the principles and supremacy of the United Nations Charter in accordance with article 103 thereof, which it will be recalled, provides as follows:

"In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail."

The supremacy of this provision was expressly reiterated by the eight SEATO nations under article VI of said treaty, in which each solemnly agreed that the SEATO Treaty:

"* * * does not affect the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The key provisions of the SEATO Treaty are to be found in article IV. Paragraph 1 thereof permits the use of force by one or more member states only in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack." But where the integrity or inviolability of any territory covered by the treaty is threatened "by other than armed attack" or "by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area," then, paragraph 2 of article IV requires, as a prerequisite to intervention, that "the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures to be taken. * * *"

The consent of all eight SEATO nations was originally required before any military action under article IV could be undertaken by any of them (New York Times, May 28, 1962). Later, this rule was modified so that action could be undertaken if there was no dissenting vote—i.e., an abstention would not count as a veto (New York Times, April 19, 1964). At the last two annual meetings of the Ministerial Council of SEATO, France has refused to support a communique pledging SEATO backing for South Vietnam against the Vietcong (New York Times, April 15–16, 1964; May 3–6, 1965; see also, Los Angeles Times, May 3–4, 1965). It would appear that with the threat of a French veto a formal SEATO commitment in Vietnam has not been sought by the United States. However, even if there had been unanimity among the SEATO nations, the provisions of article 53 of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter will still prevail:

"But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. * * *

Manifestly, no such authorization has ever been conferred, either by the Security Council of the United Nations or by the General Assembly, from which it follows that American action in Vietnam clearly cannot be supported by reference to SEATO.

So long as the United States remains a member of the United Nations, our right to intervene is circumscribed by the provisions of the United Nations Charter. As members of SEATO, our right to intervene is limited, both by the requirement for unanimity among all of the eight treaty nations and, in addition, by the superseding requirement of article 53 of chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, prohibiting any enforcement action under a regional arrangement without the authority of the Security Council. Our justification for acting contrary to our solemn obligations under the United Nations Charter appears tenuous and insubstantial. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. Government has simply acted as its own judge of its own interests in patent disregard of the fundamental law embodied in the United Nations Charter.

III—CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

This disregard of the rules of the charter, inherent in U.S. intervention in Vietnam, is compounded by the fact that such intervention is also violative of our own Constitution. Whatever doubts may have existed prior to the President's "Report to the Nation Following a Review of U.S. Policy in Vietnam" [24] (set out at his news conference on July 28, 1965), as to whether U.S. action in Vietnam constituted the conduct of a war, the President in that report made it explicitly clear that "this is really war," noting that "our fighting strength" was being raised from 75,000 to 125,000 "almost immediately" and that "additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested." Can the President's conduct be squared with our Constitution (apart from the obligations imposed upon member states by the United Nations Charter)?

It is the genius of our constitutional system that ours is a government of checks and balances. A dangerous concentration of power is avoided by the separation—in Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution—of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The doctrine of "separation of powers" is fundamental to, and is one of the "great structural principles of the American constitutional system." [25] The Supreme Court has recently characterized this "separation of powers" as "a bulwark against tyranny," *United States* v. *Brown* — *U.S.* —, 33 Law Week 4603 (June 7, 1965). The Supreme Court had earlier said:

"The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate powers. Each includes all authority essential to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President." Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2, 139 (1866).

Classically stated by Blackstone [26] and derived from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montesquieu,[27] this constitutional separation of powers was deliberately carried over by the Framers into the conduct of foreign affairs. For, contrary to widely held assumptions, the power to make and conduct foreign policy is not vested exclusively in the President, but is divided between him and Congress, with each endowed with complementary, but separate [28] powers and responsibilities.[29]

Thus, in making and carrying out general foreign policy, Article II, Section 2 requires the President to have the "Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." And the President also requires the advice and consent of the Senate to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls."

When statecraft fails and the question becomes the ultimate one of war or peace, the Constitution imposes a tight rein upon the President. His participation ends at the threshold of the decision whether or not to declare war. Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, that power is confided exclusively to the Congress.[30] There is no mention of the President in connection with the power to "declare war." Under the Constitution, Congress alone must make this decision. The Clause does not read "on recommendation of the President," nor that the "President with advice and consent of Congress may declare war." As former Assistant Secretary of State James Grafton Rogers has observed: "The omission is significant. There was to be no war unless Congress took the initiative." Rogers, "World Policing and The Constitution," p. 21 (Boston, 1945).

"Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of war is entrusted only to Congress." *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company* v. *Sawyer,* 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.).

That the President lacks constitutional power to make war is underscored by the historic statement made by President Woodrow Wilson on the night of April 2, 1917, when he addressed the Congress in a joint session:

"I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious,

---

[24] Presidential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1 (Aug. 2, 1965), pp. 15–19. See also State Department bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 606; State Department bulletin, May 24, 1965, passim; State Department bulletin, May 31, 1965, p. 838, Krock, "By Any Other Name, It's Still War," New York Times, June 10, 1965.

[25] Corwin, "The President: Office and Powers" (New York, 1957), p. 9.

[26] Blackstone, "Commentaries on the Law of England," 146 (7th ed. 1775).

[27] Cf., Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "Separation of Powers," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1935).

[28] "One of the most striking facts in the institutional philosophic history of the United States (is) that the legislative-executive quarrels during the colonial period convinced the colonists of the desirability of a separation of powers rather than a union of powers." Wright "Consensus and Continuity," p. 17 (Boston, 1958).

"The doctrine of separated powers is implemented by a number of constitutional provisions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while others say that a given task is not to be performed by a given branch." *United States* v. *Brown,* supra—U.S., 33 Law Week, at p. 4605.

[29] Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution" (Boston, 1833), passim, Dahl, "Congress and Foreign Policy" (New Haven, Conn., 1950); Robinson, "Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative" (Ill. 1962).

[30] Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution reads:

"The Congress shall have the power:

* * * * *

"1. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water."

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

very serious choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making."[31]

President Franklin Roosevelt also heeded his constitutional responsibilities and was also mindful and sensitive of the constitutional limitations applicable to the President when, before a joint session of the Congress on December 7, 1941, he requested the Congress for a declaration of war following Pearl Harbor.

The decision to place the responsibility for declaring war exclusively in Congress as the direct representative of the people, and not even to provide for the President's participation in that decision was a most deliberate one by the Framers.

The Constitutional Convention had been urged to rest the power to declare war, the "last resort of sovereigns, ultima ratio regum," in the executive, or, alternatively, in the Senate. 3 Story, "Commentaries on the Constitution," par. 1166. The arguments were made that "large bodies necessarily move slowly" and "despatch, secrecy, and vigor are often indispensable, and always useful toward success." Story, ibid.

When the issue was debated at the Convention, Mr. Gerry stated that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." Madison and Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." The motion carried. Farrand ed., "Records of the Federal Convention" (New Haven, 1911), II, pp. 318–319.[32]

Nowhere in the debates is there support for the view that the President can wage a war or "commit" our Nation to the waging of a war. On the contrary, warmaking was to be a purely legislation prerogative. The only use of force without a declaration of war that was contemplated as the debates clearly show, was "to repel sudden attacks."[33]

These constitutional provisions that only Congress shall have the power to declare war and that Congress has the sole responsibility to raise and support the armies, to provide for a navy, and to impose the taxes to provide the funds to carry on a war, reflected a profound distrust of executive authority and a corresponding reliance upon the legislature as the instrument for the decisionmaking in this vital area. Bemis, "The Diplomacy of the American Revolution" (New York, 1935), pp. 29–35.

These provisions reflected things painfully learned during the early colonial period, when every major European war had its counterpart on the American frontiers. The Colonies were therefore determined to end the imperial authority to decide for them what wars they should enter and what the outcome of those wars should be. Savelle, "The American Balance of Power, and the European Diplomacy 1713–78," in Morris ed., "The Era of the American Revolution" (New York, 1939), pp. 140–169.

The Convention was not only determined to deny warmaking power to the President, but was also unwilling to entrust it to the Senate alone. To assure the fullest consideration, the Framers therefore provided that the House of Representatives, larger and more representative than the Senate, should also be brought in to decide this vital question. The action and decision of the whole Congress were therefore constitutionally made necessary to this fateful undertaking.

"The Constitution says, therefore, in effect, 'Our country shall not be committed formally to a trial of force with another nation, our people generally summoned to the effort and all the legal consequences to people, rights and property incurred until the House, Senate and the President agree.'" Rogers, "World Policing and the Constitution" (Boston, 1945), p. 35.

Concededly there have been many instances, when the President has sent U.S. Armed Forces abroad without a declaration of war by Congress.[34] These have ranged from engagements between pirates and American ships on the high seas to the dispatch of our Armed Forces to Latin American countries.

These precedents cannot justify the present actions without bringing to mind Swift's comment on "precedents" in "Gulliver's Travels":

"It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before, may legally be done again; and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities to justify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail to directing accordingly."

Here it is important to distinguish our country's involvement in the Korean war. For the United States fought under the aegis of the United Nations pursuant to a definitive resolution of the Security Council authorizing and directing the employment of Armed Forces of member states, so that the United States was thus performing its solemn obligations undertaken in becoming a signatory of the United Nations Charter, a treaty which is the "Supreme Law of the Land." But in the Vietnamese situation, there has been no authorization by the Security Council; indeed the Security Council has not even been seized of the matter, has not been requested to entertain jurisdiction of the present conflict.

It is therefore unfortunately vitally necessary, although trite, to recall that "the Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men." *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 1 Cr. 137 (1803). Under a government of laws, the President is not free from the checks of the Constitution of the United States; the President is not free to assume the powers entrusted solely to the Congress. Ours is not a government of executive supremacy.[35]

Here it is fitting to recall that on May 6, 1954, at a time when the fall of Dien Bien Phu was imminent, then Senator Lyndon Johnson, as Democratic leader of the Senate, at a Jefferson-Jackson dinner, criticized the Eisenhower administration in these terms:

"We will insist upon clear explanations of the policies in which we are asked to cooperate. We will insist that we and the American people be treated as adults—that we have the facts without sugar coating.

"The function of Congress is not simply to appropriate money and leave the problem of national security at that."[36]

A New York Times survey (June 14, 1965) reports widespread "uneasiness" over the President's foreign policies: that the American academic world "is intellectually and emotionally alienated from the President, to whom it gave such strong support in the election"; that there is "increasing—and mutual—hostility between the President and many segments of the press"; that many Democratic Members of Congress are "restive and unhappy * * * over what they regard as [the President's] high-handed manner of making and carrying out decisions on foreign affairs"; that many friendly governments abroad "are apprehensive about Mr. Johnson's use of national power"; that among these views are expressions of "dismay," the unreliability of CIA and FBI reports which the President accepted, the lack of clear policy, the disregard of "principles, support or advice."

It is therefore imperative that Congress guard zealously against any executive usurpation of its exclusive power to declare, or to decline to declare war.

President Johnson has not been unmindful of the damaging consequences inherent in the violation of the separation of powers. As recently as August 21, 1965 the President vetoed a $1.7 billion military construction bill, calling it "repugnant to the Constitution." In a stern message to Congress, the President described certain sections of the bill as clear violations of the "separation of powers"; warned Congress to stop meddling

---

[31] President Wilson went on to say:

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

[32] The Framers concluded and provided that "the power of declaring war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative; but that it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the nation. War, in its best estate, never fails to impose upon the people the most burdensome taxes, and personal sufferings. It is always injurious and sometimes subversive of the great commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves the prosperity, and not infrequently the existence of a nation. It is sometimes fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, wherever a successive commander will lead; and in a republic whose institutions are essentially founded on the basis of peace, there is infinite danger that war will find it both imbecile in defense, and eager for contest. Indeed, the history of republics has but too fatally proved, that they are too ambitious of military fame and conquest, and too easily devoted to the views of demagogs, who flatter their pride and betray their interests. It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to make peace." Story op. cit., sec. 1166.

[33] Manifestly the residuary power left to the President—"to repel sudden attack" contemplated attacks on the country's geographical territory—not "sudden attacks" in far-off lands, such as southeast Asia. Cf. Tonkin Bay joint resolution of Aug. 6–7, 1964, discussed in sec. IV, infra.

[34] See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, hearing, "Situation in Cuba," 87th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 17, 1962 (Washington, G.P.O., 1962), pp. 82–87; Rogers, op. cit., especially pp. 93–123.

[35] "With all its defects, delays, and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations." Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company* v. *Sawyer*, supra, 343 U.S. at 655 (1952).

[36] Jackson, "Role and Problems of Congress with Reference to Atomic War," May 17, 1954, publication No. L 54–135, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

in the prerogatives of the executive branch (New York Times, August 21, 1965, p. 1). Yet the President has not hesitated to intrude upon the exclusive power vested in Congress to declare war.

IV—CONGRESS HAS NOT DECLARED WAR IN VIETNAM; ITS JOINT RESOLUTIONS ARE NEITHER A SUBSTITUTE FOR A DECLARATION OF WAR NOR DO THEY MAKE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR-MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL

Congress has not declare war in Vietnam and the President does not claim that any declaration of war supports his actions in Vietnam. In fact, the President is reported to be extremely reluctant to ask Congress directly to declare war.[37] Instead, the President is reported (New York Times, June 19, 1965, p. 10) to believe that authority for his actions may be inferred or extracted from the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution of August 6–7, 1964 (H.J. Res. 1145; Public Law 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, 88th Cong., 2d sess.) and the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1965 (H.J. Res. 447; Public Law 89–18; 79 Stat. 109, 89th Cong., 1st sess.) making a supplemental appropriation to the Defense Department for the Vietnam operations.

The Tonkin Bay resolution is not a declaration of war. At most, it is an ultimatum—if that. It "approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." It goes on to express the view that "the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia 'is vital' to the national interests of the United States" and declares he readiness of the United States to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol SEATO state to defend its freedom. The resolution, however, provides that all such steps shall be "consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty."

It is clear that Congressmen who voted for the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution were not voting a declaration of war in Vietnam. The resolution does not mention North Vietnam nor China; indeed it does not even mention Vietnam. It was "passed in the fever of indignation that followed reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S. fleet units in Tonkin Bay." CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 9, 1965, p. 12528. There is no evidence that Congress thought or understood that it was declaring war. It took no contemporaneous action which would have implemented a declaration of war. And the remarks of several Members of the House and Senate during and since the debate on the resolution reinforce the conclusion that the Tonkin Bay Resolution was not regarded as a declaration of war. Congress manifestly cannot delegate to the President its exclusive power to declare war; and even under the specific terms of the Tonkin Bay Resolution, the President's actions neither conform nor are consonant with the Constitution—and, as we have seen in the earlier analysis, the President's actions are not consonant with the Charter of the United Nations, nor with the SEATO Treaty.

In passing the May 7, 1965, resolution, authorizing a supplemental appropriation for the Vietnam operations, Congress was confronted with a fait accompli which severely circumscribed its action. Its constitutional check on the will or errors of the Executive was by the President's message, reduced to its power of the purse. Such a circumscription will not necessarily prevent unwise or unpopular decisions or allow for the exercise of the full discretion which the Constitution intended Congress to have, and for it alone to exercise. Nevertheless, a resolution authorizing an appropriation does not constitute a declaration of war, nor can it constitutionally authorize the President to wage an undeclared war.

The presidential assumption of powers vested exclusively in the Congress concern arrogations of power which convert republican institutions, framed for the purpose of guarding and securing the liberties of the citizen, into a government of executive supremacy. If the Constitution has such elastic, evanescent character the provisions for its amendment are entirely useless; presidentially-determined expediency would become then the standard of constitutional construction.

Under the rule of law, compliance with the forms and procedures of the law are as imperative as compliance with the substance of the law. A lynching is a totally inadequate substitute for a trial, regardless of the guilt of the victim. What Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote in another context is equally applicable here: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." *McNabb* v. *United States*, 318 U.S. 332, 347, (1947).

Under our system, constitutional powers must be exercised in a constitutional manner by constitutionally established institutions. Disregard of fundamentals in an area concerning the highest sovereign prerogative affecting the very lives and fortunes of its citizens in the interest of a short term expediency undermines " 'constitutional morality' to such an extent that the maintenance of the order itself is endangered." Friedrich, "The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective," p. 216 (Chicago, 1963).

Finally, it cannot be over emphasized that even a declaration of war by the Congress would not negate the violations of our obligations assumed under the United Nations Charter or negate the violations of international law inherent in United States intervention in Vietnam.

Conclusion

A learned authority in international affairs has stated:

"Bluntly, all the rules about intervention are meaningless if every nation can decide for itself which governments are legitimate and how to characterize particular limited conflict. Unless we are prepared to continue a situation in which the legality of intervention will often depend upon which side of the fence you are on, and in which, therefore, our policy becomes one of countering force with force, we must be willing to refer questions of recognition (i.e., legitimacy of the government involved) and characterization of a disorder (i.e., whether an armed attack from abroad or a civil war) to some authority other than ourselves. The United Nations is the most likely candidate for the role." [38]

The United States has not observed the letter or spirit of its treaty obligations with respect to the action taken in Vietnam. World order and peace depend on the willingness of nations to respect international law and the rights of other nations. The United Nations is a symbol of the rejection of fatal policies which led to World War II, and an acceptance by the peoples of the world of the principles of collective security, and the avoidance of war and the use of armed forces in the settlement of differences between nations. The United Nations was intended to insure the preservation of international peace, security, and justice, through rules of law, binding upon all member nations. The fundamental condition for the effective functioning of the United Nations is the observance on the part of all signatory nations of the obligations assumed under the charter. Only in this way can the awesome potential of a third world war be prevented.

We have concluded that the U.S. Government is in violation of its treaty obligations under the U.N. Charter. We urge upon the Government that all steps be immediately taken to undo this illegality by an immediate return to an observance of the letter and spirit of the provision of the U.N. Charter.

This is a solemn hour in history. We have a moral obligation to history to return to the high purposes and principles of the United Nations—to honor the pledges we solemnly assumed—to settle international disputes by peaceful means—to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force.

At this fateful hour, we do well to recall the prophetic dream of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the architect of the United Nations, who upon his return from the Yalta Conference in his last address to the Congress in March 1945, said:

"The Crimea Conference * * * ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join."

Should we not, 20 years after President Roosevelt's hopeful dream—20 years after the advent of the nuclear age with the awesome potentiality of incineration of our planet and the annihilation of our civilization and the culture of millenia—should we not "spell the end of the system of unilateral action * * * that has been tried for centuries—and has always failed"?

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the measure before the Senate would authorize the appropriation of supplemental defense funds required by our forces in Vietnam. I shall vote for the measure for what it is—an authorization to fund urgent military requirements. And I shall vote to table the amendment to repeal the so-called Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964.

Much has been said in recent days about the implications of our votes for or against this or that proposition bearing upon the foreign policy of the United States. We have been reminded that the Senate approved ratification of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1, and adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution by a vote of 88 to 2. And it has been suggested that, by these acts, the Senate conferred upon the President complete discretion to deal with southeast Asia as he may see fit.

I do not so regard my votes for the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Nor do I feel that, by now voting against repeal of the resolution and for this authorization bill, I am abdicating my responsibility as a Member of the Senate and of the Committee on Foreign Relations to maintain a vigilant watch over the course of this Nation's policies in southeast Asia in the months ahead.

Eighteen months ago, when we adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution, we were giving a vote of confidence to the President in his handling of a particu-

[37] Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965, "The United States May Become More Candid on Rising Land-War Involvement," pp. 1, 16.

[38] Roger Fisher, professor of law at Harvard University, "Intervention: Three Problems of Policy and Law" found in Essays on Intervention, a publication of the Marshon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University Press, pp. 19–20.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

lar situation. To repeal that resolution today would make no sense unless one feels, as some of my colleagues may feel, that it is time for a vote of no confidence in the President. That is not my view, and that is why I shall vote to table the amendment.

I am satisfied that the administration is sincere in its purpose to avoid an escalation that would lead to a general war in the Far East and in its conviction that our objectives can be attained without that happening.

At the same time, I believe that we have a continuing and continuous responsibility to satisfy ourselves that our policies make sense and should be supported. And I believe that the President has a similar responsibility to Congress and to the people to keep us fully informed at all times.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I send to the desk a motion and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion will be read for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] proposes as follows:

I hereby move to table the pending amendment of the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] to the pending bill, S. 2791, a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 92, nays 5, as follows:

[No. 41 Leg.]

YEAS—92

Aiken	Cotton	Hill
Allott	Curtis	Holland
Anderson	Dirksen	Hruska
Bartlett	Dodd	Inouye
Bass	Dominick	Jackson
Bayh	Douglas	Javits
Bennett	Eastland	Jordan, N.C.
Bible	Ellender	Jordan, Idaho
Boggs	Ervin	Kennedy, Mass.
Burdick	Fannin	Kennedy, N.Y.
Byrd, Va.	Fong	Kuchel
Byrd, W. Va.	Gore	Long, Mo.
Cannon	Harris	Long, La.
Carlson	Hart	Magnuson
Case	Hartke	Mansfield
Clark	Hayden	McClellan
Cooper	Hickenlooper	McGee
McGovern	Neuberger	Smathers
McIntyre	Pastore	Smith
McNamara	Pearson	Sparkman
Metcalf	Pell	Stennis
Miller	Prouty	Symington
Mondale	Proxmire	Talmadge
Monroney	Randolph	Thurmond
Montoya	Ribicoff	Tower
Morton	Robertson	Tydings
Moss	Russell, S.C.	Williams, N.J.
Mundt	Russell, Ga.	Williams, Del.
Murphy	Saltonstall	Yarborough
Muskie	Scott	Young, N. Dak.
Nelson	Simpson	

NAYS—5

Fulbright	McCarthy	Young, Ohio
Gruening	Morse	

NOT VOTING—3

Brewster	Church	Lausche

So Mr. MANSFIELD's motion to lay on the table Mr. MORSE's amendment was agreed to.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair wishes to announce the following appointments:

BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY

Pursuant to Section 9355 of title 10, United States Code, the Chair appoints Senators MCGEE, Moss, and ALLOTT as members of the Board of Visitors to the Air Force Academy.

BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE COAST GUARD ACADEMY

Pursuant to Public Law 207 of the 81st Congress, the Chair appoints the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] as a member of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY

Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, the Chair appoints Senators ELLENDER, ROBERTSON, and MURPHY as members of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Military Academy.

BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY

Pursuant to Public Law 301 of the 78th Congress, the Chair appoints Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY of New York, to the Board of Visitors of the Merchant Marine Academy.

BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE NAVAL ACADEMY

Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, the Chair appoints Senators HOLLAND, BIBLE, and BOGGS as members of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Naval Academy.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL FEDERAL EXPENDITURES

Pursuant to Public Law 250 of the 77th Congress, the Chair appoints Senator CLINTON ANDERSON as a member of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures to fill the vacancy created by the retirement from the Senate of Senator Harry F. Byrd.

INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION, CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

Pursuant to Public Law 170 of the 74th Congress, the Chair appoints the following Senators to attend the Interparliamentary Union, Canberra, Australia, April 11–16, 1966; Senators TALMADGE, YARBOROUGH, LONG of Missouri, SCOTT, HRUSKA, and SIMPSON.

SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] is about to propose an amendment. I understand that he does not intend to speak on it very long. I understand that the distinguished chairman of the committee may have a few words in answer.

It will be my intention then to move to table the amendment of the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I would anticipate there will be a yea-and-nay vote. I can guarantee that there will be.

I suggest that all Members stay close to the floor as possible.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 481 to S. 2791, and ask that it be read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 3, after line 8, add the following new section:

"SEC. 302. During any period that any armed force of the United States is engaged in armed conflict or hostilities in southeast Asia, no person who is a member of that armed force serving on active duty by virtue of involuntary induction under the Universal Military Training and Service Act shall be assigned to perform duty in such area, unless (1) such person volunteers for service in such area, or (2) the Congress hereafter authorizes by law the assignment to duty in southeast Asia of persons involuntarily inducted into such armed forces."

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the proposed amendment would merely provide that draftees should not be sent to southeast Asia to combat without the consent of the Congress.

It does not provide, as some columnists have mistakenly reported, that they shall not go. It provides that Congress must approve.

There are two objectives. Congress should be further included in our proceedings. There has been much discussion in the last few days and months on the degree of participation of the Congress in some important measures. This would be one way for Congress to participate and stand up and be counted.

The history of the proposed amendment is that last August when I was visiting in the White House with President Johnson, who had invited me to come there and express my views or opposition to our policy in southeast Asia, I told him that I was planning that afternoon to introduce this amendatory legislation.

The President asked me very insistently not to do it. Then he said "If we

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

my vote reflects my conviction that we must protect men we have sent into battle no matter how mistaken the policy may be that sent them to that battlefield.

I accept the words of Senator RUSSELL, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, when he said in presenting this bill to the Senate:

It could not properly be considered as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments.

I agree with these further observations of Senator RUSSELL:

Mr. President, an attempt to brush aside the misgivings and reservations that many Senators and members of the public hold about events in southeast Asia would be futile. This is not my purpose. I, too, am extremely unhappy and concerned about the gravity of the situation there and what our commitment portends.

This bill cannot possibly be construed as either an endorsement of or as an attack upon national policy. It involves more the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and a member of our family and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not throw it to him to enable him to assist himself out of the water, this would be a callous and heartless attitude for us to take.

I think the debate over the past few weeks and the Senate Foreign Relations hearings have been most helpful in clarifying some of the problems we face in Asia. I only wish more Senators had been involved in the debate of our southeast Asia policy a year ago. I hope now that we will do everything in our power to avoid an all-out war in Asia. Such a war would claim the lives of vast numbers of American men and in the end create conditions of disorder that would open the way for the very tyranny we fear. I hope the debate will continue on all aspects of our Asia policy. It is only through such free and open discussion that we can find the way to an effective policy.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BEING MISLED INTO AN UNNECESSARY HOLOCAUST IN VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yesterday, in discussing S. 2791, I stated that, in my opinion, the American people are being misled into an unnecessary holocaust.

S. 2791, the supplemental procurement and construction authorization bill, now before the Senate, will plunge the United States into an unlimited war in Asia.

It is a blank check for unlimited escalation.

I use the word "misled" advisedly because the true facts are not made available to the Amercan public and we are asked to legislate under a cloak of secrecy.

Just as when we were asked to pass the Bay of Tonkin resolution in August of 1964 and to pass an unneeded $700 million appropriation in May of 1965, we are now asked to pass—in a hurry—a $4.8 billion military authorization which is far more than it seems, and takes us one more step down the road to a major war which, while now confined to southeast Asia, could easily spread to the rest of the world.

The President was clear when he requested this supplemental authorization.

He said in his message of January 19, 1966:

In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of authorization and appropriation, the Congress has provided continuing support for our national decision "to prevent further aggression" in southast Asia. The quoted words come from the joint resolution of the Congress—Public Law 88-408—approved on August 10, 1964. It is in the letter and the spirit of the resolution that I request this supplementary appropriation. While that resolution remains in force, and until its obligations are discharged, we must persevere. I believe the resolution is right, and I believe the course we follow is necessary. I intend that those who must face danger and death as we follow that course shall be supported. I am confident that the Congress will agree.

In the clear and enequivocal words of the President, the supplemental is requested within "the letter and spirit" of the Tonkin Bay resolution.

We are being urged to pass this supplemental as an urgent matter.

Yet, as the able and distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. FULBRIGHT, pointed out on February 28, 1966:

The Armed Services Committee of the House stated that there was no particular urgency and that this bill is a kind of legerdemain affecting next year's budget. It was handled in this way so that there would not be as big a deficit as would have been the case otherwise. Therefore, these authorizations were shifted into this bill. As far as the material being needed now, the House stated that the testimony on that point was not persuasive.

The report of the Armed Services Committee of the House states:

The essential purpose of, and underlying cause for, the proposed legislation is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters, ships, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles are all being utilized at a rate greater than it was possible to anticipate when the 1966 authorization for those items was passed. This legislation was approved by the committee solely in order to achieve more rapid procurement of replacements of articles consumed, and to provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time.

If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items involved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction, may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definite data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization.

We realize the difficulty of determining exact future needs in any wartime framework, however, and to the extent of the proposed legislation we are accepting in good faith the assurances of the services and the Department of Defense that this authority is needed for these purposes at this time. We assure the Members of the House that the performance of the Department of Defense and of the services in living up to these assurances will be closely followed.

As I have said, we are called upon today to legislate under a cloak of secrecy. And it is not easy for an individual Senator to obtain the necessary information on which to determine whether the broad grants of power to the President and the Secretary of Defense which would be made by this bill are really necessary. In the 367-page printed volume of the Senate hearings on S. 2791 there are not fewer than 958 deletions—close to 3 deletions per page. The 374-page printed volume of the House hearings on a companion bill contains the same abundant deletions.

Even if an individual Senator should obtain unanimous consent from the Senate Committee on the Armed Services to read the original hearing record containing all the testimony, including the portions deleted for security reasons, the individual Senator would be better informed, presumably, but could in no event share that additional information with the American people.

Thus, if in the course of the original hearings, it should be disclosed that substantial escalation is provided for in this bill—as Secretary of Defense McNamara did testify to publicly—the individual Senator could not reveal the factual background to the American people if those facts are based on the classified material he read.

There are five basic policy decisions which the Senate is being called upon to decide in voting on S. 2791.

In the first place, it is being called upon to authorize unlimited escalation as the President may decide. As Secretary of Defense McNamara stated before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

The budget will provide forces and equipment sufficient to fight the war at substantially increased scope and intensity, should that become necessary and desirable.

In the second place, S. 2791 would authorize the Secretary of each military department to build military installations and facilities any place in southeast Asia they may decide. This is contrary to established precedent under which military installations and facilities are authorized on a line item basis.

In the third place, S. 2791 would authorize the Secretary of Defense to build such permanent military bases anywhere in the world. This again violates established precedent for line item authorizations by the Congress for each such base.

The House hearings clearly reveal that the Department of Defense, in submitting its budget request for these military bases, could not justify its request on the basis of specific items, again pointing to the fact that there is no urgency for the authorization of such bases because the military planners do not now know what they will need.

And finally, S. 2791 would change the method of funding the support of Allied forces in southeast Asia from the military assistance program—coming within the purview of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—to the regular authorizations for the support of the Department of Defense—coming within

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

the purview of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. This is a vital change in policy since, to all intents and purposes, this represents a downgrading of civilian influence in South Vietnam as represented by our Ambassador there to the benefit of our military commander there.

There are thus five policy decisions involved in S. 2791:

First. A reaffirmation of the Bay of Tonkin resolution;

Second. Delegation to the President of the power of unlimited military escalation in southeast Asia;

Third. A change in long established precedents for Congress to authorize the establishment of each military base and the delegation of such authorization authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy; and, finally,

Fourth. A change in financing the support of the allied forces in South Vietnam from the military assistance program to the regular authorizations to the Department of Defense.

S. 2791 is therefore not a simple military supply bill. It is a bill making sweeping changes in U.S. policy.

If this were just another military authorization bill to supply needed material for our fighting men in Vietnam, there would be no question of my support for it.

But S. 2791 is not just another military authorization bill.

S. 2791 is nothing more than another device like the premise was to commit the Congress to administration policy.

It is designed to obtain blanket congressional approval of what has been done militarily in Vietnam and of what may be done militarily in the future however great the escalation and into whatever part of southeast Asia this military adventure may lead our forces.

I have in the past and will in the future support military authorization and appropriation needs but only where such needs are real and where the bill is not being used as a coverup device for securing enormous delegations of power from the Congress to the executive branch or for securing congressional approval for future policies, the nature of which is not disclosed to the Congress.

It has been alleged and will be again that this bill is needed to support our boys at the front. On the contrary, the enactment of this bill will spell the death of thousands more. I want to see that wanton scarifice of the flower of our youth stopped. I have voiced again and again on the floor of the Senate my conviction that all South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. We have already lost over 2,000 of them, and under this bill the casualties will steadily increase. I cannot in good conscience lend my vote to this needless and unjustifiable slaughter. I shall vote against this bill.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the yeas and nays entered on Saturday, February 26, 1966, on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, be rescinded, and that the bill proceed to a third reading, and then I shall ask for the yeas and nays on passage.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Georgia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to, as follows:

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles in amounts as follows:

Aircraft

For aircraft: for the Army, $225,600,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $738,300,000; for the Air Force, $1,585,700,000.

Missiles

For missiles: for the Army, $64,000,000; for the Navy, $26,200,000; for the Marine Corps, $27,500,000; for the Air Force, $63,700,000.

Tracked combat vehicles

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $75,800,000; for the Marine Corps, $10,900,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201 In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, $27,995,000;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $52,570,000;

For the Air Force, $71,085,000.

TITLE III—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

SEC. 301. The Secretary of each military department may establish or develop military installations and facilities by acquiring, constructing, converting, rehabilitating, or installing permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities and equipment, which are necessary in connection with military activities in southeast Asia, or in support of such activities, in the total amount as follows:

Department of the Army, $509,700,000;

Department of the Navy, $254,600,000;

Department of the Air Force, $274,100,000.

SEC. 302. The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States, and in connection therewith to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities and equipment in the total amount of $200,000,000.

SEC. 303. The Secretary of each military department may proceed to establish or develop installations and facilities under this Act without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529) and sections 4774(d) and 9774(d) of title 10, United States Code. The authority to place permanent or temporary imporvements on land includes authority for surveys, administration, overhead, planning, and supervision incident to construction. That authority may be exercised before title to the land is approved under section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and even though the land is held temporarily. The authority to acquire real estate or land includes authority to make surveys and to acquire land, and interests in land (including temporary use), by gift, purchase, exchange of Government-owned land, or otherwise.

SEC. 304. Whenever—

(1) the President determines that compliance with section 2313(b) of title 10, United States Code, for contracts made under this Act for the establishment or development of military installations and facilities in foreign countries would interfere with the carrying out of this Act; and

(2) the Secretary of Defense and Comptroller General have agreed upon alternative methods of adequately auditing those contracts;

the President may exempt those contracts from the requirements of that section.

SEC. 305. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the purposes of this title, but the appropriations for public works authorized by sections 301 and 302 shall not exceed—

(1) for section 301: Department of the Army, $509,700,000; Department of the Navy, $254,600,000; Department of the Air Force, $274,100,000, or a total of $1,038,400,000.

(2) for section 302: a total of $200,000,000.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. (a) Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in connection with support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.

(b) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report with respect to the estimated value by country of support furnished from appropriations authorized to be made under this subsection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on passage of the bill.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass? On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], and the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE], the Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE], and the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 93, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 43 Leg.]

YEAS—93

Aiken	Hart	Moss
Allott	Hartke	Mundt
Anderson	Hayden	Murphy
Bartlett	Hickenlooper	Nelson
Bass	Hill	Pastore
Bayh	Holland	Pearson
Bennett	Hruska	Pell
Bible	Inouye	Prouty
Boggs	Jackson	Proxmire
Burdick	Javits	Randolph
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Ribicoff
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, Idaho	Robertson
Cannon	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell, S.C.
Carlson	Kennedy, N.Y.	Russell, Ga.
Case	Kuchel	Saltonstall
Clark	Long, Mo.	Scott
Cooper	Long, La.	Simpson
Cotton	Magnuson	Smathers
Curtis	Mansfield	Smith
Dirksen	McCarthy	Sparkman
Dodd	McClellan	Stennis
Dominick	McGee	Symington
Douglas	McGovern	Talmadge
Eastland	McIntyre	Thurmond
Ellender	McNamara	Tower
Ervin	Metcalf	Tydings
Fannin	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Fong	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Fulbright	Monroney	Yarborough
Gore	Montoya	Young, N. Dak.
Harris	Morton	Young, Ohio

NAYS—2

Gruening	Morse

NOT VOTING—5

Brewster	Lausche	Neuberger
Church	Muskie	

So the bill (S. 2791) was passed.

The title was amended, so as to read: "A bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the bill was passed be reconsidered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is always a great honor and a distinct privilege to congratulate the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. Today is no exception. The able and skillful chairman of the Armed Services Committee has again earned the highest respect of the Senate with the near-unanimous passage of the supplemental authorizations for our Armed Forces.

Characteristically, his resolute and highly capable handling of this measure, more than anything else, was responsible for this great success. He was eloquent. He was articulate. The credit is his and it is richly deserved.

The Senate's action today represents just one of many brilliant achievements in support of our servicemen brought about by the tireless efforts of the great Georgia Senator. Through the years he has keenly appreciated and anticipated consistently the needs of our servicemen. That is extremely important. But even more, he, like no others, has devoted his unexcelled determination and undaunted capacities to assuring the fulfillment of those needs—all to make our troops unmatched on the face of the earth. So again today he has successfully represented those men with his usual incomparable advocacy, or, as he put it himself—with all the power of his being. We are grateful. All America is grateful.

We are grateful, too, for the splendid efforts of the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. As chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, he is always a tireless and devoted worker for the men in our armed services. Today's success is his to share.

And to the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] goes high commendation and sincere appreciation for his unsurpassed cooperative leadership. As always, his unfailing efforts helped immensely to bring about the passage of this most important authorization.

Finally, I personally am deeply grateful to those Members of this body who so ably and properly presented their own views concerning our efforts in Vietnam, but who nonetheless joined today in giving our fighting men the decisive support which they deserve so much. I am referring particularly to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas—that astute and eloquent chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I also refer to the senior Senators from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], and Tennessee [Mr. GORE], to the junior Senators from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG], and South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN], and to all other Senators who, while examining and analyzing our southeast Asia policy and the nature of our commitments there—which is truly their privilege in the best traditions of this body, today stood behind our troops to meet the vital needs of those brave men who risk their lives daily.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] was not available to vote today. The RECORD will reflect that had he been here he would have voted for the bill that was passed as he said in his speeches on the floor of the Senate. He would have voted to table the amendments that were offered.

The senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER] was appointed as a congressional adviser to the American delegation to the GATT Trade Center meetings in Geneva, Switzerland. He is serving as the personal representative of the Senate Commerce Committee at the trade meetings.

The GATT meeting which opened on Monday has been specifically called to consider ways and means of promoting increased trade with underdeveloped nations.

Senator BREWSTER will be in Geneva for a week as a member of the American delegation. He regarded the mission as extremely important to the United States, and of particular interest to the port of Baltimore, one of the foremost trading centers in the United States.

We assured the Senator that we would make every effort to see that he had a pair; and in the event that that was not possible, if it appeared his vote would be required, we would seek to have him return. We did not think that that was necesary and the RECORD will so show.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, informed the Senate that, pursuant to the provisions of 42 United States Code 2251, the Speaker had appointed Mr. YOUNG of Texas as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to fill an existing vacancy thereon, on the part of the House.

The message announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 12889.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 12889).

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I move to strike out all after the enacting clause of H.R. 12889 and substitute therefor the language of S. 2791 as it just passed the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Georgia.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed, and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on passage of the bill, as amended.

The bill (H.R. 12889) was passed.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate insist on its amendment, request a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes there-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

on, and that the Chair appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. SALTONSTALL, and Mrs. SMITH conferees on the part of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the Senate bill (S. 2791) is indefinitely postponed.

PERSONAL STATEMENT

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I had intended to make these remarks before the motion to table was acted on, but when the motion was presented, I thought it would be presented as an amendment rather than a motion. Since I felt my remarks would have little effect on the outcome of the vote, I withheld them until this time.

It was my hope that we would have a straight vote on the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. The matter of the Tonkin Gulf resolution has been discussed for sometime, and it was indicated that there would probably be a vote on the question of rescinding it, which had been suggested by some officials high in the administration.

There was a later indication that, following the vote on that, or perhaps as a substitute, we would have a vote on the reaffirmation of the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

I had intended to vote against the Morse proposal to rescind the Tonkin Gulf resolution, but also to vote against the amendment which would have reaffirmed that resolution.

It is my judgment, by virtue of the various interpretations that have been placed on the Tonkin Gulf resolution since it was first approved in August 1964, that the resolution, in the minds of some persons, has taken on a meaning and a significance which had not been attributed to it at the time it was before the Senate and was passed on August 10, 1964.

It is my opinion, in view of the continuing discussion of the resolution, that the Senate will be somewhat slow in the future about adopting resolutions of this kind.

The fact is that I made a statement, which was affirmed by some Members of the Senate—and the position I took was reaffirmed by the President in his press conference—that this resolution did not give to the President any power he did not have before we passed the resolution, and that if we had rescinded it we would not have taken away any powers he possessed under the Constitution and any powers which have been confirmed by the history of this country and by precedents.

I think the question must be asked: What purpose do resolutions of this kind serve?

Acknowledging that the resolution gives the President no power which he does not already possess, there are, then, two purposes.

One, it may be reassuring to the President in the way of congressional or public support. Second, there is the possibility that passing such resolutions will prevent second-guessing and improper criticisms.

Those of us who served either in the House or in the Senate following the action of President Truman in the Korean war will remember the conversations in the cloakroom to the effect that it would have been wise if President Truman had had a resolution passed to prevent criticism on the part of Members who had given their vote in support of a resolution for that action in Korea.

I think President Truman acted quite properly, and took the responsibility which the President has, without in any way seeking to take authority or power which he did not properly possess and carry it out on his own accord.

Various interpretations have been placed on the resolution by Members of the Senate. The minority leader said we should not rescind the resolution because we would be taking away powers the President was given. I submit we could not take way any power by rescinding the resolution because we did not give the President any power by passage of the resolution.

It was suggested in debate—not so much on the floor, but outside this Chamber, in statements made by some people high in the administration—that because Congress passed the resolution, Congress should not be critical of new policies or new applications. I submit this is a dangerous interpretation of the resolution.

In view of the experience we have had over the last 6 months in the interpretation and application of the resolution, I think we ought to be most careful in the future with regard to similar resolutions, not just because of the political implications but because what is involved is a fundamental change of the constitutional power of the Presidency.

If we are to allow this practice to grow and establish precedents whereby resolutions of this kind begin to take on strength of their own, the only logical conclusion is that, first, the constitutional powers which Presidents have exercised since the country was founded are being challenged, and perhaps even undermined.

Second. There is danger in this kind of resolution that there may be a growth of tradition and the establishment of precedents of power in the Congress which it does not possess and which is not provided for under the Constitution.

Third. There is danger that in the passage of resolutions of this kind it may lead to challenges on the part of Congress as to the power of the President. Whether the attempt would be successful or not is an open question, but if we are concerned about protecting the constitutional powers of the President, if we are concerned with not making the Senate into a kind of garden club which passes resolutions with reference to Presidential powers, and if we are concerned perhaps with the freedom of this body to carry out its own constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy, resolutions of this kind should not be approved in the future.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am about to lay down the pending business.

Mr. MORSE. I invite the attention of the majority leader and the minority leader to the fact that this is a day of precedents in the Senate; a very important precedent, I believe, was established and the policy reaffirmed.

The minority leader will recall that a few days ago on the floor of the Senate, we were discussing how to dispose of the bill, timewise, and I urged that the Senate go ahead without a unanimous-consent agreement and the probabilities would be that we might finish the bill by Tuesday night.

I invite attention to the fact that this Tuesday night, the time is now 6:15, and a vital precedent has been established. In fact, as an old common law lawyer, and a believer in sound precedent, I should like my majority leader to know that that precedent is going to stand.

Accordingly, we can forget about unanimous-consent agreements on major legislation from now on, because we save time without having them.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The distinguished Senator from Oregon is truly generous. He is extremely tolerant. He possesses an infinite amount of wisdom with respect to human nature, and I congratulate him.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, that is a great compliment and I thank the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to join the minority leader and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] in saying that I, too, believe that the Senate has had one of its finest days of debate. It has resulted in the exercise of self-discipline which the Senate has shown so well in the Chamber today.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it adjourn until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar No. 982, H.R. 12563, be laid down and made the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill, H.R. 12563, to provide for the participation of the United States in the Asian Development Bank.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no action will be taken on the Asian development bill tonight.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

States, credit shall be given for amounts for which liability is relieved by this section.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to the said Lieutenant Charles W. Pittman, Junior, an amount equal to the aggregate of the amounts paid by him, or withheld from sums otherwise due him, on account of the liability to the United States referred to in the first section of this Act. No part of the amount appropriated in this section in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.

With the following committee amendments:

Page 1, line 5, strike "$3,493.71" and insert "$3,358.70".

Page 2, lines 10 and 11, strike "in excess of 10 per centum thereof".

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. This concludes the call of the Private Calendar

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 25]

Annunzio	Gubser	Rostenkowski
Baldwin	Hagan, Ga.	Saylor
Baring	Irwin	Scott
Berry	Jones, Mo.	Springer
Bolling	Keith	Steed
Dawson	Leggett	Todd
Dingell	Matthews	Toll
Dowdy	Miller	White, Idaho
Downing	Morgan	Willis
Dyal	Morton	Wilson,
Edwards, Calif.	Mosher	Charles H.
Fisher	Olson, Minn.	Wright
Fuqua	Powell	
Griffin	Purcell	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 394 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 12322, COTTON RESEARCH AND PROMOTION ACT

Mr. SISK, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 750, Rept. No. 1302) which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

H. RES. 750

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12322) to enable cottongrowers to establish, finance, and carry out a coordinated program of research and promotion to improve the competitive position of, and to expand markets for, cotton. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Agriculture, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1966 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, EVALUATION, AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 743 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 743

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, and all points of order against said bill are hereby waived. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed three hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from California is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. SMITH], and, pending that, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 743 provides an open rule, waiving points of order, with 3 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 12889, a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The essential purpose of, and underlying cause for, H.R. 12889 is, of course, the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopters, ships, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles are all being utilized at a rate greater than it was possible to anticipate when the 1966 authorization for those items was passed. It is hoped that the legislation will achieve more rapid procurement of replacements of articles consumed, and will provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time.

The bill authorizes $3,417,700,000 for procurement; $151,650,000 for research, development, test, and evaluation; and $1,288,100,000 for military construction.

Mr. Speaker, there have been questions raised, and we have heard a great deal of discussion in the past few days respecting this particular piece of legislation.

It seems to me that the issue is very clear cut and the interpretation to be placed upon a vote for and in support of this legislation is very simple. We simply desire to make certain that our men in uniform will have ample equipment and weapons to meet our commitments there and to make certain that we carry out the aims and the programs of our Government in South Vietnam and in other areas of the world where such commitments exist. Through the proper and timely and, yes, the escalated carrying out of those commitments we will that much sooner bring the enemy to the point of being willing to discuss peace with reference to these problems.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SISK. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from California yielding to me, and I would like to associate myself with his statement as far as the vote on H.R. 12889 is concerned. My question, in the interests of consistency, inasmuch as last week I raised similar doubts re waiving all points of order on the rule making in order debate on the supplemental foreign aid bill authorization, is one on the rule. As the member of the distinguished Committee on Rules of this House who is bringing this legislation to the floor, will the gentleman kindly advise me why line 9 is inserted therein eliminating all points of order? This was a bill which was brought from the Committee on Foreign Affairs recently. It was stated then that there was no reason within the bill itself for this, and that it had simply been inserted on recommendation of the Parliamentarian without a request by the chairman of the committee or without the desire of the Committee on Rules. Is this the same situation today?

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, if I may comment, I would like to call the gentleman's attention to page 5 of this legislation, the bill H.R. 12889, and specifically to call his attention to line 8 of page 5, Title IV: General Provisions, section 401(a). If the gentleman will read that, he will find that this bill provides for certain transfers of funds. Therefore, that would be subject to a point of order, since it does amount to a transfer of funds.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, I have read that in detail. I know that the committee of which I am a member, the House Com-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Library Services and Construction Act Amendments of 1966—Continued

	Estimated total Federal amounts [1]	Title I, services		Title II, construction	
		Estimated Federal amounts [1]	Estimated matching funds [2]	Estimated Federal amounts [1]	Estimated matching funds [2]
Guam	$62,704	$33,196	$17,101	$29,508	$15,201
Puerto Rico	800,434	387,244	199,489	413,190	212,855
Virgin Islands	53,477	28,925	14,901	24,552	12,648

[1] Estimated total of basic and additional Federal amounts.
[2] Estimated total of basic and additional matching expenditures from State and local sources.

EXCERPT FROM PROPOSED LEGISLATION

EDUCATION

I have proposed a total Federal investment in education and training during the coming year in excess of $10 billion—a threefold increase since 1961.

Our education programs must be administered wisely and well. Shortly after passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, I directed that the Office of Education be reorganized to carry out its expanded responsibilities more effectively and efficiently. This reorganization has now been completed.

In addition, we established the new post of Assistant Secretary for Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to strengthen program coordination throughout the Government.

The Congress has already put this Nation on the path toward the achievement of goals to—

1. Extend special educational help to 12 million disadvantaged and handicapped children;

2. Eliminate illiteracy within a decade;

3. Bring public library services to 15 million more Americans;

4. Reduce by half the rate of high school dropouts over the next 5 years;

5. Guarantee the opportunity for education beyond high school on the basis of ability to learn, rather than ability to pay;

6. Provide college building and facilities to meet the needs of 9 million students expected by 1975.

Full educational opportunity for every citizen requires that we build on the beginnings we have already made. I recommend measures to expand the Headstart program for preschool children; to strengthen the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965; to expand Federal assistance to higher education; and to improve the Nation's libraries.

I

To expand the Headstart program for preschool children

New programs have had the visible success of Operation Headstart. The disadvantaged children who have benefited from this program are already entering first grade—with new confidence in themselves and greater eagerness to learn.

I have requested funds almost double the Headstart program during the coming year to insure full year programs for 210,000 children; summer programs for 500,000 children.

This marks a significant step in providing greatly expanded preschool assistance for 5-year-olds from disadvantaged homes, and summer nursery programs for 3- and 4-year-olds.

II

To strengthen the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965

Though funded only 4 months ago, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 has already begun to bring its benefits to the Nation:

Special help is being provided the disadvantaged—remedial teaching, health and food services, augmented teaching and counseling staffs.

More books—interesting and up-to-date—have begun to appear on school library shelves.

New approaches to old problems are being tried; instructions for the student extends beyond the classroom—to museums, hospitals, factories.

Regional education laboratories are being developed to stimulate new techniques of teaching and learning in our schools.

State educational agencies are strengthening their staffs and assuming greater responsibilities.

Educational deprivation cannot be overcome in a year. And quality cannot be achieved overnight.

I propose that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act be extended for 4 years.

My budget includes increased funds for each title of the act.

In addition, I propose that coverage of the act be enlarged to raise from $2,000 to $3,000 the family income formula for allocating aid for education of the disadvantaged commencing in fiscal 1968; to earmark additional funds for children of American Indians and migrant workers.

Careful study of the incentive grant provision of title I shows that payments would be made to many districts unrelated to need.

I therefore recommend repeal of the incentive grant provision of title I in order to focus Federal aid on basic grants to more than 20,000 local school districts.

Too many schools in urban and rural slums are ancient and in disrepair. Obsolete schools aggravate the problem of eliminating de facto segregation in our northern communities, thus depriving children of full educational opportunities.

There is a pressing need for long-range, community-wide planning to bring innovation and imagination in school construction.

I propose that $5 million be added to title III to help communities in planning school construction to encourage innovation and to deal with obsolescence, overcrowding, and special problems such as de facto segregation.

A recently completed study of the federally impacted area program, requested by Congress, has concluded that certain provisions should be revised.

I recommend revision of the existing law—

To require school districts to absorb a uniform and fair share of the burden of educating children in federally affected districts;

To base payments on school expenditures in local districts rather than on national or State average per pupil cost;

To eliminate eligibility for Federal impaced area assistance in those cases where Government property is leased to private enterprises that pay local taxes.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of title 42, United States Code, section 2251, the Chair appoints as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy the gentleman from Texas [Mr. YOUNG] to fill an existing vacancy thereon.

PRIVATE CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Private Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first individual bill on the Private Calendar.

ENZO (ENZIO) PEROTTI

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 4926) for the relief of Enzo (Enzio) Perotti.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. TALCOTT and Mr. GROSS objected, and, under the rule, the bill was recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary.

OSMUNDO CABIGAS

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 5838) for the relief of Osmundo Cabigas.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

RONALD WHELAN

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7141) for the relief of Ronald Welan.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

RONALD POIRIER, A MINOR

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 8865) for the relief of Ronald Poirier, a minor.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill may be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

LT. CHARLES W. PITTMAN, JR., U.S. NAVY

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9302) for the relief of Lt. Charles W. Pittman, Jr., U.S. Navy.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 9302

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Lieutenant Charles W. Pittman, Junior, United States Navy, of Columbia, South Carolina, is relieved of liability to the United States in the amount of $3,493.71, representing the total amount of overpayments of compensation made to him by the Department of the Navy during the period June 6, 1960, through June 30, 1964, as a result of the use of an erroneous pay entry base date. In the audit and settlement of the accounts of any certifying or disbursing officer of the United

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

mittee on Armed Services, in its wisdom, inserted this there for this stated purpose. If in fact this does eliminate the question of the transferability between operation and maintenance funds, and pay of the Army or personnel funds for all the military services, then why is it necessary to have a waiver of all points of order, which I believe the gentleman will agree with me eliminates the powers of the individual Members as to germaneness and as to other functions in an authorization bill which is coming from a legislative committee to be considered in debate on the floor of the House? It is getting to be a habit rather than a necessity for simply inserting the waiver in all rather than an appropriation bill or a Ways and Means Committee bill. I wonder if the elected Members, the people's personal representatives in this Congress, realize that they are waiving away by operating under such rules their power of objection and even compounding it because of the fact that it is not necessary?

Mr. SISK. Let me say to my good friend from Missouri that I well appreciate the statements he is making. I want to assure the gentleman that the Committee on Rules does not take lightly this idea of waiving points of order. We only do this when we feel it is essential in order to expedite the legislation as well as in order to be completely fair to all Members of the House. According to legal advice which we had in the committee that this particular transfer would be subject to a point of order, which means that one individual could bring about the elimination of transfers, we sincerely feel that this would be in the best interests of the legislation. I want to say to my good friend that I do not think you will find the committee feels lightly about this whole question of waiving points of order. We are concerned, I think, to try to see every Member's rights are protected and that legislation is brought to the floor where it may be considered from the widest possible standpoint, with an open rule, with the right of amendment and the right of every Member to make his position known. However, as the gentleman very well knows, from time to time, on these transfers which are subject to points of order, it is simply felt that it is in the best interests of the expeditious handling of the legislation to waive points of order in such a case. I hope the gentleman will accept that statement, that it was done in all good faith.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I do accept that, and I am delighted with the statement of the gentleman from the Committee on Rules, which is thus made a matter of record, but if you will refer to page 2 of the report of the committee where it discusses section 401, it plainly sets forth that in the original Department of Defense language there was this "transferability," but that the committee added the words "for their [the services] stated purposes."

And then there is the last sentence in that paragraph, discussing section 401 (a) wherein there appears the statement:

> There is no intent to authorize additional appropriation transfer authority for the purposes of this section.

Mr. Speaker, I also want to get that in the RECORD.

Then there is the question which simply comes back to the statement of whether, if there is no intent and if it was not requested—it has not been requested over the past 19 years based upon my available research and knowledge, by the Committee on Armed Services that any points of order be waived, why is it suddenly injected here so that debate thereon can be eliminated?

Mr. Speaker, I believe we are treading on dangerous ground.

Mr. SISK. I well appreciate the gentleman's position, but our advice was that that language was subject to a point of order. I understand the explanation of the report and I gather that that possibly was not the intent.

I well understand the gentleman's feelings, and I want to assure the gentleman that the committee is going to look closely at all requests for waiving points of order and we shall not do so unless such requests are made.

Mr. HALL. I appreciate that.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation. I have done this in order to emphasize the point that I made in the House last week when we were considering the rule on the bill which came to us from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and I shall continue to object to the inclusion of such points of order.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. SISK. I yield to the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I wish to congratulate the chairman and members of the Committee on Armed Services for the very fine hearings which the committee held on this bill, and for the manner in which they expedited the consideration of the bill in the committee.

I also wish to congratulate the chairman and the members of the House Committee on Rules for their prompt action so that this bill could be brought up at this time, which is the earliest consideration of the bill that could possibly be accomplished.

Mr. Speaker, these two actions represent leadership on the part of the Committee on Armed Services and on the part of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. Speaker, this bill is a very important one. As stated in the committee report, it is directed toward the support of our forces in Vietnam. All of us understand the purpose of this bill. When we are voting on this bill every Member will appreciate the fact that he or she is voting to give our boys who are fighting in South Vietnam and carrying out the word of our country and the obligation of our country, and to act in accordance with the national interest of our country, the means and the facilities—the military means and facilities—to accomplish the purposes that we have in mind—to stop aggression and to bring about as early as possible peace in this area, and in the world.

Mr. Speaker, in connection with this legislation there is the resolution of August 10, 1964, which completely covers the entire situation. In that resolution we said, in unity with the Chief Executive, and to show the world the unity between the Chief Executive and the legislative branch, that the United States—and I quote:

> The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Now, Mr. Speaker, the President has the power and has had the power under the reserved powers of the President as Commander in Chief, but this resolution was adopted at the time in order to show the world the unity that existed between the executive branch and the legislative branch of the Government of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, we took the same course of action in the Formosan resolution when President Eisenhower was the Chief Executive of our country. We took the same course of action in the Middle East resolution when President Eisenhower was our Chief Executive. Both of the resolutions are still the law of our land, just the same as the resolution of August 10, 1964, is the law of the land today.

So, Mr. Speaker, the firmness of President Johnson in performing his duties as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, following in consonance with this resolution, is the finest example of leadership that could be evidenced by any man.

If we had firm leadership in the thirties when Hitler was around, the probabilities are that World War II never would have taken place.

If we had that firm leadership as exemplified by the late Sir Winston Churchill, I believe Hitler would never have been permitted to go in and take over Austria.

Those who felt that Hitler would be satisfied were living in a dreamworld of hope. Hitler was not satisfied. Then followed the taking over of the Sudetenland—the forcing of the Czech Government to cede the Sudetenland, an important part of Czechoslovakia, to the German Reich. They hoped Hitler would be satisfied. But Hitler was not satisfied. Later Hitler without opposition took over the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Then came the rape of Poland and then the war.

We were dealing with a militant aggressor in those years and we are dealing with a militant aggressor today. There is the calculated risk of action—yes. But there is the calculated risk of inaction. And the calculated risk of inaction was evidenced in the thirties when Hitler was permitted to go ahead—and to

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

go ahead—and to go ahead—finally bringing about the great catastrophe known as World War II.

So this bill is up today to enable our boys and those of our allies to fight for freedom and to fight against militant aggression. It is as important today that we have firm leadership as it was important in the thirties when firm, strong leadership was lacking.

So in voting for this bill today, I am voting not only for the bill but I am also voting again for the resolution that we adopted on August 10, 1964, which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of both branches of the Congress. Thus, we will convey to the actual and potential enemy and also the rest of the world that America is united. They will understand that message. They will understand that action. They will understand that language.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the Committee on Rules, I express my appreciation to the distinguished Speaker of the House for his comments with reference to our committee. I join with him in his commendation of the Committee on Armed Services for their expeditious handling of this bill.

Further, Mr. Speaker, I join with our distinguished Speaker in the very eloquent way in which he has expressed the position of the House of Representatives, and join fully and wholeheartedly with him in the hope that our vote will be unanimous. I join with him, too, in feeling that we will again be expressing our support for the resolution which was adopted in 1964.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

(Mr. SISK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may use.

(Mr. SMITH of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 743 will provide for 3 hours' debate, an open rule so far as amendments are concerned, waiving points of order for the consideration of H.R. 12889, to authorize additional appropriations for fiscal 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction. Points of order are waived because of section 401(a) which apparently provides additional leeway for the use of funds previously appropriated.

The purpose of the bill is to authorize additional appropriations in fiscal 1966 in the areas of weapon procurement, research and development, and military construction. These additional funds are required because of the accelerating situation in Vietnam.

The authorization is broken down as follows: $3,417,700,000 for procurement, $151,650,000 for research and development, $1,288,100,000 for military construction, and $4,857,450,000 for total authorization.

All services share in the authorization, and in all parts of it. The Marines are included with the Navy.

The committee has tightened up the language submitted by the Department of Defense in section 401 to insure that funds appropriated for one purpose will not be shifted to another, according to the report. However, the requested rule asks that points of order be waived, because of this very point. The language in question is the last phrase of section 401, lines 14 and 15 on page 5 of the bill.

The committee also added an amendment to insure that it would receive information prior to contract letting on intended military construction. In the same field, the committee added authorizations to the bill for the Navy to construct additional facilities at Okinawa and Subic Bay. The Joint Chiefs approved the addition.

This authorization is not to be merely a speeding up of fiscal 1967 actions, but is to be in addition thereto. While testimony on this subject and solid facts are indecisive as to how much an increase will be achieved, the committee has the assurances of the Department of Defense and will keep a close watch on the situation to see that an actual increase is achieved.

Pages 5 through 21 of the report detail the various construction projects, research programs, and weapons covered by the bill. Three billion one hundred forty-nine million six hundred thousand dollars alone is for aircraft, planes, and helicopters. Also included are tracked vehicles, missiles and missile ground support equipment. Construction projects run the gamut from troop housing to airfields and supply depots.

Finally, section 302 includes a $200 million authorization to provide the Secretary of Defense with authority to proceed with any construction he finds vital to U.S. security, wherever needed, to support our troops.

There is no minority report.

As stated by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. RIVERS:

> Our men are in South Vietnam. They need weapons. This bill is an essential step in providing those weapons.

Mr. Speaker, I know of no objection to the rule, and urge its adoption.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD].

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the pending legislation, which is authorized by this rule. I hope that the House will take prompt action on the appropriation authorization. Our Defense Appropriations Committee has had hearings on all items included in this authorization bill and is ready to report as soon as the authorization becomes law.

The funds authorized in this bill are needed now because our Defense Establishment is spread dangerously thin from one end of this world to the other if we are to meet all of the worldwide commitments outlined by the Secretary of Defense in his Senate testimony within the past 2 weeks. Not to pass this legislation would place reserve stocks for American fighting men in a dangerous position in some sections of the world.

We have Reserves and National Guard troops that have recently enlisted in the Reserve and National Guard that have gone as long as 3 and 4 months without fatigues in which to train. That fact came out in the testimony before our committee. Funds are needed and are necessary to carry on worldwide commitments of this Nation. I hope that the House will move forward and act promptly on this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, for the past 10 days our Nation has witnessed confusion within the administration on the U.S. peace terms and future form of government in Vietnam. This spectacle has produced so much official fog that it can only be harmful to the war effort.

It is time, indeed it is past time, for the party in power to face its responsibilities and offer clear, consistent leadership with regard to our goals in Vietnam. Instead, we see a continuing wrangle that disputes whether we should be in Vietnam at all, what our aims are there, and whether the right means are being used to achieve these aims.

These divisions were brought to a head when a prominent Democratic Senator proposed settling the problem of Vietnam as the problems of Poland, of Rumania, of Bulgaria, of Czechoslovakia were settled after World War II—by admitting the Communists to a share of responsibility and power in government. This proposal has triggered an outpouring of contradictory statements and doubletalk from administration spokesmen.

Some spokesmen denounced the idea. Vice President HUMPHREY declared:

> Such a plan would be like putting a fox in a chicken coop * * * an arsonist in a fire department.

Under Secretary of State George Ball termed the Senator's suggestion "absurd." McGeorge Bundy said the United States is "not going to deliver the South Vietnamese people to the administrations of a Communist regime, because that is what this war is all about."

But, almost simultaneously, other official spokesmen began to talk in different terms. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, one of the President's chief advisers on Vietnam, said the Senator's call for Communist participation in the government was "very, very close" to his own view. However, just 2 days before, General Taylor had told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he did not see how "the freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese could be compromised." At the time this was generally understood to mean that General Taylor opposed any political role in South Vietnam for the Communists. The next day, February 23, the Senator in turn seemed to back off from his original proposal by saying that he was not proposing that the Vietcong should automatically have a share of power in an interim preelection government but was merely saying that they should not be "automatically excluded" from having it.

Mr. Speaker, at almost the same time, Bill D. Moyers, the White House press secretary, said there was no disagreement between the administration and the Senator "if Senator KENNEDY did not propose a coalition government with

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Communist participation before elections are held." But then Moyers, when asked what kind of government the administration envisioned in the interim period between negotiations and elections, said this "should be left to the negotiating parties."

Mr. Speaker, the same day the President in a speech attempted to answer the question: Who has a right to rule in South Vietnam? Unfortunately, he confined himself to broad philosophy, rather than addressing himself to the questions raised by the Senator. The President said:

> The people must have this right—the South Vietnamese people—and no one else. Washington will not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. We shall insist for ourselves on what we require from Hanoi; respect for the principle of government by the consent of the governed. We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor their results.

At a news conference on February 26, the President avoided the opportunity to make the administration view clear. He was asked:

> Mr. President, to clear up some confusion * * * about the role of the American military in Vietnam could you set the record straight on whether the American troops in Vietnam are fighting to stabilize and maintain a democratic, non-Communist government or whether their goal is to get free elections in which the Communists might emerge as a part of a coalition government?

The President replied:

> Well, I would have to refer you to the detailed statements of Secretary Rusk * * *. If they're not satisfactory, I would refer you to the statements of the Prime Minister in Honolulu.

Since Secretary Rusk and Prime Minister Ky have not been in complete agreement, this answer given by the President is anything but helpful.

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu have both said they would never deal with the Vietcong or the National Liberation Front. Secretary Rusk has said there is no insuperable obstacle to representation of the Vietcong at a peace conference and that the administration would accept any government in Vietnam provided that the elections were free.

On February 27, the debate within the party in power reached new heights. The Senator insisted that the administration would be prepared to see Communist elements in the government. The Senator cited Mr. Moyers eight times as support for his views although he agreed that the administration had on some occasions made conflicting statements. The Senator pointedly said:

> Statements that are made that we will never deal with assassins and we will never deal with murderers makes it difficult for them to believe they are being asked to come to the negotiating table other than to surrender.

The Senator also moved back to his original position, saying that in return for certain concessions, "we"—note he does not say the South Vietnamese people but "we"—"would see that they played a role in the processes of the government, whether it is in the interim period of time or in the final period of time."

Vice President HUMPHREY, that same afternoon, reminded the Senator that the Vietcong was "not an Asian version of Americans for Democratic Action" and that he is "not going to be any part of suggesting to the people of South Vietnam or any other government, that you should reward the kind of banditry and murder which has characterized the Vietcong by giving it legitimacy in a government. I just do not believe in it. There is no legitimacy to the National Liberation Front. It is exactly what it says it is, a front and we do not intend to recognize it as a sovereign entity."

The Vice President also pointed out the dangers in coalition governments when he cited the situation in Laos today. He described Laos as "a country in turmoil; the Pathet Lao attacking, backed by thousands of North Vietnamese troops and moving in on the Mekong River which if the Communist attack is successful, would destroy the hopes of the development of that vast area."

Mr. Speaker, is it any wonder that a member of the administration admitted that "the credibility of our Government has been assailed. We have a great problem here maintaining our credibility with our own people." This remark was made last December.

I call upon President Johnson to end the confusion. Perhaps he is unable to be as forthright as his Vice President, but he should make unmistakably clear whether he is supporting the suggestion that the Vietcong be given a share of power and responsibility in an interim government and in a government established after elections or whether he is supporting his Vice President. The American people have a right to know exactly what it is their young men are fighting for in Vietnam, and they have the right to know it now.

Several Democratic Members of the other body have endorsed the proposal that the Communists be admitted to a share of power and responsibility in the Government of South Vietnam.

The longer uncertainty continues about the attitude of the President toward a settlement that would, in the Vice President's words, "put the fox in the chicken coop," the more difficult it will be to maintain the morale of American fighting forces and the people of South Vietnam. And the more difficult it will be to justify American casualties in a war that is presumably fought to prevent Communists from forcing themselves into positions of power and responsibility.

Let there be no misunderstanding about the issue. The question before the President is not the ultimate government of South Vietnam after a free election. The question is what is the attitude of the United States toward inclusion of Communists in a government that would rule until elections are held and would determine the form of the elections—a government that would determine whether the elections would be truly free.

Unless the United States is prepared to oppose a coalition interim government at a peace conference, South Vietnam will go the way of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe and of Laos.

Mr. Speaker, if a coalition government including Communist representation is acceptable to the President—as it is to many influential members of his party, all the fighting in South Vietnam—all the sacrifices—all the bloodshed—make no sense, and they should not be further prolonged.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman a question and make a statement before I ask the question. I intend to support the rule and to back strongly the President's supplemental authorization of $4.8 billion to fully back our men in the field, but I do think it is unfortunate, given the importance and implications of the legislation, that the House today is limiting debate to merely 3 hours.

Mr. LAIRD. Debate and full consideration of this request as well as the U.S. commitment in this area of the world is absolutely vital. I agree with the gentleman from New York and hope we proceed in that fashion here in the House of Representatives.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. ABBITT] such time as he may consume.

Mr. ABBITT. Mr. Speaker, I support the rule and the bill, H.R. 12889, the supplemental defense authorization bill, commonly known as the Vietnam military bill. This legislation is of vital importance, not only to our military men fighting in Vietnam but to all Americans.

Our boys, through no choice of their own, are in Vietnam where they are being shot at, many of whom are being wounded, mutilated and killed. It is inherent upon us to furnish them with all necessary military material that is at our command so that they will not be lacking one whit to protect themselves and to achieve the goals for which they have been sent. We either must furnish every needed article of offense and defense or else it is our duty to pull them out. We must support them wholeheartedly and fully or else bring our boys back home. It is not fair to them and it is not fair to America to do less.

This is not the time to argue whether we should be in Vietnam or whether we should have gone. We are there and our boys are being killed by the Communists daily. It is inherent upon us to put up or get out and I call upon this administration to do everything necessary by way of supplying our men with the needed munitions of war immediately and constantly and I, therefore, wholeheartedly support this bill and hope it will be passed unanimously.

(Mr. ABBITT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN].

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and of the bill which is to follow. I appreciate very much the gentleman from California giving me this time, which I have asked for in order to present the following statement in behalf of 78 Members of the House of Representatives, and I understand there may be a few more coming in before the day is over.

I understand that several of the 78 Members who signed this statement will make additional remarks.

But as one who has just returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam and who served for 6 years on the Armed Services Committee, I believe this statement stands by itself as a timely and important contribution to the discussion and understanding of a critical issue:

We agree with President Johnson's statement that "we will strive to limit conflict, for we wish neither increased destruction nor increased danger." We therefore reject any contention that approval of this legislation will constitute a mandate for unrestrained or indiscriminate enlargement of the military effort, and we strongly support continued efforts to initiate negotiations for a settlement of the conflict.

We, in particular, wish to express our concurrence with the President's statement of last week in which he declared the Vietnamese conflict to be a limited war for limited objectives calling for the exercise of "prudent firmness under careful control."

That is the end of this statement, and it is signed presently by 78 Members of the House of Representatives. A list of the signers is included below:

WILLIAM ANDERSON.
THOMAS ASHLEY.
JONATHAN BINGHAM.
JOHN BLATNIK.
JOHN BRADEMAS.
JAMES BYRNE.
RONALD CAMERON.
EMANUEL CELLER.
JEFFREY COHELAN.
JAMES CORMAN.
DOMINICK DANIELS.
WILLIAM DAWSON.
CHARLES DIGGS.
JOHN DOW.
KEN DYAL.
DON EDWARDS.
GEORGE FALLON.
LEONARD FARBSTEIN.
DONALD FRASER.
SAMUEL FRIEDEL.
RICHARD FULTON.
EDWARD GARMATZ.
ROBERT GIAIMO.
JACOB GILBERT.
JOHN GILLIGAN.
MARTHA GRIFFITHS.
RICHARD HANNA.
JULIA BUTLER HANSEN.
WILLIAM HATHAWAY.
AUGUSTUS HAWKINS.
KEN HECHLER.
HENRY HELSTOCKI.
FLOYD HICKS.
CHET HOLIFIELD.
JAMES HOWARD.
J. OLIVA HUOT.
CHARLES JOELSON.
HAROLD JOHNSON.
JAMES KEE.
CECIL KING.
PAUL KREBS.
ROBERT LEGGETT.
CLARENCE LONG.
TORBERT MACDONALD.
HARRIS MCDOWELL, JR.
ROY MCVICKER.
JAMES MACKAY.
JOHN MACKIE.
SPARK MATSUNAGA.
LLOYD MEEDS.
PATSY MINK.
WALTER MOELLER.
WILLIAM MOORHEAD.
JOHN MOSS.
LUCIEN NEDZI.
ROBERT NIX.
JAMES O'HARA.
ARNOLD OLSEN.
EDWARD PATTEN.
MELVIN PRICE.
ROLLAND REDLIN.
THOMAS REES.
JOSEPH RESNICK.
HENRY REUSS.
GEORGE RHODES.
BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL.
EDWARD ROYBAL.
FERNAND ST GERMAIN.
JAMES SCHEUER.
CARLTON SICKLES.
ROBERT SWEENEY.
HERBERT TENZER.
FRANK THOMPSON, JR.
PAUL TODD, JR.
MORRIS UDALL.
LIONEL VAN DEERLIN.
WESTON VIVIAN.
LESTER WOLFF.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS] and ask unanimous consent that he be permitted to speak out of order.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, last week, when the foreign aid supplemental authorization bill was before the House, I questioned the need for an additional $100 million for the contingency fund for a period of 120 days when $50 million had been provided in the regular appropriation for the entire current fiscal year and not a dime had been spent in Vietnam.

I said then that money from the present contingency fund was being used by President Johnson, not in Vietnam but to help the British in the boycott of Rhodesia—in a joint and outrageous effort to destroy that friendly government which is seeking its independence from Britain.

In addition to the use of contingency funds, I am going to try to ascertain before the day is over whether U.S. military planes are being used in this reprehensible enterprise and, if so, on what conditions and by what authority.

The subject of United States-British persecution of Rhodesia on last Thursday brought the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. O'HARA] to the floor of the House where he referred to me and proceeded to unburden himself of a few remarks from which I quote briefly:

Our position as regards Rhodesia —

He said—

is based upon our national morality and our sense of virtue * * *. Our virtues and moralities do not change with the scenery of different parts of the world. What we stand for * * * is the right of self-determination of peoples everywhere * * *. I cannot make it too clear that the issue in Rhodesia is essentially the same as the issue in Vietnam.

Then he topped it off with this:

But we are not beholden to Britain, nor Britain to the United States, because our two countries think alike and act with similar response when the virtues and moralities are in issue.

I assume that when the gentleman from Illinois says our "virtues," "morality," and support for "self-determination" does not change with the scenery that these ingredients would apply with equal force and effect to the city of Chicago, among others. There, according to reports, Mayor Daley, the nominal head of the Democrat political machine, with whom I assume the gentleman from Illinois has at least a passing acquaintance, is accused by some Negroes and whites of denial of the right to determine "the kind of lives they will make for themselves and their children."

A Negro leader has announced he will be a candidate to unseat the mayor and perhaps attention should be given, in the interest of "virtue," "morality," and "self-determination," to a boycott of Chicago by the 50 States—a boycott in which the virtuous British would be invited to participate.

But let us take a quick trip abroad and see, as the gentleman from Illinois says, how well "our two countries—the United States and Britain—think alike and act with similar response when the virtues and moralities are the same."

Let us begin with Cuba, less than 100 miles off our shores. Perhaps, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. O'HARA] would like to describe to the House the standard of "virtue," "morality," and "self-determination" the U.S. Government ascribes to Fidel Castro. He might also explain the British version of "virtue" and "morality" which permits them to trade as usual with Dictator Castro while the latter supplies subversives and guerrillas to undermine the governments of Latin America and bleed this country of money and troops, as in the case of the Dominican Republic.

Perhaps the gentleman from Illinois would also like to explain the "virtue" and "morality" of British trade and profits as usual with Communist North Vietnam whose guns have killed 2,000 Americans and wounded another 11,000. He might further explain by what standard of "virtue" and "morality" the British continued to trade with Red China during the Korean war when 35,000 Americans were being killed and another 120,000 wounded. Without Red Chinese troops, equipment and supplies in North Korea there would have been little more than a skirmish.

Turning now to Africa I can remember how the society of bleeding hearts in Washington hailed the establishment of a so-called independent, self-determining government in Ghana. They called it the African "showcase of democracy," and the dollars of American taxpayers rolled in. Not too long afterward, the head of that government, Nkrumah, also known as the "Redeemer," made a trip to Washington, re-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

ceived the red carpet treatment, and promptly went on a national television network to boast that he was a Marxist. Thereafter, he kept the path hot to Moscow, carrying high the torch for communism, at the same time grabbing the money we so tenderly proferred him. That worked so well that Dictator Nkrumah either executed, or jailed and held incommunicado, all self-determining opposition. Through the years since 1957, we heard of no strangling boycott by the virtuous British, in which the U.S. Government was joined to bring down the tyrannical Nkrumah government and provide freedom for the Negroes of that land.

Can the reason be that the Rhodesians unlike the British and Ghanians never picked the pockets of American taxpayers? For the Rhodesians the moral of this story seems to be that if you want to escape a boycott and economic punishment climb aboard the Johnson gravy train as have the British, Ghanians, and a host of others. The tried and tested formula these days seems to be to grab all the foreign aid possible, then stage an insurrection, throw out the bad guys, establish a military dictatorship, and start the process all over again.

Incidentally, it would be interesting to know the extent of Dictator Nkrumah's masterminding, along with his Communist pals, including the notorious Roberto Holden, of the massacres and atrocities that have taken thousands upon thousands of lives, black and white, Protestant and Catholic, on the African Continent in the last few years.

Now Ghana has just acquired a military dictatorship and it will be interesting to hear from the apologists, both in and out of Congress, when it is expected "virtue" and "morality" will take over. Or is a military dictatorship now accepted as "self-determination"?

When it became apparent that the showcase government of Ghana was in reality a brutal tyranny, Nigeria was then touted as the new showcase. Prime Minister Balewa was pro-Western and an able man. But early this year Negro troops of the Nigerian army cut him down with their machineguns, along with some of his Cabinet officials, and established a military dictatorship. If there has been a British-United States boycott of Nigeria for the purpose of establishing "virtue," "morality," and "self-determination" for the Negroes of that African country we have not heard of it.

Mr. Speaker, it was some 190 years ago that a little band of men assembled on this continent, announced they had absorbed enough abuse from the British monarchy, and sued for their independence.

Promptly haughty Britain, then mistress of the seas, threw a blockade on this continent and attempted to strangle the colonists economically. That failed because, in part, the British could get no help. France, a world power, helped break the blockade.

A few months ago British subjects in Rhodesia announced they, too, had paid enough tribute to and taken enough dictation from Britain. They announced their independence.

Promptly the British Government established a boycott in an effort to strangle the Rhodesians economically and just as promptly the shameless opportunists in Washington announced they would join and help bring the Rhodesians to their knees.

Why have the ultraliberal opportunists in Washington involved this Government in still another affair on the African Continent—a move that may well lead to warfare?

Because, they say, Rhodesia, which has been self-governing for two decades, "is not yet ready for independence," and because the color line has been drawn too tightly in Rhodesia.

These Washington opportunists have apparently never read history or they would know that the rebel colonies of 1776 had at hand a large population of colored natives, Indians, and many thousands of Negroes, none of whom were recognized as a part of the community for political or governmental purposes.

But laying aside for the moment the history of our forefathers' successful struggle to win freedom and independence from the leeching British in London, it is unbelievably reprehensible that the United States would now join Britain in clamping a boycott on any friendly country.

Rhodesia is a friendly country. It is not and never has been an enemy. It is strongly anti-Communist and has offered to send combat troops to Vietnam even though they may be needed at home if the British carry out their threat to use military force. Whether the British, in that case would use Englishmen to kill Englishmen or hire mercenaries as they did in 1776, is not known at this juncture.

But by what authority did Lyndon Johnson impose a boycott on trade with Rhodesia? Article 1, section 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress has sole power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. No power is vested in the executive to block foreign trade except under laws which control trading with the enemy and Rhodesia has not been designated an enemy.

Additionally Congress, less than a year ago, in legislation which bears the Johnson signature, amended the Export Control Act of 1949 to provide that:

> The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the United States (A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States and (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse to take any action * * * which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed by any foreign country against another country friendly to the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I charge that President Johnson, in his usurpation of authority to regulate foreign commerce with Rhodesia deliberately violated the Constitution of the United States, and I charge that in the second instance, with reference to the Export Control Act, as amended, he deliberately violated the will and intent of Congress, if not the law.

Yes, let us have virtue and morality but let it begin here at home.

On the walls of this Chamber hang two portraits and only two. One is that of the man often referred to as "the Father of his Country," George Washington, the first President of this Republic. It is not difficult to imagine what Washington would say to those in this country today who so blithely use the power of the Government he welded to join in destroying the Government of a valiant little country seeking its independence from British dominion.

The other gentleman we honor each day is the Frenchman, Lafayette, without whose help in breaking the British boycott of 1776, it is doubtful that either portrait would hang in this Chamber. Instead, there would probably be one portrait—that of King George III.

To those who now pander to the British, in view of their dealings with Communist China, Communist North Vietnam, and Communist Cuba, I ask again whether this Government is operated on a standard of double, triple, or quadruple morality?

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. FLYNT].

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I support the rule called up by the gentleman from California [Mr. SISK] and I support the bill, H.R. 12889.

If the resolution referred to a few moments ago during the debate on the rule by the Speaker of the House of Representatives were at issue today, I would vote to reaffirm that resolution.

(Mr. FLYNT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

(Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, this debate on Vietnam which has been going on in the other body for some weeks, and which we join in the House today, will serve a national purpose if—instead of producing recriminations—it makes us face up to our present alternatives, which are relatively few.

In conducting this debate, we need to bear in mind that it could be hurtful to the national purpose if it should result in giving Hanoi and the Vietcong a false impression of indecision and irresolution, increasing their will to persist and thus prolonging the war.

I do not mean to imply that we should refrain from engaging in debate. The right to debate this and any other issue freely, both in this forum and throughout the land, is the very thing for which American men are dying in Vietnam today.

But surely this particular bill, providing the military wherewithal necessary to the successful conduct of the effort to which the Nation is committed, must pass. And it must pass overwhelmingly.

This bill is hardly a proper vehicle for the expression of disaffection from our national objectives. Let us express verbally whatever reservations we may sincerely feel, but a vote against this bill would be almost unthinkable.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

It would be like coming upon a man in the ocean, whose boat had capsized and left him swimming, and—instead of throwing him a lifeline—engaging in a long, abstract debate about whether he should have been in the ocean in the first place. The time for discussion would be after the lifeline had been thrown.

Today American men are engaging a ruthless and relentless enemy in the jungles of Vietnam. For the most part, they did not ask to go. We sent them. Certainly, by all that is right and holy, we owe them the obligation to back them up with the weapons, the tools, the materiel, and the united support that they need.

For any Member of this House to vote against this bill today would not hasten the end of the war. If any considerable number of our Members were to do so, it could result in unnecessarily extending the war by planting false hopes in the minds of our enemies. It has been their central hope that, if they hold on long enough, eventually we will weary of the long, twilight struggle as did the French, and ultimately withdraw. If we would hasten their lying down arms and coming to the conference table, then let us demonstrate clearly and forcefully today that theirs is a vain and forelorn hope. The best opportunity for such a demonstration on our part would be by a unanimous vote for the adoption of this bill.

If we really will peace, then the peace offensive and the military offensive must go hand in hand. They must be conducted with equal vigor, for one depends upon the other.

We might as well pontificate on the free coinage of silver or the admission of slave States to the Union as to argue about whether American troops should be in Vietnam. The fact is that we are there. The question is: Where do we go from here?

Hardly anybody actually wants to tuck tail and run, inviting an armed Communist takeover. Few indeed are bloodthirsty for a bigger war. Practically nobody is really satisfied with the present situation, and almost everybody yearns for an honorable solution. In the search for this elusive grail, we have been repeatedly frustrated.

Perhaps the clue to such a solution may be found in a comment by President Johnson, upon receiving the Freedom Award on February 23, wherein he said:

> Men ask who has a right to rule in South Vietnam. Our answer there is what it has been here for 200 years: The people must have this right—the South Vietnamese people—and no one else. We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor their result.

Part of the vulnerability of the South Vietnamese to Vietcong propaganda stems from the dismal fact that for the 12 years of its independent existence South Vietnam has not elected its national leaders. They have had 10 Premiers in the past 2 years alone, and not one of them chosen by the people. Little wonder that so many in that land show limited enthusiasm for defending their freedom.

Think for a moment what a dramatic thing it would be if the President should publicly and formally propose to the United Nations a clear-cut peace plan based upon one simple keystone—the will of the people.

To begin, the President could recommend that a free election be held in all of South Vietnam—not next year but this year—in which it would be proven, by ballots rather than bullets, just exactly what government the people of South Vietnam want to represent them.

He could propose that these elections be supervised by the U.N. to avoid their being falsely rigged by either side—and be preceded by a U.N.-supervised 6-weeks truce to provide a proper atmosphere for their conduct.

It would be necessary, of course, for both combatant forces to agree in advance to respect and abide by the results of the elections. But on what defensible basis could Hanoi or the Vietcong refuse? A turndown on their part would expose as total fraud their pretenses at representing the popular will, betray their lack of faith in the people of South Vietnam, and help turn the tide of Asian opinion to our side.

Surely we would have nothing to fear from such free elections. There has been no truly free election anywhere in the world during the past 15 years which has given any real comfort to the Communists. The South Vietnamese people have demonstrated their desire to participate. On last May 30, elections were held throughout South Vietnam for provincial and municipal advisory councils. In spite of Vietcong threats and intimidation aimed at keeping people away from the polls, fully 70 percent of those registered voted in the election even though the officers elected were to have very little real authority.

As a second stage, we might want to consider building into the plan a concrete proposal for similar free elections, either 2 or 3 years hence, in which all the people of North and South Vietnam could vote on unification as decreed in the Geneva accords of 1954.

Both north and south profess to want reunification of the country—but each on its own terms. The Geneva agreement specified that such nationwide elections would be conducted in July of 1956.

South Vietnamese leaders were never satisfied that really free balloting would result in the northern zone, and the solemn agreement was never kept. Much of the present bitterness stems from this failure.

A somewhat disturbing report in the morning newspaper today quotes South Vietnamese Premier Ky as saying that his country has the "noble and supreme task" of "liberating the North and reunifying the fatherland." Let us devoutly hope that he does not mean a reunification merely on his own terms brought about solely by the force of arms and unratified by popular vote, for this would be as wrong in principle as the evil against which we fight. The evil of communism lies not in its name alone, but in its policies and its methods. We shall not defeat it by mimicking those methods. We shall defeat it ultimately by demonstrating to the world that there is a far better alternative by the way of democracy, the way of the freely and constitutionally expressed popular will.

We have repeatedly said that we stand behind the Geneva accords, even though we were not a signatory. This proposal would be wholly consistent with our joint declaration with Great Britain, made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as reported in the Department of State Bulletin, volume XXXI, which read:

> In case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek unity through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

So actually we have said these things before, at different times and places. But most of the world, unfortunately, does not know that we have said them. Maybe we have not quite put them into one simple package sufficiently dramatic to constitute a clarion call to peace and freedom in Asia.

At worst, it would put Hanoi on the psychological defensive. If the overture failed, then all the world would know that we really had tried, and everybody would have a clearer idea as to just what we're fighting for—the right of every people to have a government of their own choice, and not one forced upon them by anybody else. No longer, if Hanoi rejected the proposal, could the Vietcong masquerade as liberation forces or accuse us of trying to force our will upon their country.

Surely this is one weakness in Senator ROBERT KENNEDY'S proposal that the Vietcong be admitted to a coalition government, for the impression arises that we are bartering away the freedom of South Vietnam.

The point is that we are not there to impose on the South Vietnamese a government of our choice but to defend their rights to a government of their choice.

Let us make this crystal clear—so clear that nobody can mistake or misconstrue it. Such an assertion of our faith in the democratic processes would show the strength of our deepest national convictions. It would be consistent with every major civilizing development since the Magna Carta.

We would be challenging the aggressors to let the people decide—in the forum of reason rather than the battlefield of war. If they should refuse, it would further condemn them even in the eyes of Asians, perhaps gain us more allies and certainly leave us in a better psychological position if we are to stay and fight.

And if they should accept, it might pave the way to the conference table and the honorable settlement for which all men of good will so fervently yearn.

But if we would encourage the enemy to join us on this or any other avenue to peace, then we must demonstrate beyond doubt that we have both the will and the means to triumph in the military phase of this struggle against aggression, and the patience to persist even in the face of adversity. Unanimous passage of this bill today would be one such clear demonstration.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] 5 minutes.

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am supporting this rule and I am supporting the legislation. I think if a study of the map of southeast Asia is made, you could readily determine that we are not fighting in South Vietnam just for 16 million people. We are fighting to keep 1 billion people from sliding into the control of Red China. That is what we are fighting for.

In that 1 billion people, there are 85 million people, highly industrialized and scientifically trained people in the nation of Japan with a capability of making any kind of plane or electronic gear or any other kind of equipment that can be used in war. This is the one thing that Red China needs—the industrial capability of Japan.

We are fighting against the four-prong formula of Communist conquest—infiltration, subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla takeover. If this formula of Communist conquest is allowed to go unchallenged, it will be used in every country in southeast Asia and in every country of the underdeveloped world.

Let no one believe that our surrender and withdrawal from Vietnam would bring peace in southeast Asia or in the world. It would bring further use of the formula of Communist conquest in every country in southeast Asia and in the underdeveloped world.

Peace cannot be established by the surrender to a dictator's forces of tyranny and aggression. We cannot bring peace to the world in that way. None of us want war. None of us want our boys to be killed in foreign jungles. We all want peace and we all want to negotiate, but we do not want to reveal every term of possible negotiation before we get to the negotiation table. That is not the way that negotiation is successfully accomplished. Peace can be established in my opinion by the support of just principles by our country and hopefully by other countries throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 12889, with Mr. CAREY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] will be recognized for 1½ hours, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES] will be recognized for 1½ hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS].

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, in that a little later, time may be of the essence, I yield 10 minutes now to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. RYAN].

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for having yielded to me to start what I hope will be a reasoned debate on the policy considerations which should guide us in considering this very important bill today.

The bill before us authorizes a supplemental appropriation of $4.8 billion principally for the procurement of aircraft and missiles and the construction of bases. The funds are needed, we are told, for the war in Vietnam. This is certainly not a routine authorization for a routine appropriation. It is rather a request for another brick in the arch of congressional support which the administration is constructing for its policy. Although the war is being fought without a declaration of war, the President never hesitates to remind the Nation that it is being fought with the sanction and approval of Congress. The President made it clear in his news conference on February 27 that he regards support of this authorization for military appropriations as an endorsement of the administration's Vietnam policy. If the President considers this a matter of policy, so do I.

The basic issue is U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The question is not whether courageous American soldiers, sailors, and airmen are to be adequately equipped, supplied, and protected in carrying out and executing their assigned missions. Of course, as long as they are committed to battle, they must be provided for properly. No one argues that. If this were simply a bill to give supplies to the dedicated men in the field, it would have my full support. The real question is what our goals and objectives in southeast Asia should be and what strategy should be adopted in an attempt to realize them. It is not a matter of support for men in combat, but whether they should be in combat at all, or if they are, what their missions should be in the context of what strategy and what policy.

This is a bill to finance escalation, not to finance an existing policy or decisions already made. It is now before us, and our responsibility is a heavy one.

We should understand, if not accept, the fact that modern warfare is conducted without a formal declaration of war by Congress. We delude ourselves, and we delude the American people, if we pretend that Congress should ignore policy when it authorizes the appropriation of funds.

Let us admit it. Since the House grip on the budget is the only hold it has on foreign policy, an authorization request is the only time when the House can review foreign policy.

Yet the American people rely on Congress to oversee foreign policy. I am receiving hundreds of letters about the Vietnam crisis. I am sure we all are. Unless we are prepared to tell our constituents that they have come to the wrong place—that they should write to the President instead—we must at some point take a stand. This bill is likely to be our only chance.

We are entrusted by our constituents to act in this, as in every matter, in their interest and in the national interest.

Today is the third time in 2 years the House has been called upon to express itself on our policy in Vietnam. It may be the last time.

THE IMPORTANT DEBATE

Mr. Chairman, there is a crucial debate raging within the councils of government, and this authorization touches the fundamental issues. The important debate is not about "withdrawal" or "mindless escalation." Nor is it about appeasement or bombing China. There are no Chamberlains or Hitlers in seats of power in this country.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. objective in Vietnam has not been clear. Most Government officials now agree on one of two general objectives, and many of them vacillate between the two. One's view of what military and diplomatic strategy to pursue really depends on which of these objectives he believes that the United States should seek.

The general objective sought by one view is a limited one: to prevent the Vietcong from taking over South Vietnam by force, and to end hostilities in such a way that ultimately the United States can honorably leave the country. Those who favor this objective generally argue that the United States can and should only play a limited role in Asia. They believe that a future Vietnamese Government would be independent of China, at worst a Tito-type situation. Therefore, they are not overly troubled by the prospect of a coalition government in Vietnam, reflecting the political realities.

This general view was expressed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the distinguished diplomat, George Kennan.

Those who take this line believe the Vietcong must be a party to negotiations and are prepared to accept an interim coalition government. This was the essence of Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S statement on February 20.

Furthermore, those who take this line have a military strategy which they believe will lead to a solution. That strategy is based on the theory that we must show Hanoi and the Vietcong that they

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

cannot win the war. This military strategy has been most clearly outlined by Generals Gavin and Ridgeway. Proponents of this view oppose escalation of the war.

The second general objective has been gaining popularity within the administration during the past month. It is a much wider objective. It holds that the United States should help the Saigon government to gain control of South Vietnam and to carry out an extensive pacification plan which will deny the Vietcong the allegiance of a significant part of the population. Those who urge this objective believe that, if South Vietnam goes Communist, the whole area of southeast Asia will be jeopardized. Conversely, they believe that, if the Vietcong are decisively defeated, Chinese communism will be effectively contained.

Those who take this view are horrified by the thought of an interim coalition government—or by the prospect of elections which the Vietcong might win. This is the line of reasoning which, according to Senator FULBRIGHT, calls for "total victory." It is the doctrine espoused by the Secretary of State. Officials who follow this approach necessarily react very sharply to Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S proposal.

Those who take this line have a military strategy of their own. They want the United States to conduct search-and-destroy missions—to drive the Vietcong out of areas which they now control. They then want our troops to "hold" these areas, while pacification plans proceed.

This is the strategy proposed by Vice President HUMPHREY and Gen. Maxwell Taylor. According to General Wheeler's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (hearings on H.R. 12334 and 12335, pp. 4932, 4933, 4949), this is the strategy of General Westmoreland. It calls, of course, for a continually increasing U.S. troop commitment. It believes that the U.S. role in southeast Asia must be long term, and that we will need many bases and supply lines. In short, this is a policy of extended escalation.

Mr. Chairman, this crucial policy debate may well determine the course of U.S. domestic and foreign policy for the next decade. It is a debate which Congress should not avoid. Otherwise, we abdicate our responsibility and contribute to the process by which the Executive determines when and where and how to put this Nation to war.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the authorization which we consider this afternoon deals directly with the substance of this debate. As I will demonstrate, it is an escalation authorization. To my view, it deals directly with policy. For it in effect says to the President: Here is the money with which to escalate. If you do so, it is all right with us.

Mr. Chairman, it is not all right with me. In my view of domestic and international policy, a wider war is not the answer.

IMPLICATIONS OF MINDFUL ESCALATION

First, I want to make clear what I understand the mindful escalation policy to propose. It would impose a military solution upon an essentially political problem. My understanding of that policy comes from reading the transcript of the hearings before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, reading dispatches from Vietnam in the New York Times and Washington Post, and listening to the recent speeches and comments of President Johnson and Vice President HUMPHREY.

The object of the policy is to wipe out the Vietcong, and to hold huge areas of the Vietnam countryside while the Saigon government carries on a program of pacification. Its proponents hope that the countryside can be cleared in 2 or 3 years—through intensive search and destroy missions—but they believe that the pacification of the countryside may take a great many more years of realize.

Advocates of this escalated policy have no illusions about its cost. They know that it will take a great many men to conduct the search and destroy missions; more important, they know that it will require a great many more men to hold on the countryside once it has been initially cleared. While it would be nice to believe that these tasks can be left to the South Vietnamese themselves, advocates of this policy are convinced that the countryside cannot be held without the presence of American troops in each village and hamlet.

Most of those who urge mindful escalation admit that the cost will be considerable. They are calling for a minimum of 400,000 American troops. According to Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times magazine on Sunday, February 27, all of the President's military advisers agree that more than double the present strength is essential. Senator STENNIS has said 600,000 men may be required. Seymour Topping reported from Saigon in the New York Times on February 26 that military authorities there expect that during peak combat periods there would be at least 2,000 American casualties per month.

Mr. Chairman, I am not persuaded by these military "experts." I might remind my colleagues that the military have been wrong before. It was Secretary of Defense MacNamara, who upon returning from Vietnam on October 2, 1963, said the major part of American forces would be home by Christmas, 1965. I do not doubt that America has the ability to defeat the Vietcong and to secure victory for the Saigon government. But I am neither convinced that the allies could secure victory according to their timetable, nor persuaded that the total annihilation of the Vietcong is worth the cost to America.

I have always taken General MacArthur's crisp comments on a land war in Asia most seriously. Senator Cain asked General MacArthur whether he had told Secretary of State Dulles that:

> Anybody who commits the land power of United States on the continent of Asia ought to have his head examined.

MacArthur replied:

> I don't know whether I made the statement, but I confirm absolutely the sentiments involved.

Military situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, page 156.

I have also been impressed by the study which Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had made on the conditions for a land war in Indochina while he was the Army's Chief of Staff. After reading the full reports of the study, General Ridgway concluded:

> We could have fought in Indochina. We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required—a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. (See "Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway," Harper & Row, 1956).

Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear that the cost of the policy of mindful escalation may be just as great as the cost of the Korean war. In that war there were 157,000 casualties, including 54,000 deaths.

We have all perhaps read the report published last month by Senator MANSFIELD upon his return from Vietnam. Its conclusions are sobering. We would do well to recall them this afternoon. The report concluded:

> Despite the great increase in American military commitment, it is doubtful in view of the acceleration of Vietcong efforts that the constricted position now held in Vietnam by the Saigon government can continue to be held for the indefinite future, let alone extended without a further augmentation of American forces on the ground. Indeed, if present trends continue, there is no assurance as to what ultimate increase in American military commitment will be required before the conflict is terminated. For the fact is that under present terms of reference and as the war has evolved, the question is not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation, but rather of pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open ended.

The Mansfield report, it seems to me, makes it indelibly clear that the war can be won only by literally multiplying the numbers of American troops. It points out that, when we began to increase our troops after the authorization last May, the Vietcong began to supplement their forces correspondingly. The report also point out that the Vietcong at the present time "have the capability of a substantial increase in their numbers within a short period of time." Although an estimated 35,000 Vietcong were killed last year, their ranks swelled from 103,000 to 230,000 during that time. At a minimal guerrilla ratio of 5 to 1, it would have been necessary to recruit 600,000 new troops just to keep pace.

To put the matter more vividly, Secretary of Defense McNamara estimates that 4,500 North Vietnamese are infiltrating South Vietnam each month. To keep the current 4-to-1 superiority, it will take 20,000 additional troops a month to Vietnam.

A more depressing way of looking at these statistics is offered by Prof. Bernard Fall. He points out that the traditionally accepted guerrilla ratio—based on the experience of Malaya and the Philippines—is 10 to 1. According to U.S. News & World Report for March 7, the Vietcong now have 235,700 men.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Thus, an army of more than 2 million men would be required to defeat the Vietcong. At present the Saigon government has an army of about 570,000 men, but the manpower pool appears to be pretty well depleated. Professor Fall doubts that the Saigon government could ever field an army of more than 1 million men. Therefore, to defeat the Vietcong, he reasons, the United States would be required to send at least a million men to fight in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by the escalation of this war for yet another reason—the threat of Communist China. The threat of Chinese intervention must always remain a consideration in any review of our role in Vietnam. This is the area where our aspiration to secure freedom may collide with China's ambition to secure protective satellites. We must look beyond the conflict in Vietnam to the potential collision between the United States and China .

Prof. Roger Hilsman, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 1:

Today Communist China and the United States are on a collision course. The outcome can only be war.

The cost of war with China, Mr. Chairman, would be inestimable.

Then there is the possibility that in the face of mounting casualties the administration will have difficulty in resisting increasing pressure to end the land war by using ultimate weapons on Hanoi, Haiphong, or China.

Mr. Chairman, these are my concerns about a policy of mindful escalation. Yet I believe that an analysis of the proposed authorization makes it clear that continued escalation is precisely what is intended.

AUTHORIZATION FOR ESCALATION

My study of the bill, hearings, and Secretary McNamara's testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees shows that virtually all of the authorization is for procurement of aircraft or missiles, and for bases and other military construction. The rest is for research. No new authorization is asked for ammunition or supplies.

The bill before us is not simply designed to keep the war at the present level, but to permit the escalation of the war in the discretion of the Executive.

The largest item in the authorization bill is $3.4 billion for procurement of aircraft and missiles. Almost all of this is for the procurement of aircraft and aircraft parts. This is not simply to replace aircraft which have been lost in battle. In 1965, 275 fixed-wing aircraft and 76 helicopters were lost. According to Secretary McNamara, aircraft cost less than $2 million per plane. Thus, less than $600 million are needed to replenish the air force. Yet the bill authorizes almost $3 billion for aircraft.

It is also worth noting that most of the lost aircraft were lost in missions over North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara estimated that 169 of the 275 planes were lost over North Vietnam. It seems fair to conclude that, if the Defense Department expects to lose more planes this year than in did last year, the losses will result primarily from a stepped-up program of bombing in the north.

We should be especially reluctant to underwrite such a project. Bombing of North Vietnam has neither brought the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table nor stopped the inflow of men and munitions. Indeed, Secretary McNamara estimates that infiltration from the north has more than tripled since we began the bombing. Senate hearings, page 338. It should also be noted that the intervention of regiments of the North Vietnamese Regular Army came about as a result of the bombing which was started on February 7, 1965.

In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary McNamara explained at page 132–133 that the authorization is not just for replacement of planes:

It does include added inventory.

He explained:

We are providing for procurement of aircraft to be added to the force or modernize the force, rather than to replace potential losses.

As for helicopters, Secretary McNamara stated:

The number of helicopters that we are buying far exceeds any number that we are likely to lose, and far exceeds any number that would be required to modernize units in the forces as of July of last year. (Senate hearings, p. 191.)

Besides the procurement of aircraft and missiles, the other major request in the authorization bill is for military construction; $1.2 billion are requested for this purpose. Certainly there is a need for increased port facilities and access routes to transport supplies to the men who are already in Vietnam. Also, hospitals, housing, and community facilities are needed. But the bill goes beyond this by providing for the construction of airfields and ports which will allow continued escalation of the war without further action by Congress.

Thus, in explaining the administration's request for funds, Secretary of Defense McNamara said:

We will be prepared to house and support additional units if their deployment should be required in the future. (Senate hearings, p. 12.)

Following this theme, the House Committee on Armed Services Report at page 16 states that the money is needed "to achieve and maintain objectives in southeast Asia under present force deployments and to provide a base for augmentation thereof."

Furthermore, other policy decisions appear to be hidden in this authorization bill. Only about one-half of the $1.2 billion request for military construction will be spent in South Vietnam; $346 million will be spent on "other" parts of the Asian mainland—presumably in Thailand.

The decision to build new military airfields, ports, and facilities in Thailand may seem desirable militarily, but it also appears to represent a decision to broaden the base of the war. Similarly, many of the new airfields and ports will be built—under this authorization—with cement, rather than with temporary construction materials such as aluminum matting. This would seem to suggest a decision to build military ports and airfields which will last for a long time to come.

Mr. Chairman, my conclusion that this authorization will be considered as congressional approval of mindful escalation is drawn largely from the testimony of the Secretary of Defense before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. At one point in the Senate hearings, page 105, for example, the following exchange took place between Secretary McNamara and Senator SMITH:

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, are there any plans to escalate and step up the offensive in Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, there are preparations being made, and they are reflected in the fiscal 1966 supplement, for substantially increasing our deployments to South Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of our air units there. Whether or not we will carry out such higher rates of activities and actually deploy all of those additional forces is a decision that only the President can make, and no such decision has yet been made.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that Congress should have some voice in the decision about whether to escalate this war rather than stabilize it. Yet as Secretary McNamara's statement makes clear, this authorization would put that decision squarely and solely in the hands of the President.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to point out that the House Armed Services Committee report expresses the committee's view that there was inconclusive evidence that the authorization is necessary for this fiscal year. It states this doubt at page 3:

If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items involved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization.

I would suggest that the administration has asked for this authorization for yet another reason, not connected with military necessities or bookkeeping. It wants a congressional authorization which it can cite as evidence of approval of the strategy of escalation.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a simple authorization to continue the war at its present level. We should not pretend to ourselves or to the American people that it requires no policy judgment on our part. This authorization represents the administration's decision to make it easy to escalate the war in the future.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT

There are those who believe that Vietnam marks the single great battleground of freedom. They argue that we should be prepared to send every soldier, every plane, and every bomb that we have to gain control of that country. If the government of Saigon does not triumph, they argue, no country can be assured of freedom.

Mr. Chairman, let us examine the nature of our commitment to Vietnam. Until this month, the administration argued that it was based on the statements and policies of three American Presidents.

The most important building block in this argument was President Eisenhower's letter to President Diem on October 23, 1954. The letter said:

We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government, can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied.

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong Government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage anyone who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

For a while the administration maintained that our military commitment stemmed from this letter. But that argument has since been discredited. It was first deflated in a 1965 essay by Arthur Larson, who was Director of the U.S. Intelligence Agency under President Eisenhower. Larson goes through the letter sentence by sentence and concludes:

The nearest thing to a commitment at this stage was an indicated willingness, subject to some stiff (and as yet unsatisfied) conditions and understandings, to provide economic and technical assistance, including military advisers, material, and training" (Larson, "Vietnam and Beyond.")

Then, on August 17, 1965, President Eisenhower settled the question surrounding his letter once and for all.

We said we would help that country—

He said—

We were not talking about military programs, but about aid. (See Max Frankel's article "Military Pledge Is Denied by Eisenhower," New York Times, Aug. 18, 1965.)

After President Eisenhower refused to accept responsibility for our military involvement, the administration turned to a treaty and congressional declarations to explain the root of our commitment. It pointed to the SEATO Treaty and two principal actions of the Congress—the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964 and the $700 million supplemental appropriation for military activities in southeast Asia which passed the House on May 5, 1965.

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Rusk said on February 18 that our commitment to Vietnam grew out of SEATO. "It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in South Vietnam," he said.

However, our obligation under SEATO is clearly limited under the treaty. In the first place, the testimony, Senate report, and Senate debate which surrounded the passage in 1954 of the Southeast Asia Treaty make it clear that instances of Communist subversion, inspired from without, were to be treated under article IV paragraph 2 of the treaty which says:

If, in the opinion of any of the parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area or of any other state or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

Instead, Secretary Rusk relies upon article IV paragraph 1, which says:

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Even if paragraph 1 of article IV were applicable, the nature of our obligation to Vietnam would be limited.

As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at page 14 of the Senate hearings on the treaty:

We made clear at Manila that it was not the intention of the United States to build up a large local force including, for example, U.S. ground troops for that area, but that we rely upon deterrent power of our mobile striking force.

It was apparent to the signers of the treaty, to the Eisenhower administration, and to the U.S. Senate that the treaty did not involve any promise to commit American ground troops to Asia. Senator Alexander Smith, one of the two U.S. Senators to accompany Mr. Dulles to the treaty conference in Manila, emphasized this point in the debate on the Senate floor.

Senator Smith said:

The great contribution which this country is capable of making to the defense of southeast Asia in the event of an act of open aggression would be, as Secretary Dulles has said, to strike at the source of aggression rather than to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war. We have no purpose of following any such policy as that of having our forces involved in a ground war. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 103.)

Article IV paragraph 1 is only operative in the event of an open armed attack. If such an attack should occur, each state agrees to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This provision helped to assuage the doubts of a Congress which was troubled that the Korean war had been fought without a declaration of war. It make it clear that the treaty signatories are not bound to take any action without going through the appropriate constitutional channels. Thus, the President of the United States is obligated to consult Congress before meeting the obligations of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty requires that "Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations." Yet, if we accept Secretary Rusk's contention that we have been acting in Vietnam under this treaty since 1954, we should recognize that for the first decade we were violating the treaty by not reporting the measures taken to the Security Council.

The framers of the SEATO treaty did not contemplate our involvement in an Asian land war, and we have not acted in accord with the provisions of the treaty. SEATO should not be considered the source of our increasing commitment in Vietnam.

President Johnson has also often said that our commitment to Vietnam was sealed by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

However, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August of 1964 did not contemplate extending the war to North Vietnam, nor the landing of large American armies in Vietnam.

That resolution is cited as the legal basis although before it was adopted in the House and Senate the Senate debate made it clear that the resolution was an affirmation of the then existing policy.

Senator FULBRIGHT, in making the legislative history of that resolution, had the following exchange with Senator MCGOVERN:

Senator MCGOVERN. Does the Senator think there is any danger in this resolution that we may be surrendering to General Khanh's position as to where the war should be fought? (General Khanh had advocated attacking North Vietnam.)

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not think there is any danger of that. * * * I do not think the policy that the war be confined to South Vietnam has changed. I think it is still the policy. I think it is the correct one.

Later in the debate, Senator BREWSTER asked:

So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.

Senator FULBRIGHT replied:

There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Senator FULBRIGHT during the debate also said:

I personally feel it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian Continent.

Mr. Chairman, in my view the policy pursued in Vietnam was not contemplated by the resolution of August 1964.

Last May 5 the administration asked House approval of a supplemental appropriation of $700 million for military activities in southeast Asia not because the appropriation was necessary but because the administration candidly sought congressional approval for a new departure in policy.

No longer was the United States aiding the South Vietnamese to fight their own war. The United States was fighting the war. I voted against that bill because I was not willing to vote approval of the decision to convert the conflict into an American war. The administration had not defined its objectives, and there had been no congressional debate.

On May 5 there were 34,000 American Armed Forces personnel in South Vietnam. Today there are 210,000 and 6 divisions.

The war has indeed escalated, and the administration cites the $700 million supplemental appropriation vote of May 5 as another legal basis for our commitment as well as one of the bricks in the arch of congressional support.

Let there be no mistake about it. Today's vote will be similarly construed.

Mr. Chairman, there is yet a third explanation for our commitment to Vietnam—one which invokes American history and evokes America's idealism. In his speech at Freedom House on February 23, President Johnson appealed to the traditional American devotion to liberty. We are in Vietnam, he said, to "keep the faith for freedom."

In his speech last week, President Johnson recalled President Roosevelt's four freedoms. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. I agree that we are dedicated to these freedoms at home and abroad. But our commitment is no less great in Paraguay, Spain, or Southern Rhodesia than it is in South Vietnam. Do we not have as strong a moral responsibility to "keep the faith for freedom" for the people of Cuba and Hungary as for the people of Indochina?

In these cases the United States has recognized that it cannot join the battles of every nation in the world. We should send economic aid; we should exert diplomatic and economic pressure; we should set a personal example; we should strengthen the United Nations; but we cannot commit ourselves to fight an unlimited military war in every case of injustice.

Our friends around the world recognize that no matter how great our love for freedom, our resources are not omnipotent. They know that we are prepared to use our full resources to stop armed aggression, as in Berlin, and to defend ourselves against a nuclear threat, as in Cuba. However, they do not expect us to devote all of our resources to the battle in Vietnam. Many of the world's leading diplomats no doubt share the view of George Kennan, the distinguished former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union:

Not only are great and potentially more important questions of world affairs not receiving as a consequence of our preoccupation with Vietnam, the attention they should be receiving, but in some instances assets we already enjoy, and hopeful possibilities we should be developing, are being sacrificed to this unpromising involvement in a remote and secondary theater of activity.

Most of the world's leaders seem to be baffled and distressed—rather than heartened—by our increasing involvement in Vietnam.

Whatever the nature of the commitment may be, we are clearly not obligated to pursue a policy of continued escalation which involves a full-scale land war on the Asian mainland.

ALTERNATIVES TO ESCALATION

Mr. Chairman, there are realistic alternatives to the extended escalation policy implicit in this bill, and they should be considered before we embark upon a wider war.

I want to make it clear that I do not consider pulling out to be an acceptable course of action. The damaging effect of withdrawal upon our prestige and our relations with other countries of southeast Asia and our allies elsewhere would be severe. The consequences for Cambodia and Thailand must be recognized. We are past the point of unilateral withdrawal even if it would have been sensible—which I do not suggest.

The decision has been made without being formally made. We do have a pledge to the freedom of the people of South Vietnam and their right to freely choose their own government. However, within the framework of that pledge, there are reasonable and honorable alternatives.

In past speeches before the House, I have made specific proposals for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. I believed they were meritorious when I outlined them on June 10, 1964, and again on February 24, 1965.

Although conditions have changed and we have Americanized the war, I still believe they should be pursued.

They should be explored in a stabilized situation, not an intensified war. If we follow what might be called the Gavin-Kennan-Fulbright-Hilsman plan, we can hold Saigon, the provincial capitals, and our own bases, while we support the South Vietnamese as long as they are willing to carry forward counterguerrilla warfare and programs of economic and social reform.

This would bring about a deescalation of our military involvement in South Vietnam which should be accompanied by a cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam. While pursuing this military strategy, we should continue to press for negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, I have consistently said that the conflict in Vietnam was not susceptible to a wholly military solution—that it would be won not on the battlefield but in battle for men's minds, that the Government must win the confidence of the people, that we could help with support—but that our power must be exercised in a supporting role for the benefit of the underdeveloped peoples. We must assist development, not insist on domination.

This raises the whole question of our intervention policy, whether in Vietnam or Santo Domingo or in any one of the 40-odd nations with which Dean Rusk reminded us we have treaty obligations. Of course, we cannot withdraw from the world. Neither neoisolationism nor the doctrine of military might should guide our actions. George Kennan said at hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10 that we should not be asked "to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country." The administration has sought to create a vital interest where there was a stake but not a life or death embrace.

Mr. Chairman, our obligation to the freedom of the South Vietnamese did not require nor commend increasing escalation and a further influx of American combat troops. Rather it commended to us a search for political and diplomatic alternatives. In the interest of aiding that search, eight of us sponsored on January 21 and 22, a conference of experts and scholars to examine and analyze the situation in Vietnam, prepare realistic proposals to facilitate a negotiated settlement and to project the framework of a creative Far Eastern foreign policy.

The report of the ad hoc Congressional Conference on Vietnam was issued on February 15, 1966. Our colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROSENTHAL], deserves our commendation for his initiative in this project. While I do not necessarily subscribe to all of the conclusions and recommendations in that report, I believe they point to the general direction our policy should take. Therefore, I include the foreword and the conference recommendations at this point in the RECORD:

AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

FOREWORD

On January 21 and 22, 1966, a group of experts and scholars met in Washington at the invitation of eight Members of the House of Representatives to analyze the current situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic proposals to help end the war and facilitate a negotiated settlement.

The sponsoring Congressmen have felt unsatisfied with the recent role of Congress in foreign affairs. They believe their office requires a more fundamental examination of foreign policy than that allowed by even the most careful consideration of specific legislation. The sponsors are convinced that the level of congressional analysis can be raised through greater intimacy between the legislative branch and the intellectual and university community. It was with this in mind that they invited to Washington a group of experts particularly qualified to discuss with them Vietnam and its implications for American diplomacy.

Some of the participants have spent considerable time in Vietnam, and have obtained intimate association with conditions there. Others offered the important perspectives of experience in negotiation, study of economics, diplomacy or international law, or

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

expert knowledge of relevant geographical areas.

Participants were requested not to dwell on episodes or errors of the past. Instead, they were asked to discuss present policies and possible alternatives to them; to analyze the problems involved in reaching and enforcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to project the outlines of a creative American policy toward Asia.

Certain conclusions and recommendations emerged in the discussions and these are stated explicitly at the beginning of the report. The subsequent summary of the discussions also includes some individual points which contributed to the analysis, although they were not unanimously endorsed.

The sponsors regard the proposals made by the conference as important contributions to their own thinking about Vietnam and the formulation of American foreign policy. They feel the report deserves the attention of their congressional colleagues, members of the executive branch, and the American people. Finally, they view the conference as having set an important precedent for future congressional initiatives in foreign affairs.

CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Conference reached the recommendations and conclusions set out below. A summary of the discussions from which they were developed follows.

Present strategies

1. There are diplomatic alternatives, not yet fully explored, to continued military escalation of the war in Vietnam.

2. Continued bombing of North Vietnam is not in the American interest either in shortening the war or in improving prospects for a negotiated settlement.

3. There should be no further escalation of American troop commitment. There are serious risks of inviting greater North Vietnamese and Chinese activity.

4. Unilateral withdrawal of all American troops prior to a cease fire or peace conference is not in our national interest.

New policy initiatives

5. The most productive course for the future is a deescalation of military activity and commitment.

6. The National Liberation Front must be recognized as a principal belligerent in the war, and as a necessary party to any peace conference and settlement.

7. To improve the likelihood of negotiations, the Saigon government should be broadened to include representatives less hostile to negotiations.

8. The United States must help promote greater contact between all South Vietnamese factions—representatives of the National Liberation Front, the Saigon government, and influential private citizens.

Negotiations and the convening of a conference

9. The difference between the several negotiating positions is not insurmountable. The United States might agree to Hanoi's four points, treating them as one interpretation of the 1954 agreement and thus an appropriate basis for negotiations. The controversial point three of the Hanoi program would then be a subject for subsequent discussion rather than prior approval.

10. The 1954 Geneva Conference should be reconvened with all parties to the hostilities represented.

11. A procedure for reconvening the Geneve Conference would be to have the three nations on the International Control Commission (Canada, India, Poland) request a conference to receive new instructions on enforcement of the 1954 agreements.

12. The inability of the United Nations thus far to use its good offices to help end the Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of including China as a full member of that institution. Despite the difficulties of involving the U.N. in a settlement of the war, all parties should seek opportunities to utilize the United Nations in appropriate ways.

Terms of a settlement

13. A cease-fire must be secured. Given the dispersed nature of the conflict, a cease-fire might be more easily reached at a conference, though the possibility of a prior cessation of hostilities should be explored carefully.

14. Agreement must be reached on a provisional government in South Vietnam and procedures for the holding of elections to form a constituent assembly. A provisional government might be established on the basis of geographical areas controlled, with contested areas to be administered temporarily by the International Control Commission. Alternatively, decisions regarding such a government could be reached by prior negotiations between all parties in the south.

15. All parties must firmly adhere to the results of free elections.

16. Amnesty must be granted for all parties in the conflict.

17. Guarantees of the cease-fire, the provisional government, free elections, troop withdrawals, amnesty, and neutralization must be enforced by an effective International Control Commission. The International Control Commission must, therefore, be significantly strengthened. United Nations participation in this process might reduce administrative difficulties and set precedent for future United Nations participation in the solution of other civil conflicts threatening world peace.

18. A settlement should assure the neutralization of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Arms control agreements must be reached applying to other nations of the area, prescribing their nonparticipation in military alliances, the freedom of their territory for foreign military bases, and their protection from outside arms, material, and armed personnel infiltration.

Mr. Chairman, these 18 points by no means exhaust the possibilities for negotiations. Rather, they indicate the direction in which our policy should, in my view, be directed. Unfortunately, our policy does not now appear to be headed in this direction. During the pause in the bombing in December and January the administration appeared genuinely to seek negotiations. There was no apparent response from Hanoi to the President's peace offensive, and the administration appears to doubt the possibility of negotiations.

But this Nation should never abandon the search for peace. We should never abandon ourselves to all-out war. We are not only the strongest nation on earth, we are the most ingenious. We have an unflinching belief in the law, and we have a great tradition of domestic peace preserved by the law. It is in this tradition that I have a great belief in the possibility of world peace through world law. Or, more precisely, I believe that world law is our only hope for world peace.

It was with this faith in international law that the United Nations was founded some 20 years ago. It was founded by men who had learned a lesson far more profound than the lesson of Munich or Manchuria or Ethiopia. They had learned the lesson of London, of Berlin, of Paris, of Hiroshima. They had learned that while wars can be won, they are never an answer. They provide no answer for the hundreds of thousands who are injured, made homeless, killed. The lesson of the Second World War was the need for a world order and international law.

But we seem to have forgotten that lesson in the war we fight today. We should have taken this dispute to the United Nations the moment it arose. We should have taken it to the Security Council. If the Soviet Union blocked us there, we should have gone to the General Assembly. There is a good case to be made against the Vietcong. That was the place to make it.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that it is now too late to bring the United Nations into this dispute. Finally, last month, we took the matter to the Security Council. They decided not to act. Now we should be prepared to take it to the General Assembly.

There are those, I know, who say that the United Nations is too weak to handle this war. If it should try to handle this war, and fail, says the argument, then the United Nations will be damaged, perhaps permanently.

But, consider the damage which follows from not taking this issue to the United Nations. In effect, we are saying to the world: The United Nations cannot handle major disputes. Mr. Chairman, need I remind this body that the United Nations was founded precisely to handle major disputes. If we embark on a major war on the Asian mainland, and bypass the United Nations, we throw away the lessons of the last war, and discard the hope of our fathers.

It is often said that each new generation must learn its lessons anew. I pray that that maxim will not prove true of the lessons of total war.

At the outset of this speech, Mr. Chairman, I said that a great debate is now raging about which of two objectives this Nation should pursue in Vietnam—a negotiated settlement or "total victory." In all candor I must confess that the debate appears to be being won by those who ask "why not total victory?"

This objective will be sought through a policy of mindful escalation. Its proponents will elevate the American troop commitment slowly, gradually conditioning the American people. They are mindful of the domestic consequences which might follow full mobilization. Its proponents will also be selective in their bombing of North Vietnam. They are mindful of the danger of an all-out war with North Vietnam, or beyond that, with China.

Mr. Chairman, those of us who urge stabilization of the war are also mindful of the effects of escalation. We are mindful of the domestic effects and the international effects. We should accept the challenge of the generals and explain why not total victory.

Mr. Chairman, I do not doubt that America can win this war if we are willing to pay the price. If we are willing to sacrifice American lives and Vietnamese lives, to sacrifice the poverty program at home, to sacrifice a treaty banning nuclear proliferation. But is this in our national interest? Is it in the interest of world peace and the rule of law?

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Do we not have an obligation to the U.N. Charter which requires that threats to the peace be dealt with by that international organization? We are not discussing Munich. We are discusing Laos; we are discussing Algeria. Each of those conflicts ended with a compromise settlement, a negotiated peace. That should be our goal in Vietnam.

But instead, the administration's policy is now swayed by those who council us to abandon ourselves to the great game of war. We can win it they urge, so let us. Mr. Chairman, it is hard to resist this temptation, I am sure. But that is the role of statesmen and politicians. When generals council victory, we must council peace.

Mr. Chairman, when I vote on this measure it will be with a heavy heart. I know that few in this body will vote with me, and I do not lightly disagree with my President and my party.

This has not been an easy decision for me to make. In fact, it has caused me more soul searching than any vote I have cast in 6 years in this House. I yield to no one in my devotion to my country. I yield to no one in my respect and admiration for the qualities of courage, dedication, and patriotism of the American soldier. He performs miraculously in battle regardless of the conditions under which he fights. I know something of what he is experiencing in Vietnam today, for 20 years ago I too fought a jungle war in the Pacific. I hoped then, as my father did before me in the Meuse-Argonne almost 50 years ago, and as my brother did after me in Korea, that thereafter disputes among nations could be settled through international law.

I fully recognize that war is still an instrument of national policy. It is used today in Vietnam where we are at war without a declaration of war. If war were declared by Congress, the situation might be different. But today on the basis of the record I am unwilling to ratify with my vote an authorization which will be interpreted as the sanction for greater escalation of our military commitment.

It will be accepted as the third brick in 2 years in the arch of congressional support for a policy which may well lead to world war III.

Imbedded in this authorization are far reaching questions about how the United States should relate to the developing world and the social, political, and military revolutions in that world, about our relations with the Soviet Union, about our approach to China which is the key to peace in Asia.

Mr. Chairman, now is the time to reassess our policy and find an honorable, diplomatic resolution of the Vietnam conflict and then build a viable policy in the Far East.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may require.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to say that I totally, unequivocally, internally, and eternally, disagree with the position of the gentleman who has just preceded me. This bill, the title of which I have read in asking for the House to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, is for the purpose of providing the needed equipment and bases for our boys in southeast Asia. The bill, as I have said, is supplemental to fiscal 1966 for procurement authorization and is directed entirely to the support of these men in this part of the world.

I would like to state at the outset that regardless of the debate that is raging in other places in the area known as Washington, D.C., one thing is crystal clear to MENDEL RIVERS, a Representative from South Carolina; namely, our soldiers, our sailors, our marines, our airmen, our Coast Guardsmen, are in southeast Asia. Most of these men are in Vietnam and, for your information, that number exceeds 250,000. They need your support, they need facilities, and weapons. The passage of this bill is your expression to your fighting men in this part of the world, mostly Vietnam, and to the American public and to the world that we intend to support our forces in every possible way.

The bill we have for consideration today is H.R. 12889 which authorizes supplemental appropriations during fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, research and development and military construction for the Armed Forces.

For my part, I do not need to know anything more than what I have just stated. Your flesh and blood are far away—today they need your support—they are dying for you and for me.

Let me describe the bill briefly for you.

The Department of Defense submitted two separate bills, one for procurement and research and development, and the other for military construction. We combined these two bills for the simple reason that they both constitute a part of the same program and it was felt that dealing with the whole matter at one time was proper for all concerned.

This bill contains authorization for appropriation as follows:

Procurement	$3,417,700,000
Research, development, test, and evaluation	151,650,000
Military construction	1,288,100,000
Total	4,857,450,000

I will draw your attention to three tables on page 5 of the report which set out, very clearly, the authorizations and appropriations for fiscal year 1966 in the first two columns and in the third column, the additions which will be made by this bill. The amounts for aircraft, missiles, and so forth, are set out in money amounts. I will not recite all of the details that appears on these three tables. It is all set out there in clear, factual fashion.

In virtually every respect this bill is exactly like those which you have considered in the past, and merely represents more of the same. There are two differences, however, that I would like to point out. First there are no naval vessels in this bill as there always have been in the regular programs; and second, for the first time the bill contains authority for tracked combat vehicles. We amended the law last year to include the requirement that these items be specifically authorized. But other than that there is nothing new.

PROCUREMENT

On page 6 of the report you will see that the Army will receive at total of $965,400,000 broken down into aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles. Each aircraft, missile, and tracked combat vehicle is named and described. For obvious reasons, numbers are not given but you may be sure that if any Member of the House wishes to have that kind of detail I will be very glad to furnish it with the understanding that it is classified material.

On page 9 of the report you will see that the Navy and Marine Corps will receive $802,900,000. This again is broken down in the same fashion—and on page 11 it will be seen that the Air Force will receive $1,649,400,000, in this case broken down only into aircraft and missiles. In all these instances each of the items is named and described.

A matter of particular note, I think, is that of the $3.4 billion representing procurement in this bill, a little over $3.1 billion is for aircraft and the reason for this is quite simple. Mr. McNamara testified that:

> Although the aircraft loss rate continues low, the rapidly increasing number of sorties is resulting in larger total losses. In 1964, we lost 38 fixed-wing aircraft and 24 helicopters to hostile action.
>
> In 1965, with both the very large increase in activity and the attacks against North Vietnam, we lost 275 fixed-wing aircraft and 76 helicopters. We anticipate that 1966 losses will be somewhat higher.
>
> A total of about $1.8 billion for the replacement of aircraft losses is included in the fiscal year 1966 supplemental. Another $168 million is included for the Army to equip new aviation units.
>
> The considerably higher rates of utilization of many types of aircraft in all the services will also increase the consumption of spares. For example, Air Force tactical aircraft in Vietnam are now flying 60 percent more hours per month than they normally do in peacetime. And you may recall that I mentioned last August, we were increasing the utilization rate of Military Airlift Command aircraft also by about 60 percent. Accordingly, we have included in the fiscal year 1966 supplemental about $1.2 billion for aircraft spares and other aircraft equipment for all the services.

I will now go to "Research and development."

The amount in this bill for research and development is very small. Normally, in the regular programs, research and development comes to almost half of the total bill. Here the sum of $151,650,000 represents only about 3 percent of the bill. The reason for this is evident in that the weapons that the men are fighting with and will fight with are the result of research and development carried on in the past. Actually the funds in this supplement will be used in every instance to accelerate development projects of particular interest to our operations in southeast Asia.

On pages 13 through 15 of the committee report there is set out considerable detail as to the research and developent programs which are contained in this bill.

Perhaps one of the most important items is a very much intensified program

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

to find a cure for a particularly virulent strain of malaria. Another important item relates to field medical treatment facilities and equipment. Others are an aircraft photo flasher system for night photography—and acceleration of the frozen blood program to provide backup for the blood bank system.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

The "Military construction" portion of the report begins on page 16. It will be seen there that the total program is $1,238,100,000. On pages 17 and 18 are set out in quite considerable detail the areas in which the construction will be carried on and the amounts involved.

It is in the military construction portion of the bill that there is the only monetary addition made by the committee. The committee added $49.7 million. This addition covers two items—the construction of a jet-capable field in Okinawa for the Marines, and ship repair facilities in the Philippines for the Navy. These were found to be very important projects which had not been included in the program but which after its submission were approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

While on the subject of "Military construction," I should point out another amendment made by the committee. This appears as subsection 401(b) on page 5 of the bill. It is also set out on page 2 of the report.

Under this amendment, the Secretary of Defense is required to furnish to the Armed Services Committees a description of each military construction project, "together with full and complete justification therefor, including a cost analysis thereof, prior to the execution of any contract for the establishment or development of a military installation or facility."

The reason for this amendment is the fact that the committee was concerned over the lack of preciseness in the "Military construction" request.

As the report states:

> While providing sufficient latitude to the Department to construct necessary facilities, the committee felt that it should receive information prior to the contract execution -

Relating to these projects.

The committee does not mean to infer by this amendment that it doubts the need for these construction projects. The committee is anxious, however, to avoid giving the Department of Defense anything like a "blank check."

Obviously it is difficult to plan construction in an area some of which is in an actual combat condition. I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that some of these facilities described on pages 17 and 18 of the report may never be built, or, if built, not in the locations which appear in the secret backup material. The progress of the war and many other considerations will dictate the actual course to be followed.

Mr. Chairman, that is the bill.

Let me repeat what I said at the outset—that while I have very strong personal feelings about the war in Vietnam and have expressed myself frequently on this subject, I feel that these considerations have very little to do with this bill and its passage.

Our men are in Vietnam. They need our support and our help. Passage of this bill is that support and that help.

Let the debate as to whether we should be in Vietnam, or how we should conduct the war in Vietnam, be carried on at another time. I will join in such debate. This is not the time for that debate. This is the time for only one thing—and that is to vote our fighting men the weapons that they need.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield just for a moment?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman for just one moment.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. This bill also includes appropriations for housing, hospitals, doctors, food, and clothing for our Armed Forces; does it not?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. This bill and the rest of the supplemental together, yes. That is absolutely right. You cannot fight a war without taking care of such necessary things as that.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, is this not a supplemental authorization bill for the fiscal year 1966?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That is right.

Mr. RYAN. Did I understand the gentleman to say that he had been assured by Secretary of Defense McNamara that our boys had everything they need and that there were no shortages?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. "Positively," I said.

Mr. RYAN. Will the gentleman explain where in this bill there is an authorization for money for clothing?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. For clothing?

Mr. RYAN. For clothing.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. For the gentleman's information, we do not authorize clothing. We authorize weapons systems, implements of war. Clothing comes under housekeeping. It is a continuing appropriation, and the Appropriations Committee has exclusive jurisdiction on that. They provide an awful lot of clothing. I know you will be delighted to hear we have all the clothing we need, and we are getting along like a million dollars.

Mr. RYAN. I thank the gentleman. May I ask another question? Where in this bill is there an authorization for money for food?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That is not in this bill.

Mr. RYAN. Then I take it the gentleman did not intend, in answering the question of the gentleman from New York [Mr. FARBSTEIN], to leave the impression that this bill authorized money for clothing and food.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. We have an Appropriations Committee that takes care of all of that.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Certainly. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. But this includes hospitals, does it not?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That is right.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. And this is made evident on page 19 of your report. Without this appropriation we could have no hospitals or the necessary money to build whatever new hopsitals are needed in Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. In southeast Asia.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. I would like to inquire of the chairman to make the record eminently clear that there are no appropriations included in this particular bill. This is an authorization bill for appropriations, and the question of the clothing will be considered in the supplemental appropriation bill which will be before the House in a week or 10 days.

There may be no clothing shortages as far as Vietnam is concerned, but I am sure that the distinguished chairman, from South Carolina, will admit that there are clothing shortages in the United States and in other sections of the Army because of the drawdown in stocks.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Let me say this: This is an authorization bill. Our committee does not authorize clothing. If the gentleman on the Appropriations Committee—and he is a distinguished member—says there are clothing shortages, this comes under his committee and I will accept that statement.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the able chairman for the splendid statement he has made and for bringing this bill to the House, and to assure him that I am wholeheartedly for this bill.

What I want to ask is this: Every time I see a picture in the paper of some American men going down a jungle trail in Vietnam, running the risk of being attacked by snipers and being ambushed and the like, I just wonder if there is not some way that the genius of our country can provide a method of ferreting out, or a method of destroying, the enemy without those men having to walk and to expose themselves on those jungle trails.

My question to the able gentleman is this: Is there any way that we can possibly provide the firepower to our men over there which will save their lives and limbs better than they are now being saved from the enemy?

Second, could we do this by increasing the amount of our research appropriation? I notice that the bill provides for the Army $27 million-plus, for the Navy $52 million-plus, and for the Air Force

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

$71 million-plus for research and development.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Right.

Mr. PEPPER. I know there are many problems, but could we possibly provide any more money for research that would, at a greater financial expense, conserve the lives of our precious men over there?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. At the moment the Defense Department tells us this is all they need, but following this up, on the 7th of March we will begin hearings on the regular 1967 authorization, and in that bill there no doubt will be more research and development authorization. No doubt some of the questions which perplex the gentleman will be answered in that bill as far as research and development is concerned.

As far as the safety of the men is concerned, we have tried every way on earth to safeguard these men. I do not like the idea of photographers following them all over the place with TV cameras, showing all kinds of things. I do not like that, but they do it. There are many things I do not like about this war, but I have to back my President, and he does the very best he can.

This is the most insidious thing we have ever gotten into. There has never been a war like this or one to compare with it. We are learning all kinds of new things.

Just the other day a friend of mine invented a light which he puts in a C–123—and you open up the bays and a very vast light comes out and lights up the whole area like a football field. They try all kinds of things that the minds of these great scientists can produce to save our men and ferret out the Vietcong. People have called me lots of things. Some have called me a hawk. No one has called me a dove. But what I am interested in is the American Eagle and keeping the American Eagle flying.

Mr. PEPPER. I remember President Roosevelt telling me during the early part of World War II, when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I we were losing a terrific amount of tonnage and lives to German submarines. The Navy decided to put a research program into effect and invited a great number of the inventors of the country to come to facilities that the Navy established for them in New London, Conn., and put each one in a little cubicle and let him go to work with his idea. He said that in 6 months' time those men had come up with the best methods that we had been able to contrive to diminish our shipping losses due to submarine warfare.

Now, all I want to say here is that I was wholeheartedly behind the able chairman and his committee and the President, but I hope, I will say, that we will tell the armed services of our country and the Department of Defense, do not spare any money in research and do not spare any money in more weapons or more firepower. You will not have any trouble with Congress giving more money for research and for more and better weapons which will save the lives of the men making this gallant fight.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I assure the gentleman from Florida that we have told the Secretary that 100 times. Every chance we have had. Every bill we have had before our committee has come out of our committee unanimously.

Now, as far as research and development is concerned, we have averaged between $6 and $7 billion per year on that. We are exploring every area we know. I do not think we have been niggardly with our funds at all. We have given them everything that they claim they need.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman yield to me?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Of course I will yield to the distinguished member of the committee.

Mr. STRATTON. Is it not true in response to the questions raised by the gentleman from Florida that the overall departmental appropriation request is also a request for very substantial amounts of ammunition to do just the job he is talking about, so that we can use our vast productive capacity and vastly superior firepower to save lives of American soldiers?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. So much so that we have opened up another ammunition plant which is now in full production.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman yield to me?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do not have much time, but I will yield to you one more time.

Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell the Committee what he expects in the way of an increase in our troop strength in South Vietnam? The chairman said earlier we have 250,000 men there. What does he expect in the next 6 months, and in the next year?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I did not say 250,000 on the mainland. I said over 250,000 in southeast Asia.

Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell us what he anticipates in the next 6 months?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Your guess could be as good as mine; but it will be sizable. It will be sizable; but your guess is as good as mine. However, I will tell you one thing: I would rather have too many than too few, and that is what we are trying to do. I know the gentleman agrees with me that we do not want to have too few, because these Communists do not frighten very easily.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may desire.

Mr. Chairman, I join with the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in urging your support of H.R. 12889. Before proceeding with my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address myself briefly to some of the questions which have just been asked, especially in reference to inventories. Now, on yesterday, when Gen. Lewis Walt appeared before the House Committee on Appropriations, I asked to have a conference with him in respect to the military situation and the inventory situation specifically under his command presently in Vietnam. He advised us that this is the third war in which he has participated and never has he found the inventory situation as good as it is presently in Vietnam. This does not mean that our inventory situation back here in the United States or in anticipation of future developments is all that we want, because as we brought out in the hearings—and it is in the published hearings presently before you—we do have shortages, including shortages of Marine clothing.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to the chairman.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. The shortages about which I was speaking were not in Vietnam. There are no shortages in Vietnam. I am sure the gentleman will agree with me on that.

Mr. BATES. Yes, indeed. That is the point I tried to establish.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LATTA. Before my question, let me say that since I have been a Member of Congress I have always supported these authorization requests and the appropriations for them. I intend to support this one. But I know there are a lot of Members of Congress who have had many, many letters from parents who have received letters from boys in South Vietnam indicating certain shortages.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to the attention of the gentleman in the well, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES], an article dated Monday, February 21, 1966, written by Mr. Hansen W. Baldwin, which goes into great detail with reference to some of the shortages which exist in Vietnam.

I know that the gentleman from Massachusetts has seen this article, but I would like to have the comments of the gentleman upon the article.

Mr. BATES. I have not only read the article, but I have also talked on the telephone personally with Mr. Baldwin. As a matter of fact, this morning at 8 o'clock. I met with the Secretary of Defense and asked him to complete the study which is now being made of Mr. Baldwin's article and to which reference has been made by the gentleman from Ohio. However, the Secretary of Defense did indicate generally—and I want to say "generally"—and the report has not been submitted to me yet—that the accusations and the charges which are made by Mr. Baldwin in his article are not accurate.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I want to thank him for following through on this matter. I know this article was very disturbing. We have had other reports which seem to verify some of the charges which have been made in this article.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to further discussion of this matter on the floor of the House as a result of the request which you have made.

Mr. BATES. I will say to the gentleman from Ohio that no one is more concerned than I am to make absolutely certain that our men have what they need in combat.

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. MINSHALL. As a member of the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, we have been holding intensive hearings for the past several days on exactly the subject about which my distinguished colleague [Mr. LATTA], and the gentleman from Massachusetts have been discussing, mainly with reference to clothing shortages. We have discussed this question with General Johnson, Chief of the Army; we have recently discussed it with General Greene and General Walt of the Marine Corps, and also the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral McDonald.

As a result of our subcommittee hearings there is no doubt in my mind or in their mind that our troops in Vietnam are currently receiving all that they presently need. I concur with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services when he says that they are getting all they need. However, what concerns General Johnson and General Greene are forecast shortages and the shortages that are presently in existence today with reference to our troops here on the homefront.

There is a definite shortage of clothing, specifically of cotton khaki pants that they are issuing to the Marine Corps. They are presently receiving only one issue of cotton khaki pants, whereas the normal issue calls for three pair. This shortage will not be relieved until late this year.

So, we cannot say that there are no shortages of clothing. There is this particular shortage, plus others, that we brought out in the hearings, and which will be made public when our hearings are published.

The Army will have adequate fatigue jackets but not enough pants in the months ahead. The Marines forecast a shortage of cotton khaki pants. This will be a funny looking Military Establishment. George Washington's army at Valley Forge may have had no shoes, but the Great Society's forces are running out of pants.

Mr. BATES. As a matter of fact, I heard about them in our own hearings.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BATES. I yield further to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LATTA. There have also been other shortages that have been brought to the attention of the Armed Services Committee in addition to clothing.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to the attention of the gentleman the testimony which appears on page 5068 of the hearings which were held by the Committee on Armed Services where General Greene was being questioned by Mr. Blandford.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Blandford asked the question:

How about 105 ammunition, proximity fuse ammunition, proximity fuses, and 8-inch howitzer ammunition? Has there been any reduction in that for practice purposes?

General Greene replied:

We have had some shortages in 105-millimeter illuminating ammunitions. I checked on that specifically when I was out this last time in South Vietnam. However, although we don't have the levels that we would like, our operations at night using this ammunition have not been restricted. We still had enough on hand. I would say that 105-millimeter illuminating would have to necessarily be used carefully in training.

Then Mr. Blandford asked the following question:

Well, actually, am I correct that there has been a reduction in the availability of this type of ammunition for training purposes?

General Greene replied:

That would depend, of course, upon the division commanders. I cannot give you the specific answer.

Then he goes on to another question which appears at the top of page 5069 to which General Greene replied:

We have had a problem there again in 4.2 illuminating projectors.

Then Mr. Blandford asked this question:

Where are the other places where we have problems?

General Greene replied:

I believe the committee in their visits and examination of this problem, as I recall, found six different types of ammunition in which there were indications of shortages. The Marine Corps has not been hampered or crippled in actual operations in South Vietnam in any of these areas.

Mr. Chairman, this is testimony which was given by General Greene before the Committee on Armed Services.

I believe we ought to admit these shortages exist and do something about them.

Mr. BATES. I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio for revealing to the House this matter which was uncovered by our Committee on Armed Services, and we certainly intend to pursue this at every opportunity.

I would just like to say to the Members generally now, if anyone has any specific items that they have reason to believe is in short supply either overseas or here, call it to our attention and we will certainly look into it and see that the situation is rectified.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I gladly yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. General Greene also said this—and we certainly do not want to cover up anything—but this is what General Greene said:

The Marine Corps has not been hampered or crippled in actual operations in South Vietnam in any of these areas.

If we find any shortages, believe you me, we certainly are going to follow through on them.

If the gentleman will yield further—right today in Washington, Lieutenant General Walt who heads the marines in the Da Nang area, said that he has never had an army of marines with better morale or better equipped. That is what he said today and he also said he has fought in three wars.

So wherever we find shortages, we will follow through on them. So I do not think we need to worry about that kind of thing in Vietnam today.

Mr. BELCHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BELCHER. This does not necessarily involve the question of shortages, but I had a complaint from the wife of a serviceman in Vietnam. She said his letter stated there were 10 of them in their outfit, I think it was in the engineers—and all their sidearms and weapons had been taken away from them. He said that four of them had been killed by snipers and they had no means of protecting themselves.

I also noticed on television, as I imagine a lot of other Members of the House did, where a lady complained that her husband had been attacked and the only thing he had to defend himself with was a knife. He had no side arm or rifle whatsoever to defend himself with. Has anything like that come to the attention of the committee?

Mr. BATES. I have heard a story such as the gentleman relates. Has the gentleman addressed any inquiry himself to the Department of Defense?

Mr. BELCHER. Yes, I have.

Mr. BATES. What was their reply?

Mr. BELCHER. They have not had time to make a reply yet.

Mr. BATES. If the gentleman will give me specific information, I will be very happy to cooperate with him. Because certainly the interest which the gentleman displays is on something that we on the committee also take very, very seriously. If there are any problems—if there are any shortages, we want to correct the situation. We do not want to hide anything under a bushel.

Mr. BELCHER. Of course, this did not involve the question of a shortage. The guns were there but they were taken away from the men and the guns were locked up.

Mr. BATES. I am not referring only to shortages. I am referring to any other kind of situation that the gentleman will give me specific information on and I will be happy to cooperate with him.

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LATTA. This is a very important matter. I think when the committee was before the Committee on Rules they asked for 3 hours and you thought that 3 would be adequate.

Mr. BATES. The gentleman is doing very well.

Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman for yielding because we did bring out something that was apparently overlooked in the Armed Services Committee. I want to commend the gentleman in the well.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

You gave assurances that you will look into these matters as they come to the attention of the Members. I, also want to commend the chairman of the committee because he has been most helpful in the past about these matters. I think in my own case when I hear from parents of servicemen in Vietnam instead of bucking these things over to the Pentagon and getting their stock reply—"We will look into it"—I will buck them over to your committee. I will get more information that way.

Mr. BATES. I shall be very, very grateful to the gentleman if he does so. As a matter of fact, yesterday afternoon someone made an inquiry of me with reference to a particular bomb. This morning I was at the Pentagon, as I indicated a few moments ago, and I asked the Secretary of Defense to get out his book. We looked specifically into that book to find out about the inventory situation that we have and as to the present usage rate on this particular bomb and what our production is going to be and what our inventory is going to be 12 months from now. So if the gentleman will give us the information to which he refers, he will be doing us a favor. We would be most happy to cooperate with him because this is our business and when we come before the House we want to indicate what the facts truly are. I must say that the gentleman has been most helpful here today.

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNGATE. I understand the gentleman is fully familiar with the article by Hanson Baldwin that appeared in the New York Times of February 21, and the committee has the problems therein mentioned under active consideration.

Mr. BATES. Yes, we have had the full discussion on that and will get full disclosure of information on those points.

Mr. HUNGATE. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, just to complete our thinking on this particular point. If this bill was before the Congress 10 years ago, not a single item in it would be considered by the Committee on Armed Services. Now why do I say that? Because years ago our committee did not take under its jurisdiction and purview missiles or airplanes. This year we are adding tracked vehicles. The only thing this committee had at one time under its jurisdiction was the question of the construction and also naval vessels, but there are no naval vessels in this particular bill. So now when we come before you, we want to make certain that as fully as possible we give you all the information to which you are entitled.

In fact, there was a time when naval vessels were provided by the Congress when we did not even have to give an authorization because there was enough authorization left over from World War II to last a thousand years.

Mr. Chairman, I agree fully with the distinguished Speaker of the House when he said that if we had had firm leadership prior to World War II, perhaps we would never have had World War II.

I believe, too, that if we had not declared that Korea was outside the defense perimeter of the United States, perhaps there would have been no Korea. But that is history. Today we are dealing with facts and not with conjecture.

As the distinguished chairman of this committee has said, our boys are now in South Vietnam. Maybe some in your family are in South Vietnam. I know that my family is represented there.

So this bill contains authorizations for appropriations for procurement, for research and development, test and evaluation, and for military construction in the amount of $4.8 billion.

We have done much in the field of research and development. This year alone we will spend $6.7 billion just in military research and development. The fantastic things that have been invented, if they could be revealed here, would give you considerable comfort. Some of these are already in the hands of our troops and more are forthcoming.

I would like to say that we do have one reservation, and that is the question of the timing of this specific legislation. Was it necessary to come here today, or could it have waited in the orderly process of things and been considered with the fiscal year 1967 bill, which we will consider on the 8th of March? That is a question. We asked for the specific facts. I must be frank and candid and say to you that the information which came to us was inconclusive. We did feel that much that is in this bill perhaps could have been deferred until the 1st of July, but we do not want to gamble. We do not want to take a chance.

Oh, I know and you know that when the President comes up here with a budget for 1967 and he can eliminate from it $12 billion, like we have in this general appropriation supplemental bill, then, of course, it looks much better as the American people review it. But from a military point of view it achieves no purpose if bookkeeping is the only purpose.

Nevertheless, we do not want to gamble. If this bill can be expedited, we want it expedited, because we want to make certain that our young men have what they need when they need it and not have too little too late.

The rapid buildup of U.S. forces in South Vietnam in the calendar year 1967 did not provide time for the advanced development of detailed plans. Many of these will be submitted as soon as the Secretary of Defense receives this information. I would not say that clairvoyance was used by the Department of Defense as to the development of programs either last year or this year. Many of the members of our own committee believed a year ago that we should have increased our production of helicopters, ammunition, and production in other fields. But it was not done at the time we recommended because it was never believed, so we were told, that this war would escalate to the degree which it has.

But as I have indicated, we are dealing with facts and not with fantasies, and we have young men there today and we must support them.

In the military construction area this bill provides for troop housing, ports, depots, hospitals, signal communications, airfields, and community facilities, not only in Vietnam, but nearby in the Philippines, in Guam, in Okinawa, Wake Island, Midway, and even in Thailand.

Some will even be built in the United States. The list appears on page 26 of the report.

As proposed originally by the Department of Defense, the language in section 401(a) of this bill was susceptible of an interpretation that it constituted an unlimited transfer of authority to the extent that the Department of Defense appropriations for personnel functions could have been used for procurement, or that procurement appropriations were authorized to be transferred to operations and maintenance-type expenditures in behalf of South Vietnam.

But our committee wisely—I believe wisely—added the words, "for their stated purposes," so that whatever we have in this bill must be used for the general purposes intended and not according to what someone might want to do regardless of the intent of Congress.

I will invite your attention to the fact that any aircraft, missile, or tracked combat vehicle for which funds are authorized in this bill can be made available to the Vietnamese or to the Koreans or to the Filipinos or to the Australians or whoever else might be engaged in combat on our side in Vietnam.

Why did we do this? The practical aspect of this is obvious. When these men are engaged in combat, that is no time to be keeping detailed accounting records.

The fact of the matter is that the U.S. Government and the people of this country must pick up the tab anyway. So let the men spend the time on defending themselves and executing the war, rather than keeping these detailed reports.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall close. I have already taken more time than I had anticipated, but the basic purpose of this bill is to support our fighting men, as well as our friendly allies, who are in Vietnam now fighting for the objectives of freedom.

There might be all kinds of debate that could extend day after day, as it has in the other body, as to whether we are bombing enough, or just right, or too little, or whether we should get out of South Vietnam altogether. But while we are discussing this, time is moving on, and it takes a long time for many of these implements of war to be manufactured.

Our forces require essential supplies, equipment, and facilities, to enable them to accomplish the job which they have been sent over there by us to do. I advocate that all members of this committee, regardless of what disposition they might have in respect to foreign policy, to support this bill and to support our men that we have sent 10,000 miles away to fight in the cause of freedom.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished majority leader [Mr. ALBERT].

(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the distinguished chairman of this committee and the distinguished ranking member, both of whom have adequately explained the details of this bill. I join them in urging the prompt adoption of this measure.

The bill which is now before this House, its background and its implications, have been considered with all the wisdom and experience we can bring to bear. It has been referred from committee with a strong endorsement which has taken into account every pertinent circumstance and consideration. It has been examined and debated, and extensive public discussion has taken place. I believe that the time for debate is over and the time to pass this bill is at hand. What is needed now is prompt and overwhelming approval of the present bill to demonstrate to those who oppose us that there is no division in the Congress or among the American people regarding support for our troops in Vietnam.

I think recent discussions have made our goals in Vietnam crystal clear. As the President stated on February 23:

> Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the success of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is to prevent the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam.

The Secretary of State wisely pointed out on February 18:

> We are in Vietnam because the issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because the outcome of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in which we and our children will live.

Now, I do not intend to try the patience of my colleagues by repeating on this occasion all the reasoning which has led to the conclusion that we must stand by the people of South Vietnam. Of course the task which faces us is not an easy one. Of course it is not without risks, grave risks. Of course, we cannot foretell how long it will be before an obdurate aggressor will be brought to his senses. But the difficulty of the task is not the criterion. This country was born under a resolution which called for liberty or death.

Our men are in Vietnam now, they have undertaken the brave struggle with courage and determination. They are not going to be abandoned by this House at this hour. We are standing and they are fighting for what we believe is the right war in the right place and at the right time.

Surely we are under no illusions about the nature of the war we are fighting or the goals of those who have provoked it. This is no struggle for liberation. This is a part of an international conspiracy aimed at all southeast Asia. This is not a civil war. It is an invasion, organized, sponsored and led from Hanoi. The hardened international conspirators behind this invasion have already made it clear that Thailand is the next target in southeast Asia while the free lands of Latin America and Africa should not be neglected.

The horrors which have been visited upon the people of South Vietnam as a result of these decisions are well known to us. Our hearts go out to them in their suffering, but also our admiration for the determination with which they have resisted the onslaught. I am proud that this country has, in consonance with our cherished traditions, lived up to its promises made to come to the assistance of the South Vietnamese.

I hope that any doubts about whether we have a legitimate commitment to South Vietnam have been laid to rest. Our vital interests are involved in the struggle of the people of South Vietnam to build a new society according to their own desires, free from Communist aggression. Our commitment to Vietnam has been expressed since 1954 in congressional resolutions and acts, Presidential declarations, bilateral assistance agreements, and the SEATO treaty, as well as in the joint resolution of August 7, 1964. The Congress has supported this commitment at every stage of the way. The vote we ask on the bill before us today will be a further expression of support for that commitment. The word of the United States is at stake here, and if the word of the United States is not good everywhere, it will not be good anywhere. If we fail in our commitments at one time how can friend or foe ever depend on our commitments at anytime.

That the Communist north might attempt to take over South Vietnam by subversion or aggression was clear from the moment the Geneva agreements were signed in 1954. Indeed, it is a fact accepted even by the few scholars expert on Vietnam who criticize aspects of our policy, that the Communists violated the Geneva agreements before the ink was dry on them. They did this primarily by leaving their agents and caches of arms behind in the south, thus failing to regroup to the north as agreed, with a view to the battle they foresaw even then. The United States declared formally at Geneva that we "would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

In October 1954, President Eisenhower undertook a program of direct assistance to help South Vietnam become "capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." And the United States joined with its allies in the SEATO Treaty, which was made applicable to South Vietnam by a special protocol. On May 11, 1957, Presidents Eisenhower and Diem issued a joint statement which included the following language:

> Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared:

> The United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States can render.

And on December 14 that year, replying to President Diem's appeal for additional support to meet the growing effort of the north, President Kennedy reaffirmed that the United States was "prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect its people and to preserve its independence."

President Johnson has reaffirmed these commitments many times, and on August 7, 1964, the joint resolution of the Congress, adopted by a vote of 504 to 2, stated inter alia, as follows:

> The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and in accordance with its obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member of protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

This resolution is still on the books.

This resolution is the law of the land.

The legality of the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam is not subject to question. As my colleagues surely know the American Bar Association's House of Delegates has voted unanimously on this question, to uphold the only reasonable view possible; namely, that our action concords with the Constitution, the United Nations Charter, and the SEATO Treaty. Specifically, the charter recognizes the right of individual and collective self-defense, a right inherent under international law. And the applicability of the SEATO Treaty under which the pertinent obligations are individual and collective, was definitively spelled out by the Secretary of State in his statement of February 18.

At this late stage can there be any doubt who started the war in South Vietnam or who provoked its escalation? It is crystal clear that the actions of the United States have constituted a measured response to escalation by North Vietnam. Having laid the groundwork for aggression as early as 1954, the Communists hoped to achieve their conquest through rigged unification elections in 1956. However, the South refused to be taken in this way, insisting that the voters' freedom to vote would have to be supervised and guaranteed by an adequate and impartial system of supervision. The north thereafter began gradually to infiltrate native South Vietnamese trained in guerrilla warfare, with the result that from 1957 to 1959 over 1,000 civilians were assassinated or kidnapped by the Vietcong. From 1959 through 1961 Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks were intensified. In 1961, in response to President Diem's request, the small American military mission was increased in order to add advisory func-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

tions to its former logistical and support functions. North Vietnam between 1962 and 1964 greatly increased its infiltration of military personnel, political cadres and equipment, and the number of American military advisers had to grow. By early 1965, Vietcong attacks reached intensive levels, and as a result we responded with air attacks against the north and the introduction of combat personnel. Regular units of the North Vietnamese military forces were introduced from December 1964, and this infiltration has continued to grow.

Does any one doubt that the so-called National Liberation Front of South Vietnam is an artificial creation of Hanoi. This apparatus was created in late 1960 in Hanoi, indeed the names of the alleged leaders were not even disclosed until spring of 1962. When these names finally were released, these purported leaders were unknown to the people of South Vietnam, in fact Vietcong prisoners to this day reveal a singular unawareness of the names of these so-called leaders. An attempt has been intensified to create the impression that the Vietcong front is composed of independent South Vietnamese groups as well as Communists, and that it represents the people of South Vietnam. However, the flow of refugees away from Communist areas, the Vietcong's ever increasing reliance on terror, the morale of the South Vietnamese fighting forces, and the lack of support by legitimate South Vietnamese organizations give the lie to these claims. The Vietcong have never been able to gain any kind of a foothold in South Vietnamese political parties, labor unions, refugee groups, regional organizations or churches, and South Vietnamese politicians who have opposed particular governments in Saigon have never defected to the Vietcong.

The Vietcong's attempts to call general strikes have failed, and their best efforts to prevent the people from voting in last year's provincial and municipal council elections also failed. People outside Vietnam are in many cases regrettably ready to believe the fiction that the Vietcong represent an indigenous political movement, perhaps because this would make our own withdrawal easier to bring about, but the people of South Vietnam are not duped by these pretensions. The Vietcong are an arm of Hanoi, and the South Vietnamese know this.

In certain quarters we still hear the call for negotiation, for peaceful settlement. Does any one at this stage doubt the sincerity and perseverance of the United States in seeking a peaceful solution in South Vietnam? Again and again, using every channel available, the United States has invited Hanoi to meet for discussions without the imposition of any conditions whatsoever. Every suggestion made has been considered and, where possible, acted upon by the United States. At considerable military cost, the air attacks against the former sanctuary of North Vietnam were shut off for over a month.

Hanoi, however, has remained obstinate and vitriolic about these negotiation efforts, rejecting them out of hand insisting upon prior acceptance of its own conditions. As the Members of this House know, the chief stumbling block remains Hanoi's insistence upon recognition of the so-called National Liberation Front as the sole, genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. Hanoi has likewise insisted upon acceptance of this front's program, that is, upon handing over South Vietnam to Hanoi.

I do not say that we should give up our attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam. Indeed, we must continue to persevere in these efforts. But I do believe that we must not, we cannot betray our commitments to the South Vietnamese people. This Nation has the resources and the will to win in South Vietnam, and win we shall. Our objectives are limited and reasonable. They boil down to making North Vietnam back off from its aggression in South Vietnam. I for one am not going to be frightened from this course by those who raise the specter of a possible war with Communist China. We seek no such confrontation with Red China, and our limited objectives should be clear to Peiping's leaders. At the same time, we possess the awesome power necessary to such a confrontation, should the Chinese Communists indulge in suicidal rashness. The central point is that we must persist in the struggle to thwart the ambitions of Hanoi backed by Peiping, so that, pacification achieved, the noble, revolutionary programs which were the subject matter of the Honolulu Conference can proceed with greater vigor—and the people of South Vietnam can live in peace.

The issues are clear, Mr. Speaker. Our commitments and our obligations are clear. Our duty is clear. Our troops and the civilian representatives who are helping the South Vietnamese are doing their duty. The people of this country will not shirk their duty. And just as surely, this House will not shirk its duty. Our military have carefully considered what they need to carry on the fight, and the bill which is before us is a request for the funds necessary to provide for these needs. Let us, then, without further prolonging discussion, without feeding the hopes of the enemy that he can win in Washington what he cannot win on the batlefield, proceed to enact this bill. Our fighting men deserve this vote of confidence, immediately, overwhelmingly, and without further ado.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BRAY].

(Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding to me at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill, but I do so with several qualms. My first qualm is that the President seems to want to keep this war on an unadmitted "no win, no lose" middle track. We are not pulling back to enclaves and we are not pushing ahead to military success. This kind of policy is costly—much too costly. I will not vote to fund a war that throws men into a meat-grinder and money into a pool of quicksand. I want to see us switch to military and diplomatic tactics aimed at putting us in a position to negotiate a successful conclusion to this war before we have spent tens of thousands of lives and tens of billions of dollars.

To move into this particular legislation, I would like to say I am not surprised that the Armed Services Committee had to make provision for additional funds for Navy construction in the Far East. Secretary McNamara has been extremely careless during the last few years in assessing American maritime and naval needs. He has grossly underestimated our civilian and military seapower needs in the Far East. Our merchant marine has been left to stagnate. Our Navy has also been neglected—as witness the fact that it was up to the Armed Services Committee to provide for Navy construction needs in the Far East. I think the Secretary's lack of awareness of seapower and water transport has been costly to our war effort. From Vietnam to Brooklyn Navy Yard, Secretary McNamara has done too little, too late.

I would like to say, frankly, that I am worried about American maritime power. Secretary McNamara decided some time ago that Vietnam could be supplied by airlift, and he neglected the merchant marine. Now the Russians are building a merchant marine that is planned to make our merchant marine look like a tugboat fleet. The British have said that our merchant marine is so old and shoddy it can for the most part be insured only at a premium—and this could force many of our ships off the sea. I would have thought that the British would be content with bringing supplies to North Vietnam. Evidently they want to get the profits out of supplying both sides in this war.

In short, the administration has not shown any foresight in planning the needs of our Navy or merchant marine. I hope that this carelessness is over and done with. There is only one area in which this administration has anticipated seapower needs before they developed. I have read recently that our Potomac fleet is being reactivated. Evidently the President has determined that our budget is so well balanced that the Presidential yacht can be brought out of mothballs—but we cannot afford Brooklyn Navy Yard.

I am also disturbed that much of the supplemental appropriation before us here today really belongs in the 1967 budget, but has been moved up to get it out of the fiscal 1967 budget to make room for wasteful spending programs in next year's budget. I do not think a supplemental appropriation should serve this purpose.

I support this bill as a military spending bill necessary to support troops in the field, but in many ways it disturbs me. Its disturbs me if it has any connotation as being a mandate for escalation. It disturbs me that votes for this

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

authorization may be construed as support of administration policy—my vote is not a vote in support of administration policy, my vote is rather a vote in support of American troops. I would also like to say that my vote here today is not a vote for the budget gimmick aspect of this bill. I am starting to feel that everything that comes before us these days has a budget gimmick in it.

I am getting tired of the President's little devices for getting expenditures out of the fiscal 1967 budget and getting receipts into it. I am getting tired of his foreign and Vietnamese policies. We are pursuing policies at home and abroad that would not convince a child, no less Ho Chi Minh, that we have any long-range fortitude. We are pursuing wasteful programs at home and absurd programs abroad. We are giving our allies aid while they give Ho Chi Minh trade. We are stationing troops in Europe to protect Europeans who thumb their noses at our war effort because they think that any nation pursuing such shapeless and soggy policies must be in water over its head.

I am worried about the President's policies. There is too much blood and too little belt-tightening. I favor a tough policy, but toughness is not optimistic, extravagant, and malcoordinated sacrifice for insufficiently defined objectives. Toughness is a stern, calculated unwavering pursuit of reasonable and well-defined goals. This is not a definition of administration policy.

The policies of this administration are dangerous because they are not coming to grips with diplomatic reality as regards our allies and military reality with respect to Vietnam. The administration's glittering generalities and optimism have built the American people up for a letdown if we cannot win a reasonable settlement at a reasonable cost. The potential backfire of this secrecy, optimism and misrepresentation would cheer Hanoi more than all the dissent in these United States. It is constructive dissent that can head off the backfire.

My vote is for our soldiers, and for their splendid endurance in the face of this nerve-shattering war. I do not support the way in which the administration is conducting our overall cold war policy.

I would also like to point out a way in which we can cut military expenditures to make up for the money we are voting today. We can begin to withdraw some of the 318,000 troops we have in Europe to protect the allies who do not support us. Three weeks ago, I introduced a resolution, House Resolution 728, to call on the President to begin withdrawing troops. Today's expenditure authorization makes my budget-cutting resolution more important. I urge this House to consider House Resolution 728, and I am putting its text and other information in the Appendix today.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, we have heard from many that we should not be in Vietnam. I do not care to discuss that matter at this time, because it is a moot question. It is a condition, not a theory that confronts us. We are in Vietnam. Several hundred thousand troops, sailors, and airmen are there engaged in as vicious war as anyone has participated in during the history of this country. We are suffering heavy losses. The situation is very precarious.

So, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this bill today is to provide the proper weapons and supplies for servicemen who are in Vietnam. The weapons and supplies called for in this legislation are necessary.

After all, Mr. Chairman, we only have two alternatives before us in southeast Asia. We are in Vietnam in great force, and the enemy has refused to even talk about peace. So one alternative is to surrender. That would make the United States the paper tiger of our time, and it would also result in turning over all of southeast Asia to the Communists. The ultimate results of such action on our part is horrible to even contemplate.

Mr. Chairman, we have another alternative—an alternative which the appeasers ignore. That alternative is to win, and that is what this legislation is designed to help us accomplish.

Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that the United States has been bemeaned and cursed and attacked at home and abroad—and I especially refer to those attacks at home with reference to the demonstrations which are designed to do everything they can to defeat the United States—despite this fact the United States is still the "Real McCoy." Despite all of the anvil choruses denouncing the United States and demanding that we surrender, the fact of the matter is that we are still there, and do not plan to surrender until peace is secured. Also, despite the fact that we have made many, many errors—no question about that—in our military planning, and timing, I have never yet seen and I do not believe anyone has ever seen American troops any braver, more dedicated, and more patriotic than those which are participating in the conflict in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I have been over there several times, and I have talked to many of our American troops. I want to say that at no time have I found one man who was not proud that he was an American and proud of the job he was doing. They did ask the question as to why we did not try to win. They asked the question as to why Americans were demonstrating against their country. They could not understand with all that America means to the world, all of the greatness of America; they could not understand why our own people would bitterly attack America for its effort unselfishly being made in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I heard that question raised many times. I went to the hospitals and talked with dozens of young men and boys there. I talked to men who had an arm off or a leg off. At no time did I hear one man complain. He was proud he was an American.

Mr. Chairman, the only questions they were asking were what are we doing to win on the homefront, and why these anti-American demonstrations are taking place in America.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the GI in Vietnam has only one thing in his mind; that is, that the United States may win, and I deeply hope that in some way these wounded American patriots can transfer that patriotism; that same will to win to the homefront.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FARBSTEIN].

(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, in the past, I have expressed reservation about some of the administration's actions in Vietnam. Recently, I joined a number of other Representatives in urging the President, among other things, to deescalate our military efforts in Vietnam as a further effort to bring the war from the battlefield to the conference table. I still feel no good can come from further escalation and do not wish this vote to be considered otherwise. I desire to create a climate leading to the conference table.

Today we are faced with the task of voting on an appropriation for $4.8 billion for Vietnam. Each Member must do some soul searching before casting his vote. I, for one, have carefully reviewed my predilections and balanced them with the Nation's well-being.

American boys are committing their lives and honor to this fight in the Far East. These young men must not be deprived of equipment, necessary hospitals, medical treatment, essential supplies, and helicopters needed to help them survive in this jungle war. The Congress, regardless of any reservations and unanswered questions on administration policy, must not fail to grant the funds to supply these brave men. I do not desire to be in the position of turning my back on our young men who are presently sacrificing their lives in Vietnam.

On the scale, I find I must vote in favor of the appropriation.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, the hearings that preceded the approval of H.R. 12889 by the Armed Services Committee represented a very earnest effort by our members to determine the urgent needs of our military and to support them by this bill. We are aware of the scope of our involvement in southeast Asia and wish to provide what is required to achieve victory at the earliest possible time.

It is apparent that as yet our full military capabilities have not been employed in Vietnam nor have we followed the strategy that full military considerations would dictate. We trust that our actions are understood to reflect our desire to resolve the differences by peaceful means. However, there is a real danger that our enemies will exploit our restraint through propaganda designed to create the impression we are losing the war, know we cannot win, and are plagued by disunity on the homefront. Certain events and actions might tend to give credence to such claims but our debate here today is not one of them.

We are here attesting that we are determined to win and will meet the needs of our forces in their effort to do so. We

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

on the committee have asked our service chiefs and department heads to tell us what they required and by this legislation we are seeking to meet their needs in full.

I have been disturbed that certain items have been transferred from the fiscal 1967 program without any real assurance that procurement will be so accelerated that inclusion in this bill is necessary. To the extent such technique is employed, it does not have my approval. However, I have found it difficult to remove this criticism without in some way interfering with sound objectives. Therefore, I rely upon the good faith which must be implicit in the underlying request.

Another important element in this legislation is the provision for military construction totaling over $1¼ billion. Our involvement in southeast Asia necessitates prompt action to provide needed facilities in support of supply, housing and hospital operations. Although many of the items have been specified, the bill makes available to the Secretary of Defense an additional $200 million for expeditious accomplishment of emergency contruction needed to meet any crisis which might develop. It is proposed that this authority will be fully funded.

This bill will appeal to all as a timely, and we hope adequate, response to needs paramount in our thinking. We trust none shall misread our intent. Our determination to achieve our valid objectives in Vietnam is clear and in this spirit we support H.R. 12889.

The action we take today will have an impact on our fighting men. Too frequently the headlines suggest confusion or division on the home front. This is detrimental to their morale and makes their task more difficult. We can be sure that our support of this measure will furnish unmistakable evidence that this House will respond to their needs promptly and completely.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It is my impression and the impression, I believe, of others that the French lost the war over there not on the battlefield but in Paris. Would the gentleman agree with that?

Mr. PIRNIE. There is reason to believe that is true. But we certainly have something more working in our favor as compared with the French.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I certainly hope that is true. But the French soldiers over there were left with nothing to fight with because of decisions resulting from agitation and dissent in their capital city of Paris. Is that not true and is it not so that that resulted in their defeat?

Mr. PIRNIE. I hope that history will not repeat itself insofar as our effort and our operations are concerned.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. We must give our fighting men every support on the battlefield and I commend the gentleman on his statement and certainly agree with him.

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman.

(Mr. PIRNIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY].

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in my mind that this bill is essential to the support of all of our forces in Vietnam.

I have visited Vietnam in the recent past and have seen the construction at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay and at a number of other locations. I was very pleased by the construction activities that I saw. In fact, I made particular note of my feelings in this regard when Defense Department construction witnesses were before the committee.

This is not to say that I am completely happy about the form of this present bill.

The bill authorizes construction in a number of different areas as will be seen from pages 17 and 18 of the report. There is construction in the Philippines, Guam, at Midway and Wake Islands and about $63 million worth of construction right here in the United States. And, incidentally, that U.S. construction is set out by State and installation on page 26 of the report.

The majority of the construction in this bill, over $736 million worth, is in Vietnam itself. The construction program involves almost every type from training facilities to ammunition storage. Some of it is for the Navy, some of it is for the Air Force and the largest part, some $407 million, is for the Army.

We have a lot of people in Vietnam and maybe we will have more in the not too distant future. These people have to have, in great part, much the same kind of facilities that they would have to have here in the United States. They have to have barracks, hospitals, airfields, fuel and ammunition storage, and every other kind of facility which is a normal part of a military operation. I guess food and weapons come first in priority, but physical facilities such as I have named run a very close second. And we have got to provide them.

Of course, there are special problems involved in construction in a place like Vietnam. Vietnam is an undeveloped country, and any kind of logistic support is difficult.

Right now, there is only one major port, Saigon. Transportation within the country is practically nonexistent. Simply stated, there was nothing in Vietnam for us to start with as there would be in a developed country. We have to provide everything ourselves. We have to provide port and warehouse facilities. We have to construct roads, and all of this has to be done under the most difficult circumstances and, obviously, at costs that are much greater than they would be here in the United States.

Notwithstanding a full appreciation of these difficulties, I think I should say, as I mentioned a moment ago, that I was not at all pleased with the way the Department presented the construction program for this bill. I am against any kind of blank check to the Department of Defense. And I am not alone in this. Many members of the committee feel the same way. But that is the kind of program that was handed to us in committee. I tried as hard as I could to keep some congressional control, realizing the difficulty in predetermining exactly what was going to be built where, and how much it was going to cost. I know that General Westmoreland needs to have a good bit of flexibility. I know he cannot predict the exact course of this war and for this very reason he cannot predict exactly where he is going to need a particular facility or the exact cost of it.

Notwithstanding these understandable difficulties, the Congress, in my mind, has a responsibility to see to it that it keeps itself informed as to just how our funds are being spent.

It was with this in mind that I offered an amendment in committee which now appears as section 401(b) of the bill. The department has contended that this language is too rigid—that it will cause delays. I do not think the problem is as great as they contend. But anyway we have agreed on substitute language which I think will serve the purposes I had in mind about as well as the original language.

The new language which is in the form of a committee amendment and will be offered by your chairman reads as follows:

> The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a description of all construction projects, including cost estimates and periodic reports, made available to the Secretary of Defense simultaneously with the receipt of such information from the persons responsible for the construction of such projects in support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam. Whenever such construction projects, involving $1,000,000 or more, are performed by private contractors, the Secretary of Defense or his representative in Vietnam shall report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the name or names of such private contractors. The amounts involved in each contract a copy of the report in support of each progress payment, and a complete report prior to final payment.

The new language still does not provide an ideal situation but it will enable us to keep our finger on the construction program.

I want to stress that I have no doubt as to actual need for this construction, but I want to know and I think that you and I have a right to know just what is being done and how it is being done.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the pending bill, H.R. 12889, authorizing appropriations for equipment, materiel, construction, and other purposes in support, primarily, of our effort in Vietnam.

Our fighting men are engaged in one of the bloodiest, dirtiest, most brutal conflicts ever witnessed. It is the responsibility of this Congress to provide full support promptly for all equipment, materiel, and facilities which will aid in saving the lives of our fighting men and hasten a successful conclusion of our effort in Vietnam.

I strongly endorse this legislation for weapons procurement and other purposes in full support of our commitment

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

in Vietnam, Just as I voted for the recently adopted supplemental authorization for economic aid and assistance. As I have previously stated, the military effort and the economic effort in Vietnam are inseparable policy of the United States in dealing with the problem of Vietnam and southeast Asia.

I also support this resolution as a logical supplement of the policy decision made by the Congress in 1964 in the adoption of House Joint Resolution 1145, which authorized the President to take all necessary steps including the use of armed forces, since we regard as vital to our national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Vietnam and in southeast Asia.

A vote for this legislation today is a vote to support our fighting forces, a vote to support previously adopted congressional policy, and support for the President of the United States and the policies of this country in the critical conflict in Vietnam. Some might have doubts; others might have reservations; we may debate our respective positions; but support of this legislation is support for the policy of President Johnson. We ought to overwhelmingly support this legislation because it is the right thing to do and the only thing to do.

I congratulate the distinguished chairman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], and the members of the Armed Services Committee who have brought this legislation to the floor. They have given it the most thorough consideration, and yet have acted expeditiously on a matter of the most urgent need. The whole question of Vietnam has been discussed, reviewed, and debated very thoroughly in the halls of this Congress. On the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, we have been meeting and holding hearings on this subject almost daily since we reconvened this year. Both in subcommittee and full committee, we will, as other legislation comes before us, particularly the foreign aid authorization bill, debate Vietnam and other world issues for many weeks and months during the balance of this session. There have been discussions and debate on previous days on this floor just as there is today. Everyone has had ample opportunity to project his viewpoint, to criticize, to support, or to say what he has to say on behalf of himself and his constituents.

Notwithstanding voices of dissent, and I do not discourage proper dissent, it is clear that by vote after vote in this body, the overwhelming number of representatives of the people of this country, in carrying out the desires of their constituents, have time and again supported the President of the United States and the policies of this country as they apply to Vietnam.

I also suport this resolution because I am opposed to unilateral withdrawal by the United States from Vietnam. Such a course of action is unthinkable surrender, and would accomplish nothing, while its results would be disastrous. There are those who maintain that we have no business in Vietnam at all. I disagree with this viewpoint because we Americans have learned the bitter lessons of two world wars when aggression is allowed to succeed. Aggression under any name, technique, or strategy must not succeed. Nevertheless in determining our policy course and in support of this legislation whether the United States should be in Vietnam is almost moot. We must face the facts of life as they are.

The fact is that the United States is committed in Vietnam in principle, in manpower, and in materiel. We are committed by treaty, the pledges of three Presidents of the United States, a joint resolution of the Congress, and other declarations. We have approximately 250,000 men in southeast Asia, and the prospects seem apparent that we may have 400,000 or more, if necessary. By way of comparison I note that at the peak of the conflict in Korea we had 327,000 men there. Our expenditures for Vietnam are at the rate of $2½ billion a year and climbing steadily. With these facts, I find very little comfort or logic in the argument which alleges that the United States should not be in Vietnam for political reasons, military reasons, moral and humanitarian reasons, or that the United States is there illegally; or that the United States should not be there because this is a Vietnamese problem; an Asian problem; a problem for the United Nations; or a problem of someone else.

Another blunt fact is that there is no doubt in my mind that South Vietnam is and has been fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. Vietcong, National Liberation Front, or any other group of alleged or real indigenous dissent to the contrary, the fact remains that there is a determined aggressive and violent campaign to take over the government and the people of South Vietnam. General Giap, leader of the North Vietnamese Army recently said:

> If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome then it can be defeated everywhere in the world.

In other words, if the United States wins in Vietnam, we will have effectively destroyed the new technique of aggression, the so-called wars of national liberation. Vietnam therefore is a big test of the Communist strategy of aggression.

The United States has in vain sought to substitute words for bullets. We have talked to every nation in the world; we have gone to the United Nations; we have temporarily ceased bombings; we have made it clear that we do not intend to use more force than is necessary; and yet—we have had no favorable response from the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the Red Chinese, or anybody else. The reason it seems to me that we have had no response is that the enemy thinks that the United States and its allies will tire of this fight and that they, the enemy, therefore can win it.

It seems to me that we cannot fail or unilaterally pull out of South Vietnam without dire consequences.

The people of South Vietnam are fighting for self-determination, a principle we strongly believe in. Therefore, the South Vietnamese ought to have that right without any infringement or interference by the North Vietnamese, the Red Chinese, or anybody else.

By our action here today we will make it clear to the world that the majority of Americans support our strong military help to the people of South Vietnam to resist subversion and foreign military intervention plotted, directed, and supplied from the north; and make sure that the Communist doctrines of guerrilla warfare and wars of national liberation will not succeed against the determined people with firm allies.

We seek an end of the war by negotiation or other honorable means not in conflict with our obligations. I support our efforts to do so. I also support the purpose of moving on as rapidly as possible with the more constructive task of laying foundations for a better future for all the people of southeast Asia.

But our fighting men know why they are fighting in South Vietnam and they need our support. U.S. Army Capt. James Spruill, who was killed in Vietnam just last April, recorded his own conviction on Vietnam in simple and eloquent words in one of his letters. I quote a passage:

> Above all, this is a war of mind and spirit. And it is a war which can be won no matter what present circumstances are. For us to despair would be a great victory for the enemy. We must stand strong and unafraid and give heart to an embattled and confused people. This cannot be done if America loses heart. At the moment my heart is big enough to sustain those around me. Please don't let them back where you are sell me down the river with talk of despair and defeat. Talk instead of steadfastness, loyalty, and victory—for we must and we can win here. There is no backing out of Vietnam, for it will follow us everywhere we go. We have drawn the line here and the America we all know and love best is not one to back away.

Mr. Chairman, I urge unanimous approval of this vital Presidential request, because the United States must persevere.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be announced as for the $4.8 billion supplemental appropriation for Vietnam, although I have opposed and will continue to oppose the policies that have made this appropriation necessary. I support the appropriation because our men in Vietnam are the victims of that policy and they must have the support they need.

I believe that the President sincerely wants peace, but I also believe that peace is unattainable unless the assumptions upon which our current Far Eastern policy is based are drastically changed. Specifically, if we continue to treat every Chinese move as a major threat to world peace, our panic policies will serve to translate that potential into action which will endanger not only Asia, but the entire world.

There is evidence that China, despite her bellicose statements and her harsh and cruel internal life, is cautious in deed if not in word. It is clear that she has a paranoid fear of being attacked and

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

this fear can only be intensified by U.S. efforts to encircle China. The Chinese have developed a nuclear capability that may soon be operational. Therefore, China must begin to share—along with the other great powers—the responsibility of keeping the peace and protecting the integrity of other nations.

Our success in containing Russian expansion since World War II is insufficient argument for applying exactly the same policy in Asia. We have forgotten that that policy of containment was established among nations sharing our traditions and values, who had sufficient wealth and wisdom to maintain their own independence, and who had a democratic foundation to sustain the ideals that we were defending. But we cannot defend freedom and democracy in southeast Asia the same way we did in Europe precisely because Asia is not Europe. Much of southeast Asia is anti-Chinese; but, because of its immediate colonialist background, it is also anti-Western—perhaps more so.

Unfortunately, the people of southeast Asia do not yet have the institutions, the training or the leadership to make Western democracy work—no matter how much we insist and no matter how much we help. But, they do not want to be pawns in a forever shifting cold war. They want more than anything else to be left alone—left alone by the Chinese and, more importantly, by us. They want no entangling alliance, no binding treaties, and, no depreciation of their already meager resources through war.

It would appear that a sound Asia policy would be to foster the neutrality of southeast Asia and do all we can to help bring China into the community of nations so that her fears of the West, and of the United States particularly, could be brought to the level of rational discussion.

This cannot be done so long as we are forcing her hand through attempting to beat North Vietnam into diplomatic submission. This can only be done through the relaxation of tensions in southeast Asia, through a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and through the peaceful and faithful implementation of such a settlement.

We must, I believe, be ready to sit with the Vietcong at the conference table and to allow them participation in the future political life of South Vietnam. And we must stop the bombing of North Vietnam lest we draw in China and destroy hope for peace in that region of the world.

I anounce myself as for this measure because I don't want to see our boys die in the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place for lack of domestic support. But I would hope that our efforts for peace in southeast Asia would be intensified to end not only that war but also the threat of world war III.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT].

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I should like now to discuss the Army's fiscal year 1966 supplemental program for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles, for which authorization is requested under the provisions of section 412b, Public Law 86-149, as amended.

This program has as its principal objective the availability of military hardware to equip the Army. Because of the expansion of the Army's operations in Vietnam during the past year, equipment shortfalls will occur unless procurement actions are continued in several commodity areas.

The supplemental request reflects Army plans to make heavy current-year investments, especially in long leadtime items, to sustain our buildup in southeast Asia, to permit orderly expansion of the Army to authorized force levels, and to replenish inventories reduced by drawdowns resulting from increased combat consumption or new unit activations.

Authorization is requested, under the fiscal year 1966 PEMA, supplemental budget submission, for $825.6 million for aircraft and aircraft spares and repair parts; $64.0 million for missiles and missile spares and repair parts, and $75.8 million for tracked combat vehicles. This is the first time that tracked combat vehicles have been included as a separate budget activity, and the first time for which special congressional authorization has been required.

AIRCRAFT

The budget figure of $825.6 million for aircraft and aircraft spares and repair parts represents approximately 34 percent—slightly more than one-third—of the total PEMA request of $2,465 million. The aircraft category is second only to the ammunition category in projected dollar outlay, and reflects the continued emphasis on the role of Army aircraft in support of both combat and logistical operations in Vietnam.

Funds budgeted under the fiscal year 1966 supplemental estimate will permit inventory add-ons to aircraft which are urgently needed to enhance combat capabilities in Vietnam, assist in meeting deployment schedules, and pay back, with preferred items, drawdowns from reserve assets.

Additional buys of the CH-47A cargo transport helicopter—Chinook—and UH-1B/D tactical utility helicopter—Iroquois—are projected. These are the workhorses of Army air operations in Vietnam. The Army also plans to finance the initial PEMA procurement of the CH-54A heavy lift helicopter—Flying Crane—and to expedite procurement of the OH-6A observation helicopter—Pawnee—to replace several marginally adequate aircraft types currently in use in Vietnam. Additional procurements of helicopter trainers and fixed-wing surveillance aircraft are also evisioned.

Other costs relate to the modification or retrofit of in-service aircraft, $16.6 million; ground and support equipment, $16 million; component improvement, $2.1 million; production base support, $2.2 million, and first destination transportation, $0.2 million. Included is $220.9 million for accelerated requirements of aircraft spares and repair parts.

MISSILES

The $64 million estimate for missiles and missile spares and repair parts represents 2.6 percent of the total PEMA submission. The projected funding is to cover costs of replacing Hawk air defense equipment connected with southeast Asia deployments and for providing similar equipment to support new unit activations. No new missiles are included. The estimate for missile spares and repair parts is $28.5 million.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles the supplemental request comprises approximately 3 percent of the overall PEMA total. Estimated costs, in almost all cases, are related to the replacement of combat losses or the equipping of new units. Approximately $22.8 million is projected for add-ons of self-propelled artillery and mortar carriers, to include the 155 millimeter medium howitzer, M109; the 8-inch heavy howitzer; M110; the 175 millimeter field artillery gun, M107, and the 81 and 107 millimeter mortar carriers, M125A1 and M106A1. Some $9 million is included for additional buys of the full-tracked cargo carrier, M548; the command post carrier, M577A1, and the light armored recovery vehicle, M578. A total of $44 million is also budgeted for repair parts and support materiel.

Mr. Chairman, I support the unanimous recommendation of the House Armed Services Committee that the Army's fiscal year 66 supplemental request for missiles, aircraft, and tracked combat vehicles be approved and I recommend its favorable consideration by this body.

(Mr. HÉBERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] such time as he may consume.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this legislation and its implications of backing the President in his efforts to bring about world peace in our time and security and freedom throughout the world.

Mr. Chairman, this bill is a carefully drafted piece of legislation and should have the support of every Member of Congress. It will provide the tools now necessary to pursue our objectives in South Vietnam. I am happy to support the President and the troops 100 percent in this noble effort to preserve freedom and stop aggression.

Our President has said:

To know war is to know that there is still madness in this world.

The truth of this is borne out in South Vietnam. There we are vigorously responding to the requests of the local government to assist in preserving the independence of that tiny nation.

In so doing we are upholding the nonaggression and freedom-seeking objectives of the southeast Asia collective defense treaty, approved by the overwhelming vote of our Senate, 82 to 1. We are also following the overwhelmingly ap-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

proved resolution of the entire Congress in support of our national efforts there, allowing "the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam upon its request for "assistance in defense of its freedom."

Yet the whole matter could come to an end and bloodshed could cease and the avowed objectives of most of mankind could be achieved if—as President Johnson suggested in his latest state of the Union speech—everyone would "stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962." We are willing to do so.

These agreements are certainly reasonable, providing as they do for free elections and local self-determination. If in fact North Vietnam and the communist world have confidence in the popularity of their cause, their aggressions in South Vietnam should come to an immediate halt; and we could proceed together to bolster up the local government of South Vietnam with free elections and assured independence.

Our own Government has sent, throughout the world, topflight representatives seeking to find some channel to bring peace while preserving the independence of South Vietnam in fulfillment of the accords of Geneva.

It is appalling that thousands of persons are losing their lives and billions of dollars are being expended in the machinations of war, when these lives and these treasures—both of life and of materials—could be much better spent in the forward progress of mankind.

These thoughts all underline the statement of the President:

> To know war is to know that there is still madness in this world.

Nevertheless the responsibilities are on our shoulders at this time and we must fulfill them to the best of our ability, as disagreeable and as tragic as they may appear from time to time.

When I spoke in Jacksonville on May 30, 1964, Memorial Day of that year, I said something about the Vietnam War which I think is appropriate to repeat at this time. I said:

> Under these circumstances we, the American people, should be careful that partisan political considerations have nothing to do with the decisions that must be made, and we should be in constant prayer that whatever decisions are made are in the best interests of the country and of mankind generally.

As I conclude my remarks I would like to give you an analogy which seems fitting: in the world of business, no businessman would put great responsibilities on the shoulders of his office boy. He would not send that inexperienced lad to conclude some important contract transactions or any other deed of large proportions. In the troubled times of 1966, it is true that our country has these grave responsibilities of which we all are soberly thinking today.

But if we believe, as I am sure we all do, that there is a God in heaven, he surely would not be giving us, in these times, these responsibilities unless he thought that we were indeed capable of fulfilling them.

So, although our tasks may be hard and the sacrifices great, I share with you the hope that we will each here today take courage and rededicate ourselves not only to our beloved Nation, but to the highest of human principles: sharing as we must these great responsibilities called forth by the challenging times in which we live.

(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support this bill and commend the committee for bringing it to the floor of the House, with full provision for all recognized needs of our Armed Forces in southeast Asia.

The fight being waged in South Vietnam is a fight for freedom. In the long run, it is also a fight for peace, for no real peace will be possible for men anywhere unless the forces of aggression are stopped in southeast Asia.

I cannot conceive of any action by the Congress that would do more to encourage aggression, in all parts of the world, than the defeat of this measure. The evidence that Congress was not prepared to back its Armed Forces with the supplies and equipment needed to carry out our policies—which defeat of this bill would mean to the world—would undermine the faith of every friend and ally we have. It would also encourage the enemies of freedom to embark on new conquests and invasions all over the world.

On the other hand, overwhelming approval of this bill will demonstrate our determination to do all that is necessary to back our men and to provide them with what they need to do their difficult and dangerous duty in Vietnam.

I hope and trust the bill will be overwhelmingly approved.

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. It is a simple bill. It simply represents a recognition of the requests of our fighting services for what they need to do the job to which our servicemen are presently committed in Vietnam. And I think we have no alternative in this body except to support this legislation.

I have been a little concerned by those Members of this House and of the other body who have suggested that one can support this bill today without supporting the policy of our Government. That, to me, is nonsense, self-delusion. What is Congress supposed to do in a fighting situation anyway?

We do not make decisions on strategy. We do not consult with the commanders in the field at every point. Rather we pass authorization bills, like this one. We pass appropriation bills. That is what we have done before with regard to Vietnam, and that is what we are doing again today. Obviously we are supporting the policy of our Government in this legislation, a policy of resisting the spread of communism in southeast Asia and thereby proving to the Communist aggressors that aggression does not pay.

I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it just is not possible to have it both ways: either you support that policy of our Government or else you are against it. And you vote today registers your position on that vital question.

Mr. Chairman, what we are facing today in South Vietnam represents in my judgment a very serious test, indeed an acid test, in our history as a government. As the majority leader indicated a moment ago, it is a showdown test of our ability as a democracy to survive the continuing challenge of communism.

People in Communist countries have said that we are paper tigers—not because they do not recognize that we have bigger bombs or greater carriers or more planes than do the enemy countries, but because they are convinced that when the chips are down, we in America just do not have the courage to see things through.

It is about time that we recognize that, whether we like it or not, we are in a fighting war in Vietnam and that we must give to our fighting forces and to the administration, which has been pursuing a policy backed by the overwhelming votes of this Congress and the people, the support that they deserve and should have.

Debate is a good thing in a democracy. But even in a democracy there must come a time when debate ends and when we get behind the decision that has been taken and back up our men on the fighting fronts. That is what this bill does, Mr. Chairman, and that is what the companion appropriation bill will do when it, too, comes to this floor.

The time has come now for us to put an end to further harassment of our Vietnam policy, to these attacks on our policy, these proposals which seem to come forward every day or so, of some new concessions that somebody thinks we ought to make to the Communists to somehow lure them to the negotiating table.

This is a time now for national unity. Let us not forget that it was President Kennedy who describe the Communist method of negotiation by saying, "What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable."

That's what the Communists are trying to do in Vietnam. That is what our forces out there are trying to prevent. Let us support them, not add to their burdens and problems.

I say, Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to have a little confidence in our Armed Forces, to have a little unity in support of our policy. As President Johnson indicated in the White House briefing the other day, no politician ever gets elected by constantly predicting his own defeat. The question in Vietnam is

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

whether we can prove to the Communists and to the world our determination, our patience, and our fortitude under pressure. Let us put an end to these doubts and fears that undermine our will and our resolution, and let this House join now in an overwhelming expression of confidence in our policy and confidence in our Armed Forces.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN].

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889 and say to my colleagues that this bill should not only pass, but it should pass with an overwhelming vote. This would serve notice on the world that when it comes to supporting our servicemen, who are defending freedom wherever challenged, that the American people are ready, willing, and able to provide whatever they may need to carry out their missions. This legislation was approved by the Armed Services Committee, as the accompanying report states, "solely in order to achieve more rapid procurement of replacements of articles consumed, and to provide proper equipment for a larger force in a shorter period of time."

But, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to the reservations expressed by the committee on page 3 of the report regarding the necessity for this legislation. I cannot but have the feeling—which you will note from the report is shared by most members of our committee—that many of the items involved in this legislation may simply have been removed from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. I am not satisfied that the actual need for this legislation has been sufficiently established and that the procurement of essential items will, in fact, be appreciably accelerated by the enactment of this bill today.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would refer my colleagues to the language of the report on page 3 wherein it is stated that:

> Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization.

So, as you read this report, which I remind you again was a unanimous report, it is certainly not unfair to conclude that the Department of Defense has failed to sustain the burden of proof with respect to the necessity for this supplemental authorization and that, being realistic, we are participating in a substantial bookkeeping exercise that obviously offers little military advantage.

In saying this, however, I do not mean to infer that what has been asked for in support of our troops will not be needed within the time frame of the budget for fiscal year 1967 which will be before the House for approval within the next few months. It is for this reason that I have no hesitation in my support for this bill. But as I said at the outset of my remarks, I nonetheless feel that by our actions today we should let our voices be heard loud and clear so all may know that we are going to provide our troops in the field with whatever they may need in supporting the interests of our Government and our determination to resist communistic aggression at this crucial hour.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to use the balance of my time to make two other points. While they may not be directly related to the legislation before us, they certainly have a vital bearing on the conduct of the war in Vietnam.

My second point is simply this: Our concern today in seeking to provide all the supplies necessary to our troops should not be permitted to pass without drawing attention to the similar problems confronting our enemy. Ho Chi Minh is dedicated to a policy of total victory. Anything that the Hanoi regime needs and is denied cannot help but put roadblocks in their path to the south. The traffic of free world ships into North Vietnamese ports, regardless as to whether their cargoes are Communist or free world, strategic or nonstrategic, simply must be stopped. Our governmental policy has clearly been too tolerant of this free world assistance to our enemy. The administration's indifference has created a leadership vacuum which the maritme unions have recently sought to fill through independent action because of this apparent tacit abdication of this aspect of foreign policy to private effort. Bills exist in Congress which would do what the maritme unions seek to acocmplish, but the administration has shown only a negative interest. Regardless of official efforts to depreciate the importance of this trade, I simply cannot comprehend how the tolerance of even one free world ship in the harbor of Haiphong can be justified. Now, in January of this year there was, in fact, a decided increase in this traffic over the previous month. The Department of Defense publicly admits that there were three British, one Cypriot, and three Greek vessels in North Vietnam. While again the classified report indicates that the true figure is well over double that—well over double it, I tell you—and that is what we are not being told—actually the secret reports given to me by the Department of Defense show that free world arrivals in North Vietnam in January are actually more than in any month since last July. I will say that again. Free world arrivals in January in North Vietnam were more than during any month since last July.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit that we cannot say that we have provided our fighting men with the supplies they need without looking at the other side of the coin, without having done everything that we can to interdict the enemies' lines of supply.

We should close every possible valve in their lines of supply and the higher up in the pipeline the better it will serve our interests. That is why I say that we should make sure that nothing destined for North Vietnam is ever loaded aboard a free world ship.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my third point focuses not upon military hardware needs but, rather, upon that which this hardware seeks to accomplish.

Mr. Chairman, the struggle in South Vietnam is essentially no different from that encountered in many other places in the world, where we are confronted with communistic aggression and subversion. It is simply nothing but a struggle for the minds of men.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. presence in South Vietnam, to be successful in lessening the spread of communism, must win the support of the South Vietnamese people by convincing them that we share a common cause, and that the United States is determined to help them achieve security and to establish a better way of life.

Mr. Chairman, this effort can only be successful if the South Vietnamese are fully and accurately informed about the problems which we are facing jointly, and what is being done to solve these problems.

Mr. Chairman, early last summer General Westmoreland made it clear to our special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that was sent to South Vietnam by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], that in his judgment television offered a tremendous opportunity to help unify a country where communication is extremely difficult, if not totally nonexistent. With proper encouragement, this project was finally approved. I have followed its progress closely. While I am apprised of some initial technical difficulties, I am informed that it is now operational and performing well since its inauguration in early February, and that there are airborne transmitters beaming daily television signals to the Saigon area.

Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to see these flying TV stations as they were being assembled right here in the Washington area, at the Andrews Air Force Base. I talked to the officers and men that were actually installing the equipment. I saw what went into these planes. It was the biggest scavenger hunt I have ever heard of—spare parts and obsolete equipment were sought wherever they could be found, and if they could not be found, makeship parts were fabricated on the spot.

I was even told that some essential components were found on the local shelves of the Sears & Roebuck stores.

Mr. Chairman, I have never witnessed a greater dedication than that of the crews who worked 24 hours a day, really around the clock, in order to get these planes operational and send them on their mission.

Mr. Chairman, just this past week I had an opportunity to talk with the Vice President, following our White House briefing—that was last Thursday morning—and I asked him how this television project was getting along and whether or not he had heard anything

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

about it while he was in Saigon. I am pleased to report to my colleagues of the House that he was most enthusiastic about the great potential of this program. He concurred in the need for its expansion just as fast as possible.

So, Mr. Chairman, I say to the members of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union today that if this program is a good program and if it can perform a vital function in helping to convince the people of South Vietnam of our determination to help them resist a ruthless advance of communism in their homeland, it is time we got to work here procuring the proper equipment with which to do this job, rather than sending them wornout, discarded, obsolete equipment held together with coathangers, baling wire, paper clips and Scotch tape.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard rumors to the effect that there are requests now pending for new and better equipment, including more suitable aircraft for this job, and as soon as I can learn more of the details as to what will be required, I am going to do what I can to get it and get it quick, and get it to South Vietnam. I urge your help in providing whatever may be needed in order to realize fully this dramatic potential of television in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, the bill now pending before us calls for the authorization of $4.8 billion. The total of the President's recent supplemental request was $12.3 billion. These are only supplemental funds. No one knows how much we have spent in the past, and certainly all of us are certain that much more is going to be required in the future. I have been told that the original program, this television program, in South Vietnam called for the expenditure of $1.4 million.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 3 additional minutes.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I thank my colleague for yielding to me this additional time.

The original program to provide this television network in South Vietnam called for only $1.4 million, to provide a network throughout the country that would reach from 80 percent to 90 percent of its inhabitants, and that this could be accomplished within a year. When we are talking about a $12 billion supplemental appropriation, I say $1.4 million is a modest sum. The Government could afford it as much as the Government could afford my taking a sip of water from this glass.

So, Mr. Chairman, as we provide the hardware and equipment that will be needed for our troops in South Vietnam let us be bold to also think in terms of using one of our greatest assets, one we have not used heretofore to the fullest.

You know, Mr. Chairman, we hear so much about bold and imaginative programs. But when we come up with something truly bold and imaginative we put it together with obsolete equipment.

Let us do all we can to convince the South Vietnamese of our good intentions especially when we have a program that can serve our purpose and be expanded without bloodshed. Now bear that in mind. We are not going to try to kill people with television. Why do we have to appropriate all this money and send our boys by the hundreds of thousands crawling through the jungle and wreaking destruction on the countryside just to convince the South Vietnamese people that we mean business when no nation in the world can claim the abilities we have achieved with television?

By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to add that the occasion of this bill is a time for unity and not a time for dissension. The debate in recent weeks over our policy in Vietnam has had its purpose and its day in court. It has properly served to get a lot of thinking out in the open. However, the criticism that has been prompted, I believe, has reached the point of diminishing return. After all that has been said, we are still confronted with the stubborn fact that there is no real alternative to the basic premise of our present policy. We do not intend to abandon the South Vietnamese people and our own long-range interests to the aggressive demands of communism. It is timely for us to put Ho Chi Minh on notice of our firm, united determination to support such a policy. There should be no other interpretation as to the meaning of what we do here today.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN].

(Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation. The Speaker of the House, Mr. MCCORMACK, the distinguished majority leader, Mr. ALBERT, the chairman and ranking members of the Armed Services Committee have all presented a strong position of support. The committee members have passed the bill unanimously.

I do not believe this is the time to project an image of disunity to our free world friends or our enemies. I do not believe any real service would be rendered by not providing our men serving in Vietnam with the best in equipment to carry out their military mission.

The debate here today suggests that many Members of Congress are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the inconsistent and sometimes ambiguous reports coming out of Vietnam. The American people have expressed an increasing amount of doubt about our policies. I believe this attitude arises because the people do not feel they have been told the entire story. I further believe the American people will back a firm policy that is designed to win, if they are told the complete facts.

I have felt for some time that we should find out who our friends really are in southeast Asia and this includes our allies in both NATO and SEATO.

As the gentleman from Michigan suggests, the shipping in and out of Haiphong has increased appreciably this year—this is, of course, understandable during times of military conflict. But the deplorable fact that our allies—our friends, if you will, are among those who are carrying supplies and materiel for the support of our enemies. Why can not we be equally firm with these so-called friends who choose to make a profit from both sides of this war? To me, this borders on the brink of international treason. Not only does this problem exist in Vietnam but they continue their normal trade relations with Cuba and other puppet countries of the Soviet Union and Red China. Sooner or later we are going to have to get tough with our friends and ask them to appropriately decide which side of the fence they are really on.

I sincerely believe President Johnson's place in history will be determined by his ability to strengthen the SEATO alliance to bolster their ability to provide for their own security in that section of the world—thereby minimizing the number of American boys required to uphold our commitment in that faraway section of the world. The same thing can be said of our relationship with the NATO countries. Heaven forbid the day when our traditional alliances crumble.

The only way we can expect to retain the respect of mankind is through a policy of firmness and fairness—be it military, economic, or political.

Therefore, I support this bill today, but in closing I would like to admonish my colleagues to continue to seek other means to win this war. We can and must escalate the peace offensive throughout the world through the application of an economic, political, psychological, technological, and humanitarian offensive—employing techniques that are creative, bold, and imaginative. This will require a broader commitment from all Americans and our free world friends as we jointly uphold our firm resolve to sustain freedom for all mankind.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HALL] such time as he may require.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as has been well stated, this bill represents authorization for our troops of all the services in South Vietnam. I rise in support of it because I think the way it has been reviewed, albeit hastily but by line item, whether in areas of research and development or in procurement of military equipment, tanks and missiles, or whether in the area of construction—indicates the proper approach to all authorizations by a legislative committee.

Many of us are extremely proud of the logistical support that is being rendered to our troops there.

A vote for this bill is a vote for continued support of these people and I would like to assure one of the gentlemen who queried our distinguished chairman that medicine is again making a record in South Vietnam that has never been made before, based on the modern state of the art, to the point where we are having less than 1 percent of deaths from all battle casualties that reach any kind of aid. However, Mr. Chairman, all the supplies will not help if we are handicapped too much by a lack of will to win and by dissension in the ranks back home.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

We have perhaps in the past overextended ourselves and not defended ourselves to the maximum. It is poor military policy if we do not use a maximum offense as the best defense.

Perhaps there are items here in this supplemental or deficiency bill that have been moved from the fiscal year 1967 into the supplemental or deficiency authorization in many areas. But there is certainly much here that is needed immediately in follow-on and long leadtime items, and your committee is convinced this is the most appropriate way to get the materiel into the hands of our troops. Perhaps there is much here that was lopped off a year or so ago by a penny wise and pound foolish Secretary of Defense or Bureau of the Budget. But now the equipment is needed and to my mind it is proper and not further debatable, in view of the committee hearings, report, and unanimous action.

Perhaps there has been too long a delay in the proper interdiction of logistical supply lines of the North Vietnamese but now it is time to get on with the job.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, a vote today is not in support of any of the Secretary of Defense's multiple mistakes or lack of State Department foreign policy. This is a vote for all our men in all the services in southeast Asia on a basis where we have undoubted superiority, in the air and sea, and should be about the job with adequate supplies.

I strongly recommend a unanimous vote in favor of this supplemental authorization bill for the men in southeast Asia.

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Washington [Mr. HICKS] whatever time he might require.

(Mr. HICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support this bill.

My office is now tabulating the returns from a questionnaire I sent out last month—13,000 have been returned, and they are still arriving in large numbers. The questionnaire has a good deal of blank space, which the respondents have used liberally for comments. Mr. Chairman, these comments, as well as answers to the questions I asked, show that the people of my district overwhelmingly support the President's policy in Vietnam. Therefore, they would support this bill as I do.

But, Mr. Chairman, along with their concern about Vietnam they are tremendously concerned about inflation. I confess that I too am worried about inflation, and have been for some time. The bill before us is a supplemental authorization bill. Why must it be supplemental? Because we did not properly evaluate the situation last year. Now military expenditures are rising relentlessly, while unemployment continues its downward trend, and unemployed skilled labor virtually no longer exists. All of these things show inflationary pressures, and those pressures are tremendous now.

We must not ignore the inflationary danger. We must not allow ourselves to take half measures and pretend that we are facing the problem squarely with all its implications. We must not let ourselves underestimate the danger by always dealing with parts but never with the whole. If we do, we will continue to have supplemental instead of comprehensive legislation.

What is the answer? Because inflation is caused by rising demand, measures must be taken to curb demand. Many approaches are offered, and several of them together seem to me to offer the best approach. The Federal Reserve Board has already raised the price of money. This alone will not solve the problem. However, combined with other measures it can help to restrain investment and reduce demand in that way. We must also look to decreased Government spending and increased taxes.

Nonmilitary spending must be curtailed where it is possible to do so without jeopardizing what is best in our Great Society programs. And that does not mean cutting down impacted areas school aid, or school milk, and hot lunches. It does mean that we must redouble our critical scrutiny of every measure for the expenditure of funds to be sure that it will achieve the purpose as economically and efficiently as possible.

As for taxes, last week I voted against the tax bill the purpose of which was to raise revenue to pay for increased spending of the Vietnam war. I voted against it not because I think we do not need a new tax measure but because it seemed to me a palliative and not a cure. I do not oppose the withholding changes, and I think it is sensible to graduate the withholding rates to coincide more closely with tax rates. And since it is true that the Government needs funds now, a speed-up in collection will obviously help in the short run. The excise tax reimposition does bother me because excise taxes are not the most equitable kind of tax. But above all, I consider the measures in that bill too little and too late.

The tax which was not even discussed last week but which will be paid regardless of the tax bill approved by this body, the tax which is the most discriminatory of all, is inflation.

We cannot avoid taxation of some kind. The question then is whether we should tax through inflation, ignoring the problem and letting it take its course, or face the problem squarely and make the decision to tax in an orderly and evenhanded way. I think the choice is clear. Although it is never popular to raise taxes, we will have to do so. But we must do so in a meaningful way, not by halfhearted measures which lull us into thinking we have met the need. The sooner we recognize this fact and move to act the better.

If we do not take well-planned measures soon, then we will surely give rein to inflation. By so doing we may impose the cruelest tax of all on those least able to bear the burden, on the elderly and disabled living on fixed incomes, on the poor, the unemployed.

A minute ago I mentioned the questionnaires I am receiving from my constituents. A comment on one of them seems to me to reflect the responsible thinking of the people of my district on the need to be realistic about paying for our programs, both foreign and domestic. The writer said:

> We all want the benefits of the Great Society but nobody seems to want to foot the bill—if we are going to spend let us raise taxes (I might point out that I make over $10,000 a year with two dependents so I will feel it) but it has to be done.

I was pleased to find in last Sunday's Washington Post that my views coincide with those of a most eminent economist, Dr. Paul A. Samuelson. He points to the latest estimates of our gross national product in this coming year, now expected to rise about $5 billion above what has been forecast. His most telling point, in my view, is that our economic expansion is becoming rapid and frantic instead of orderly and durable, that it cannot benefit the country, and that it will harm those at the bottom of the economic ladder. It should be restrained so that orderly growth can be continued.

I fully agree with Dr. Samuelson's conclusion that a new tax plan is needed, and that work on such a plan should go forward at once.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate my support for this bill and to express the hope that all my colleagues will support it too. At the same time I urge them to face without flinching the need to keep our economy in hand and the responsibility to do so.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

(Mr. ROSENTHAL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I vote for this supplemental authorization with reluctance and apprehension.

The policy which such a vote would seem to endorse is one with which I have often disagreed. It is one with which, in many respects, I disagree now. Bombing of North Vietnam has been of negligible military effect and has involved serious diplomatic drawbacks. I have also felt that any settlement, any negotiations, any provisional government, and any elections which excluded the participation of the National Liberation Front would be highly impractical. Indeed, I think one of the principal obstacles to peace, in addition to the present hostility of North Vietnam, is our apparent refusal to acknowledge the existence of the National Liberation Front which is composed largely of South Vietnamese, and is clearly in control of much of South Vietnam. We do not intend to exterminate that force. We therefore must deal with it. And we must make clear to all that we shall deal with it. That concession I believe to be a prerequisite for settlement.

I believe, therefore, that there are diplomatic alternatives to further escala-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

tion of this war. Not being sure if these alternatives have been adequately explored, indeed having some feeling that they have been too quickly passed by, I am unable to accept any contention that we must escalate in Vietnam. Yet, I fear that this authorization permits such an escalation.

I am, moreover, puzzled by many of the provisions in this authorization itself. I share the reservations expressed in the committee report:

"If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items involved, in all three categories of procurement, research, and development, and construction, may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration. Obviously no military advantages would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this subject was indecisive and the committee has not yet been provided with sufficient definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real acceleration, or to determine the amounts involved in the proposed legislation which could safely and should properly be deferred until the regular 1967 authorization."

With these misgivings, however, I still feel constrained to vote for the measure before us today. I can find no adequate reason to refuse American forces the support necessary for their survival. I question the policies which brought over 200,000 men to Vietnam. That being said, I still cannot find acceptable grounds for refusing those forces the means to defend themselves and to survive in war.

Here is a deeper problem, a more fundamental issue. The President's primacy in foreign affairs is nothing to be treated lightly. Its ultimate source of legitimacy is the Constitution. I do not believe that the congressional role in foreign affairs is such that we should feel completely free to deny the President the means to pursue a policy, particularly in war, once that policy has been reached with ample consultation. Clearly, Congress must reserve the right to act in such a manner. The proper constitutional vehicle for such action, however, is a declaration of war. In any case, I believe that the right to deny the President in war should be exercised only in circumstances of the greatest clarity, or in issues about which there is little ambiguity. Vietnam is not such an issue, despite the misgivings many have about policy.

I am not happy with the minimal role to which Congress is thus consigned. Nor am I convinced that the Congress has been adequately consulted or respectfully attended in the formulation of policies in Vietnam. But I do not accept the proposition that this vote today constitutes a considered and broad sense of Congress.

I do not believe my own vote, simply as a vote, properly represents my viewpoint on this matter, any more than the total vote of Congress adequately represents the total sentiment of Congress. Complicated positions on matters of war and peace are not to be abbreviated by such simple symbolism. So I deny the legitimacy of this vote as a deep expression of individual or collective viewpoint on the full range of policy in Vietnam. I am voting for support and supplies for the American troops already committed to Vietnam.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I yield to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. BOGGS], whatever time he might require.

(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to commend the chairman of the distinguished Armed Services Committee and the members of that committee, including my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT], and many others. This committee reported this legislation unanimously. It is a committee that debates issues thoroughly and completely. In my judgment, this committee would not have reported this bill unanimously had it not felt that it was absolutely essential for the security of our Nation and for the freedom of our Nation.

I should also like to commend and congratulate the Members of this body, the House of Representatives, for the unity which they have shown in the face of this challenge to our country.

In my judgment, the only way we can be defeated is not by the Communists from the North Vietnam or by the support which they receive from the Chinese Communists, who have declared time and time again their announced intention of conquering all free world, but we can be defeated if we divide among ourselves. We can be defeated if the word goes out to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not stand united in Vietnam, and that we will talk when we should be defending the bastions of freedom there and helping the men who are fighting in the name of freedom.

I hope that this bill will be adopted by an overwhelming vote—I hope by a unanimous vote.

For 25 years this country, known as the hallmark of freedom, has faced first one, then another threat to freedom—to our own and to that of our friends. One after another these threats have been confronted and eventually contained. But still the threats persist.

It has been a trying quarter of a century for the forces of freedom. At times we become exasperated with the continuing need to defend freedom. It is at those times that we need to remind ourselves that freedom is not entirely free; it must constantly be defended to be assured. If there has been any time in the history of the changing world that we could not afford to tire, it is now.

I believe that we must reexamine the quarter-century that has just passed us to see where we have gone, what we now have, and what we should be striving for. Let me take a minute or two to try to gain that perspective.

In the Second World War the challenge to liberty quickly became obvious and direct, and the call for our response became apparent. After 1945 the new challenge of communism in the form of the Red army moving across Europe became clear-cut; our measured response to that advance was clearly called for. It was successful; the adversary was stopped, but not before he had engulfed much of Eastern Europe.

The Communist threats in southern Europe and the Middle East in the late 1940's were not as direct and open, but they soon became clear. The bold responses of the American Government and of the threatened peoples themselves brought about a subsidence of the threat, and again Communist expansionism was stifled.

In Asia, meanwhile, the calamities of the World War and its aftermath were permitting Communist rule to establish itself on the Chinese mainland and on the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. The free world was at a loss to stop it. But, by 1950 when the Communists were sufficiently organized in power to openly attack South Korea, the free world no longer stood by passively, and as in Europe, the Communist thrust was eventually stalled.

Shortly thereafter, the southeast Asian independence movements, which were soon to drive European colonial power from that area, were usurped by the Communists. A Communist regime, in the guise of anticolonialist liberators, was installed in North Vietnam under terms of the 1954 Geneva agreements. Not satisfied with the territory they already had, the Communists that same year began stockpiling arms in the south and infiltrating some 10,000 Communist guerrillas into the South Vietnamese peasantry. The groundwork for an extensive insurgency was laid in the south.

By 1956–57 the insurgents began to act, when it became evident that South Vietnam would not fall peaceably under Hanoi's control. By 1959 terrorist attacks, assassinations, and kidnapings had claimed an estimated 1,000 South Vietnamese civilian victims. Another Communist thrust was underway against a free world country.

An earlier campaign against the French in Indochina had not been stopped until the Communists were able to establish another Communist-ruled nation. By 1960 that new Communist country was pressing in a new push into Laos and actively into South Vietnam, and it was making progress.

If the new thrust of communism was to be stopped, it had to be done in Vietnam and Laos. It was clear that Communist forces were gaining new territory. The free world had been relatively successful in stalling Communist aggression elsewhere in the world. Was it to falter in southeast Asia? That question was posed in the 1960–62 period. It is still posed for us in 1966 with regard to Vietnam.

Asia then has become the locale for the Communist offensive. But they are different Communists than the free world faced in Europe, and they are using different techniques. There is no longer direct, open aggression. Instead the Chinese and their North Vietnamese agents are perfecting the art of national

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

liberation wars—of subtle, covert, and ambiguous external assistance to internally based guerrilla units.

What we face in Vietnam today is this kind of ambiguous, elusive military confrontation. But the world is not preoccupied with other major wars at this moment, or with other major responsibilities that are of overriding concern. Nor is there a decolonization battle waging in Vietnam. There are no excuses for us not to see this conflict in Vietnam as aggression by one state against another. A properly measured and positive response to this aggression must be found and pursued.

To those who would ask proof of aggression against the South Vietnamese, I would ask the purpose of the 80,000 Communists, taken from the south to Hanoi in 1954, who were infiltrated back into the south beginning in 1961. I would also ask why nine or more regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces have been brought into South Vietnam in the past year. And I would ask the meaning of open boasts by the Hanoi leadership of its support for the so-called liberation movement in the south as a step toward reunification on Communist terms.

That there has been aggression from North Vietnam, there is no question. This aggression against the south is directed and supported politically and militarily from Hanoi. The weapons, equipment, and other supplies for it are supplied largely by Hanoi, which in turn is supported by Communist China.

That the South Vietnamese deserve and must have help from us and other allies, I believe, is without question. How can we, or anyone, expect the South Vietnamese to meet successfully the growing power of all Asian communism? It is not by our choice that we are there. It is by the decision of the North Vietnamese, supported by the Red Chinese, that we are forced to respond to their aggression. The initiative has been on their part. Our actions have only been in response to their determined and growing aggression.

Our actions have been in accord with our commitments under the Southeast Asia Treaty and with our bilateral commitments to the South Vietnamese made and confirmed by three Presidents. Our commitment to South Vietnam is firm. Under the SEATO terms we have agreed that "each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." That obligation has been called.

It seems to me that our obligation is even more than this. It is to come to the defense of freedom. "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." Those words of the late John F. Kennedy are still our guidelines.

Mr. Chairman, at this point, I should like to insert into the RECORD a recent speech on the war in Vietnam which I delivered in Chicago to the annual convention of the National Sand & Gravel and the National Ready Mixed Concrete Associations. The address was given on February 10, 1966, and the text of this speech follows:

ADDRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS, DEMOCRAT, OF LOUISIANA, BEFORE THE NATIONAL SAND & GRAVEL AND THE NATIONAL READY MIXED CONCRETE ASSOCIATIONS, CHICAGO, ILL., FEBRUARY 10, 1966

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to come here today. You stand in the tradition that has made this country great: That of individual enterprise and effort. Your work contributes to the well-being and security of all Americans. And, because this is America, you too reap the benefits.

I could speak with you about some of the legislative proposals now pending in the Congress, or at some length of the relationship of Government to business and labor.

Today, however, because of the limitation of time, I would like to speak on a subject that now transcends all other. It is an issue that, despite the best efforts of President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and many others, requires broad discussion and understanding.

I shall talk to you of Vietnam. I shall try to tell you why we are there, what we are trying to do, and the means we are employing. I shall consider some of the alternatives which have been proposed by critics.

You are intelligent businessmen. Your profession impels you to be realistic. You look at the hard facts. Thus, I shall not demean your intelligence with platitudes.

Your time is limited. The subject is complex. Our cause is still misunderstood. So let us begin.

First, let us speak of old realities and new myths. The old reality is that the Communist world is still predatory. Now it is China more than the Soviet Union which casts covetous eyes on her neighbors. Communist China believes that it can conquer the world. It believes that it can do this through so-called wars of national liberation. In South Vietnam, such a bloody war of so-called liberation is raging. The Communist Vietcong are trying to take over South Vietnam. They are being abetted, with men and arms, from North Vietnam. The root instigator is Communist China.

We are in South Vietnam to help the South Vietnamese people retain their independence and freedom. This is our immediate goal. Our whole history impels us to protect our weak friends from aggression.

Our resistence to militant communism in South Vietnam is part of a long series of events in which we have defended freedom. It started with the Truman doctrine in 1947. Congress and the country agreed with President Truman, and American aid was sent to Greece. The policy was a brilliant success and Greece and the Mediterranean were saved for the West.

So South Vietnam is in the tradition of our help to Greece and Turkey in 1947, Formosa and Korea in 1950, and Berlin since 1948. All these stands in defense of freedom were successful. All these areas remain in the free world.

But we have an even more important task. Vietnam is a crucial test between our country and Communist China. If we leave without a just and honorable peace, the word will quickly spread around the world, like a prairie fire, that the West has quit and communism is the victor. The impact of this is obvious.

First, it would demonstrate that the Chinese brand of communism which repeatedly and explicitly says it wants no peace will become dominant. The Sino-Soviet split will be resolved in favor of the militant and aggressive Chinese.

As Secretary of State Rusk recently pointed out: "A central issue in the dispute between the two leading Communist powers today is to what extent it is effective and prudent to use force to promote the spread of communism. If the bellicose doctrines of the Asian Communists should reap a substantial reward, the outlook for peace in this world would be grim indeed."

Now the leadership of the Communist Chinese—the average age of the 17 men who make up the top leadership is 68—face many problems of their own. One is what Communists call revisionism. This is the tendency to forsake militant revolution for internal development, using some of the same incentives employed by free enterprise societies outside the Communist orbit. This is what the Russians are experiencing, and by resisting aggression in South Vietnam, we are encouraging such revisionism in China.

The effect of such a withdrawal on Japan would be serious. There a laborious effort has been quite successful in creating a peaceful and democratic society. Its economy and industry are now harnessed to the ways of peace. I was in Japan recently and I am convinced that it could not continue as a free society if we, in effect, surrender in Vietnam and withdraw from southeast Asia.

Similarly, what do you think would have happened in Indonesia had we not been in Vietnam? Do you think the recent overthrow and demise of one of the largest and most powerful Communist parties in the world would have been successful had not the Indonesians known that we were in southeast Asia and would remain until an honorable peace is attained.

Equally important, we stand in Vietnam because we know that if we retreat there, then Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, would all fall very quickly. The probable result would be world war III.

President Johnson has stated our reasons for being in Vietnam. If the Communists win, he said: "They would know they can accomplish through so-called wars of national liberation what they could not accomplish through naked aggression in Korea—or insurgency in the Philippines, Greece, and Malaya—or the threat of aggression in Turkey—or in a free election booth anywhere in the world."

Our military effort in Vietnam, then, is vital to the ultimate success of the South Vietnamese people in achieving a stable, viable, government with a free society. But the fact is that military success in defeating the Vietcong is only the initial step in a long, tough, task of rebuilding the South Vietnamese society to meet the challenges and responsibilities of self-government as a modern state.

The military difficulties are compounded by the state of the South Vietnam economy and political organization. The Communists have wreaked havoc. In the dense jungles and broad deltas they have employed every conceivable method of terror and coercion.

Imagine, if you will, the United States with half of the cities and towns under Communist control. Imagine no road or railroad or canal or river safe for communication and transportation. Imagine the farmer unable to produce his crop because of terror, murder, and assassination. And picture a terrain of jungles and swamps largely inaccessible. Then you will have some notion of the problems in Vietnam. Add to this the fact that most of the leadership—mayors, councilmen, educators, editors, physicians, lawyers, and engineers have been assassinated.

It is under these conditions that we seek to join with the forces of the South Vietnamese Government to pacify their country. This is why our military leaders do not claim victory.

The economic and social challenge is very great. But you do not hear enough of our efforts in these areas. That was the princi-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

pal reason for the President's visit to Hawaii this week.

Today more than 1,000 employees of the Agency for International Development—many of them striving in the countryside and the small hamlets and villages—are engaged in helping the South Vietnamese people in every conceivable area.

Our Government is now providing more than $300 million a year for our technical personnel to work with the South Vietnamese. This economic assistance is a four-point effort in four major areas:

1. Grant aid, to finance imports to help maintain the South Vietnam economy on a day-to-day operating basis, and to prevent serious inflation, and curb the balance-of-payments deficit.

2. Capital projects assistance, to broaden the economic base and improve urban facilities with water supply systems, electrification, improved harbors, roads, and transport facilities.

3. Technical assistance, to improve human skills through education in agricultural methods, public health, public safety, public administration, logistics and other areas, and

4. Counterinsurgency, to maintain basic services for the people by providing foodstuffs, farm tools, roofing and cement, and other materials. Included in this part of the program is strengthening of the national police force.

Now I have discussed with you why we are in South Vietnam and what we are trying to do there. I have a further duty. This is to frankly discuss with you what the critics of our policy, both in and out of Congress, are saying. A President can be right and the entire country disagree with him. Or he may be wrong and still enjoy mass approbation.

We have an obligation to answer these arguments. On one side some advocate at worst, complete surrender—that we get out right away. At best, they guise this defeatism in an enclave theory which would effectively give the bulk of the country over to the Communists and leave us isolated.

Others advocate mass bombing. They want us to take the war to the Chinese mainland. Their intention is honorable. The result would be devastation, but not victory. And their proposals might unleash a world war.

Disparate as these critics are in the solutions they propose, they are similar in their eagerness to be relieved of the burdens of world leadership. They both want us to get the whole thing over with. Both views smack of the sentiments of Prime Minister Chamberlain. Mr. Chamberlain once spoke to the British Nation and I quote: "Of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing—why should we get involved?"

This was appeasement. The result was 6 years of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind. That appeasement would work was a myth then—it remains a myth now.

These critics despair too soon. We have been in South Vietnam in force for a scant 6 months. Only now is our presence being felt. Six months ago, village after village was being surrounded and overcome, and the government forces had retreated to the town squares and to the city of Saigon itself. Today, many of the villages have been retaken and pacified. More than that, the people know that we are there. They know that we intend to stay as long as necessary. The impact is one of enormous significance.

Just over a month ago I was in Vietnam. I went there to see for myself. I saw the condition of the country. I saw the magnitude of the job. I saw that we were doing that job.

I was impressed by the will of the Vietnamese people. But I must pause to tell you about our magnificent men. Our forces are extremely able, alert, and intelligent. Most of the men in our Armed Forces today are high school graduates. Most of our officers are college graduates. Most of them are trained in government, in economics and political systems. And most of them, thank God, understand the philosophical and political threat of communism so that they know what the war is all about. The morale of our men is tremendous. Inspiring is the only word for it. They know why we are there. They know what we must do. And they have the ability and will to do it.

What then are the prospects for immediate victory? Victory in this instance is not like that of a conventional war, in that it must mean the containment of communism, and this will undoubtedly take time and effort and sacrifice. But the stakes are enormous.

I recall as vividly as any experience of my life, the days of the Cuban crisis. You may remember that Congress had just adjourned and President Kennedy summoned all of the congressional leaders back to Washington. There in the Cabinet Room of the White House he outlined in detail the Russian missile threat to the United States. For one terrible week the Nation looked down the nuclear barrel. On the Monday after the Sunday morning that Khrushchev wrote his letter to the President indicating withdrawal of the missiles, President Kennedy said, at his final briefing: "The military threat of Russia is receding. Now the threat will come from Communist China as it develops the hydrogen bomb."

Two years later, almost to the day, gathered in the same room, with almost the same people, with the exception of President Kennedy, President Johnson briefed us on the explosion of the first nuclear device in China. There were many questions directed at Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. One prevailed above all the others. What threat does this pose to the free world? The answer came back, candid and brief—very little as of now, but a major and dangerous one 10 years from now, barring no change in the aggressive government now dominant in China.

And as I talked with our leaders in Vietnam and Saigon, these meetings kept recurring in my mind.

So this is the ultimate challenge of Vietnam. Whether we turn back the threat now or whether we repeat the events of other days and ultimately face a China infinitely stronger than it is today and determined to conquer the rest of mankind.

This is the challenge, but what of the future? Our objectives are clear. We intend to contain communism in Vietnam. We do not believe that the Communists will stop unless we stand firm. Thus we are erecting a wall, not a wall of brick and stone and barbed wire, but a wall of will and resolution.

Yet at the same time, I want to assure you that President Johnson is doing everything possible to get the Vietnam conflict to the conference table where we can achieve a just and honorable settlement. Our emissaries range the world for peace. Now we take our search for peace into a new forum at the United Nations.

We will stay in Vietnam no longer than is necessary. We seek no territory or bases. We support free elections in South Vietnam if they can be conducted in peace and without Communist intimidation.

The problem is, as the most recent pronouncements from Hanoi so graphically reveal, that the Communists do not yet want peace. They still think that they can win.

Our enemies hope that we are a callow nation. They confuse our reluctance to accept our destiny of world leadership with lack of resolve and thus call us a paper tiger. They hope that we will be unwilling to bear the weight of world leadership when the mantle grows heavy. They dream that the mightiest nation in the world, with a gross national product of nearly three quarters of a trillion dollars, will fall for the spurious alternative of guns or butter. They hope that the Democratic Party, fearful of being characterized as a war party, will hesitate to conduct our Vietnam policy with vigor. They cling to the vain expectation that our national determination will crumble.

They are wrong and their hopes futile.

We are strong, and we are resolved. President Johnson has the vast majority of our people behind him. And even if he faced substantial public opposition to our policy, he would still do what is right in Vietnam. His duty is to the national interest of the United States, not partisan political concerns.

So we will persuade the Communists that the price of aggression is too high. And in the process, we will prevent world war III.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LEGGETT].

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague from California [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, once again, as with the special appropriation of $700 million for the war in Vietnam which was voted last May 5, I am required, by conscience, to vote in opposition to the overwhelming majority of the Members of this House and to question, by that vote, the course and conduct of our policy in Vietnam.

I do this with sadness, for I do not like to be in opposition to the President who, no less than myself or any other Member of this House, is acting out of conscience and a profound desire to serve the best interests of this Nation.

I am not ignorant of, nor lacking in appreciation for, the terrible sacrifices made each day by our fighting men on the battlefields of Vietnam. Indeed, it is what these men are going through that has moved me to studied and deep reflection on this war.

I oppose this bill as a futile attempt to achieve, by additional force of arms, solutions to problems which are not primarily military but essentially political, economic, and social.

I am concerned lest the money that is voted today be interpreted as a support of this most futile course. I am concerned for the lives, American and Vietnamese, that this act of expansion of the war will cost.

Last week, I supported and voted for an authorization of funds to pursue a program of peace to relieve the hunger, misery, and suffering of the Vietnamese people.

Today, I cannot now vote funds to permit us to expand the war.

Time does not permit us, under the limited debate rule, to discuss the wisdom of our initial involvement in Vietnam. Suffice it to say, we did, in fact, go astray, and now we find ourselves sinking deeper and deeper into a land war in Asia for goals which become increasingly obscure and at costs which we dare not fully assess.

Somehow, we find ourselves in the role of a nation attempting to preserve the era when Western nations determined the fate of Asia. That era is gone forever.

The course we follow runs counter to the sweep of history and puts this Nation

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

in opposition to the forces of nationalism which history has demonstrated cannot be contained by military action.

We have been repeatedly warned of the dangers of committing ourselves to a course which involves us in a land war in Asia. Yet, the funds we are asked to vote today finance such a commitment and reinforces the notion that with more men, more weapons, and the inevitable higher casualty lists, we can achieve stability of the political situation in Vietnam, foster support by its people of the government, develop its economic potential, and alleviate the suffering of its people.

This course is counterproductive in my estimation.

If we continue along this course and wander ever more deeply into the jungle mists of Asia, I fear that many more innocent Vietnamese will die, many more brave American soldiers will perish, many mothers and fathers will weep, and the honor of this great Nation will be cast over with a shadow that only time will dispel.

It diminishes, in the eyes of the world, our very real desire for peace.

The era has long since passed when we must arm to negotiate—for negotiate we must. We must negotiate with all parties to this conflict. The Vietnamese people must be represented in these negotiations by all parties, including the Saigon government and the NLF.

We must pursue peace through the United Nations and work toward the achievement of the Geneva accord. Peace in Vietnam, in all of southeast Asia—indeed in the entire world, dictates this course as it dictates my nay vote on this supplemental authorization of funds.

(Mr. BURTON of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the Chairman of the Committee if he would give me 4 minutes.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do not have 4 minutes to give to the gentleman, but I will give him 2 minutes; I have already given him 2 minutes.

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, it is unfortunate that the only record that will really be made in the House of Representatives this 1st day of March 1966, is that virtually unanimously, with few exceptions, the Congress of the United States votes $4.8 billion additional authorization to defend freedom in South Vietnam.

I support the President and this appropriation—the loyalty to the United States of those who do not certainly is no issue here. There are perhaps some outside this hall who would question the patriotism of anyone who expresses trepidation with respect to our commitment in southeast Asia. I would say that anyone who is not concerned with discussing choices of procedure to accomplish peace and the freedom and progress of southeast Asians in the face of the obvious threats to the existence of mankind is a superpatriotic fool.

All Americans, I believe, are impressed with our own ability in this country to accumulate one-half of the production of the world by private enterprise, democratic, reasonably bloodless, hard work. There are none of us who would not want our system to work for the world as it does here.

American policy since post-World War II is to spread the benefits of our system worldwide through Marshall plan aid, Agency for International Development, Alliance for Progress, food for peace, and kindred international organizations. We supplement our program through the most extensive military oversight system ever designed on this globe, Peace Corps, tourism, and sundry other State, private, and Federal technical assistance programs. We have spent more money and given more people assistance under this program than other nation or group of nations in history.

By and large we have been extremely successful with sophisticated people. The threat of communism which I understand to be as a forsaking of liberty and justice and individual freedom in favor of a precisely managed socialistic dictatorship has been met and has been successfully challenged.

The trend for the left in Britain, Italy, France and Japan after World War II is now only a whisper because through our aid and their own creativeness these countries are economically successful. Were this not a fact, all of our guns and rockets could not have changed the tide.

In the underdeveloped countries, however, of Africa, Asia and South America where poverty is rampant and populations are exploding, our "do good" policy has been questionably successful. A success record for Japan, Taiwan and Western Europe should be closely evaluated in relation to other restless countries unable to fathom the precedents we give to them.

The problem is that we become mesmerized with the term "communism." We know of the doctrine of Stalin, Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung that they peacefully or forcefully plan to capture the imagination of peasants and rural people first in south Asia, then Africa, then South America, and we are set in panic. We remember Hitler said what he would do and in 10 years he almost did it. We see the Communists restless in their containment and we fear they will do the same.

Communism should be contained—there are many other ways where liberty is not irrevocably lost by which people might develop and progress. History will no doubt record our age, I hope, as the great era when mankind conquered space and poverty through the programs developed in the competition between democracy and communism. I hope that the programs which ebb to the top as successful are democratic.

We should not become paranoid, however, when the competition is discussed. I and many Americans would like to see the United States develop the leadership and the programs that will bring peace and prosperity to the underdeveloped world. When war breaks out, usually all hope of real progress is jeopardized.

The problem is that if the United States is going to assume the stature of policeman of the world we should develop a realistic policy of helping people declare effective wars on poverty and stagnation worldwide. We are the only nation that literally has a military ring around the world—the only nation that can provide that needed cloak of protection. When we use that cloak to stamp out dictatorships of the right or left, we are working for the good of mankind. When we use that cloak and the CIA to stultify programs of people and perpetuate military coups and dictatorships, we many times militate against the progress of peoples.

When people's movements are grounded in communism we are in a dilemma. The people's program to change poverty we should support—communism we fight, and rightfully. Not to recognize that Communist programs with their ham-and-egg offerings appeal to many people, however, is to misread human nature. To handle such a movement of change when war does not break out is relatively easy. We step up our military assistance program to maintain the status quo and simultaneously step up AID efforts to promote economic development. A military coup many times is superimposed and our purposes are confounded in local public opinion. The point is that we want to help people develop because that gives us security in the United States. However, we do not act with vigor until we are hit on the head with communism.

When local war breaks out we are totally confounded as in southeast Asia today. We want to help people but things are so confused we do not know who to help or who to hurt. We are engaged in a war which it is to our own and the world's interest not to formally declare. We want to fight communism wherever it might be, but we are obviously confused because we are forced to support six successive dictatorships, none of which were popularly elected, one of which only this morning very democratically announced the summary execution of a number of too enthusiastic merchants for the American dollar.

I am pleased to see the United States now announce the $1 billion effort to solve the economic problems of South Vietnam, this sum apparently to constitute the balm to salve the pangs of any would-be Communist supporters for a better economy. We certainly were not prepared to offer this kind of "dough" while the French had control and it is only now that we are psychologically prepared to support this kind of one small country commitment. If we want to be the policeman of the world, which role I frankly support, I think we should have better reflexes than this.

We are now in this position where to prove our point we are dropping bombs at a greater daily rate than during World War II. Our commitment as reported in the newspapers is better than 50,000 tons of TNT per month, or 500,000 250-pound bombs per month. It is obvious that if we only wound one Vietcong with every 10 bombs we would cascade the enemy to the conference table

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

in 30 days. We now have in excess of 200,000 men committed, joining 500,000 South Vietnamese, plus 40,000 allied soldiers. Civilian casualties, I understand, are fantastic, though American military deaths are light to date. We have a program to liberate territory and are making modest gains. However, the Vietcong today is twice as strong as they were last year this time, control more territory, and their main units are yet to be engaged.

We are raising our level of support by a substantial percentage and I believe the fiscal year 1967 military budget, when it is properly supplemented next year, will again extend substantially our commitment.

We are expending ammunition at the greatest rate in history, perhaps expending on this undeclared war one-fourth of our national income—approximately $24 billion. We are thus drawn in battle to defeat a so-called Vietcong and North Vietnam who have a less budget for a year than we have in a month, who need but a few truckloads of materials a day to sustain them, who have no air force, no navy and certainly not a modern army. They do have tunnel and jungle sanctuaries that are difficult to penetrate.

I think then my judgment under these circumstances would be to gage carefully not only what we do but how we do it. We are really not so much ourselves trying to beat the Vietcong but trying to supplement the force of the free South Vietnamese so that the people themselves will want to rid themselves of the Vietcong. Barbarous executions by South Vietnamese and massive land scarring by B–52's and our artillery will not get the support of the people if nearly a million injured refugees are forced into Saigon as was reported today.

It is possible that we can try too hard and lose the people. In a jury trial you can have a perfect plaintiff's case, but spend too much money on diagrams and witnesses and lose the jury.

So in an election you can have an electable candidate, spend too much money and he is defeated by the electorate because the money shows.

The point is that money along will not win the war of ideas in South Vietnam.

I do not think we can say realistically for long that the peasant just wants to be left alone, he has no philosophy, yet by night many of them make the best soldiers in the world.

The people of South Vietnam are erupting in part by northern stimulation and in part by conditions. The stimulation we can control, but we must develop and sell long-term economic programs to change conditions, to control corruptions, to expand education, to democratize leadership, to abort class and caste systems and foreign economic domination.

We must outline workable programs. It is not enough that we carry on a foreign aid program at the $3 billion-plus authorized level and $1 billion-plus appropriated level and carry on a program largely with surplus grains and through the many times corrupt private sector and channel that aid to scores of countries.

We appropriate at the $2 billion level to change poverty in our domestic program in 3,000 counties—OEO. Are we successful? How can we do the job worldwide at this level where per capita income is not $2,000 as in the United States but $100 as in nearby Mexico or less.

The point is that we cannot ship surplus materials with hands clasped across the boxes even at the greatest rate in history worldwide and then under our assumed worldwide police power declare that nations in our favor can qualify for this aid to more or less do as we do but that if this program is obviated by creeping poverty, local corruption, dynastic domination or population explosion, we will blow your head off if you try to revolt if you are Communist tinged.

Rightfully and in a good moral conscience if the United States would stimulate people rebellious against dictatorship oppression and poverty, where our aid programs are ineffective, maybe more rebellious people would be oriented toward the U.S. middle ground rather than the extreme right or extreme left.

In our efforts to maintain and perpetuate our own security we should not be satisfied with a good try to defeat poverty worldwide. We should make our programs work. Where poverty and domination swell behind dormant dictatorships, then should American foreign policy be to effect change by democratically oriented revolution if need be.

Declare to the world, then, that the impoverished and the dominated will receive our support, not just a halfhearted effort and not just when communism is the competitor. This policy declared and followed then will mean a successful U.S. foreign policy—people will rally around us worldwide—this is the best and only effective containment policy—this policy also will have a natural fallout of giving us security at home.

It will mean a worldwide effort for perhaps our lifetimes by the United States and other successful democracies at a dollar level commitment not at current foreign aid rates, but at current military South Vietnam rates.

By my words of trepidation to the President concurrent with 77 of my colleagues this is what I mean.

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

(Mr. CLANCY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly support H.R. 12889 and the $4.8 billion of supplemental military authorizations, primarily for southeast Asia.

This supplemental authorization is needed in support of the American effort to help block Communist efforts to subjugate all of Vietnam.

Today, the one most compelling problem demanding our attention is the situation in Vietnam, and it is up to us to see that our military needs there are adequately funded. Our Nation's primary obligation is to fully support our men who have been sent to combat in South Vietnam. Wherever American boys are sent to battle they should be supplied with the best possible weapons and with the best logistical support that we can give them.

The passage of the bill we are now considering is indispensable to our military posture and preparedness. It is designed to insure that there will be no shortages in Vietnam so that our fighting men in the field can perform their mission with maximum efficiency. Overwhelming passage of this legislation will give needed assurance to our men in Vietnam that we are standing behind them 100 percent.

We now have more than 200,000 men actually deployed in South Vietnam. Added to this figure are the many thousands who directly support them in southeast Asia. And our commitment in South Vietnam is growing daily in terms of men, material and money.

We must not be content to fight just to keep from losing; rather, we must marshal our resuorces and concentrate our energies on winning this conflict in the shortest possible time. We must strive to avoid a long and bloody stalemate dragging on for years. It appears the Communists are testing our will and determination at this time and in this place to see how long they can drain our resources—particularly our manpower. They are counting heavily on a collapse of the American will to resist their aggressive designs.

Yes, our will and staying power are being tested by the Communists in this hard and bitter contest. It is obvious that the principal Communist objective is to get the United States involved to a maximum extent in a ground war of attrition in Asia in which our superiority in weaponry remains unused.

It is mandatory that we undertake effective action to bring this struggle to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible.

Certainly we would all prefer not to have to be there. However, aggressions left unchecked will continue to grow. It is in our best interests to repel this aggression, but I urge that we do so with all deliberate speed.

The legislation before us provides in the main authorization for appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles, and for the construction of military installations. The authorization totals $4,857,450,000, which exceeds by $50 million the sum requested by the administration. It will provide the required authority for the necessary appropriations to support military operations in southeast Asia.

Section 401 of the bill provides that funds for the support of the South Vietnamese armed forces and the other free world forces fighting in South Vietnam shall be derived from the regular appropriations for the support of our own military forces rather than from funds carried in the military assistance program. We are advised that a transfer of this authority will result in improving procedures for supplying military items to the United States, Vietnamese, and other free world forces in Vietnam.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

It is unfortunate that the appropriations requested last year were insufficient. I would be the first to concede that developments in a situation such as we find ourselves in Vietnam cannot be predicted precisely, and we must allow for flexibility in our planning and judgments.

My colleagues and I on the Armed Services Committee must rely to a great extent on the information and facts furnished us in briefings by the Secretary when he appears before us. Yet, even a cursory review of the record indicates that he, too, is sometimes wrong in his assessments of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. role in that war, and in his short-term predictions of the outcome.

It is my earnest hope that Secretary McNamara will give greater heed to the combined judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he will follow more closely recommendations made by them on military matters. The military advice he receives represents many years of experience. Experienced professional military judgments are most essential in aiding the Secretary to arrive at the crucial decisions he must make.

Before closing my remarks I would like to urge once again that we lose no time in passing the bill under consideration. To win the struggle in Vietnam, we must unite as a nation to let the entire world know that we are going to make the necessary sacrifices and bear the necessary costs to defeat the Communist aggression there.

It is well to remember that the war in Vietnam is not primarily a war about Vietnam. It is a war which concerns the future of Asia, a war which could very well determine the future of the entire free world. I hope we will continue to honor our commitment to freedom in Vietnam, and we should take every step possible to insure that the struggle is brought to a successful conclusion in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Chairman, I now yield to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. GEORGE W. ANDREWS].

Mr. GEORGE W. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I am supporting this bill 100 percent. I think the sooner it becomes law the better off our fighting men in South Vietnam will be.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say that in my opinion the vast majority of the people in Alabama are supporting our President in this vicious war against communism. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that there has not been a draft card burned in Alabama; there has not been a beatnik-led demonstration against our foreign policy in Alabama. We have had some beatnik-led demonstrations down there that did not concern our foreign policy. I will predict to you if such a demonstration as that occurs in Alabama, somebody is going to get hurt.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think the sooner we fight this war to win the better off the whole world will be. I think the greatest, most courageous decision made in the history of this Nation was made by former President Harry Truman when he ordered the use of an atomic weapon on Hiroshima. He served notice on the Japanese Government that if they did not surrender, they could expect further bombings within 3 days. Hearing nothing from the Japanese, the second bomb fell on Nagasaki. You know the story. That courageous action forestalled the bloodiest invasion that had ever been planned in the history of this world and saved hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. If I were running this war, Mr. Chairman, I would pick up the telephone and call Hanoi and say, "We will give you 30 days to get out of South Vietnam lock, stock, and barrel. If you are not out at the end of that time, then you can expect us to drop whatever type bombs we desire, wherever we choose to drop those bombs," and let us get this thing over with and bring those boys back. I know the argument against that is that you might endanger the lives of the people in this country. Now, this is war that we are in, Mr. Chairman.

We should all share the jeopardy. I am thinking of that kid in that rice paddy and in that snake-infested, malaria-infested, sniper-infested jungle whose life is in danger and in jeopardy 24 hours a day. Let us bring this war to an early conclusion. I tell you in my opinion there is nothing that the Communists respect more than power. We have it today; let us use it and get through with this war.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. BINGHAM].

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, earlier today the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. COHELAN] submitted a brief joint statement on behalf of 78 members of this House. I was privileged to be among the sponsors of this statement.

I shall vote for H.R. 12889 for the purpose stated in the committee report. But, in so voting, I do have reservations, and these reservations go somewhat beyond the terms of this joint statement. My vote does not mean that I am wholly satisfied with the administration's policies with respect to Vietnam. While I agree with President Johnson that we cannot withdraw from Vietnam and let the Communists take over, and while I salute him for resisting the pressures of those who would expand and escalate the war, I do not believe that we have yet been sufficiently resourceful or flexible in our efforts to get negotiations started. In fact, recent developments create the impression that the administration is no longer giving much thought to the question of how to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Why, then, am I voting for this supplemental authorization bill? First, for the simple and obvious reason, mentioned in the joint statement, that we must give our forces in Vietnam all the support they need, so long as they are there. The second reason is more complicated: I fear that a substantial vote against the authorization might actually impede our objective of getting talks started by encouraging Hanoi to continue its apparently total intransigeance.

This leads to a question which I submit we should all ponder. It is certainly one of the key questions before us at this time. The question is: Why, in spite of all the President's efforts since last April to get discussions started with Hanoi, has Hanoi steadfastly refused to budge?

Rather than discuss this question today, in the atmosphere of a debate on this defense authorization bill, I intend to examine it at some length tomorrow under special orders, and I would be glad to have any Members join in a discussion of the question at that time.

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KUPFERMAN].

(Mr. KUPFERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting for this appropriation because I cannot leave our American troops in the lurch without proper protection on a foreign shore. But it must be pointed out that it was a great mistake to have put them and us in this position.

The biography of General Ridgeway, in discussing the filling of the vacuum in Indochina when the French pulled out in 1954, shows that we could only be involved in a stalemate at great loss to the United States in lives and money.

We should not have been put in our present position. We should not have been involved in an escalation. We should not have waited so long to bring the question to the United Nations.

When the administration states that it seeks no blind escalation, we must question whether it has not already done so and left us in the lurch.

An article by Murray Kempton in the New York World-Telegram and Sun on Friday, February 25, 1966 entitled, "Clear Sighted Escalation" well describes the situation into which we have been led. I should like to insert Mr. Kempton's article in the RECORD at this point.

The only course left to us to pursue, as my predecessor, now Mayor Lindsay, has said, is hard diplomacy to seek peace.

CLEAR-SIGHTED ESCALATION

(By Murray Kempton)

"The tide of battle in Vietnam has turned in our favor."—Vice President HUMPHREY on his return.

It will be 5 years in June since another Vice President came back from Saigon.

"There has been a substantial improvement in the situation in Vietnam," Lyndon Johnson said then.

There were 685 American military advisers in South Vietnam at the time. The Vice President brought a promise to raise the total to 1,600 or so. But the real danger, he said, is not from communism but "from hunger, ignorance, poverty, and disease."

Privately, the Vice President told President Kennedy that "American combat involvement at this time was * * * undesirable because it would revive anticolonial emotions throughout Asia."

For this is a war that has always been going well.

Even so, by October of 1961, Gen. Maxwell Taylor went to Saigon and came back to report that, while only the Vietnamese could beat the Vietcong, more American troops were needed to show them how to do the job. President Kennedy was skeptical.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

"The troops will march in," he said, "and in 4 days everyone will have forgotten. It's like taking a drink. The effect wears off and you have to take another."

Still, in December 1962, he ordered larger commitments to Saigon. Everyone was encouraged. That spring, Secretary of Defense McNamara went to South Vietnam for the first time. "Every quantitative measurement we have," he reported, "shows that we are winning the war."

Taylor came back in October of 1962 and found "a great national movement" assembling to destroy the Vietcong. "The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in South Vietnam," the President said in his 1963 state of the Union message.

Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was having his troubles by then and none of our official tourists echoed Vice President Johnson's assessment of Diem as the Churchill of Asia. Still, in October, Secretary McNamara said that a thousand of the 16,000 American troops in Vietnam could be brought home by the end of the year and that the major part of the military job would be finished by 1965.

So, by Christmas of 1965, we had more than 200,000 Americans under arms in South Vietnam, and the Vietcong had risen from their 12,000 at the time of Lyndon Johnson's confident introduction to the problem in 1961, to more than 230,000.

There was never a time when the thing was not said to be going well, and here we are at a moment when it is impossible to deny that, until now, it has all along been going very badly indeed.

There is no way to imagine the delight of our enemies in our situation except to think what would be our own pleasure if there were 200,000 Chinese struggling through Indonesia or 200,000 Russians wallowing in Albania without one of our soldiers to the smallest degree inconvenienced.

And poor President Johnson, since all these disasters come from the careful plans of Democrats, is reduced to a dreadful mangling of history in order to argue that a series of decisions, which time has proved to have been based on mistaken estimates, where part of a sober, coherent plan now turning toward fulfillment. We can believe him when he says that we have no cause to fear a mindless escalation. It is quite enough to remember the history of the last 5 years and recognize that everything that was done was so carefully thought out.

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. REID].

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889, a supplemental authorization of $4.8 billion for necessary procurement, research and development, and military construction.

Mr. Chairman, I have been in Vietnam. I have been with our troops, and I can report to this House that their morale is absolutely magnificent and is deserving of the fullest support.

Further, Mr. Chairman, there should be no doubt whatsoever in Hanoi or Peiping that the United States of America will totally and completely back its men in the field while at all times utilizing every resource of diplomacy—including the U.N.—to reach the conference table and an honorable and viable peace.

However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this debate today is important. It is on a serious subject. It deals with many implications for the future of American policy, the chances for peace, and the opportunity—free from terror and aggression—for South Vietnam to do the job that must be done in rural reconstruction and pacification backed by major reforms—including education and land reforms—by the government in Saigon.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that the debate here in this House, compared with the other body, is very limited; that we are only devoting 3 hours to one of the most important subjects ever to come before these United States. Frankly, we have not conducted a serious national debate here today, and I regret it. However, I strongly support this authorization.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LONG].

(Mr. LONG of Louisiana asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I rise to give my full support to H.R. 12889 and urge its immediate passage.

The duty we owe to our fighting men is clear. Those men and women who today are performing so nobly to guarantee a continuing place for freedom in our world must be as fully supplied with the equipment necessary for them to do their jobs as it is possible for us to give them. Their sacrifices are incalculable. We must not fail in our duty to them.

Few individuals outside our own military forces are acquainted with the tremendous effort being made by our forces in Vietnam. Focus your attention on the wide role played by any one of our services. Our Navy, for example, is involved in almost every facet of the conflict. Its flexibility, mobility, and ability to extend our national power through every medium has been well demonstrated.

In the air, fighters and bombers are flying combat sorties well into North Vietnam. Three carriers from the 7th Fleet are on station off Vietnam at all times. Two of these giant warships, each with their 100-plane airwings, strike at North Vietnamese infiltration routes 24 hours a day. The third carrier, operating further south off the Vietnamese coast, provides air support for United States and Allied ground forces in South Vietnam.

Destroyers, the workhorses of the fleet, cruise the waters of the South China Sea. These ships have fired an average of 12,000 rounds a month—more than 160 tons of ordnance—against the Vietcong targets. In addition to bombardment, our destroyers are carrying out missions in antisubmarine warfare, search and rescue, and protection of the fast carrier striking forces. Other craft are on constant alert for possible shipment of supplies into South Vietnam. Thousands of junks are detected and searched each week. Still other ships carry thousands of marines ashore and thousands more are ferried in behind the enemy in helicopters from amphibious assault ships.

Logistics is an area of naval activity which cannot be overlooked. Over 94 percent of the logistic support for all U.S. Forces operating in Vietnam is brought in by sea. Ashore, more than 10,000 Navy personnel are providing support. Seabee units are at work constructing bases in the jungles of Vietnam, Navy hospital corpsmen are carrying out their duties with units, and officers are performing advisory roles with the Vietnamese Navy and river assault groups.

Gentlemen, these operations depend on our authorization of the appropriations for the procurement of the aircraft, missiles, and equipment needed for the job. This bill enables us to continue acquisition of these things during the remainder of fiscal 1966. The committee under the leadership of its illustrious chairman has studied carefully the needs reflected by this bill and is convinced of the soundness of the bill. Their vote on the bill was unanimous. I heartily endorse that vote.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. ICHORD].

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889 authorizing the appropriation of $4,857,450,000 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the support of our troops in South Vietnam. This authorization, Mr. Chairman, representing a supplemental authorization for the fiscal year of 1966 is vitally needed to support our troops.

It has been asked for by the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces as necessary to accomplish our objectives, in South Vietnam. It has been supported by the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been unanimously recommended by the House Committee on Armed Services. This measure must be passed to meet the commitment this body itself made when it passed the Tonkin resolution of August 10, 1964 by a vote of 416 to 0.

The time for debate is past. The time for action is now. This is not only to carry out a commitment of the Executive. This is a commitment of the Congress itself and we should show the Communist aggressors not only in southeast Asia but all over the world that we are united in our determination to stop Communist aggression.

Mr. Chairman, Winston Churchill said:

> It is the duty of every citizen in time of trouble to do or say or even think of nothing that can weaken or discourage the energies of the state.

This statement, in my opinion, can well serve as a standard of conduct for all Americans in regard to South Vietnam. The questioning of our policy now which we committed ourself to on August 10, 1964 can only serve to weaken the state and give encouragement to our enemies. This is our time to say something which will strengthen and encourage our men in South Vietnam. We should speak out

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

with an overwhelming vote in favor of this measure.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LOVE].

Mr. LOVE. Mr. Chairman, I supported this bill and in so doing support the administration and its policy in Vietnam. I naturally feel that this bill is necessary to support our forces in southeast Asia but I especially like the psychological impact it can make at this time in the world of ideas and the need for unity in our own country. My remarks are in extension of research, development, test and evaluation supplement for the Air Force as set forth in pages 5 of the committee's report.

The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia support supplemental for the research, development, test and evaluation, Air Force appropriation amounts to $71,085,000. These funds are required for immediate initiation of developments involving two aircraft weapons systems, development and test of an item under the chemical/biological operational support program, development and test of a number of items in the conventional munitions program, and a classified project.

The aircraft and related equipment program amounts to $36,300,000 which provides for two engineering development programs under the close support fighter program. These developments, which will increase our capabilities for close air support of ground forces in southeast Asia, consist of $10 million for development and test of modifications to the F–4 (TSF) aircraft to improve its performance capabilities, and $26,300,000 for development and test of modifications to the A–7A aircraft to adapt this Navy aircraft to meet Air Force requirements.

The other equipment program amounts to $34,785,000 which provides for an advanced development program requirement, a number of items in the engineering development program, and a general support program development requirement. In the advanced development program, $1,600,000 is included for development and test of a conventional munitions component. In the engineering development program, $250,000 is provided for development and test of a munition under the chemical/biological operational support program, and $7,735,000 is provided for a number of munitions and other projects under the other operational support program. The general support program includes $25,200,000 for development of a specialized collection activities program system.

The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia support supplemental for this appropriation includes only the most urgent developments which can be made available to combat forces before June 30, 1967. Therefore, the items selected are those whose lead times are so long that they cannot be deferred until the fiscal year 1967 appropriation becomes available.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANDERSON] such time as he may require.

(Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889, the supplemental defense authorization bill. At an hour when more than 200,000 American men are locked in mortal combat with the enemy in southeast Asia, it is inconceivable to me that as Representatives of the people in the Congress we would do less than support this bill. It is a bill designed purely and simply to authorize the necessary supplemental funds required to fund military procurement of needed items. There have been some suggestions both in the debate here on the floor today and elsewhere that something more should be read into this vote than an approval or authorization of necessary funding for the American Armed Forces. Indeed, there have been times today when it seemed as if certain Members of this body wished that there could be two separate and distinct votes on this measure. One vote would permit those who are simply in favor of doing something for the boys to vote "aye." The other vote would be for those who not only wished to authorize funds for the Department of Defense but simultaneously to give a ringing and rousing approval to everything past, present, and future that has been or will be done by the Johnson administration.

Certainly, there is nothing in the wording of the legislation now before us which explicitly commits anyone to an approval of the various policies that have been pursued by the administration with respect to the matter of Vietnam. It could be argued that implicit in the approval of this authorization bill is the approval of current policy. However, I think that we would be establishing an unwise precedent indeed if we were to attempt to read too much into the passage of a military authorization bill. By the same token, I think that the 76 Members of this body who have signed a manifesto or declaration that their vote for this measure does not carry with it approval for the escalation of the war or our deeper involvement in southeast Asia will also "carry coals to Newcastle."

Mr. Chairman, I have no qualms at all concerning the legality of our present position in South Vietnam as expressed in a recent resolution of the American Bar Association. I think our presence there is legal under international law, under the SEATO treaty to which we are a signatory, and under the Charter of the United Nations. However, I think that the future actions of the present administration with respect to the conduct of the war in South Vietnam must be based on a clear declaration of what our ultimate purpose there is to be. I am not convinced that the administration has been absolutely clear in this regard. In particular, I am concerned at the obvious attempts that have taken place recently to gloss over the differences that apparently were opened up between the administration and the junior Senator from New York when the latter spoke in favor of admitting the Vietcong to a share of power and responsibility in South Vietnam. Rather than attempt to paper over internal differences of such fundamental nature, I think that the administration should make it crystal clear that our boys are not dying in South Vietnam merely so that we can ultimately repair to the bargaining table perhaps to hand over a portion of the government of that country to the Vietcong. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I take this time to set down these words so that my position may be irrevocably clear. I support this measure and with it the heroic sacrifices being made by our men in South Vietnam. At the same time I do not want history to record that by this vote I gave this administration my blank check with respect to its future conduct of policy in South Vietnam.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. RANDALL].

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, our fighting men are committed in Vietnam and we have passed the time for much more debate. It seems to me we should be more concerned about getting the implements and tools of war to them so that they can do the job. I think we might pause for a monment to reflect that this is the first time in all of our American history that we have ever stopped in the middle of a fighting war to debate how we got into the war and why and whether it was a wise thing to do. That is exactly what we have been doing for far too long.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RYAN. Has war been declared by the Congress?

Mr. RANDALL. It has been brought out crystal clear that the joint resolution unanimously agreed to by this House, 416 to 0 on August 7, 1964, is a sufficient declaration to authorize the President to conduct military operations in southeast Asia.

The southeast Asian resolution stated "that the Congress approves and supports the President as Commander in Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The resolution was very firm and included the recitation:

> The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of peace and security in southeast Asia.

Mr. RYAN. Does the gentleman construe that resolution to be a declaration of war?

Mr. RANDALL. Not a formal declaration, but for my part the resolution provides ample authority and I think also, for the overwhelming majority of fellow Members, as will be shown by the vote on this bill today.

The situation as to Vietnam is that the President has ordered a gradual buildup of forces only after frequent consultations with the Congress. The Congress has repeatedly expressed its approval not only through the August 1964 resolution but by monetary appropriations for the war. Exclusive of the measure before us today, the Congress has overwhelmingly approved two sup-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

plemental appropriations including the $1.7 billion southeast Asia emergency fund passed on September 17, 1965, directly after the President announced his intention to increase our military participation in that area. There have been frequent consultations by the President with Congress, both by resolution and by appropriation and by both means we have overwhelmingly approved the President's policy. The Congress' strongest weapon in foreign policy is through control of appropriations. Approval of these monetary sums should be recognized as constituting firm support of the President's authority to conduct war in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war by the Congress. There exist some valid reasons why there should not be a formal declaration of war.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of humanitarian concern about injury or harm to a few Vietnamese civilians in the jungles of Vietnam. If this has happened, it has been accidental and unavoidable and not by design or intentional.

But I want to take the time to discuss some items in this authorization that were touched on briefly by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HALL].

I refer to funds for more and better field hospitals and evacuation facilities. I know you have heard about the new hospital ship and also those new portable operating rooms that can be brought in by helicopter and permit an operation to be performed very near the scene of combat. Let us remember the present rate of fatalities among our American wounded is less than 1 percent. That represents a drop from the 2.5 percent level of Korea. In World War I it was about 9 percent, as I recall. In World War II it dropped to 3.4 percent. In Korea it was 2.5 percent. Now it is less than 1 full percentage point.

This means we now enjoy the most admirable record of any war in history in taking care of those who are badly wounded, and seeing to it that they survive.

I ask my fellow Members to compare the foregoing figures with casualties on our highways. On February 26 the National Safety Council finally got all of its estimates in for 1965. The death toll on our highways was 107,000. But listen to this—52.2 percent of all injuries were fatal. This is the figure we must set for comparison to the less than 1 percent figure of fatalities among our wounded in Vietnam, all because of the excellence of our evacuation and field hospital procedures.

Mr. Chairman in the remaining moments of the time which has been accorded me I wish to commend the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HARDY], for the amendment which he added to H.R. 12889, which provided that the Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House a description of each construction project, including a cost analysis, prior to the execution of any contract.

It is also heartening to know that an amendment has been added that requires the Secretary of Defense to furnish the Armed Services Committees of both the Senate and the House complete information on any alternative methods of adequately auditing contracts before the President is empowered to waive any provisions of present statutory requirements for audit either by the Comptroller General or the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting that construction costs are excessive but I was glad to learn that the General Accounting Office is going to send some representatives to Vietnam. We cannot have a construction program going forward in southeast Asia with an attitude of "business as usual." These facilities must be constructed to a minimum standard consistent with their intended use. Maximum use must be made of local labor and materials. The maximum of emphasis should be placed upon prefabricated, dismountable, and even inflatable structures which will give the very greatest value for the lowest cost. These remarks are simply cautionary, but become necessary when contractors are proceeding on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. For the present I have confidence that our American ingenuity and experience will win out over the serious construction problems facing us in Vietnam.

The Asian Communists have decided to make the war in Vietnam a test of our determination and resolution. In other words, to make this war a test of our will to win. They think they can sap our capability to the point where we will either withdraw or consent to peace on their terms. This must not happen.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that neither the House nor the Senate had any intention of declaring war when they passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Not even the President, who asked for the resolution, has ever suggested that he was asking Congress to declare war.

I would remind my colleague of the debate which took place in the Senate at that time. Those who engaged in the debate never thought that they were declaring war. They were not. I would recall, for example, the exchange between Senator BREWSTER and the floor manager of the bill, Senator FULBRIGHT.

> Senator BREWSTER. So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.
>
> Senator FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it.

Mr. Chairman, I might note that I explored this question more thoroughly in my speech during the debate earlier this afternoon.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOW].

(Mr. DOW asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOW. Mr. Chairman, as one who is not in favor of escalating the conflict in Vietnam, let me say that I will vote for the bill before us to authorize a total of $4.8 billion as a Department of Defense supplement, southeast Asia, fiscal 1966.

My affirmative vote for this bill is given with a sad heart. The men at the front should not be allowed to run short of the ammunition and equipment they need to defend themselves. That is the only reason I can see to vote for this authorization.

The situation is different from one last year when there was an earlier authorization for the Vietnam conflict. At that time I did not support it, for administration spokesmen told us that funds were available in other accounts without legislation. The legislation then was intended as an expression of policy.

Although voting today for the new legislation for munitions, I still do not favor the policy of escalation which the legislation makes possible.

It is a great inspiration to me that I can join today with several score of my colleagues in a statement that throws some question upon the escalation of the combat in southeast Asia. Those who have assembled these signatures deserve appreciation for they have done us all a great service.

Let us look at the authorization before us today. From the testimony at the recent hearings before the Committee on Armed Services of the other body, it is unmistakably clear that the purpose of the present authorizations is to provide for much more extensive combat. For example, on page 132 of the report of those hearings, the Secretary of Defense says of the aircraft procurement that after replacement of losses, "It does include added inventory."

In referring to helicopters he says on page 191:

> Well, the number of helicopters that we are buying far exceeds any number that we are likely to lose.

Commenting generally on all procurement to be authorized, the Secretary of Defense on page 11 has the following to say:

> To support these higher rates of consumption and combat attrition, rebuild inventories, and provide for the additional forces, we have greatly increased production rates and started new production lines.

So that, in voting, "aye" to maintain our men overseas, we are unfortunately required to vote at the same time for increasing the conflict.

If we had clear reasons for our actions in Vietnam and a clearly limited objective at the end, it would be much easier to justify the procurement which we are permitting today.

They say that we have a commitment in Vietnam. However, the Constitution of the United States does not contain the word "commitment." The Constitution provides for treaties, because these are a definite form in which the parties sign for definite obligations. Is our ship of state to be guided by bulging commitments which are not written and no one can define? If we have to get along in a world of commitments, a good case could be made that we have a commitment to all men everywhere in the world to keep the peace. And that commitment may be a firmer one than any commitment we owe to a particular group of men in Vietnam.

If the aim of the United States is to contain communism, I wonder if the

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

planting of a fencepost in Vietnam is going to serve as a complete fence against communism all over the world. If our aim is to destroy communism, how can we do that by a single beachhead on the coast of Asia, a continent where there are over a billion men? I suspect that any hold we maintain there, or any local government we set up there can never exist in peace with the rest of Asia. It will always be a thorn in the side of civilization in that part of the world and will either be expelled or it will promote a third world war, engulfing us all.

I know that our people truly believe that they art fighting for the freedom of people of South Vietnam. Yet hardly knowing the language of Vietnam, how can our people impart American-style freedom in a few short years to a society where other customs have obtained for centuries back?

How many more times and in how many places can we continue to be the sole policeman and judge for enforcing a law that no association of nations has authorized us to enforce? The Americans fighting and serving in Vietnam are doing so nobly and sincerely. But is the leadership that we Congressmen are giving them the wise leadership that it should be? That is a question.

Should we not listen to the recent words of caution that come from the World Council of Churches, our National Council of Churches, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and from Pope Paul, himself, urging that we should hold back in this sad conflict?

Mr. Speaker, these are not the only questions that can be raised about the policy of our country in Vietnam. They are enough, however, to suggest that we should consider a better course.

For the reason stated earlier, I will not attempt a denial of these military funds as my small lever for changing our line of action. Yet certainly, I and those of like mind, must find other ways to guide our national policy upon a better course.

I endorse measures which the President is taking in the direction of peace and justice. Many hopeful measures have been proposed by others, as well. Let us believe that some of these will prevent escalation of the conflict to the point of worldwide nuclear catastrophe.

A legislator owes more to the men under arms than the obligation to supply weapons and ammunition. He owes to those men who are offering their lives the application of his best judgment and wisdom in order to make sure that those men are sent only to the right places at the right time. Our eyes should not be focused solely on the battlefield in southeast Asia.

More important still, are the moral questions and a horizonwide view of international politics which will bring a correct evaluation of the whole situation. Above all, we must set a good objective and a clear one. This is our part of the job. This is what Congressmen owe our fighting men.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. PIKE].

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman, Kahlil Gibran, a poet and artist of the Near East, once wrote a story about critics that may be appropriate as we consider the cruel dilemma of Vietnam.

One nightfall a man traveling on horseback toward the sea reached an inn by the roadside. He dismounted, and confident in man and night like all riders toward the sea, he tied his horse to a tree beside the door and entered into the inn.

At midnight, when all were asleep, a thief came and stole the traveler's horse.

In the morning the man awoke, and discovered that his horse was stolen. And he grieved for his horse, and that a man had found it in his heart to steal.

Then his fellow lodgers came and stood around him and began to talk.

And the first man said, "How foolish of you to tie your horse outside the stable."

And the second said, "Still more foolish, without even hobbling the horse."

And the third man said, "It is stupid at best to travel to the sea on horseback."

And the fourth said, "Only the indolent and the slow of foot own horses."

Then the traveler was much astonished. At last he cried, "My friends, because my horse is stolen, you have hastened one and all to tell me my faults and my shortcomings. But strange, not one word of reproach have you uttered about the man who stole my horse."

I think President Johnson could well paraphrase the words of the traveler and say, "My friends, there are so many who can point out the faults and shortcomings of our Nation's policies. But is it not strange that hardly a word of reproach has been uttered against the policies of Hanoi who started the war in Vietnam, and who keep it going. Stranger still, to hear not one word of reproach for the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front, which has systematically killed and tortured thousands of civilians in South Vietnam for the past 12 years."

Now the time has come for us to reaffirm the vote of the Tonkin resolution. It is in the interest of peace that the world know we support our President and that our country is united. The Communists of southeast Asia would gravely underestimate the staying power of this country if they thought that the Congress of the United States did not support the President. When peace where freemen can determine nation, and the validity of our commitment, then, and only then, will we move this war to the peace table. A vote for this bill is a vote for peace. Not the peace of surrender, but an honorable peace where free men can determine what shall be the course of their nation's destiny.

What we are doing today makes certain that a military victory is beyond the hopes of Hanoi.

When this penetrates the policymakers in Hanoi, I am convinced that the real hopes for peace will begin to surface. They will not be convinced, if they think we are divided. The vote today will demonstrate not division, but unity.

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, we have heard every shade of opinion in this debate. We have shown for what my chairman would call the "gillionth" time that in a free society free speech means that every shade of dissent must be heard. It has been heard.

The debate on this bill started with an expression of anxiety from one of my colleagues, from my party, from my State. He was afraid that if we passed this bill, we would, in his words, be placing another brick in the arch of congressional support for our Nation's policy in Vietnam."

I would like to conclude this debate with an expression, not of fear, but of hope. I hope that we will pass this bill. I hope that it will be construed as another brick in the arch of congressional support for our policy in Vietnam. I hope that it will be construed as the support of the American people for our policy in Vietnam. I hope that it will be so construed in this Chamber, in this city, in this Nation, in Saigon, and especially in Hanoi and Peiping.

I hope for more than that. I hope that we are not building an arch but are building a firm foundation, a foundation of strength and security on which a firm peace can be built, a foundation on which the brave people of South Vietnam can build a future of hope for their children.

As the people of Vietnam look to America for hope, so do the people of Thailand. As the people of southeast Asia look to this land for hope, so do all the people in this world. If all they hear when they listen to the debate on this bill this afternoon in this House of Representatives are words of anxiety and fear, of nibbling and quibbling, then there is not much hope for them. If people all over the world look to America and conclude that America offers them no hope, then there is not much hope for America.

Let us give them some hope today. Let us give America some hope for the future. This is the measure on which to do it. This is the time to do it. Now is the hour to put this debate behind us and get on with the job.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889 which authorizes appropriations during fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, track combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction.

I rise in support of this important legislation because incorporated in its provision are funds to give, above all, our soldiers in Vietnam, the tools they need for victory. This legislation helps make it possible for our Nation to carry out our present policy in Vietnam.

My colleague from New York completely overlooks the fact that our total lack of arms during the early and middle 1930's was an open invitation to Hitler's aggression.

My colleague ignores the facts of history when he argues that the legislation before us today is designed to escalate the war in Vietnam. On the contrary, this whole appropriation will make pos-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

sible purchases of those very sinews which our soldiers need to finally convince the Communists in Vietnam that their course of continued hostility against freedom will end in defeat and disaster.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we are now winning the war in Vietnam. We are winning this war because we have finally turned the tide against Communist subversion and terrorism by giving our soldiers all of the tools they need. There are those who argue that the Vietnam conflict is the most costly conflict that our Nation has ever been engaged in when measured against the number of Communist casualties. I think it is a dangerous practice to weight the cost of the war against enemy losses. My own judgment is that the most meaningful test is, one, whether we can win sooner with these added tools for our soldiers, and more importantly, and, two, whether this additional equipment which we are now sending to Vietnam is saving American lives and those of our allies. The answer in both instances is "Yes."

Because of our massive assignment of equipment to Vietnam, our losses are steadily going down; and those of our soldiers who have received injuries are being saved at a higher percentage rate than ever before recorded in any conflict. Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the American people, once having committed themselves to the defense of freedom in Vietnam, want to make sure that our American troops are fully equipped in their difficult struggle against the Communists; and it is for his reason that I intend to support this bill.

But more importantly, I support this legislation because I remember only too well how an unprepared America saw a Hitler escalate his maniacal quest for victory into World War II.

The tragedy of Dachau and Buchenwald, the massive losses which we suffered in World War II, and the mammoth destruction could have been avoided. Hitler could have been stopped before he got started had we 30 years ago had the same vision and determination which we are demonstrating in Vietnam today.

Those who argue against our policy in Vietnam insist on being blind to the fact that this struggle is part of a 20-year struggle against the ravages of communism. It is ironic that at a time when we have every reason to believe that victory can be ours in Vietnam, voices are being raised in this country to withdraw our effort and leave the whole of three continents—Asia, Africa, and, yes, South America—subject to the same kind of terror and subversion by Communist guerrillas that we are witnessing in Vietnam.

It is in this light that I hope this legislation before us will be overwhelmingly approved this afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose this supplemental defense authorization for the war in Vietnam, just as I opposed the much smaller request of $700 million on May 5, 1965.

It is difficult for me to take this action. I do not desire to deprive our military forces of the support they need to carry out the jobs assigned to them, regardless of how much I may differ with the policies which have led to those assignments.

Many of my colleagues, who are similarly concerned with our course in Vietnam, have elected a different type of action. In a statement circulated to other Members and the press they indicate that they will vote for the supplemental defense authorization. But they add this statement:

> We therefore reject any contention that approval of this legislation will constitute a mandate for unrestrained or indiscriminate enlargement of the military effort, and we strongly support continued efforts to initiate negotiations for settlement of the conflict.

I can support that statement. But I cannot accept the faith of my colleagues that this statement will alter the course which has been set within the military and executive offices toward a larger and, in the last analysis, an unlimited war.

Why do I say this? Last year when the President asked this Congress for $700 million in supplemental defense appropriations, many of my colleagues made similar statements as they voted for that modest sum. At the very moment we were voting, operations were being conducted that required many times that amount of additional funding. Plans were then in existence, and were announced within a few weeks, to triple our military manpower in Vietnam and to expand our military construction program in Vietnam many times over. In addition, those plans, since carried out, have been doubled and may be doubled again before the year is out. Not once has Congress been asked to vote on these decisions prior to their being taken.

This has been the history of our involvement in Vietnam for 15 years. Congress has gone along with the plans of the executive branch, voting the funds requested, voicing a pious hope for the use of good judgment, but never establishing an independent policy or lifting an independent voice.

The United States financed the last several years of the French effort to maintain their colonial rule in southeast Asia, as part of our commitment to the military containment of Russian communism, which we saw as the specter of the postwar period. I doubt if Congress knew the extent of our commitment to the French, or knew that Dulles offered them atomic bombs to use against the Viet Minh or the Red Chinese. I doubt if Congress realized that our policy at that time merely postponed the inevitable collapse of French colonialism in southeast Asia—a collapse which the French themselves had accepted in 1946—and cost the peoples of France and Vietnam a few hundred thousand more in dead and wounded, as well as costing the U.S. taxpayers a few billion wasted dollars.

We created and supported to the hilt the government of Ngo Dinh Diem for the 10 years of its existence. Congress voted the funds for this adventure as part of our foreign aid program, never asking whether Diem had a legitimate mandate to rule this artificial creation of South Vietnam as a family empire—never asking why he was permitted to unilaterally declare that the Geneva agreements were not binding on his country—never asking who in the U.S. Government was authorized to encourage him in this defiance of an international agreement.

Yet today we are told by the executive branch that Congress has approved every step of our involvement in Vietnam. We are told that approval by Congress of our aid program for Vietnam is evidence of our approval of the escalating military involvement there—is evidence of congressional commitment to a program now costing tens of billions of dollars, involving hundreds of thousands of our youth, and leading to yet unknown perils. I voted for some of those aid programs, little realizing how that vote would be construed.

If the argument that congressional approval of AID programs to Vietnam constituted endorsement of our military involvement there is not sufficient, we are told that the Tonkin Bay resolution of August 1964 provides the basis for our involvement in Vietnam today. I voted for that resolution. Who can vote against a resolution supporting our right to defend ourselves when our vessels are attacked at sea? I made this vote knowing that on the floor of the other body abundant colloquy made it clear that this resolution added no authority to the President's powers as Commander in Chief to repel attack, and provided no mandate for a change in the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Yet, today, it would not surprise me to see U.S. bombers over Peiping, with the pilots waving a copy of the Tonkin Bay resolution as the authority for their action as the bombs are dropped, if this same justification were carried to another extreme.

This country is involved in a problem of tremendous complexity in Vietnam, and in all of Asia. This is a problem requiring the most exhaustive and far-reaching analysis, the best judgment, and the most dedicated effort of which this country and its Government is capable. Yet at no point in recent years, except possibly during the last few weeks, has the Congress of the United States examined fully the nature of that problem. We are presented with the problem in pieces. We are told that we must accept the judgment of those who are closer to the situation, who know all the facts. Because we accept that judgment on the little pieces, over the years, then when the time comes that the mistakes of the past come home to haunt us, we are told that we authorized those mistakes, that each approval of a little piece on faith now adds up to approval of a total policy—a policy which can no longer be changed.

I choose now to break that pattern in the only way that a Member of Congress can do so with any effect. I will vote against this bill, just as I voted last week against the tax bill and the foreign aid bill.

I urge my colleagues to do likewise. They will then be fulfilling their responsibilities as representatives of the people of the United States, for it is the vote that will be examined by the people, and by those members of the executive

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

branch who seek to analyze the will of Congress—not their very laudable disclaimers of intent to support a larger war, or their call for a negotiated peace.

The contradictions of the U.S. course in Vietnam may soon be apparent for all our people and all the world to see. The political leaders of this country have contended that our efforts in Vietnam have been motivated by a desire only for the freedom of the people of that country. We are publicly committed to accept the free choice of the people of South Vietnam as to the kind of government which they desire. For 16 years, however, U.S. policies have prevented the expression of that free choice, despite all our protestations to the contrary. When the day comes that that choice is expressed—and that choice repudiates the United States and its handpicked military dictators—the people of this country will be entitled to ask the quesion: "Why have we labored and sacrificed so much, and in vain?"

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889 which will authorize additional defense appropriations in the amount of $4.8 billion during this fiscal year.

The issue before us is not whether we should or should not be in Vietnam. There are over 200,000 young Americans fighting in Vietnam today.

The President, who under the constitution has the responsibility for foreign policy and is designated as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has made the decisions which commits our Nation to this struggle in southeast Asia.

The Congress has the constitutional responsibility of providing the funds to give our boys the weapons, food, clothing and other equipment to sustain them in their dangerous mission.

Last summer I recall there were many of us in the House who felt the 1966 defense budget was not adequate to insure sufficient funds for the greater U.S. role, determined by the President in southeast Asia.

Minority members on the House Appropriations Committee stated in additional views contained in the committee report dated June 17, 1965:

> The situation in Vietnam and the overall problem caused by Communist aggression in southeast Asia is of extreme concern to everyone. It is our judgment, based on the testimony before this committee, that the fiscal year 1966 budget request reflects inadequate funding for the Vietnamese effort. Policy decisions affecting our position and commitments in Vietnam were made by the President. This commitment included the large-scale introduction of American personnel and equipment. We believe these decisions to commit American lives and American prestige must be backed up and supported with the appropriations necessary to carry them out successfully.

Although there were additional funds included in the final version of the defense measure last year, it is obvious that the administration did not heed the minority views. Nevetheless, our responsibility remains the same: We must back up and support the decisions of the President to commit American lives with the necessary appropriations to insure the success of their mission.

Mr. MACHEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the supplemental appropriation bill, H.R. 12889, for the Defense Department. In so doing I want to make it clear that I fully support the President's conduct of our involvement in Vietnam. How we vote and what we say today on this crucial policy decision will have far-reaching implications. We must show our fighting men in Vietnam that we are united behind them and will not hesitate to give them whatever is needed to do the job they are doing for the cause of freedom. We must at the same time show Hanoi that we are united behind and support our President in his continuing efforts to find an honorable solution to the war in Vietnam. We must guard against doing anything that could lead to misinterpretation by our enemies of the strength of our determination to do what must be done in Vietnam.

Never before in our history has our involvment in armed conflict had to be explained our and over again as has our participation in the fight for freedom in Vietnam. The simple answer is this: We are fighting by the side of the Vietnamese in order to prevent their enslavement by communism through the use of force and terrorism. But our reasons for being in Vietnam go much further. They include the protection of our own national interest. For, if we allow Communist aggression in Vietnam to be profitable and to succeed, then that aggression surely will continue. Inevitably we will have to stand up to it somewhere. The costs then—in lives and money—could make the Vietnam war look like a minor conflict by comparison.

There is a great paradox existing in our world today because of our nuclear capability. However, in reality there is nothing paradoxical about it. Our capacity to destroy people and property in an instant has in itself aroused new hopes of lasting peace. When victory can mean a struggle for survival, a worldwide conflict with the armed power that is apparent today has become unthinkable.

The peace of the world absolutely requires that we maintain a powerful national defense—a defense that could destroy an enemy and one that could assure survial if nuclear war should be forced upon us. The world is now in the situation that another Pearl Harbor is not possible. Our destruction and the destruction of our enemy would be separated by only a few minutes. However, at the same time we must be prepared for the continuance of small wars.

I can remember in the thirties when we heard so much about "peace in our time." A few years later we were involved in the most terrible war in the history of mankind. History has taught us that peace cannot be bought by appeasement. Appeasement only feeds the appetite of the aggressor.

It is an irrefutable fact that if the United States were to remove its troops from South Vietnam, the Communists would move in from the north and take over. This has been made clear to us by the continued aggression of North Vietnam.

As as matter of fact, escalation has occurred very rapidly since I have been in Congress. When I took my seat in January last year, our policy and program was a continuation of the Eisenhower-Kennedy position; that is, technical assistance and advice to the South Vietnamese and housekeeping tasks for the advisers.

However, in the early morning of February 7, 1965, the Vietcong forces carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa on two barracks installations in the Pleiku area and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casualties were inflicted and at least one village was burned.

These attacks by the Vietcong were a concerted and politically timed effort to sharpen and intensify the aggression and to test the will of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States to resist.

From that point on, the combined efforts of the United States and South Vietnam were stepped up. We began the bombings of limited military targets in North Vietnam and greatly increased our commitment in numbers of men and supplies.

We are present in Vietnam today because we were asked for help and we responded. Now we have the grave responsibility not to withdraw and abandon the 15 million Vietnamese that have fought at our side.

I can assure you that a unilateral suspension of hostilities would result, not in an end to violence, but in an increase of North Vietnam's terrorist aggression against what would then be a totally defenseless population.

There is a second consideration. If the United States were to pull out of Vietnam, the Communist world would be put on notice that they could defeat democracy in any area they chose by the exertion of brute force.

We can be certain that as long as the Vietcong—with their ally, Red China—feel that they can win, they will continue to press forward.

We have and must continue to demonstrate that we will resist aggression, either overt or covert—and at the same time keep the door open for negotiation. Our President has kept an open offer of negotiation, which he has reiterated again and again. But this offer has never been accepted.

The United States has attempted more than once to use the machinery of the U.N. to help solve various aspects of the Vietnam situation. Only to have the Vietcong condemn the U.N. activities as illegal and state that they could not guarantee the safety of any investigative mission.

As you can see, any peace settlement, to be effective, must be agreed to by parties who are willing to work out and abide by such an agreement. However, we have received no indication that Hanoi or Peiping are interested in any type of peace discussion.

I can quote to you from a letter that President Eisenhower wrote to Winston Churchill in 1954. He said:

> If I may refer again to history, we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?

I think that with draft card burners and demonstrators to the contrary, our position in Vietnam is the only possible one for the cause of peace.

It is unfortunate that those who exercise the right of free speech in opposition to our policy do damage out of proportion to their numbers. There is disturbing evidence that their demonstrations are prolonging the war and undermining the morale of our Armed Forces. Because of the worldwide attention they have received it is believed that the Vietcong and/or Red China are encouraged to prolong the war because they feel that a collapse of the U.S. war effort is imminent.

However, until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its intervention in the south, or until effective steps are taken to maintain peace and security in the area, the Governments of South Vietnam and the United States will continue necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Vietnam.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, the measure now before the House for its consideration is directed toward providing adequate defense support for our American troops in Vietnam.

World peace is certainly the goal of each and every one of us here in this Chamber, as it surely is the earnest desire of every American.

I am confident that no one hopes and prays for lasting peace more than our own young men now serving in the Armed Forces in South Vietnam. For they know the terrible meaning of war, and must hope for the early success of our efforts to start negotiations, get the conflict away from the battlefield, and bring it to the conference table.

But, while these efforts to discuss our differences, and to negotiate a just and equitable settlement in Vietnam go forward, and while we continue to promote the cause of peaceful social revolution, political reform, and economic development in southeast Asia, we dare not neglect to support fully our fighting men with the essential implements to lighten their burden and shorten the time before they can return to their loved ones at home.

For that reason, I know Congress will give its overwhelming approval to the present legislation as an expression of national unity behind America's servicemen in the field.

In voting for this supplemental defense authorization, I wish to make it clear that my vote should not be construed as an unqualified endorsement of all aspects of our policy in Vietnam.

Moreover, such an affirmative vote by the Congress of the United States, in my opinion, does not constitute a mandate for unrestrained or indiscriminate enlargement of the military effort, and most certainly, not a blanket approval of present and future action in that part of the world. On the contrary, I believe it is vital to all concerned that this country exercise the most careful prudence in all our activities in southeast Asia so as to limit the conflict as much as possible.

But it seems to me to be in the interest of our constant search for peace to support the authorization.

This demonstration of unity in today's vote is designed to convince the Vietcong that the vast majority of the American people are determined to support our fighting men in Vietnam and open the way for an early settlement of the conflict, giving the Vietnamese people themselves the right of self-determination without external interference, and the opportunity to live in freedom and peace.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, first I want to compliment my very able friend and distinguished chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], and the entire committee for the very fine, expeditious work they have done in bringing this bill to the floor of the House.

This is a very important supplemental bill authorizing appropriations during fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test and evaluation and military construction in the amount of some $4,800 million.

The programs and items contained in this bill are directed toward the support of our forces in Vietnam, and for that reason especially, I hope that the bill can be speedily considered and preponderantly passed by the House.

Such a result would serve once again to emphasize the determination of this House to press forward with utmost vigor, speed and determination with every measure that is designed to sustain our gallant forces in Vietnam which are now fighting one of the most savage, difficult conflicts in which our Nation has been engaged.

This bill, and others to follow it during this session of Congress, will make it clear to our adversaries and others who are supporting, financing, encouraging, and helping them, that we here are completely united in our purpose to continue to do everything in our power to supply our fighting forces with every type and kind of military power, materiel, weapons, strength, and equipment that they need to gain all their objectives in this desperate struggle against tyranny and aggression.

Our armed services have their roles and their missions and their objectives, and we of this Congress have ours. Let us make it clear to all that we intend to carry them out in every detail with firm purpose, with efficiency and speed and adequacy.

Let it not be said for one moment by anyone, friend or foe, that our committee and our membership are not fulfilling, to the utmost, the constitutional duty we have imposed upon us to provide for the common defense of this country, and to make sure at all times that our armed services, wherever they may be, and especially in Vietnam, are furnished with everything that they need to carry out every single mission that is committed to them in this hour of trial, challenge and peril for the cause of freedom and security of this Nation and the free world.

History is replete with the despicable oppressions of tyrants, and their ruthless violence, mass slaughter, bloodshed, and inhumanity.

Still fresh in our minds, is our own experience with tyrants of our own times.

If we learn any lesson from past wars or past conflicts, it is the awful consequences that flow from appeasement of those who are making determined efforts to destroy us and our way of life and impose upon us a debased, slave system that would destroy our liberties.

It is not the duty, or the mission, of this committee, or this House to determine the foreign policy of this Nation, map out strategy and tactics, or conduct military operations in which this Nation may be engaged. These matters lie in the province of the executive department of the Government.

But as Members of this House, we have the urgent, special duty imposed upon us by the Constitution of backing up and sustaining our foreign policy and providing the sinews of power and strength that may be needed at any time to defend the United States, to provide as best we can for our present and future security, and to leave nothing undone to insure that our Armed Forces shall have the power, the strength and the striking force we need to protect the Nation, to preserve our freedoms and carry out our commitments to freedom in the perilous, upset world in which we live.

That is what we are seeking to do now by bringing this bill before the House, and others will follow along the same lines, designed for the same purpose, the strengthening of the national defense, and all of them will be brought here as this one is here, not for the purpose of throwing our weight around the world to see how quickly we can become involved in a nuclear war, not to conduct unwarranted and unprovoked military aggression against any nation, but solely with the design of pursuing freedom, peace, seeking justice through opposition to injustice, opposing tyranny, to preserve freedom and law and order in the world, protecting our own shores and our own homes and our own free institutions which are so meaningful, not only to us, but to all those who are determined that men and women shall be free.

However, we must be mindful of the practical realities that face us, the kind of world we are living in, surrounded as we are by so many adversaries who are working to undermine the pillars of our Government and destroy our freedoms.

There is no way that I know of by which we can wring peace from those who do not want peace, whose interests are best served, so they believe, by promoting conditions that make peace impossible, by encouraging and creating

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

discontent and dissatisfaction among the masses of people, promoting demonstrations, agitations, civil uprisings, and insurrections designed to undermine established governments, engage in unwarranted aggression against their neighbors, testing the will of freedom-minded people to resist and repel aggression, injustice, and violence in the belief that they do not have either the moral fiber, the courage, or the strength of purpose to do so.

Peace cannot come alone by making appeals to those who have shown that they are deaf to appeals, although everything must be sought and tried that we believe will bring peace. There is little to be gained by trying to plead with those whose hearts and minds are already closed to our pleas, and who may well construe our repeated pleas as evidence of weakness and indecision.

To bring about peace in Vietnam would be one of the greatest things this Nation could accomplish, not only for ourselves, but for the world, and by all means, we must continue to seek peace with all our hearts and energies, even as we realize that peace may not dwell in the hearts of those to whom we direct our ardent sincere appeals.

Some choices in this situation are not easy ones, because in the end they add up either to surrender and withdrawal and the terrible disaster that course would entail, or of continuing with this bloody struggle until the price becomes too high for Communist aggressors to pay. These are not easy choices, my friends, but neither are some of the consequences that would follow from abandoning our resistance, our commitments and our long-range security interests.

That is the very importance of this bill, and others that will follow it, because it is our readiness and strength and purpose, more than anything else, that will make clear to aggressors and tyrants that, while we want peace, and strive with all our hearts to secure peace, we will not flinch from any struggle that we deem is necessary to preserve freedom and security and justice, and that we will continue to face every contingency, and bear any risk, and make any sacrifice to uphold the cause of this country and the ideals and principles of free government.

I do not intend to discuss the technical provisions of this bill because they are spelled out in the report, and I believe the House already understands their purpose and scope.

This is the time, of all times, that the executive department and the Congress must work together. There is a time for discussion and arguing, and there is a time for wholehearted cooperation between every branch of this Government, and every official in this Government, and in the Congress, to strengthen our defense and to assert for ourselves, as a powerful, unified, national front, our firm purpose of sustaining and preserving the Nation and doing our best through our great strength—military, economic, and spiritual, the power of our ideals and principles as well as the power of our arms, to put an end to the fighting in Vietnam and establish peace.

There is no reason why this objective cannot be achieved if our adversaries will lend an ear and listen to our appeals and cooperate with us and other nations of good will and peaceful intentions by sitting around the peace table and agreeing to the conditions for permanent, enduring peace.

Call this peace through strength, if you will, but call it the expression of our deep, determined American interest in peace, and our intention to pursue that interest, until we finally achieve the peaceful objectives we and most other nations in the world have in mind.

Until that time comes, we must be strong, always prepared and ready for any eventuality, never letting it be said that we did not do our best to maintain and preserve the peace, letting it be known to all Communists and free peoples in clear, unmistakable ways that we will not surrender our freedom, independence, democratic institutions, and that we will use our strength, not only to protect ourselves and keep our commitments, but to foster justice and peace in the world.

I hope and urge that the House will vote to sustain the committee and overwhelmingly pass this very vital, important bill, which should be passed as soon as we can pass it, in support of our cause in Vietnam and all those gallant young men who are giving so much to uphold it.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, the vote today on the supplemental military authorization bill, like the war in Vietnam itself, poses a great dilemma for Americans inside and out of Congress. The fact is that our war policies have gotten us into a situation which cannot be reversed by a vote on a single measure, but which will require a significant change in our approach to the terms by which we are willing to accept a settlement. However strong my reservations, objections, or criticisms of the policies that are engulfing us in a southeast Asia war, I am constrained to view and to vote for this measure as one to provide material support for our troops in the field.

I do want to emphasize that I oppose our war policy in Vietnam. I critized it when it took the form of an excessive response to the naval attack on our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. I opposed it when it extended our efforts to bombing North Vietnam. I opposed it last May when it changed our role from one of advising South Vietnamese in their war against the Vietcong to one of making it our war. I opposed it when the bombing of the north was to be resumed in January.

Regrettably, I must come to a similar conclusion about the economic assistance we are providing Vietnam as well. Last week I reluctantly voted for the foreign aid supplemental appropriations as a longtime supporter of foreign aid. The outstanding fact about the billions of dollars of foreign aid we have poured into Vietnam in the 10-year period from 1954 to 1964 is that it is a failure. It has completely failed to establish a viable government in South Vietnam and as a result is responsible in large measure for us being involved in such a major war in that country. While I am not convinced that the economic aid we are now providing the Vietnamese can be effective while we are at the same time engaged in heavy military operations in the same areas, I voted for that measure in the hope that some improvement in the condition of the Vietnamese people will result. The time is rapidly approaching, however, when I will not be able to continue to support such expenditures, particularly in combination with military efforts with which I basically disagree.

Thus, it should be clear that although I vote today in support of this authorization, it is the troops in the field that I vote to support and not the policies that got them there. Others have on the floor today sought to reaffirm the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which the President has relied on so extensively as the basis for the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Particularly, in the light of this intensification and the implication that further escalation lies ahead, I want it clearly understood that my vote today does not reaffirm that resolution. In fact, if the vote today were simply on the language of that resolution I would vote against it, in view of the construction that has been placed on it. Certainly if the war spreads, I may regret the action taken today and my own assent to it. I trust and pray that will not come to pass.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, my vote for this supplemental appropriation for the Vietnam conflict is not an endorsement of the policies the United States has been following in Vietnam.

I believe that some of our actions in Vietnam have not been wise. It seems to me that the reasoning offered in support of those polices would lead us on a course of action in the future that is not in our national interest.

My vote today is based on the need to sustain the troops already in Vietnam.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I have just returned from a week-long trip to South Vietnam and the Philippines.

In the course of my intensive 5-day inspection tour of South Vietnam, which took me to three delta Provinces, to each of the four military corps areas and to conference with General Westmoreland and key Embassy and AID officials, I gained a vivid impression of what we are doing in South Vietnam.

In my talks with Province chiefs and Province representatives I was informed of the programs that are being undertaken to win the loyalty and confidence of the general population. I was advised of some of the continuing problems in finding and holding adequate South Vietnamese personnel to do the job.

I saw schools and hospitals and agricultural projects designed to help develop communities that have been involved in war for over 20 years.

We observed teams of American and Filipino surgeons working with South Vietnamese nurses and medical personnel in an attempt to cope with the massive medical and public health needs of the people.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

We visited with administrators and technical assistants to get a feeling for the range and depth and quality of our programs.

I saw a South Vietnam in the throes of a vicious war. Throughout the country, from the Fourth Corps area in the delta to the First Corps in the north, ARVN, Korean, Australian, and American troops were on battle alert, and in the north especially, involved in the most active kind of military operations.

Artillery fire, air strikes, ambushes, mortar fire from the Vietcong, rifle fire from Vietcong snipers—well concealed in the canopy of the jungle and in tunnels leading to underground dens large enough to include a hospital with surgical suite and big enough to cache food supplies—were daily events.

Gallant and well-trained American forces were carrying out the most basic military maneuvers.

There were casualties and there were deaths from hostile action.

The Vietcong are pursuing their objectives of domination and subjugation with fanatical intensity in spite of growing signs that they are unable to overcome the formidable allied resistance. There are, indeed, hopeful signs that we may now be denying them their former comfortable and unchallenged access to jungle redoubts and to vital supplies of munitions and food.

The weapons, food, and medical supplies now being captured in ever greater amounts are a clear indication that the Communists are paying an increasingly high price for their open aggression.

It must surely be evident by now to Hanoi that South Vietnam cannot be taken by force of arms. The policy of our Government and our allies, combined with our field operations, must make it clear that the President meant what he said when he told the world that we would not be driven out of South Vietnam, but that we would be quite willing to go to the conference table at any time for unconditional discussions leading to a peaceful settlement.

I think it should be noted here that practically every important witness who appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stressed that we must not withdraw from Vietnam, even though some of them expressed serious doubts about how we got there in the first place, and others raised questions of how we should proceed from here to resist aggression and achieve a just settlement.

Mr. Chairman, I share many of these doubts and questions that have been expressed by such distinguished men as Senator FULBRIGHT, General Gavin, and Ambassador Kennan. But because I believe it is essential to sustain our superb military forces which are in the field today, I will vote for this authorization of funds to help them carry out their mission.

While I support this measure I do so with the deep conviction, as the joint statement of 78 of our colleagues makes clear, that this vote today should not constitute a mandate for "unrestrained or indiscriminate enlargement of the military effort." Our military force should be used with firmness, skill and restraint. But it should be used for no longer and in no greater amount than is absolutely necessary to convince our adversaries that they can achieve neither a military victory nor capitulation to their tactics of terror and violence.

Our policy must have another side as well. Our military determination must be accompanied by at least as great a determination to find a peaceful settlement. We have seen the administration, particularly in the last few weeks and months, make a concerted effort to bring this grave conflict to the conference table. I believe the President is especially to be commended for taking this matter to the United Nations, as many of us have urged for some time. I earnestly hope that we will continue to pursue every avenue this may afford, in spite of what appears to be serious obstacles.

But we must not rest on our oars. We must not overlook any reasonable diplomatic initiatives. We must state clearly our willingness to engage in mutual and inspected deescalation of military activities by the belligerents in this war. And we must certainly encourage our policy planners and negotiators to define the terms of any conference so as to include all those who are actively engaged in carrying on the war. In this latter respect it should be noted that a conference does not make progress through voting but through negotiations and the presence of the National Liberation Front would not in any way diminish the negotiating strength of the allied delegations.

There are indications, through reports over the last few weeks from the United Nations, that these overtures might prove fruitful in bringing about a resumption of the Geneva Conference.

It may very well be, Mr. Chairman, that the Communist leaders in Hanoi and Peiping do not want a peaceful settlement at this or any other time; that they seek nothing short of a total military victory. But with the dangers of a larger and much more costly war on one hand, and the unmet need of our own society on the other, the stakes are simply too great not to make every reasonable effort to get to the conference table.

If our goal, as I believe it properly to be, is both to end aggression and to negotiate a settlement that will enable the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future by free elections, then a continued and measured response to aggression, accompanied by a continued and persistent search for negotiations and a cease-fire is certainly a proper course for us to follow.

We must repeat over and over again our willingness to accept the results of a properly supervised free election.

We must make very clear to Peiping that we do not want to engage in a war with Communist China, in spite of our strong aversion to her policies and her social order.

We must make it unmistakably clear that we are against any major escalation of the war. For, as President Johnson stressed to Premier Ky at Honolulu, while we would like to see a quick end to the conflict, we are not about to take military steps in an attempt to hasten victory that might bring on still a larger war. The war in South Vietnam is essentially a Vietnamese war and must be won on South Vietnamese soil.

This flat statement by the President to Premier Ky at the Honolulu conference should make it clear to anyone intoxicated by temporary military success, that we are not interested in abandoning our basic military objective, which is to stop the aggression that is largely mounted, supported, and directed from outside the borders of South Vietnam.

If Premier Ky entertains the idea that we will support a war whose aims are the unification of Vietnam, he should be promptly advised of the limits of our support.

On the other hand, Premier Ky is to be applauded for his announced decision to hold elections by 1967. This, in my judgment, is a most encouraging development and he should be supported in every possible way in making this promise a reality.

Mr. Chairman, we clearly possess the military might to prevent a military takeover of South Vietnam by the combined forces of the Vietcong and North Vietnam. It should be equally clear, however, that unless the South Vietnamese Government and its leaders can offer their people tangible hopes of free elections, a constructive attack on the critical problem of inflation, long overdue land reforms, the just claims of the Montagnards to a place of full citizenship, adequate programs for refugees, and massive improvements in health, education, and agricultural technology, then a mere military success of victory would be hollow indeed. It would be tragic and ironic to win the war and lose the people.

There is a revolution now in process in South Vietnam. A Communist victory would end it. Armed aggression, therefore, must be stopped or there can be no alternative to domination.

But once this step of resisting aggression is taken, the answer is not to escalate the military conflict but to escalate the economic, social, and governmental reforms and improvements which are the essential base of any stable society where people are free in any meaningful sense to choose their own future.

It is only in this way that the legitimate aspirations of men for independence and a better life can be finally and firmly achieved.

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Chairman, I support this supplemental defense authorization for Vietnam. We are asked to authorize $4.8 billion for aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, research and development, and military construction. This is part of the cost of freedom for Vietnam and for the free world. It is well worth the price. Freedom is a commodity whose value increases when we lose it. Let us pay its price without demurrer and insure its retention. Let us not chance the risk of its loss. For it may not be recoverable. Freedom once lost is not easily regained.

I agree with President Johnson when he says "we will strive to limit conflict,

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

for we wish neither increased destruction nor increased danger." My approval of this legislation does not therefore constitute a mandate for unrestricted or indiscriminate use of military force. But make no mistake, I do not mean by this that we diminish our effort or that we strive for anything less than victory. We must weaken the will of the enemy to continue his assault against freedom. He must learn that there is no future for him but defeat in the course he now pursues. He must understand that unless he stops his attack upon the South Vietnamese and his destruction of their villages, he can only look forward to the bitter frustration of defeat. We will not be intimidated by him, no matter what the cost. We will not be denied in our resolve, no matter how hard the effort. The choice is his; armed conflict to the end or a reasonable settlement of differences. Whatever his choice, we will meet it.

I stand foursquare behind the policy enunciated by our President in his speech on the occasion of his acceptance of the Freedom House's Freedom Award on February 24, 1966 in New York City.

I agree with him that for us this is not a war of unlimited objectives. We seek neither conquest nor do we engage in aggression. In simple terms, we fight to prevent the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam.

We do not engage in a war of blind escalation. We meet force with sufficient force to turn the tide of battle so that our enemy will know that he cannot prevail. We practice prudent firmness, not blind escalation.

We have 200,000 fighting men in Vietnam. They have and will continue to have all the tools they need to defeat the aggressor. The authorization for supplemental defense appropriations that we now consider gives our men the muscle to do the job. I know that the Members of this House will face their responsibility and authorize these funds.

We are not alone in freedom's fight in Vietnam. Many of our allies contribute to the cause, each according to his strength and each in his own way.

I believe our President when he says that never by any act of ours will we risk a wider war with China. We neither threaten anyone nor do we seek the end of any regime. We defend only against aggression and we practice restraint in action. We are immune from vituperation in the justice of our cause.

We strive for more than military victory. We seek an enduring victory that can only be won in the hearts and minds of men and that can only be sustained in the firm faith that we seek nothing more than freedom for our Vietnamese friends to share in the good life with their children.

We stand ready to help the people of North Vietnam also in their fight against want and misery. For the victims of want are the soil in which conflict and war grow. Unless we do this, we will be called again and again to meet the challenges to peace inherent in suffering. The Communists must learn that the rewards of peace are more to be preferred than the destruction of war.

We must not be misled by the misguided few who preach love, peace, and liberty while they would deny these benefits to the very people of South Vietnam whose fate they lament by consigning them to a ruthless enemy who believes in none of these things.

In the shorthand of the current lexicon, those who fight freedom's fight are called hawks, while those who would abandon the field to the enemy carry the label dove. Now, Webster tells us that a dove is a pigeon—a bird with a stout body and short legs, an easy mark, a dupe. The same Mr. Webster tells us that a hawk is a bird of prey and that prey is spoil or booty. To call "hawks" those who seek no conquest, engage in no aggression, desire no reward, but fight only to defeat the predator who preys on freedom for booty, reverses the order of things and denies the truth. Such misnomer victimizes the unwary and misleads the unsuspecting.

I believe in democracy for Vietnam. I do not agree with those who say that the Vietnamese and, for that matter, all of the people of southeast Asia do not understand democracy and that it is therefore futile to believe that democracy can live in that part of the world. This kind of criticism dangerously feeds on the reactionary belief in racial superiority and isolation and is often mouthed by the very people who pose as the champions of human rights. I believe that the people of South Vietnam should be free to choose their own government by free elections. Whatever the result, we will honor it.

While we resist the aggressors with all our power and stop his depredations upon the people and villages of Vietnam, we must at the same time never relax our search for peace. When the aggressor learns that the road to aggression leads but to the grave, he may seek the road to the conference table. He knows that we await him there and are ready to sit down with him in the spirit of peace to seek solutions. He will learn that the rewards of the conference table are much to be desired.

Certain efforts are not measurable in time. They endure forever. The search for freedom is one of these. We who enjoy its benefits must bear its burdens for if we do not, we will not long enjoy its benefits. We must continue to bear the burden of Vietnam as long as it may be necessary to secure freedom there. If we remain steadfast, it will surely come.

We fight in Vietnam not only to fulfill our commitments to our allies and to the free world but, more important, to ourselves. The commitment is inherent in our heritage. We are the children of freedom and hopefully will be its progenitors. That is the duty and burden of all freemen. Each generation faces the challenge of the threat to its freedom and each must rededicate itself to its cause. History will never say that we allowed it to be destroyed in our lives. We will stop terrorism, subversion, and aggression whenever and wherever it rises to threaten freedom. The threat looms in southeast Asia. We have already faced and met it in Korea and elsewhere. Now we meet it again in Vietnam. We will face this challenge bravely as freemen always have in time of crisis. Let those who would destroy freedom know that freemen die in its defense not that they love life less, but they love freedom more.

I have faith in our man in the White House who daily faces the hard decisions of war. I know that he neither decides lightly nor is unaware of the consequences. But he lives with it in the knowledge that he can do nothing less without betraying freedom's cause. When in the course of time the history of our period is weighed on the scales of justice, we shall not be found wanting because of the indomitable spirit and dedication to the cause of freedom of Lyndon B. Johnson.

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Chairman, as I have listened to the debate today I have wondered if an almost unanimous chorus of praise is an assurance of survival.

There has never been a vote in my 12 years in the House which has caused me as much concern as the vote on this legislation today. A quotation of unknown origin comes to my mind:

> When the fires of patriotism, revolution, and war rage fiercely, popular attention is on the blast and the heat instead of what is right and what is wrong.

With all my heart I wish today I knew what was absolutely right and what was absolutely wrong. The bill before us has been offered as an authorization for supplies necessary to the proper defense and the well-being of American servicemen who are now in Vietnam. The rightness of sending 200,000 there coupled with the possibility of sending 400,000 or 600,000, I question, but I am unwilling to make their lives the hazard in my expression of opposition or uncertainty. Therefore, I am accepting the word of the administration spokesmen that this legislation authorizes purchase of supplies urgently needed for the safety of troops in Vietnam; and reluctantly and sadly, I will vote for it on that basis and that basis only.

Unfortunately, it has become necessary in recent months to define the limit of one's vote. My vote today does not in any way express wholehearted approval of past Vietnam policies nor blanket endorsement for any future policy. I in no way considered this a reaffirmation of the 1964 vote at the time of the incident of the Bay of Tonkin. If I regarded this legislation in any way as a vote to escalate the war, my vote would be "No," for I am most sorrowfully convinced that such escalation is based on premises which are at a minimum questionable and which history may well record as disastrous.

Mr. Chairman, I am not convinced of the infallibility of any who argue on either side. But I do believe that "the only way fallible men can find the truth is by keeping the process of inquiry continually open." I am also sure that President Johnson wants as sincerely as John F. Kennedy to "above all to be known as a President of whom history might say, 'He not only laid the foundations for peace in his time, but for generations to come as well.'" I take no

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

consolation in the cliches and slogans heard today because as Conant has said:

Slogans are both exciting and comforting, but they are also opiates for the conscience.

But rather, I take hope in what President Kennedy said:

Let us, if we can, get back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

The CHAIRMAN. There being no further request for time, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 12889

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles in amounts as follows:

Aircraft

For aircraft: for the Army, $825,600,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, $738,300,000; for the Air Force, $1,585,700,000.

Missiles

For missiles: for the Army, $64,000,000; for the Navy, $26,200,000; for the Marine Corps, $27,500,000; for the Air Force, $63,700,000.

Tracked combat vehicles

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, $75,800,000; for the Marine Corps, $10,900,000.

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. In addition to the funds authorized to be appropriated under Public Law 89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appropriated during fiscal year 1966 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, $27,995,000;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $52,570,000;

For the Air Force, $71,085,000.

TITLE III—MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

SEC. 301. The Secretary of each military department may establish or develop military installations and facilities by acquiring, constructing, converting, rehabilitating, or installing permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and equipment, which are necessary in connection with military activities in southeast Asia, or in support of such activities, in the total amounts as follows:

Department of the Army, $509,700,000;

Department of the Navy, $304,300,000; and

Department of the Air Force, $274,100,000.

SEC. 302. The Secretary of Defense may establish or develop installations and facilities which he determines to be vital to the security of the United States, and in connection therewith to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, site preparation, appurtenances, utilities, and equipment in the total amount of $200,000,000.

SEC. 303. The Secretary of each military department may proceed to establish or develop installations and facilities under this Act without regard to section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529), and sections 4774(d) and 9774(d) of title 10, United States Code. The authority to place permanent or temporary improvements on land includes authority for surveys, administration, overhead, planning, and supervision incident to construction. That authority may be exercised before title to the land is approved under section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and even though the land is held temporarily. The authority to acquire real estate or land includes authority to make surveys and to acquire land, and interests in land (including temporary use), by gift, purchase, exchange of Government-owned land, or otherwise.

SEC. 304. Whenever—

(1) the President determines that compliance with section 2313(b) of title 10, United States Code, for contracts made under this Act for the establishment or development of military installations and facilities in foreign countries would interfere with the carrying out of this Act; and

(2) the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General have agreed upon alternative methods of adequately auditing those contracts;

the President may exempt those contracts from the requirements of that section.

SEC. 305. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for the purposes of this title, but the appropriations for public works authorized by sections 301 and 302 shall not exceed—

(1) for section 301: Department of the Army, $509,700,000; Department of the Navy, $304,300,000; Department of the Air Force, $274,100,000, or a total of $1,088,100,000.

(2) for section 302: a total of $200,000,000.

TITLE IV—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. (a) Funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes in connection with support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives a description of each project, together with full and complete justification therefor, including a cost analysis thereof, prior to the execution of any contract for the establishment or development of a military installation or facility, whenever it pertains to the acquisition, construction, conversion, rehabilitation, or installation of permanent or temporary public works, including land acquisition, appurtenances, utilities and equipment, the moneys for which are authorized to be appropriated by this Act.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall also furnish to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives complete information regarding the alternative methods of adequately auditing contracts which he and the Comptroller General have agreed upon prior to the execution of any contract which would waive the provisions of section 2313(b) of title 10, United States Code.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina (interrupting the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HARDY

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I offer the committee amendment now at the desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Committee amendment offered by Mr. HARDY: On pages 5 and 6, beginning with line 16 on page 5, strike subsection 401(b) in its entirety and substitute in lieu thereof the following language:

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a description of all construction projects, including cost estimates and periodic reports, made available to the Secretary of Defense simultaneously with the receipt of such information from the persons responsible for the construction of such projects in support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam. Whenever such construction projects, involving $1,000,000 or more, are performed by private contractors, the Secretary of Defense or his representative in Vietnam shall report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives the name or names of such private contractors, the amounts involved in each contract, a copy of the report in support of each progress payment, and a complete report prior to final payment."

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, the amendment which has just been read is a refinement of the language contained in section 401(b) of the bill now before the House.

The Department of Defense contends that section 401(b) as it now appears in the bill is too restrictive and might impose unacceptable delays in military construction projects in Vietnam.

Certainly we don't want to do anything that will impose delays for any needed construction projects in that area.

At the same time, the Committee on Armed Services does want to be kept fully informed on the cost of these projects, because we do not believe that we should give any private contractors, or anyone else, a blank check.

Therefore, the Committee on Armed Services, this morning, unanimously agreed to this substitute language for section 401(b). It will require the Secretary of Defense to give to the Committee on Armed Services of both bodies all of the information that is made available to the Department of Defense with respect to these construction projects. In addition, this new language will require the Secretary of Defense, or his representative in Vietnam, to report to the committees the name or names of private contractors who are awarded $1 million contracts or more, the amounts involved in each contract, a copy of the report in support of each progress payment, and a complete report prior to final payment.

In this way the Congress will be kept informed with regard to the cost of these projects that will be constructed in Vietnam. We have the duty and obligation to this body to keep you informed as to how this money is being spent, and we feel this amendment will accomplish this objective.

(Mr. HARDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I want to say that our side of the aisle on our committee concur with the changes. It is the only practical thing that can be done under the circumstances.

Mr. HARDY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Have not you restricted this to construction projects? As the bill now stands, it goes to each project and without limitation.

Mr. HARDY. It is intended to relate to construction projects. I will say to the gentleman that it is only to the construction phase of the bill, not to the hardware phase.

Mr. GROSS. But of course the language in the bill before us does not carry any such limitation. The amendment does, but the bill does not, and I am wondering why you want to limit it?

Mr. HARDY. I think the language in the bill refers specifically to construction projects only. I do not think that the provisions of the amendment could be made applicable to military hardware, which is provided for in the remainder of the bill. Construction is the only phase of the bill to which this could be applied.

Mr. Chairman, I ask for a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, before we come to a vote on this bill, I want to make it very clear for the RECORD what we are about.

Public Law 88–408, which at the proper time I will ask to be placed in the RECORD, approved by the President on the 10th of August 1964, declares that the United States regards as vital to its national interests and the world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Therefore—and listen to this:

1. The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures:

(a) to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States, and

(b) to prevent further aggression.

2. The United States is prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. (South Vietnam is a protocol state and did request assistance.)

Also, Mr. Chairman, at this time I want to include in the RECORD the message of the President of the United States which he made at the time when he implemented that resolution, which, Mr. Chairman, is the law of the land. Also I would like to include the resolution itself.

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters here is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 5, 1964.*

H.J. RES. 1145

Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

[Approved August 10, 1964. Public Law 88-408.]

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for this bill. I shall vote for it because I believe it is needed. Our Armed Forces are fighting in Vietnam. The arms, the materiel, the weapons, the supplies, the logistic support which are provided for in this bill are needed as quickly as possible to sustain our fighting men. That is reality, and one cannot speculate or equivocate or rationalize about it.

Few issues have provoked the disagreement, the confusion and the controversy as has our intervention in Vietnam. Few issues have been so emotionally charged or so hotly contested. No useful purpose, however, can be served at this time by discussing the legal status or the original basis for our intervention or whether this bill is an affirmation of the August 1964 resolution approved by Congress. Members will differ on all of these. What we must realize now is that we are engaged in a bitter armed struggle from which we cannot arbitrarily and totally withdraw. What is important now is that our troops be given the weapons to carry on the fight, and we shall do that in this bill.

Of paramount importance, too, is that we continue to search for a way to take the battle from the rice paddies to the conference table where a ceasefire can be established and hopefully, a peaceful settlement can be negotiated. I believe President Johnson is sincere in his efforts to find a basis for establishing peace, even though so far success has eluded him. His recent speech at Freedom House in New York City when he attempted to define our purposes and goals in Vietnam affirmed once again that our purposes are limited—to prevent the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. He said, too, that the administration is not neglecting any hopeful chance for peace, that free and unfettered negotiations are sought, and that he is not discouraged by the results so far. He said that efforts to gain peace will continue.

I was particularly pleased by the President's statement in the speech in which he affirmed that we are not caught in a "blind escalation of force toward a wider war that no one wants," that there will not be a "mindless escalation of the war." Although we recognize that men may differ in their interpretation of the adjectives "blind" and "mindless" to describe wrongful escalation, we may nevertheless take heart in the President's firm posture of restraint. In disavowing escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, I believe he voices the overwhelming sentiment of the American people, who want no unwarranted buildup of American troops in Vietnam. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, this, too, is my position. Inevitably, escalation begets counterescalation, leading to an unending and frustrating spiral of death and destruction.

It is to be hoped, too, Mr. Chairman, that his announced policy in resisting escalation will apply, as well, to the question of escalating the bombing of North Vietnam. History shows that all-out air attacks do not greatly diminish the enemy's will to resist. Rather, such will to resist may be strengthened. Bombing civilians in Hanoi and Haiphong, or civilian targets such as dams that provide drinking water and irrigation, or powerplants that serve only civilian purposes gain us only the peoples' hatred. These are not important military targets and their destruction afford no significant military advantage.

Significant support against escalation of the scale of the conflict was given by General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations only a few days ago. These men are acknowledged experts of wide experience. They pointed out that we have vital interests throughout the world, and apart from the unfortunate toll in lives and resources which escalation might bring, it might well jeopardize important commitments the United States has in other quarters. I was very much impressed by their testimony and I believe it deserves the serious consideration of the executive branch and by all of us in the Congress.

In his Freedom House speech, the President also said:

> Men ask who has a right to rule in Vietnam. Our answer there is what it has been here for 200 years. The people must have this right—the South Vietnamese people and no one else. Washington will not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their choice. * * * We stand for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor the result.

I commend the President for his statement reaffirming our longstanding principle of self-determination. I hope, however, that the President initiates steps which need to be taken to make it meaningful. The National Liberation Front cannot now participate in the elections in South Vietnam. Its members cannot vote. It can offer no candidates. Premier Ky will not let them. He describes its members as gangsters, murderers and assassins, and refuses to discuss any possible role for them in the life of South Vietnam.

The Vietcong claim to have the people's support. Why not test their claim? It appears to me that a possible basis for negotiating with the NLF is to give them the opportunity to prove their popularity in free elections. New position and rights can be protected in an election held under the auspices of a neutral, impartial body such as the United Nations. Let them take their battle from the battlefield to the ballot box and win if they can. But until it is shown that the National Liberation Front does in fact represent a majority of the people, there is no justification for accepting Hanoi's proopsal that the NFL be recognized as the sole negotiating representative of the Government of South Vietnam. Certainly, up to the present time this contention has not been demonstrated to have any foundation in fact, and our administration is right in rejecting this demand.

The proposal has been suggested in some quarters that in order to induce Hanoi and the NLF to come to the negotiating table a place in a coalition government of South Vietnam should be given to the NLF. I do not favor such a proposal. Let them gain office by winning it fairly in an election. The NLF should be given the opportunity to win the people's approval, if they can do so, through a free election, controlled and supervised by an impartial authority. I believe the present Government of South Vietnam should offer them that opportunity as a possible means of settling the conflict. Details of a cease fire and the ground rules to assure a free and fair election could be worked out.

Mr. Chairman, as long as Premier Ky adheres to his present refusal to have anything to do with the NLF, as long as he treats them only as outlaws, refuses to permit them to appear in settlement negotiations, the war will go on. Perhaps hope is offered, Mr. Chairman, in a newspaper report that Premier Ky proposes to hold elections early next year. Why not offer to let the NLF take part? It offers an alternative to armed conflict—and they may accept.

The cause of peace will not be served unless there is a disposition on the part of both sides to make a reasonable settlement. Offering the opportunity to the NLF to participate in national elections—in fact, challenging them to do so, is a reasonable gesture of conciliation. It is a gesture that will give meaning to President Johnson's proposal that we will honor the results of a free election in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, the cause of peace requires constant and unremitting effort. Hanoi has been harsh, stubborn and severely uncooperative in its reactions to all peace gestures from all sources. It has not given one inch. It speaks about settlement on the basis of the Geneva agreement. So de wo. However, it insists upon the unacceptable proposition that the NLF be recognized as the sole representative of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, we must continue to move in every channel available in our effort to find some avenue that may bring the belligerents together for agreement.

I continue to hope and to believe that the United Nations will provide the means through which the settlement will be made. Under its auspices, a way

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

will be found for a settlement that will be based upon the free expression of the will of the people of South Vietnam. It appears now that the Security Council has reached an impasse. My experience at the U.N., Mr. Chairman, has taught me that even the knottiest problems have their solutions. Impasses have been broken. Let us hope this one will be broken, too—and soon.

(Mr. YATES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I hope I shall not take the 5 minutes, but I would like to ask a question or two of the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina. I note the bill provides $75.8 million for tracked combat vehicles, which leads me to ask a question as to whether any vehicle has been devised for warfare in Vietnam capable of moving through swamps and rice paddies. I note private industry has developed vehicles with huge rubber tires capable of this. Certainly such vehicles ought to be able to carry light armor and still traverse swamps. Is there any such thing available or even in the works?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman asking me about a swamp vehicle or a tracked vehicle?

Mr. GROSS. No. I am talking about a swamp vehicle. Obviously a tracked vehicle will not traverse the rice paddies and swamplands.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. We have everything you can imagine to traverse the rice paddies that are in being now.

Mr. GROSS. Except for this.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. In the research and development stage now is a vehicle that we hope will be in operation soon and will do exactly what the gentleman is talking about.

Mr. GROSS. So there is such a vehicle?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. There is one that we hope will be in production very soon.

Mr. GROSS. And on the way?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. On the way. In addition, I would say that they have adequate funds with which to produce such vehicle. I understand the price is $2 million.

Mr. GROSS. I noted in the papers the other day that from some fund in the Defense Department money was found to recondition and refurbish a couple of yachts. Is there any money in this bill for that purpose and, if so, where is it?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. It is not in this bill. You know it is not in this bill.

Mr. GROSS. I would not know whether it is in this bill or not.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. You are just kidding me and I am not going to let you kid me. You know it is not.

Mr. GROSS. No. I am serious about it. I want to know if there is any money in this bill for such purpose?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I am serious, too.

Mr. GROSS. Is there any money in this bill for the refurbishing of any yachts at this time?

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. There is not. I thank the gentleman for asking the question; but the answer is there is not.

Mr. GROSS. I appreciate the answer of the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. CAREY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 743, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes had it.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 392, nays 4, answered "present" 1, not voting 36, as follows:

[Roll No. 26]

YEAS—392

Abernethy	Betts	Carter	Davis, Ga.	Johnson, Okla.	Redlin
Adair	Bingham	Casey	Davis, Wis.	Johnson, Pa.	Rees
Adams	Blatnik	Cederberg	de la Garza	Jonas	Reid, Ill.
Addabbo	Boggs	Celler	Delaney	Jones, N.C.	Reid, N.Y.
Albert	Boland	Chamberlain	Dent	Karsten	Reifel
Anderson, Ill.	Bolling	Chelf	Denton	Karth	Reinecke
Anderson, Tenn.	Bolton	Clancy	Derwinski	Kastenmeier	Resnick
Andrews, George W.	Bow	Clark	Devine	Kee	Reuss
Andrews, Glenn	Brademas	Clausen, Don H.	Dickinson	Keith	Rhodes, Ariz.
Andrews, N. Dak.	Bray	Clawson, Del	Diggs	Kelly	Rhodes, Pa.
Arends	Brock	Cleveland	Dingell	Keogh	Rivers, S.C.
Ashbrook	Brooks	Clevenger	Dole	King, Calif.	Rivers, Alaska
Ashley	Broomfield	Cohelan	Donohue	King, N.Y.	Roberts
Ashmore	Brown, Ohio	Collier	Dorn	King, Utah	Robison
Aspinall	Broyhill, N.C.	Conable	Dow	Kirwan	Rodino
Bandstra	Broyhill, Va.	Conte	Downing	Kluczynski	Rogers, Colo.
Baring	Buchanan	Cooley	Dulski	Kornegay	Rogers, Fla.
Barrett	Burke	Corbett	Duncan, Oreg.	Krebs	Rogers, Tex.
Bates	Burleson	Corman	Duncan, Tenn.	Kunkel	Ronan
Battin	Burton, Utah	Craley	Dwyer	Kupferman	Roncalio
Beckworth	Byrne, Pa.	Cramer	Edmondson	Laird	Rooney, N.Y.
Belcher	Byrnes, Wis.	Culver	Edwards, Ala.	Landrum	Rooney, Pa.
Bell	Cabell	Cunningham	Ellsworth	Langen	Rosenthal
Bennett	Cahill	Curtin	Erlenborn	Latta	Roudebush
	Callan	Curtis	Evans, Colo.	Leggett	Roush
	Callaway	Daddario	Everett	Lennon	Roybal
	Cameron	Daniels	Evins, Tenn.	Lipscomb	Rumsfeld
	Carey		Fallon	Long, La.	Satterfield
			Farbstein	Long, Md.	St Germain
			Farnsley	Love	St. Onge
			Farnum	McCarthy	Saylor
			Fascell	McClory	Scheuer
			Findley	McCulloch	Schisler
			Fino	McDade	Schmidhauser
			Flood	McDowell	Schneebeli
			Flynt	McEwen	Schweiker
			Fogarty	McFall	Secrest
			Foley	McGrath	Selden
			Ford, Gerald R.	McVicker	Senner
			Ford, William D.	Macdonald	Shipley
			Fountain	MacGregor	Shriver
			Fraser	Machen	Sickles
			Frelinghuysen	Mackay	Sikes
			Friedel	Mackie	Sisk
			Fulton, Pa.	Madden	Skubitz
			Fulton, Tenn.	Mahon	Slack
			Gallagher	Mailliard	Smith, Calif.
			Garmatz	Marsh	Smith, Iowa
			Gathings	Martin, Ala.	Smith, N.Y.
			Gettys	Martin, Mass.	Smith, Va.
			Gibbons	Martin, Nebr.	Springer
			Gilbert	Mathias	Stafford
			Gilligan	Matsunaga	Staggers
			Gonzalez	May	Stalbaum
			Goodell	Meeds	Stanton
			Grabowski	Michel	Steed
			Green, Oreg.	Mills	Stephens
			Green, Pa.	Minish	Stratton
			Greigg	Mink	Stubblefield
			Grider	Minshall	Sullivan
			Griffiths	Mize	Sweeney
			Gross	Moeller	Talcott
			Grover	Monagan	Taylor
			Gurney	Moore	Teague, Calif.
			Hagan, Ga.	Moorhead	Teague, Tex.
			Hagen, Calif.	Morgan	Tenzer
			Haley	Morris	Thompson, N.J.
			Hall	Morrison	Thompson, Tex.
			Halleck	Morse	Thomson, Wis.
			Halpern	Mosher	Todd
			Hamilton	Moss	Trimble
			Hanley	Multer	Tuck
			Hanna	Murphy, Ill.	Tunney
			Hansen, Idaho	Murphy, N.Y.	Tupper
			Hansen, Iowa	Murray	Tuten
			Hansen, Wash.	Natcher	Udall
			Hardy	Nedzi	Utt
			Harsha	Nelsen	Van Deerlin
			Harvey, Ind.	Nix	Vanik
			Harvey, Mich.	O'Hara, Ill.	Vigorito
			Hathaway	O'Hara, Mich.	Vivian
			Hawkins	O'Konski	Waggonner
			Hébert	Olsen, Mont.	Walker, Miss.
			Hechler	O'Neal, Ga.	Walker, N. Mex.
			Helstoski	O'Neill, Mass.	Watkins
			Henderson	Ottinger	Watson
			Herlong	Passman	Watts
			Hicks	Patman	Weltner
			Holifield	Patten	Whalley
			Holland	Pelly	White, Idaho
			Horton	Pepper	White, Tex.
			Hosmer	Perkins	Whitener
			Howard	Philbin	Whitten
			Hull	Pickle	Widnall
			Hungate	Pike	Williams
			Huot	Pirnie	Wilson, Bob
			Hutchinson	Poage	Wolff
			Ichord	Poff	Wright
			Irwin	Pool	Wyatt
			Jacobs	Price	Wydler
			Jarman	Pucinski	Yates
			Jennings	Quie	Young
			Joelson	Quillen	Younger
			Johnson, Calif.	Race	Zablocki
				Randall	

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

NAYS—4

Brown, Calif.	Conyers	Ryan
Burton, Calif.		

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

Powell

NOT VOTING—36

Abbitt	Feighan	Miller
Annunzio	Fisher	Morton
Ayres	Fuqua	O'Brien
Baldwin	Giaimo	Olson, Minn.
Berry	Gray	Purcell
Colmer	Griffin	Rostenkowski
Dague	Gubser	Scott
Dawson	Hays	Toll
Dowdy	Jones, Ala.	Ullman
Dyal	Jones, Mo.	Willis
Edwards, Calif.	McMillan	Wilson,
Edwards, La.	Matthews	Charles H.

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Toll with Mr. Baldwin.
Mr. Miller with Mr. Gubser.
Mr. Fisher with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Matthews with Mr. Ayres.
Mr. Dyal with Mr. Griffin.
Mr. Feighan with Mr. Morton.
Mr. Colmer with Mr. Olson of Minnesota.
Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Gray.
Mr. Scott with Mr. Giaimo.
Mr. Jones of Alabama with Mr. Edwards of Louisiana.
Mr. Charles H. Wilson with Mr. Abbitt.
Mr. Annunzio with Mr. Dowdy.
Mr. Ullman with Mr. McMillan.
Mr. Hays with Mr. Willis.
Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Edwards of California.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. O'Brien.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 4 days in which to extend their remarks in the RECORD and include extraneous matter on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

A PROGRAM FOR TOTAL MOBILIZATION

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a bill for total mobilization of our national human resources inventory by restructuring the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 so as to provide training and employment opportunity for long-term unemployed, low-income persons in subprofessional careers.

This bill is the result of many months of work by the full employment steering committee of the Democratic study group. This committee, of which I am chairman, became concerned early last year over the need to insure that our economy is able to offer a job to every employable person. We need more jobs and we should continue the thrust of the Employment Act of 1946, which became law 20 years and 1 week ago.

Today, the majority of Democratic study group members supported and validated the President's conduct of the war in Vietnam. That campaign against aggressive Communist imperialism must be carried on, mobilizing the full force of our economic capability in manpower as well as materials.

We want the Nation to know that at the same time we affirm our continuing commitment to programs to mobilize to the full our human resources—to help our own poor become productive and self-supporting by affording them opportunity to perform socially useful work. We do not support the President's request for added military procurement authorization with the idea that the poor or any other disadvantaged group in our Great Society will pay that bill.

If we believe in the concept of justice in the rice paddies of the Far East, we also must believe in it at home; if we seek development of human resources in the Far East, we must seek the same at home.

Mr. Speaker, we must devote our concern and compassion to bringing our own long-term unemployed into the mainstream of this Great Society. We must enact the necessary programs and then we must fund them.

We cannot allow conditions of unemployment, especially of our disadvantaged Negro citizens, to remain at the present tragically high level. Today, Negro unemployment is 7 percent. The white rate is 3.5 percent. Negro teenage unemployment is 27 percent, about double the national unemployment rate of the depression of the 1930's.

Mr. Speaker, we have gone far enough with the attitude of "let private enterprise do it" and "leave it to the States." There has not been enough accomplishment.

The bill I introduce today would add a new part D to title I of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, entitled "Subprofessional Careers." The jobs to be created would be in the fields of health, education and welfare, as well as urban and rural beautification projects. The subprofessional jobs would require personal supervision of professionals, who could be freed from less challenging duties.

The jobs created would be permanent and would provide opportunity for upward mobility on a career basis within the employing Government agency or nonprofit private organization. Eligible would be unemployed low-income individuals.

Mr. Speaker, I hope we can schedule hearings and early action on this bill. Each day of unutilized human potential is a missed opportunity to strengthen our society. We must demonstrate the falsity of the old canard that the unemployed actually do not want to work, that they somehow enjoy their careers on the welfare rolls. Let us offer them real options.

SUMMARY OF THE CAREER OPPORTUNITY ACT

The Career Opportunity Act aims at creating careers for unemployed, low-income individuals in the fields of health, education, and welfare. As a first step, in fiscal year 1967, an estimated 200,000 jobs would be developed and filled at the subprofessional level in aid capacities in the schools, hospitals, nursing homes, libraries, playgrounds, and correctional institutions, indeed anywhere that a public demand for human care and service exists.

Up to 10 percent of the aids employed under this program in any State could be put to work on activities which would improve or beautify the community.

The persons eligible to embark upon these careers would include any low-income individual age 16 and over, although youths between 16 and 20 could not drop out of school in order to enter this program. The Neighborhood Youth Corps currently offers some 128,000 out-of-school youths temporary work conditioning for a maximum duration of 6 months. This act would give those youths and hundreds of thousands of adults permanent jobs with career potential.

No individual would be excluded from the benefits of this act merely because he has acquired a criminal record, unless he was convicted of a crime whose circumstances were substantially related to the type of work available under this act.

Inservice skill training would effectively guarantee the individuals employed by virtue of this act the opportunity either to advance within the employing organization under the auspices of this program or secure employment that is not federally financed. Their level of education would be raised by organized instruction furnished in a work setting that would be conducive to learning. Health services would maintain their fitness to perform their assignments.

The result is a comprehensive package designed to reach the basic needs not only of unemployed, low-income individuals who require jobs, training, and education plus career hopes for the future but also of society in general, whether low or high income, which demands a vast array of human services in the public interest that cannot otherwise be supplied.

A BILL TO DIRECT THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TO SELL SILVER DOLLARS

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks, and include a bill.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill which would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to sell the silver dollars now held in the Treasury to the American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association, Inc. The Treasury Department now has on hand almost 3 million silver dollars. Almost all of these dollars, more than 2,800,000, were minted at the Carson City Mint in the late 1800's. These are now collectors' items having a numismatic value several times that of their monetary worth.

These Carson City dollars came to light in March 1964 when the Treasury opened some vaults which had been under seal since 1935. At that time, hundreds of people were standing in line at the Treasury buying silver dollars and

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

thousands of others throughout the country had sent in orders for silver dollars. Since it was plain that all of the demand for silver dollars at this time could not be filled, the Secretary of the Treasury stopped their sale. These silver dollars now remain in the Treasury.

The bill which I have proposed would enable the Secretary of the Treasury to sell these dollars in equal amounts to the American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association, Inc. The Treasury, of course, would sell these dollars at their face value of $1 each. The Cancer Society and the Heart Association would then be able to sell them at their numismatic value of several times their face value, thereby raising several million dollars for their worthy endeavors. It seems to me that this would be a desirable way of enabling collectors to add these very desirable coins to their collections with the profits not going to speculators but being used in the continuing fight against cancer and heart disease, two of our major health problems.

At the same time, this will give the Secretary of the Treasury an orderly means of disposing of the silver dollars which now lie idle.

I want to give particular credit to Mrs. Charles W. (Mary Love) Bailey, of Austin, Tex., who has worked on and developed information concerning this proposal. She is to be commended for bringing this matter to the attention of the Congress.

Mrs. Bailey is the director at large of the Texas Division of the American Cancer Society and a member of the crusade committee of the National Board of the American Cancer Society. She is also associated with the American Heart Association. Mrs. Bailey, herself a former cancer patient, is the wife of Dr. Charles W. Bailey, a practicing physician and surgeon at Austin. Her son, Charles W. Bailey, Jr., is a junior medical student at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston.

H.R. 13150

A bill authorizing the sale of standard silver dollars held by the Treasury

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to sell at face value to the American Cancer Society and the American Heart Association, Inc. the standard silver dollars held in the Treasury in such quantities at any one sale as the purchaser or its assignee is prepared to move from Treasury storage. Not more than one-half the total of the standard silver dollars now held by the Treasury, shall be sold to either purchaser. The entire cost of moving, shipment, protection, and insurance of the silver dollars sold shall be borne by the purchaser or its assignee. Movement of the silver dollars sold from the Treasury shall be subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury.

SPEECH BY HON. THOMAS G. MORRIS EULOGIZING MRS. THOMAS MONTOYA

(Mr. WALKER of New Mexico asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WALKER of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, today I would like to call attention to a speech given by my able colleague, Congressman THOMAS G. MORRIS, of New Mexico, in which he eulogized an outstanding lady of our State who died on May 19, 1965. It is with great pleasure that I would like to read this resolution and add my own compliance with the words and thoughts expressed in this resolution:

Whereas on May 19, 1965, our beloved Mrs. Thomas Montoya, the former Frances De La O passed away and;

Whereas it is the will of the Democratic Convention duly assembled that the following resolution be enrolled on the records of this convention and a suitable copy duly attested by the chairman of this convention and the secretary be conveyed to the family of Mrs. Montoya: Know all men, born Frances De La O in the quiet ancestral village of Pena Blanca, she graduated from the high school convent of the Franciscan Sisters at Pena Blanca and devoted her activities to the traditional cultural aspects of the village.

As a young lady she joined in the bonds of holy matrimony with the late Honorable Thomas Montoya and to the everlasting happiness of Thomas Montoya and his wife, four sons and four daughters were born, six of whom were destined for noteworthy careers under the love and guidance and affection of their beloved mother. Two daughters of Mr. and Mrs. Montoya passed on at an early age.

Thomas Montoya, the eldest child, was to gain statewide popularity for his ability in serving in an executive capacity under four Democratic Governors, the while maintaining his status as a successful rancher and agriculturist in Sandoval County. Thomas O. Montoya also served with distinction and ability as a State senator from Sandoval County.

Two of the other sons, the Honorable Al Montoya and Theodore Montoya, having completed their college education, due in large part to the sacrifice of their beloved mother, chose to elect the law as their vocation and were graduated from Georgetown University. Today both Al and Ted Montoya are highly respected members of the New Mexico bar and Al Montoya has served with distinction in both houses of the New Mexico Legislature, and is presently serving as a senator from Sandoval County following the footsteps of his illustrious brother, Tom O. Montoya.

Mrs. Montoya in her declining years experienced the joy and happiness few mothers live to experience, having witnessed her son, JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, serve with honor and distinction in the New Mexico House of Representatives and also the New Mexico State Senate. She, too, saw him serve as Lieutenant Governor of New Mexico. She was proud to know her son served in those offices with honor. Joyfully, shortly before her passing, she learned with her usual humility the news that same loyal and affectionate son had been chosen as a Senator to the U.S. Congress from New Mexico. That was her crowning achievement.

To those of us here it would be unanimously agreed that no other young woman in New Mexico has been the recipient of more deserved honors and platitudes than that shining star of the Democratic Party Lorella Montoya Salazar, whose long service to the cause of Democratic principles has merited the undying gratitude of us all. She served as the loyal arm and bower to the Honorable CLINTON P. ANDERSON, senior Senator from New Mexico, whose standing internationally in all fields of endeavor and in all walks of life is acknowledged as peerless.

The charming Virginia Montoya was an assistant secretary of state where she served with distinction. She married into the pioneer Chavez family and today, as Mrs. Antonio Chavez, she is administrative secretary to the Honorable Boston Witt, attorney general for the State of New Mexico.

The Montoya children were dedicated to following the ideals of their mother and their feelings are perhaps best expressed in that beautiful poem by the poet laureate of America who said:

"My mother first friend of joy;
Last at the cross,
Joy of our gain, comfort for loss
The perfect gift to earth-born given,
Love of the heart, of home, of heaven.
Mother, O wonder word that throbs and
Thrills to heart of man and ever fills
The universe with endless song
Echoing from angelic throng."

The most fitting tribute that we can say for Mrs. Montoya was the one said by Adlai Stevenson when he memorialized Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt: "She would rather light a candle than curse the darkness."

As it must to all human beings, sorrow, sadness, misery, and pain, it came to Mrs. Montoya, but she was truly a great person. She was a lovely, gentle woman, a person of cultural taste and high standards and above all she was a strong character; witness her role as father and mother to her not yet reared lovely family when her husband was called, untimely, to his Heavenly reward.

Under the extending shadows of the soft fall pine trees of Cedarcrest and within sight of Sangre Christo Peak in the year of our Lord, May 19, 1965, all that was mortal of Frances De La O Montoya was laid to rest with the solemn requiescat en pace as a parting blessing from the lips of the parish priest whose church she served so faithfully the whole of her life in the village of Pena Blanca where she was born, and Bernalillong where she left to join her husband and two daughters.

WHAT IS THE EXPLANATION, MR. McNAMARA?

(Mr. MARTIN of Alabama asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, today I received a letter from the district I have the honor to represent. The letter, asks me the question: "As a father, mother, and wife who have a son and husband missing in North Vietnam, we would like to know if these men are being sacrificed to keep the Great Society going at home? If not, why have they not been given the proper equipment and management of operations over there to complete the job?"

These good people, in their hour of tragedy, sent me a copy of the last letter they received from their boy. I would like to quote a part of that letter written by a bomber pilot and then pose the question to the Secreary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, "What's the explanation?"

The pilot's letter reads in part as follows:

If we adhere to the schedule I saw yesterday, the combat portion of this deployment is half over. That seems a little difficult to believe in view of our scheduled return the Fourth of July. I fully expect to become a very impatient person along about mid-May if we do, indeed, conclude combat operations at that time.

Maybe we'll do something important enough to convince us that it's worth not being home during our period of "special operations," after that, but it sounds like a big waste of time to me. * * * Since my last letter, we have completed another period at

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Dixie Station. * * * During our period at Dixie we ran squarely up against one of the most frustrating facts of this war. We are short of bombs. And if Mr. McNamara says differently, I'd like to know why we could only carry 4 small bombs per plane when our aircraft should have an absolute minimum of 6 and could carry 12 just as easily.

Every bomb we carried over South Vietnam, by the way, was a World War II design; I know they aren't being made any more, and I suspect that they haven't been made since World War II.

I'm sure you've read in the papers that we have not escalated the war any; we're still trying to bomb roads, trucks, bridges, etc. That one powerplant strike back in December seems to have been one of a kind, and no word that we'll get any more targets like that has filtered down to my level at least.

Mr. Speaker, this boy is now missing in action. He may have died in the service of his country. Is it not probable that his last thoughts were, "Why?" He did not flinch from performing his duty. He carried out orders and he was willing to die in the cause of freedom. But certainly he would wonder, as all our men out there must wonder, why do we hold back and refuse to win this war as quickly as possible, or at least, take such action as will convince the enemy he cannot win and bring him to negotiations?

I think the Secretary of Defense should explain to Congress and to the American people why we send brave men out to die on bombing raids only partially armed? Why are we using World War II bombs, which must be over 20 years old, while we are spending billions for modern and up-to-date equipment for our Armed Forces? Why are we refusing to bomb strategic military targets such as railroads, powerplants, munitions dumps, war factories, military airfields, missile sites, and oil and fuel dumps? In short, Mr. McNamara, what is our goal in Vietnam? Are we going to continue to sacrifice American lives in a land war in the jungles where we cannot hope to match the Communist man for man; or are we going to use the power we have to bring the enemy to reasonable discussion by stopping his source of supplies? What is the explanation, Mr. McNamara?

BRITISH-FLAG SHIPS CONTINUE DOING BUSINESS WITH COMMUNISTS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND SOVIET CUBA

(Mr. DICKINSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, ships sailing under the British flag continue to do business with the Communists in North Vietnam and Soviet Cuba. The administration apparently cannot or will not prevent it. At the same time we honor the British shipping boycott of Rhodesia. Now, the New York Times, which has always been friendly with Great Britain, reports that Uncle Sam is being made "Uncle Sap" again and that American business is being made to suffer.

I quote an article which recently appeared in the New York Times that sets out the situation to which I just referred:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 23, 1966]

UNITED STATES IS SAID TO LOSE TRADE IN RHODESIA

SALISBURY, RHODESIA, February 22.—In the curious twilight world of business activity that has grown up around Rhodesia since it seized its independence last November, the Americans appeared today to be faring rather less well than the British.

This is the essence of reports to home offices in the United States from American oil companies doing business here, from the big buyers of chrome and asbestos, from tobacco traders and from small brokers of all kinds.

Some of them have stopped doing business with Rhodesia since the State Department advised them to respect the economic sanctions Britain imposed against the rebellious Rhodesians in her effort to bring them to heel.

Some companies, such as Union Carbide, stopped after the British passed an order January 20 making it an offense under British law to export specified products from Rhodesia.

TWO PRODUCTS SPECIFIED

Tobacco and chrome were brought specifically under the terms of the order. Union Carbide stopped making new purchases and was shipping the last of the chrome ore it had already paid for when word got around that the British Government was not playing the game.

By special authorization from the British Government, exempting both Rhodesian exporters and British importers from the order, 9,000 tons of high-grade metallurgic chrome ore have been shipped to Britain since the order was passed, enough to keep Britain's ferroalloy industry in supply for 6 months.

As long as American users abide by the law, their alternative sources of supply for chrome ore of the same high quality are Turkey and the Soviet Union, and Turkey is not able to increase her production enough to take on any new orders before 18 months.

There is chrome in the American stockpile, but to bring it up to the same grade would cost more than twice what it costs to mine, process, and ship the ore to the United States from Rhodesia.

U.S. COMPANIES COMPLAIN

The two biggest American oil companies operating in Rhodesia, Mobil and Caltex, each with more than a 15-percent share of the market before independence, are reliably reported to have complained to their parent offices that business is slipping away to the big British companies bringing oil clandestinely into the country.

An asbestos mining official estimated that British industry now has a 9-months' supply of Rhodesian asbestos.

There are alternative sources of supply, but not of the Rhodesian grades of exceptionally long fiber. The stockpile will enable the British users to carry on longer before they have to worry about the expensive conversions to use shorter fiber.

The big American tobacco traders here are still, for the most part, without instructions from home. But one, at least, is in business. In a deep southern accent, hardly diminished after years of living in Rhodesia, he gave a wisp of an explanation.

"It's like this," he said, "I don't ship the tobacco; he does. I'm not breaking the law; he is. He gets 1 percent, and I would say that's a pretty good bargain."

VETERANS NURSING HOME CARE

(Mrs. MINK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend her remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to join my colleague the gentleman from New York, Congressman HALPERN, today in cosponsoring legislation to correct an inequity with regard to the nursing home care furnished veterans who have been hospitalized under contract provisions of the law by the Veterans' Administration.

Under the current law, only veterans who have been hospitalized in a hospital under the direct and exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans' Administration may be transferred for further care to a nursing home.

Two States, Alaska and Hawaii, do not have VA hospitals. Consequently no veteran who has been hospitalized in Alaska or Hawaii under the auspices of the Veterans' Administration can qualify for transfer to a nursing home facility, because that hospitalization did not occur in a hospital under the direct and exclusive jurisdiction of the Veterans' Administration.

I believe that to be fully equitable the law must clearly provide that the Veterans' Administration shall make available nursing home care to all eligible veterans who have been treated in any hospital through contract arrangements wherein the Veterans' Administration assumes the financial cost for such hospitalization.

Whether a veteran is entitled to receive nursing home care or not should not be dependent upon where he gets his hospitalization, but rather upon whether that treatment is being paid for in the first instance by the Veterans' Administration. If the veteran's hospitalization is covered by the VA then logically his transfer to a nursing home ought to also be covered within the cost limitations as currently provided under Public Law 88-450.

What I propose is just and fair legislation, and certainly in keeping with this Congress' enactment of the medicare bill and its provisions for nursing home care for our elderly. I hope that there will be expeditious consideration of this matter, with full and extensive hearings to determine the extent of this inequity, and certainly if in fact only Hawaii and Alaska are currently under this disability, then there ought not be any reluctance to extend to our veterans the same privileges as are now enjoyed by all others throughout the country as result of the act of the 88th Congress.

PERMANENT AUTHORITY FOR THE CHILDREN'S SPECIAL MILK PROGRAM

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to call my colleagues' attention to H.R. 12804, a bill I introduced recently to extend the special milk program for children beyond the next fiscal year and to provide funds so that all children can participate in the program for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1966, and thereafter.

The people of New York were shocked by the budget recommendations slashing

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

JASPER PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Jasper, Minn, February 23, 1966.
Congressman ANCHER NELSEN,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. NELSEN: I am deeply concerned about the proposed reductions in school lunch and special milk programs for next year. In this area both programs are very popular and have widespread participation. If the proposed reductions become a reality our participation will suffer greatly and eventually decrease our employment and effect the economy of the community.

I urge you to use your influence to hold present budget figures to prevail through the next year.

Respectfully yours,
HENRY TSCHETTER,
Principal.

USE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIETCONG

(Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, earlier this month I suggested using psychological warfare to implement our efforts in the Vietnam war. Some people without much understanding of warfare or the long history of effective psychological warfare all the way from ancient times to the present had a hilarious time poking fun at the idea of spooking and hexing the enemy. To the satisfaction of their own egos they off-handedly depreciated a methodology which might, in the end, be employed to save many American lives and shorten the Vietnam casualty lists. I made these suggestions in a series of three speeches to this body which were released to the press.

This technique was adopted largely to get the ideas to the President and his Defense Secretary. It is well known that Members of the Congress find it almost impossible to communicate directly with these officials who apparently have a feeling of omnipotence or for some other reason, possibly a limitation on their time, give short shrift to non-self-generated ideas. They do read the newspapers however, according to reports, and that seems to be the way open to communicate with them.

It is desired to emphasize that I claim no credit for originating the idea of using psychological war techniques in Vietnam. For many years all branches of our Armed Forces have studied this subject and become expert in it. There are, at present, psywar efforts being conducted in the Vietnam theater of operations.

The real point is that the level of this activity is much less than it could be and much less than a number of experts in this subject feel is desirable. In short, along with our more conventional efforts, it would seem desirable to escalate our psywar efforts.

Relative to the idea of psychological warfare's potentialities in Vietnam, some newspapers have made favorable editorial comment. Examples: The Pasadena Independent on February 8, as follows:

PUTTING HEX ON HANOI

Congressman CRAIG HOSMER is nobody's nut. As a Republican he has been reelected term after term in a district where Democrats hold the registration edge. He has served on important committees and has established himself as an authority on such diverse subjects as western water, tidelands oil, military contracts, and the armed services.

HOSMER rarely shoots from the hip. When he sounds off he quotes facts, chapter and verse. He knows how to use his staff as well as the research facilities of the Library of Congress—and does so to bolster his speeches.

For these reasons HOSMER's latest suggestion—to prey upon primitive oriental superstitions in waging the Vietnam war—should not be dismissed too readily. He makes it seriously and it deserves consideration.

HOSMER points out that psychological torment might "create enough misery, anxiety, wretchedness, and distress in the minds of the North Vietnamese people to induce an intense general annoyance with the war."

Specifically, he suggests showering North Vietnam with symbols of misfortune. And those would include the ace of spades, a traditional bad luck sign; plastic models of running dogs made to look like Mao Tsetung, Red China's leader; even plastic women. In North Vietnam it's bad luck to see a woman on first getting up in the morning.

This psychological offensive might also include dropping harmless green dyes and smelly ingredients into rice paddies to leave the rice edible but unappetizing; skywriting unlucky symbols over the villages, and dropping soundmakers, particularly those that make noises like owls, which are unlucky.

Basing his suggestions on research done by the Library of Congress, HOSMER notes that conventional bombings do not disrupt the agricultural economy of the peasants, but that playing on their superstitions might demoralize them and shorten the war.

We should like to hear the Pentagon's answer—and if the ideas aren't feasible, why not? They'd be inexpensive to try, wouldn't cost any lives, and would take advantage of built-in weaknesses of the Vietnamese people.

Let's not knock HOSMER's ideas at least until they've been investigated.

The News of Mexico City on February 8, as follows:

OWL HOOTS AND GRASSHOPPER MEN

Those who are tempted to ridicule the suggestion by a Republican Congressman that the war in Vietnam could be won by owl hoots, playing cards, and plastic models of dogs and girls, underestimate the force of superstitution. The idea has weird merit. To demoralize the enemy is one of the oldest of military techniques, as attested by the Old Testament account of the defeatism of those who saw themselves as grasshooper size compared with the stature of the opposing host.

The "Golden Horde" of Genghis Khan swept to the very portals of Christian Europe, and its mysterious retreat has been attributed to superstitious fear on the part of the oriental leader. The conquest of Mexico was facilitated by the astuteness of Cortez in capitalizing on native traditions which cast the invading Spanish in the role of "white gods."

During the early part of World War II, German efforts were directed at undermining the morale of the countries earmarked for invasion, through radio broadcasts explaining the futility of resistance. Still within memory are the broadcasts of "Lord Haw Haw" in Europe and "Tokyo Rose" in the Pacific whose object was to erode the enemy psychologically.

The technique of psychological warfare has been perfected far beyond these clumsy efforts. The process of brainwashing is not limited to captured prisoners, but extends throughout the world in a vast and subtle competition for the minds of men. All media of mass communication are employed to generate attitudes, to create acceptance or opposition to a given program or policy. We pride ourselves on "independent judgment," without realizing the extent to which the clothes we wear the food we eat, the vote we cast, and the ideas we cherish are decided by constant bombardment from those who have an interest in influencing our choices and our views.

It is frequently asserted that the present ideological struggle is a "battle for human minds." In psychological warfare, no weapon can be despised if it helps to create specific symbols or images. Those who march in protest do so because they have been made to see one set of values, while those who clamor for escalation see another set.

What Representative CRAIG HOSMER suggests makes sense: instead of dropping bombs, to release the despicable running dog in the effigy of Ho Chi-Minh and Mao Tsetung, or playing cards bearing the ominous Ace of Spades, and to arrange devices to reproduce the triple owl hoot so dreaded among the North Vietnamese. Such measures, in themselves, cannot be expected to decide the issue of the war, but they can certainly make it no worse. The expense and effort would be justified if only a few of the Vietcong are made to feel, "and we were as grasshoppers in their sight."

The New Haven Register on February 19, as follows:

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO BEAT NORTH VIET

A Congressman from California suggests that we bomb North Vietnam with such harmless objects as ace of spades playing cards, gadgets that hoot like an owl, and plastic models of girls and running dogs. He believes this would be more effective than dropping explosives and would cause no casualties.

The North Vietnamese are, on the whole, very superstitious. The use of psychological warfare covering the population areas with objects having an ill omen to the natives is recommended by CRAIG HOSMER, a Republican. He suggests dropping a foul-smelling but nonpoisonous dye into irrigation ditches around rice paddies. The water would change the color of the rice. A good dosage of such incidents would, HOSMER is convinced, prompt the North Vietnamese to lose interest in pursuing the war.

It can be assumed that various methods of upsetting the North Vietnamese psychologically have already been studied. It is difficult to believe that an ace of spades playing card would be more frightening than a demolition or napalm bomb. But Vietnam is a strange country of strange people with many strange customs and practices.

HOSMER says he has been apprised of some of the superstitions by people who have lived with the North Vietnamese and know their habits and thinking. Fighting the Vietcong is largely an effort of search and destroy. It might be worth an exploratory attempt to see if this method could be trumped by an ace of spades.

And, on a related topic, the use of psychological war against us by the North Vietnamese, the San Diego Union of February 18 states as follows:

SUBVERSION AT WORK—WE MUST BACK OUR MILITARY

Today as in the early 1950's Hanoi is fighting the war in Vietnam with nearly equal emphasis on two fronts.

One of the fronts is in the jungles of Vietnam, where Ho Chi Minh's legions of guerril-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

las should learn they cannot defeat the might and power of the United States of America and South Vietnamese.

The other front is in the United States of America, where forces of the Vietcong fifth column seek to undermine the will of our people to continue the war.

As Representative CRAIG HOSMER, Republican of California, said in a House speech, Ho's technique is nearly identical to the one he used to defeat France in Vietnam in the 1950's.

Contrary to general opinion, France did not lose the Vietnamese war on the battlefield, but at home when the people lost heart to continue. Even after the disaster at Dienbienphu, about 90 percent of the French military forces in Vietnam were intact. The lack of home support, adequate supplies and a sense of futility lost the war.

The loss of the French civilian's will was not accidental. Front groups sponsored by Communists staged demonstrations, emphasizing the theme "Asia for the Asians" and "bring the boys home." Families of French soldiers were harassed, peace marches, placards, self-labeled "intellectuals" harped on the futility of fighting, and defeatist talk was encouraged.

The same familiar pattern is in use today in the United States of America by the Vietcong fifth column, actively promulgated by the Communist Party and sympathizers. It has spread from the campuses to the streets, from lecture halls to the Congress.

Fortunately, most of the American people are too intelligent to be duped. Opinion polls show the public supports the President's policy in Vietnam and our military forces. The Vietcong fifth column remains a great danger, however, because of its violence, persistence and because it gets official attention out of proportion to its size.

Abroad, the Vietcong fifth column also serves the purposes of Hanoi and Peiping. The controlled press of Red China and North Vietnam consistently publicizes the demonstrations and antiwar speeches, claiming "it shows the masses have begun to feel they can no longer tolerate the Lyndon Johnson administration's policy." It fans the desires of the Communists to persist in Vietnam.

It is a fight to the death for the Communists on both fronts. They know they cannot win the military war in Vietnam unless our fighting forces lose popular support.

They are also aware that the United States is the last power in the world today that is capable and willing to stop the tide of Communist aggression for world conquest. If the will of the United States to stop the tide crumples, the road of conquest elsewhere will be open to atheistic communism.

This is why the public must support its military forces in Vietnam.

COFFEE SMUGGLING AND CASE STUDY IN A PRICE-FIXING FAILURE

(Mr. CLEVELAND (at the request of Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the following article and editorial printed recently in the Wall Street Journal pretty well speak for themselves. They report the apparent failure of the International Coffee Agreement against which I voted twice.

These articles appear to vindicate those of us who opposed this international price-fixing cartel. The grand scheme of the agreement is apparently doomed to failure because of the smuggling which is documented here. Production continues to soar and market stability has apparently eluded the planners. In my opinion, the agreement was an unworkable one and should be ended as soon as possible. It encourages a one-crop economy in nations that should be encouraged to diversify their economies. It serves chiefly to enrich the rich (and the smugglers). I commend the article and editorial to my colleagues for their thoughtful consideration:

PSSST. "HOT" COFFEE?—SMUGGLERS FIND PROFIT IN THE COFFEE BUSINESS—INDIRECT SHIPPING AVOIDS PACT—ROASTERS ASK JOHNSON'S AID—PLEAS "CALL IT TOURIST COFFEE"

(By Frank J. Prial)

The world's newest smuggling ring seems a discredit to its trade. It couldn't care less about false-bottomed suitcases or rendezvous on moonless nights. It shuns opium and diamonds and weapons and other staples of the business. It keeps its prices low.

The smugglers deal in, of all things, coffee. They deal in it almost openly, and they deal in it in a big way. Since October 1, the smugglers have shipped coffee valued at "well in excess of $50 million" into the United States, according to a letter sent to President Johnson last week by the New York Coffee Roasters Association. It asked for help in stopping the coffee runners.

"Smuggling is so flagrant," says one New York coffee trader, "that we just think of it as part and parcel of the business. I'd say 90 percent of the trade (in the United States) buys this stuff now" for some of their supplies. Another trader seeks to lend respectability to the practice. "Don't call it smuggling," he cautions. "Call it tourist coffee" because it comes by way of a third country.

HOW TO SMUGGLE

Whatever it's called, the operation is relatively simple and, in a few instances, apparently is legal at the moment. Most major coffee-producing and coffee-consuming nations are members of the International Coffee Organization, which sets maximum and minimum prices for green, unroasted coffee beans. The prices are enforced through export and import quotas that the nations must adhere to when dealing with fellow members. Last spring, for instance, when the price slipped below the floor, exports from coffee-growing nations were cut 4.5 percent to boost the price back up.

But the controls don't affect dealings with nonmember nations or with countries termed "new markets"—Nations where coffee drinking is just becoming established. Thus, a producing nation could ship bags of coffee to a nonmember nation, which could merely reship it to a consuming land. (Specifically to the United States which takes 47 percent of world coffee exports.)

This, in fact, is just what is happening. All of a sudden, trade sources say, coffee is coming into the United States from such lands as Yemen and Laos, nations not particularly noted for their coffee output. Hamburg, Germany, is an especially popular "midway" port, dealers say. The coffee is underselling that which enters the United States through normal channels, though smugglers are said to be making a tidy profit despite the extra shipping costs.

If the shipper takes the trouble to pay export taxes in the producing nation and customs duty in the midway port, he probably isn't violating the letter of the law, coffee people say. But most smugglers apparently ignore these finer points. One trader says he knows of a Colombian smuggler who handsomely pays customs guards to ignore his shipments to "third countries."

The smuggling has proved so successful that in the "last few months or weeks smuggling has increased," says Cyril C. Spencer, the London-based deputy executive director of the International Coffee Organization. He believes the $50 million figure is too high, but has none to offer in its place.

IMPLIED CONSENT

So far, no smuggler has been caught, the industry people say. And they imply that one reason may be because the producing nations close their eyes to the practice because it helps them get rid of their overproduction.

Overproduction is the cause of the problem. There is, it seems, an awful lot of coffee in Brazil. It and other nations produce more than they may export under ICO rules.

"Eventually," predicts Donald Diamond, a coffee trader with New York's A. C. Israel & Co., "there is going to be a terrific break in the market. Overproduction is heavy right now and high prices only encourage more people and more countries to grow coffee." Actually, the smuggling has already forced down the price of coffee somewhat, according to ICO headquarters in London.

Some steps are being taken to curb the smuggling. Beginning April 1, coffee shipped via third countries will have to have "certificates of origin" on the bags, and if these end up in a consuming nation they will be counted against the export quota of the actual producing nation. But this regulation can be circumvented easily, traders say.

For instance, the smugglers could follow the practice of one of their colleagues who ships Guatemalan coffee to the United States by way of Tangier. "It comes in double bags," says a trader in the United States. "They simply strip off the original bags in Tangier and send it on here."

In their letter to the President, the New York roasters group asked that he bar imports from countries that aren't members of the ICO as soon as the level reaches "historical import figures." It also urged the United States to press plans "designed to eliminate overproduction in the coffee producing world."

THE GLOBETROTTING COFFEE BEAN

If smuggled coffee is keeping members of the International Coffee Organization awake these nights, it is easy to understand why. For the smuggling operation offers another bit of evidence that most coffee-producing nations still haven't learned very much about the law of supply and demand.

The ICO was created some years ago to fix coffee prices through a system of quotas. If prices drop below a certain point, the ICO cuts the coffeegrowers' export quotas, creating an artificial scarcity which hauls the price back up again. This is dandy for the coffee producers but hardly so for consumers. They either have to pay the fixed price or drink tea, or something.

The ICO's operations were designed to stabilize not only prices but also production. However, producing nations have been going on merrily overproducing coffee which, under the quota system, they can't export to ICO members. And here, as this newspaper disclosed the other day, is where the smugglers come in.

To be a successful coffee smuggler, it seems all you have to do is to ship coffee to a country not a member of the ICO or a country classified as a "new market" where use of the beverage is just starting to catch on. Such a deal is not covered by the quota restrictions applying to all ICO members when they do business with each other.

The "third country" simply reships the beans to a buyer in a consuming nation such as the United States. So artificially high has the ICO kept coffee prices that traders can ship beans grown in Guatemala to the United States by way of Tangier, sell at below-ICO prices and still make a tidy profit.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

refer to the statement of John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman, Civil Service Commission, on H.R. 10607 at hearings held last September before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. In order to hold down printing costs, I request that the documents accompanying Chairman Macy's statement not be reproduced, but I highly recommend that they be studied carefully by interested parties for important background information.

Mr. Speaker, revenue estimates with respect to the bill are somewhat difficult to make because of the lack of reliable information on the number of employees transferred annually who meet the conditions specified under the bill. It is estimated, however, that the potential revenue cost would run somewhere in the neighborhood of $40 to $60 million a year. This assumes that the Internal Revenue Service wins the continuing litigation involving reimbursed moving expenses and that it moves from a hit-or-miss enforcement policy to an organized crackdown—on both corporate and military transfers, a step which in my humble judgment would practically guarantee the enactment of corrective legislation. At the present time, however, it seems clear that many thousands of servicemen and civilian employees are not paying taxes on their reimbursed moving expenses—so the revenue cost figure does not represent a corresponding diminution of actual dollars now flowing into the Treasury.

It seems to me incredible that the Service would seek to tax employees on reimbursed moving costs of the type covered in my bill. This problem is not going to go away any time soon. The Government, itself, last December, in opposing review of the moving expense tax issue by the Supreme Court, has unfortunately contributed to the continuing uncertainty and confusion in this important area. If the problem is to be solved, it is up to Congress to do it.

I respectfully urge passage of the bill I have introduced.

LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954

(Mr. TUNNEY (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, I would like to introduce legislation today which would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide that construction workers shall be allowed the deduction for moving expenses without regard to the length of time they are employed at their new location.

This legislation would eliminate a provision in the present law which discriminates against the construction worker. The inequity in the present law involves the allowance of deductions for moving expenses for workers of the trades and crafts of the construction industry.

A general rule of the Internal Revenue Code provides:

There shall be allowed as a deduction moving expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an employee at a new principal place of work.

Under present law, conditions are imposed which have the effect of eliminating the construction worker's ability to take full advantage of the deduction allowance for moving expenses. Here we have a situation in which the benefits of this very worthwhile provision are denied to those who need them most—the construction worker.

Section 217(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code says:

That no deduction shall be allowed unless: (2) during the 12-month period immediately following his arrival in the general location of his new principal place of work, the taxpayer is a full-time employee, in such general location, during at least 39 weeks.

Because of the temporary nature of his employment this section is inequitable to the construction worker. The legislation which I am introducing today would allow construction workers to take the same advantage of the moving expense deduction allowance as other qualified employees in other professions now take.

McGEORGE BUNDY

(Mr. CULVER (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Speaker, this week McGeorge Bundy leaves Government service to assume his important new duties as president of the Ford Foundation. During the past 5 years Mr. Bundy's outstanding service to two Presidents and his unquestioned devotion to furthering the national interest have established brilliant new standards of fulfilling the high ideals of public service.

My own association with McGeorge Bundy dates back to 1952 when I was fortunate to have him as my tutor in American government at Harvard College. His unsurpassed intellectual capacity and breadth of vision together with his vigor and sincere interest made this a most stimulating and rewarding educational opportunity as well as an unforgettable personal experience. These same qualities combined successfully with a tough-minded pragmatic approach characterized his service to the country.

The Washington Post of February 27 contained a most fitting tribute to McGeorge Bundy by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., his colleague both at Harvard and on the staff at the White House. I am personally familiar not only with Mr. Schlesinger's description of Bundy's exceptional contribution to Government, but his account of the warmth and thoughtfulness of his personal relationships with his friends.

On this occasion, as we wish Mr. Bundy every success in his new position, it is with the knowledge that the American Government is stronger today because he served it for 5 critical years. It will be forever stronger because of the nature of that contribution and its inspirational legacy to future Americans in the service of our Nation.

I respectfully include in the RECORD at this point the tribute of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to McGeorge Bundy:

MCGEORGE BUNDY: THE END OF AN ERA

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

It is, as they say, the end of an era. Tomorrow when Mac Bundy leaves, the last of the Kennedy White House will have gone. We were, for better or worse, a distinctive group. Kennedy always wanted to bring together the world of power and the world of ideas, and he turned more systematically than any other Presdient to the universities. Bundy suited his theory and his needs perfectly.

The dean of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard combined the wide-ranging and imaginative mind of a professional intellectual with the instinct for hard judgment of an administrator who had become a top lion in the academic jungle. I think, too, it amused the President to enlist a man who was not only a Boston Brahmin but a representative of the Stimson-Lovett-McCloy mob in New York, for which Democratic Presidents have always had an amiable weakness.

Bundy, at once so spirited and so realistic, fitted superbly into Kennedy's mode of operation. He knew everybody, feared nobody, respected the President's power of decision, stated each side of an argument better than the protagonists, and was always cool, swift, lucid, precise, and funny. He had, too, the indestructible personal vitality Kennedy enjoyed so much. Nothing seems to tire him. It used to madden Mike Forrestal and me, hardly able after a late night to drag ourselves to his morning staff meeting, to watch Bundy, who had been working or relaxing as long as we had and, in addition, had played an hour of tennis before breakfast, bounce into the room, pink-faced and merry, emitting a rapid fire of bulletins, instructions, questions, and jokes.

Not everybody liked Bundy. He was very charming and very tough. People resented his air of confidence and impregnability and thought him cold and ambitious. Though warm and thoughtful in private relations, he could be ice in official contacts, and his wit sometimes declined into sarcasm in dealing with the press and the public. Like his mentors in the New York establishment, he united his commitment to public service with an evident appetite for power.

But these traits, real or fancied, hardly decreased his effectiveness. He served two Presidents brilliantly and faithfully, giving them the assistance they needed to retain their personal control over foreign and defense policy in the age when policy out of control could mean the end of the world. He brought them a wider range of alternatives than the traditional departments were ready to propose, a trenchant and fertile intelligence and a deep sense of responsibility to history. He was a great public servant.

VIETNAM

(Mr. SISK (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, the San Francisco Examiner states:

It is refreshing to read that college students are demonstrating in support of President Johnson's Vietnam policy.

It finds this further evidence that:

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

though it may bring rejoicing at Peiping and Moscow. He has completely yielded to the counsel of his advisers, sappers, and appeasers, who must be made to bear basic responsibility for what has occurred. Moreover, I predict that the expressed willingness to surender control over the Panama Canal will be taken as a signal for accelerated activity among Communistic revolutionary elements all over Latin America and the Caribbean.

"There should be only one flag flown over the Panama Canal and Zone—the flag of the United States—and the proposed treaties should be defeated."

LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954

(Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill, which would eliminate an unfair tax burden that the Internal Revenue Service is presently seeking to assert against hundreds of thousands of private industry employees and military personnel who are transferred annually for the convenience of their employer to new duty stations. Moreover, when H.R. 10607, an administration sponsored bill reported favorably last October by the House Government Operations Committee, becomes law, as I am confident it will, my bill will bar the Treasury from attempting to collect tax on the broadened moving expense allowances that will be payable under that bill to Federal employees who are required to move in the interest of the Government. As was stated publicly last year by Chairman John Macy of the Civil Service Commission before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, the employer should as a matter of equity and fairness pay the expenses of the move when the employer finds it necessary or desirable to transfer an employee to another job location. I find myself in complete agreement with Mr. Macy on this point. Moreover, when the move is primarily for the benefit of the employer, I again agree with Chairman Macy that there is no good reason why the employee should be taxed simply because the out-of-pocket expenses of the move are paid by the employer. Accordingly my bill provides for the exclusion from income of certain reimbursed moving expenses for employees who are transferred by their employer from one duty station to another.

One purpose of the bill is to overrule the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *England v. United States*, 345 F. 2d 414, cert. denied, January 1966, 34 U.S. Law Week 3242, and related Revenue Ruling 65-158 to the effect that moving expense reimbursements for such things as house-hunting trips, temporary meals and lodging at the new post of duty, and fees incurred in selling the former residence are compensatory in nature. The bill would also reverse Revenue Ruling 64-153 which holds that a dislocation allowance paid to a member of the armed service whose dependents are moved in connection with a permanent change of station is taxable to the serviceman.

The bill would remove a serious deterrent to the mobility of labor. It would deal with the entire moving expense problem in a prompt, systematic, and definite manner, bringing to an end years of litigation and confusion which are adversely affecting employer and employee alike. It would eliminate the imposition of an unfair tax on an estimated 340,000 members of our Armed Forces and on more than 150,000 employees of private industry who are transferred annually at the request of their employers. If and when the civil service bill, H.R. 10607, becomes law, the bill will provide tax equity for an additional 35,000 Federal civilian employees.

With important limitations, the bill would exclude from income of a transferred employee the following expenses of moving—in addition to the cost of transporting the employee, his family, and household goods to the new place of work, which are clearly nontaxable under existing law:

First. House-hunting trips.

Second. Temporary living expenses at the new job location.

Third. Out-of-pocket expenses incident to the sale of the old house or to the settlement of an unexpired lease on the employee's old residence.

Fourth. Out-of-pocket expenses incident to the purchase of a residence at the new job location.

Fifth. Other miscellaneous expenses directly attributable to the transfer.

The more important of the conditions and limitations included in the bill to prevent abuse and to hold the revenue cost to a minimum are as follows:

Only employees who have worked at least a year for the same or a related employer are covered. This is generally in accord with the civil service bill—H.R. 10607—which pertains to transferred employees rather than new appointees. Furthermore, transfers which may be regarded as primarily for the benefit of the employer usually involve existing employees rather than newly hired individuals.

No provision has been included relative to the reimbursement of losses, such as those suffered by an employee on disposal of his old residence. The bill is limited to payments by the employer covering out-of-pocket expenses connected with the move, as distinguished from losses. Here again, this is in accord with the approach taken in the civil service bill.

The exclusion for house-hunting trips is limited to trips within the United States. This provision incorporates a limitation similar to that provided in the civil service bill. While no express limit is placed on the number of house-hunting trips, this provision is subject to the general requirement that the expense be reasonable.

The exclusion for temporary living expenses at the new job location is limited to a period not to exceed 30 days, except if the move is to or from a location outside the United States, the maximum period can be extended to 60 days. This provision is in line with the Civil Service recommendations and is much more restrictive than the reimbursement policy in this area of many of our large corporate employers.

Nontaxable reimbursements under the miscellaneous moving expense provision cannot exceed, in the case of a family man, the lesser of $1,000 or 2 weeks' pay, with the limitation being cut in half for the employee who has no family. The dollar limitations are generally similar to those recommended by the civil service and are intended to preclude unjust criticism of the bill as a "rich man's" bill. In this regard, a recent statistical study involving employee moves of 18 large corporations indicated that 55 percent of those moved earned less than $10,000 a year, with more than 87 percent under the $15,000 level. Also of significance is the fact that approximately 60 percent of the employees moved received no promotion, and of those promoted, 65 percent received annual salary increases of less than $1,000 a year.

For completeness, several technical points connected with my bill should perhaps be mentioned. First, the exclusion provided for reimbursed expenses of transporting the employee, his family and household goods from the old to the new post of duty covers the same ground as present section 217 of the code, except that the language "including temporary storage expenses" is added to overcome the adverse decision on this point by the Treasury Department in regulations issued under section 217. There is, however, no overlap between section 217 and my bill because section 217 has no application to reimbursed expenses which, as in my bill, are excluded from income.

Second, a provision is included in the bill to cover the problem of an employee who is transferred among related companies. In effect, a parent corporation and its subsidiaries—and also "brother-sister" controlled groups—are to be considered as a single employer for purposes of testing whether the 12-month employment period has been satisfied by the employer to make him eligible for the benefits of the bill.

Third, conforming changes to the social security and Federal unemployment tax laws are included to eliminate the necessity of withholding on reimbursements which are excludible from income under the bill. It will be recalled that this problem was encountered following the enactment of present section 217 as part of the Revenue Act of 1964 and was subsequently clarified by Public Law 88-650.

Mr. Speaker, the December 9, 1965, edition of the Wall Street Journal contained a very informative article on the problems and frustrations resulting from the Internal Revenue Service decision to tax reimbursed moving expenses and I commend it to the attention of the Members.

Also, because of its significance to the problem covered by my bill, I wish to

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Campus troublemakers who urge ducking the draft, issue pro-Vietcong proclamations, and call for peace at any price, are a minority; a noisy headline-grabbing minority.

The Examiner declares that the facade of united resolution in Hanoi "appears to be yet another Communist falsehood."

The paper continues that:

General Taylor has reminded us of peculiar and unheralded shifts of Communist policy in the past. He cited the Berlin airlift and the Korean war. In both situations Communist intransigence seemed intractable until the very last moment, then suddenly evaporated.

In the belief that others may want to read this editorial in its entirety, I am offering it to the RECORD:

OPINIONS CLASH IN HANOI, TOO

Has a crack appeared in North Vietnam's apparently solid determination to continue its aggression against South Vietnam, come hell, high water, and the prospect of expanding conflict with U.S. forces?

Hanoi sources provide some indication that this might be so. A Hanoi broadcast reported that the top Hanoi leadership has had to criticize publicly a dissident faction in the North Vietnamese Communist Party for posing the current theme of militancy.

Thus, it would appear that "doves" and "hawks" exist in North Vietnam as they do elsewhere. In this case, however, the "doves" appear to be the realists. They seem to consist of a minority group within the party that fears the consequences of a lengthy struggle with the United States, presumably for highly practical reasons. Much of what has been done in North Vietnam since 1954 is being pounded into rubble by American airpower and the "doves" see no letup from this, and no profit either.

One indication of the apparent strength of the "dove" faction is the fact that Hanoi's top echelon has had to resort to public denunciation to deal with it. Thus the facade of united resolution against "American imperialism" that North Vietnam has so assiduously sought to present to the world appears to be yet another Communist falsehood.

It could even presage a sudden and dramatic turn of events. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor has, in a recent interview, reminded us of peculiar and unheralded shifts of Communist policy in the past. He cited the Berlin airlift and the Korean war. In both situations Communist intransigence seemed intractable until the very last moment, then suddenly evaporated.

In our country it is refreshing to read that college students are demonstrating in support of President Johnson's Vietnam policy. It is further evidence of what we have frequently written—that campus troublemakers who urge ducking the draft, issue pro-Vietcong proclamations, and call for peace at any price, are a minority; a noisy headline-grabbing minority.

(Mr. CONYERS (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CONYERS' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. WELTNER (at the request of Mr. MATSUNAGA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. WELTNER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

THE GREAT QUALITIES OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. MCDOWELL] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. MCDOWELL. Mr. Speaker, the great qualities of Secretary of State Dean Rusk were revealed during his 7 hours before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the New York Journal-American asserts.

The paper adds that when the true portrait emerged, it was clear why President Johnson says of him, "He is No. 1 in the Cabinet and No. 1 with me."

The article noted that "patiently, imperturbably, undramatically, Rusk repeated time and again a defense of the Johnson administration policies in Vietnam," until the issues seemed clear.

I believe that others will want to see the article to which I have referred, and I therefore am including it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

[From the New York Journal-American, Feb. 20, 1966]

RUSK—TRUE PORTRAIT REVEALED

(By William McCullam)

Thanks to his 7-hour televised ordeal before the Senate hearings on Vietnam, the little-known stature of Secretary of State Dean Rusk today stands revealed to millions of Americans for the first time.

For the first time, too, many Washington critics of the controversial man they have called colorless, indecisive, slippery, and unimaginative have seen at first hand the depths of strength and conviction behind his diplomatic mask.

It took 7 hours for the full portrait to emerge because Dean Rusk, once a former Georgia hillbilly and Rhodes scholar, is so remarkably complicated. In the end, it was clear why President Johnson says of him:

"He is No. 1 in the Cabinet and No. 1 with me."

During his marathon questioning before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Friday, the tall, bald, stolid witness displayed all the qualities which have caused exasperation among his enemies and unswerving loyalty among the relative few who have known him well.

Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his sweeping indictment of Mr. Rusk as a "Buddha-like" figure in the Kennedy administration, said the late President had considered replacing him because of the Secretary's many objections to New Frontier proposals.

On the Washington witness stand, the "Buddha-like" qualities were much in evidence as he placidly resisted the needling of his opponents, particularly Senators WAYNE MORSE and J. W. FULBRIGHT, the latter also a former rural boy who became a Rhodes scholar.

Patiently, imperturbably, undramatically he repeated time and again in his southern drawl a defense of the Johnson administration policies in Vietnam.

In a word, the witness for long stretches presented the picture described by his critics—that of a man who sees all sides, pro and con.

Not until the very end of the hearing did the lack of self-dramatics begin to emerge as the self-effacement of a gentleman; the lack of ringing pronouncements as a Gilbraltar-like commitment to a policy of searching for peace while defending against aggression.

The full, true qualities of Dean Rusk began to be evident when Senator FULBRIGHT—deliberately sardonic and sarcastic by turns—ripped into the Secretary's hour-long opening statement and went on to declare that the huge expense of the Vietnam war is unjustified.

When the assault was ended, and only then, Mr. Rusk calmly voiced the answer which deflated his hostile questioner and revealed the singleness of purpose which has guided him for over 5 years as head of the State Department.

He noted that it was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which had voted all-important approval in 1954 for the southeast Asia treaty, the treaty whose obligations have guided the Nation's actions in South Vietnam.

Then he added:

"If there is any doubt in Congress about this major policy, let us vote. Let those who oppose our involvement, our commitment, stand here on the Senate floor like men and vote it down.

"There wouldn't be a single American combat soldier in South Vietnam if Hanoi had not launched its aggression."

The issues are as clear as that to Dean Rusk, and as simple. This Nation will either live up to its pledges to halt Communist aggression against her allies, or she will not.

At long last, the issues seemed to become blindingly clear to Senator FULBRIGHT as well. In adjourning the hearing, he said:

"I do not believe any further sessions will be required."

WILLIAM F. ENGLEHART, OF DOVER, DEL., WINS THE VOICE OF DEMOCRACY CONTEST OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

Mr. MCDOWELL. Mr. Speaker, William F. Englehart, of Dover, Del., is the winner of the Voice of Democracy Contest of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and its ladies auxiliary. Mr. Englehart is to be commended for winning this contest. Among other things he says:

Democracy means responsibility. We must face this fact if we are to preserve the doctrines of our forefathers. The very survival of democracy in today's world demands responsibility and involvement.

I include the complete text of Mr. Englehart's winning speech for the information of my colleagues:

WHAT DEMOCRACY MEANS TO ME

(By William F. Englehart)

In an attempt to improve their lives, our Founding Fathers gave birth, through great personal sacrifice, to American democracy. This legacy of freedom, passed on from them to us, is ours today to perpetuate or to destroy.

And what is democracy today? In our sophisticated, modern-day society it is an act of indifference, of letting someone else make the important decisions, of "passing the buck." Contemporary democracy allows the individual to live in a private world, unhampered by concern for others. But in contrast to the apathy, democracy guarantees the right to become involved with mankind, to protest against war, hatred, and inequality. It allows freedom to follow one's conscience in the pursuit of better understanding between men of all nations and creeds.

Democracy, because of its very nature, fosters extremes which are necessary to maintain equilibrium of thought and purpose among the moderate majority. In recent months for example, rightwing and leftwing extremists have been under constant fire from various sources in both the Government and the press. Their indignation, born of patriotism, is commendable; but it is necessary to keep one basic tenet of democracy in mind: The rights of the radical must be protected if the rights of the rational are to be perpetuated. Democracy requires tolerance just as a fire requires air. Without the one, the other will soon be smothered and will die.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Having established these guidelines to democracy in contemporary America, where do I fit in? Exactly what does democracy mean to me?

American history has provided me with a heritage rich in the tradition of freedom. It has left a record of unequaled achievement in science and industry. It has given birth to world leaders for three centuries. Because of these and other accomplishments, democracy has made me proud to be an American, a citizen of the great United States of America.

At the same time, pride is accompanied by the recognition of my good fortune in living in a land such as ours. This knowledge engenders dedication to the preservation of the ideals our country is based on, and creates a desire to extend the fruits of democracy to a suffering world.

The success or failure of democracy is dependent upon the individual. Without the initiative of individualism, the spark of democracy is gone. The American colonies would have made little progress had it not been for the individualism of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, and countless others. These believers in democracy practiced its principles to the best of their ability, and succeeded in establishing a type of government that attempted to meet the needs of a free society.

Because of democracy an individual has the opportunity to plan his future, to decide what education he will attempt to obtain. He has the right of choice regarding his religion, his mate, and his home. He is allowed freedom of thought, speech, and peaceful assembly. He is not punished for dissenting, but rather, is encouraged to think for himself.

These things which we take for granted constitute the most valuable treasure on earth: our freedom. In observing the world around us, it should be obvious that God has truly blessed us.

On the surface it appears that democracy gives so much and asks so little in return. It is at this point that democracy attains its full meaning for me, for in its one major requisite is found a meaning for life in general, and citizenship in particular. That requisite is responsibility.

Democracy means responsibility. We must face this fact if we are to preserve the doctrines of our forefathers. The very survival of democracy in today's world demands responsibility and involvement. Apathy threatens to destroy the foundations of freedom built with the labor and lives of countless Americans. Only in fulfilling our responsibilities as citizens and human beings can we hope to perpetuate democracy as we know it.

In the final analysis what does democracy mean to me? Democracy is a free way of life that can be preserved only through responsibility in fulfilling the duties of citizenship. It is an invaluable treasure to be safeguarded at all costs. Democracy is my heritage, the heritage of a free America.

THE GOLDEN DOOR

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROONEY] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, February 20, the Washington Star distributed a keepsake issue of This Week devoted to telling the story of the immigrants who built America. This is a truly historic document. The text is replete with story after story of the foreign-born heroes to whom all of us owe overlasting gratitude.

Mr. Speaker, this issue makes all of us who supported President Johnson in enacting the Immigration Act of 1965, proud indeed of our participation. I am particularly proud of the honor you accorded me in letting me preside as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole during consideration of that important legislation. I am proud, too, that I could be numbered among those who were invited to join the President at the historic signing of that law under the very shadow of the Statue of Liberty. And I am proud that I could participate personally in Naples, Italy in the issuance of the first visa under the new act to my new constituent, Salvator Esposito.

I have always held in high regard the great American heroes who came to these shores from countries overseas and I have known and admired scores of Italian-born, Polish-born, German-born, and other foreign-born Americans who today are such loyal and productive American citizens. My own district has an unusually large number of these fine citizens whose daily contribution to our life and our society is indeed magnificent.

Mr. Speaker, because the February issue of This Week tells the story of so many of our great foreign-born heroes, and is therefore of such real interest to all of us, I include it with these remarks. My one regret is that the many graphic drawings which enhance its pages cannot be included with the text.

The story of the immigrants who built America reads as follows:

In 1748, 16-year-old George Washington made his first trip over the Blue Ridge Mountains to work as a surveyor along the western frontier. One day he noted in his journal meeting an Indian war party, with two scalps—and later a group of immigrants who impressed the future Father of his Country as "ignorante * * * they would never speak English but, when spoken to, they speak all Dutch."

There is a beautiful simplicity to this encounter. It sums up, in an offhand sentence, the whole story of the immigrants in America.

The young man who made the observation was the great-grandson of immigrants who had been driven to Virginia by poverty and religious persecution about 90 years before. The immigrants who spokes only "Dutch" were Germans, seeking refuge on the frontier for almost identical reasons.

So it has gone, from generation to generation. Each new wave of immigrants have come to America poor and unschooled and prospered until they came to regard the next wave as "ignorante." (Later generations added such unlovely names as mick, wop, yid, polack, spik.) John F. Kennedy a great grandson of an immigrant from Ireland, wanted to stop, once and for all, this futile pattern. When he died he was working on a book which he called "A Nation of Immigrants." There are grounds for believing he got the idea from his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, who once remarked, "I was born in the United States and so was my father. Yet my children are still called Irish. What the hell do we have to do to become Americans?"

WE ARE ALL CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS AND REBELS

It is the plain truth. All of us, from *Mayflower* descendants to the toddlers born to Cuban refugees from Castro's communism, are children of immigrants. President Franklin D. Roosevelt threw the Daughters of the American Revolution into a furor when he reminded them of it in a 1938 speech. "Remember," he said, "always, that all of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and revolutionists." But the whole truth is much larger than this plain truth. The story of American immigration is more than the search for a full dinner pail. It is one of the sagas in the history of the human race. Since 1607, when the first English settlers landed at Jamestown, Va., a staggering 42 million people have migrated to the United States—the largest mass movement in recorded history.

FIRST WEDDING, A MAID AND A LABORER IN VIRGINIA

Who were they—and why did they come? One thing is certain. From the beginning, almost to a man and woman, they were not aristocrats. Although there were a number of gentlemen among the first settlers in Virginia, they were of the poorer sort. As one of Virginia's earliest historians, Robert Beverely, remarked in 1705, "'Tis not likely that any man of a plentiful estate should voluntarily abandon a happy certainty to roam after imaginary advantages in a New World * * * the chief design of all parties concerned was to fetch away * * * treasure." Virginia's first marriage (1608) was between Ann Burras, a lady's maid, and John Laydon, a laborer. Stephen Vincent Benet describes the scene with fine irony in his narrative, "Western Star":

"And the first white wedding held on Virginia ground will marry no courtly dame to a cavalier but Ann Burras, lady's maid, to John Laydon, a laborer.

"After some 6 weeks' courtship—a fall wedding when the leaves were turning and the wild air sweet, and we know no more than that but it sticks in the mind, for they were serving maid and laboring man.

"And yet, while they lived, and they had not long to live), they were half of the first families in Virginia."

In New England, the story was much the same. There was not an iota of blue blood aboard the old freighter *Mayflower*. Nor is this the only myth that needs exploding.

Because America is an English speaking country, most of us have the impression that English immigrants alone cleared the forest primeval, fought the Revolution, secured independence—and then the others—Irish, Germans, Jews—began to arrive. Actually, most of America was well on its way to becoming a "nation of nations" by the time the embattled farmers fired the first shot at Lexington.

As early as September 25, 1608, six sturdy laborers strode ashore at Jamestown and within 3 weeks had a roaring fire going under a glass furnace, the first factory in America. Their names were Michal Lowicki, Zbigniew Stefanski, Jur Mata, Jan Bogdan, Karol Zrenica and Stanislaw Sadowski.

In 1619, when Virginia convened America's first representative assembly, the Governor declared that only natives of England would be allowed to vote. The Poles immediately went on strike, and won an almost instant victory. The court book of the Virginia Company records: "Upon some dispute of the Polonians * * * it was now agreed that they shall be enfranchised and made as free as any inhabitant."

Over 6,000 Dutch settled in New York and the Hudson River Valley and invited people from every country in the world to join them. Twenty-three Jews, refugees from Portuguese persecution in Brazil, arrived in 1654. French protestants driven out of France followed, as did Italians from the Piedmont.

One of these young Jewish immigrants, Asser Levy, won the first clear-cut victory for religious freedom in the New World. When he applied for citizenship in Nieuw Amsterdam, the Governor, gruff Peter Stuyvesant, turned him down. For 3 years, Levy pro-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

vised program of part-time work experience while still attending high school represents a sturdy bridge leading from graduation to worthwhile employment."

GOP in Criticism Exposes Its Own Weak Viet Role

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR.
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include in the RECORD the following article from the Detroit Free Press, an editorial of March 1, 1966:

AS WE SEE IT: GOP IN CRITICISM EXPOSES ITS OWN WEAK VIET ROLE

Few in Washington or anywhere else suggest that the continuing clash between Vice President HUMPHREY and Senator ROBERT KENNEDY about the U.S. policy in Vietnam lacks political overtones. The time may be late or it may be soon, but one of the two men might well pick up the reins of Democratic power when Lyndon Johnson lays them down.

As a member of the administration, HUMPHREY is both the beneficiary and the victim of its policies. If he can take some credit for the good, he is also stuck with the bad. And so far as Democratic liberals are concerned, his entry into the house of Johnson and Company left a vacuum in leadership for the left wing of the Democratic Party. It is a vacuum which KENNEDY has been trying mightily to fill.

Nor, one should add, has either of the men been wholly above criticism.

But it seems to us that criticism from the Council of Republican Organizations is in particularly poor political taste and exposes the GOP's own vulnerable position regarding Vietnam. Formed after the Goldwater debacle and composed of leading Republican liberals, the council impugns motives and charges HUMPHREY and KENNEDY with using the Vietnam issue "as a vehicle for future control of the Democratic Party."

In a statement of considerable length, the council said that its members "decry" the undermining of the Nation's policy by "political feuding and posturing" and "deplore" KENNEDY'S and HUMPHREY'S activities.

Overall it is a statement of pious self-righteousness which those deeply concerned about U.S. policy in Vietnam will find hard to take. For what the HUMPHREY-KENNEDY exchanges have disclosed, as they were never disclosed before, is the gap between what the administration appears to be saying when it calls for "unconditional" negotiations and what it is actually saying.

KENNEDY would deal directly with the Vietcong, the enemy in the field. HUMPHREY would not. KENNEDY, looking ahead, foresees that any really free election in South Vietnam where the Vietcong controls most of the territory and a large portion of the people is likely to have Vietcong winners. HUMPHREY prefers to call the Vietcong names—murderers, assassins—and blandly asserts that it would be highly unlikely any of them would win election to government posts.

Assuming that HUMPHREY speaks for the administration, his position reveals why the Vietcong and North Vietnam may have been reluctant up to now to participate in any negotiations ending hostilities. The view leaves them little choice but to grind on to what they hope eventually will be military victory or a stalemate with them largely in control of the countryside.

There has been unfortunate confusion about what the administration's position is on negotiations. If KENNEDY'S comments have clarified it in any way, they have made a significant contribution.

Which leaves the Council of Republican Organizations in the position of criticizing a critic of the administration's fuzzy Vietnam policy and of making absolutely no contribution of its own.

Without Medicare Alert Many Would Miss Benefits

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. STANLEY L. GREIGG
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. GREIGG. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to support the Sioux City Council of Community Services in its application for Operation Medicare Alert. As a result of approval of that program in Sioux City, Iowa, I am pleased to bring to the attention of my colleagues a solid report as to the progress being made in this vital undertaking.

I wish to personally commend my good friend, Paul Springer, for his dedication to a most worthy task. Also, I want to give special consideration to a most able news reporter, Mr. Bob Gunsolley, a highly competent and proficient journalist of the Sioux City Journal.

WITHOUT MEDICARE ALERT MANY WOULD MISS BENEFITS: PROGRAM HERE IS VALUABLE FOR OLDSTERS

(By Bob Gunsolley)

A small group of elder citizens is going door to door in Sioux City spreading the word on medicare among fellow oldsters.

They are finding that, despite the widespread publicity about medicare, many of the over-65 persons who are eligible for the benefits are confused about what they have to do to receive them.

The citywide canvass of the elderly has been going on since Febraury 7 under a federally financed project known as Operation Medicare Alert. It must end by March 31, when all those eligible have to decide on whether to enroll for medical benefits.

Paul Springer, former YMCA secretary here who is in charge of the project, said the assistance it provides is proving to be a real boon to many oldsters who might not otherwise have applied.

NOT REACHING ELDERLY

In most cases, the publicity just hasn't been getting to elderly persons, especially those with low income who live alone without radio or television and who rarely see a newspaper.

Some have hung back from applying because of misunderstanding, Mr. Springer said. One man said he thought he would have to sign over his property in order to apply for benefits.

Despite the controversy that preceded congressional adoption of medicare last year, the elderly beneficiaries, at least, appear to be almost solidly grateful for the program, Mr. Springer said.

Hostility has been at minimum among those called on. Some of those just don't like to admit strangers to their homes. In an even smaller percentage of the cases, less than 1 percent, hostility has been expressed toward medicare itself because it is a Government program.

EXPRESSING THANKS

Except for those few, persons visited so far have expressed gratitude not only for medicare, but also for the assistance rendered by medicare alert canvassers.

All of those involved in the project, including Mr. Springer, are 65 or over. Nine persons are being used in the door-to-door campaign, each of them working on a part-time basis. To supplement the home interviews, group meetings have been scheduled for each neighborhood as it is canvassed so that officials of the local social security office can answer some of the more difficult questions about medicare.

One such meeting was held Tuesday afternoon at the Sanford Center. Another one is scheduled for 2 p.m. Monday at Roosevelt School and a meeting will be held March 4 at Floyd School.

Mr. Springer estimates that there are about 10,000 persons in Sioux City 65 or older. Operation Medicare Alert hopes to reach most of those by the March 31 deadline, especially those in the low-income areas of greatest concentration of the elderly.

In order to become enrolled for medicare benefits, persons on social security must fill out and send in application cards they already have received in the mail. Hospitalization benefits will be free, but additional medical benefits will cost the elderly person $3 a month withheld from their social security checks if they enroll, according to Ralph Leonard, assistant manager of the local social security office.

Persons not on social security are also eligible for both hospitalization and medical benefits if they are 65 or older, but they will be billed for the medical payments. They must fill out special forms to enroll.

The purpose of Medicare Alert is to be sure that everyone who wants to has enrolled and to help those who haven't yet done so.

Of 1,000 persons called on last week, 450 were interviewed. The canvassers helped 418 of them fill out the necessary forms. Nine persons were referred to the council of community services for special help and 14 were referred to the social security office for special information.

WOULD HAVE MISSED

Mr. Springer estimates that without Operation Medicare Alert, about 75 of those visited last week would never have gone ahead on their own to apply for benefits.

Some of the canvassers find themselves doubling as social workers. They have found persons low on food who find it difficult to get to grocery stores. These are referred to the proper agencies for home food delivery.

Some who live alone and get few visitors were found to be starved for company. Ministers are notified to call on them.

Mr. Springer said that some persons on old-age assistance weren't aware that the State will pay for their medical benefits under medicare.

Connecticut's Voice of Democracy Winner

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, February 24, 1966

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, each year the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

United States and its ladies auxiliary conduct a Voice of Democracy Contest. The winning contestants from each State are brought to Washington for the final judging as guests of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the top five participants are awarded scholarships of $1,000 to $5,000.

Since this program provides an excellent vehicle for the stimulation and expression of serious thought on our Government's virtues and its shortcomings, I am especially pleased to note that one of my constituents, Miss Cynthia H. Griffin, of Waterbury, Conn., is the winning contestant from my home State. Miss Griffin's observations on the elements of democracy afford a refreshing insight into the thoughts of our young people, and under unanimous consent I include her essay as part of the RECORD.

(Cynthia H. Griffin, Waterbury, Conn.)

It is the pecularity of man to be introspective—to search within himself for motivation. Man is also unique in that he seeks significance in the world around him.

As a man matures, the need to find a meaning in his existence becomes more acute. The young person becomes increasingly aware of his own existence and his existence in relationship to others. He becomes more aware of the society in which he lives.

And so, as the young person searches for meanings—the meaning of his existence, the meaning of his society—he searches also for the meaning of democracy. He searches within himself and within others. For, democracy is government by the people. To be able to comprehend democracy, one must look to the people who comprise it.

Democracy is the most pliable form of government. It is soft clay placed in the hands of each new generation, bringing with it a challenge to each generation to sculpt its own future. Democracy takes on the color, flavor, character, and inclinations of its people. It is a government which relies on an informed, educated populace, sensitive to the needs of others, and acutely aware of the responsibility of each citizen for the common good. This is what makes democracy exciting—exciting and challenging.

The American democracy is not a government of the mass, it is a government of the people—of individuals, each contributing in his particular way to the good of the whole.

In America democracy has many faces. These faces may be those of a wealthy broker on Wall Street, a conservative politician in California, a strong-willed farmer in the Midwest, a patriotic cab driver in Washington, D.C., or an outspoken actor in Chicago. Each different, yet each representing a facet of democracy.

As a young person I must encounter democracy in the faces of these people. I must see that the Wall Street broker represents the right to succeed. He is the capitalist who gives us a healthy, wealthy, ever-striving economy. As a young person, I must realize that the sounds of the bulls and bears arguing over shares and the ever-present ticking of stock market machines are an important part of the voice of democracy.

The conservative politician represents the right to oppose. He is the man whose views may not be those of the majority, yet he is a thriving part of the democratic machinery. As a young person I must realize that the right to oppose has limitations; and if I exceed these limitations, as many of my peers have recently done, I hinder rather than help democracy.

The midwestern farmer represents the right to own property. He is the baker who fills the breadbasket of the Nation.

The cab driver represents the right of the people to be a part of the Government. It is a right which is intensified by the citizens' privilege to vote. The cab driver is one of the workingmen who are the backbone of this society.

The actor represents the right to speak freely. He is the artist who illustrates the special nobility of the arts in a democratic society. As an American youth, I must look to the arts to appreciate the richness of a culture which is free to flourish.

This is a brief sketch of the variety of people who make up this democracy and the variety of the privileges which they possess. Young people searching for the meaning of democracy will find it in these people. To know democracy is to know one's role in a democracy; to know one's role is to know one's ability to work for the improvement of democracy.

America challenges her youth to develop themselves as individuals, so that they may develop democracy as a whole. Students seeking democracy will find that the image of democracy is stamped on the faces of its people. It is an image which is mirrored in this statement—democracy is the freedom to be what is varied and the responsibility to do what is right.

The Federal Times, a Specialist Newspaper on Governmental People and Matters, Marks Its First Anniversary

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES H. MORRISON
OF LOUISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, 1 year ago a new newspaper appeared on the scene called Federal Times. At that time, its editors claimed that they would be dedicated to objectively reporting all news of importance to the millions of persons employed with the Government in a civilian capacity. A year later, it is evident that the editors of Federal Times have lived up to their promise.

As vice chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, I have taken an understandable interest in Federal Times. I can say that its coverage of our many subcommittee and committee hearings of this and last year has been of the highest journalistic quality. This worthy publication, in addition to covering the many facets of legislation pertaining to Federal civilians, has, through its editorials, feature articles, and departmental coverage, provided employees with virtually all information vital to them in pursuing their careers.

I wish at this time to commend the Federal Times and wish it many, many more anniversaries. I also include in the RECORD the editorial which appeared in the March 2 anniversary issue.

THE FIRST YEAR

With this issue, Federal Times begins its second year of operation. The year completed has been a good one. In that short span of time we have reached a weekly paid circulation in excess of 50,000 copies.

This was not an easy accomplishment. We are most grateful to the people who made it possible. Special thanks are due to the many Government and union officials who saw in Federal Times a vehicle through which each could work toward understanding the problems of the other.

The free flow of information is essential in a democracy. It is vital in a field made up of some two and one-half million people scattered across the country and around the world.

We have worked to gain the confidence of these leaders. We have done this by reporting, as accurately and rapidly as possible, both the good and the bad sides of the news. This was our announced aim in the first issue. It continues to be our policy.

A year ago we spelled out our objectives in our first editorial. Since so many of the objectives remain just as true today, we felt it would be fitting to review some of them as we begin our second year.

Editorially, we promised to support a policy of providing salaries high enough to attract and retain talented people in Government service. We continue this view and will support a raise this year which will move the Federal worker closer to salaries comparable to those paid in private industry for similar work. We will campaign not only for salary increases, but for gains in fringe benefits as well.

We promised to be a "listening post" by which the Federal worker could make his views on important subjects known to the men who make the laws. This we have done through our editorial page, our letters to the editor and our readership polls. We appeal for your participation in these polls since the results are transmitted to the policymakers and could make a difference in votes on key issues.

We promised to provide Government workers with a medium in which they could exchange ideas on how to improve both efficiency and working conditions. To do this we called upon respected leaders of both management and labor and provided them with space to express their views. Typical of these services were the reports by Dr. W. Brooke Graves on utilization of personnel, and Robert Ramspeck on the civil service system in general. Both of these articles received widespread dissemination being widely quoted and reprinted in other publications. Similar articles will appear in the weeks ahead.

We realized there would be an interest in jobs open in the Federal Government. We began with a limited list and have expanded it week to week ever since. All agencies are invited to submit their lists of vacancies. These are run without cost to the agency or the jobseeker.

Our service department answers a growing number of questions each week. In addition, special reports have covered subjects of key interest. These, too, will be expanded and enlarged to cover more subjects in the weeks ahead.

We have tackled controversial subjects like the need for reform in the sick leave policy; a review of the Hatch Act; the role of unions in government; and the adequacy of the last pay raise. In future issues we will discuss veteran preference the "buddy system," equal opportunity and other areas in need of closer inspection.

None of the things we have done or endeavored to do would be possible without the cooperation of a large number of people. It is a tribute to our civil service system that we have leaders who are willing to discuss both sides of a controversial issue. It is impressive that each side on occasion can be strong enough to admit it could be wrong.

A special word of thanks is due to our readers. By their letters and communications they have let us know what they want

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Today, with the information gathered by cooperative weather observers throughout the years, we have a vast storehouse of records of our Nation's climates. The private citizen, traveling to a distant part of the United States, can check on average maximum and minimum temperatures there before packing his suitcase. A businessman considering expansion into new markets may seek information on climate before making his decision.

With all the advances of modern technology, including satellites and automatic stations for observing the weather, the services of the volunteer observers are more needed and more valuable than ever. It is private citizens who keep official records of the weather at more than 12,000 places throughout our Nation. These devoted men and women give us the detailed knowledge of United States climates that is essential to the solution of many problems of an increasingly complex society.

ROBERT M. WHITE,
Administrator, ESSA.

HOW COOPERATIVE OBSERVERS' RECORDS ARE PROCESSED AND STORED

The daily observations that a cooperative observer makes are recorded by him on a form with space for an entire month's record. At the end of the month the form is sent to the National Weather Records Center, Asheville, N.C., where each day's observation is placed on a punched card. The cards are then used to make listings and comparisons. Data which appear inconsistent or erroneous are subject to professional review by a meteorologist, and erroneous entries are corrected or deleted.

After the records are checked the cards are used to prepare copy for the publication Climatological Data, thus making the records available to the public.

After this, the cards are filed for about 2 years, during which time they may be used for special tabulations or searched for particular combinations of significance to a specialized user. Before they are discarded they are placed on microfilm so that they can be recalled as needed in the future.

As of the end of 1965 an estimated 338 million cards containing weather data will be stored in the National Weather Records Center Archives plus an additional 170 million weather data cards on microfilm. These records are an invaluable national asset and are carefully preserved, since, unlike many other items, weather records increase in value with age.

HOW COOPERATIVE OBSERVERS' WEATHER RECORDS ARE USED

Since life on earth is dependent on the food we eat, the water we drink, and the air we breathe, it follows that the weather is an important factor in everyone's life. This is borne out by the varied and numerous uses made of data accumulated by cooperative observers.

Following are some examples of uses of weather records:

Evaluating and comparing the prospects of commercial vegetable growing in Arizona and in Florida. This study included comparisons of the frequency and duration of droughts, and of periods of high and low temperatures, length of the freeze-free season, and the distribution of rainfall as related to the growing season of various truck crops.

Planning hospital design and construction.

Making an industrial survey for a New Jersey area.

Correlating new homebuilding starts with weather data.

Evaluating insurance liability risks, verifying and paying insurance claims.

Preparing a marketing booklet on Alaska.

Determining the climate of a town.

Studying the effect of weather on mortality in New York City.

Studying the relationship between rainfall and frost data and the growth characteristics of red pine trees.

Surveying community airport development.

Comparing and adapting existing types of school construction and building materials to extreme environmental and climatic conditions.

Studying climatic change; is the climate changing and if so, in what way?

Delivering fuel supplies.

Planting and harvesting crops; studying the growth of trees, studying the risks of freezing by specified dates, and studying the relationship between climate and altitude.

Selecting a retirement location, or a climate favorable to a particular health problem.

Computing snow-melt rates over a watershed for which dams are being planned.

Determining the need for company salesmen to have air conditioners in their cars.

Making drought studies and determining drought disaster areas.

The Weather Bureau is able to help requesters with these and other problems as well as to help researchers in their attempts to learn more about our climates because thousands of cooperative observers have faithfully recorded the weather at various locations for decades and decades.

Hon. Albert Thomas

SPEECH
OF
HON. FRED B. ROONEY
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 28, 1966

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I deem it an honor to add my voice to the many already raised in this Chamber in praise of a great and good American lawmaker, ALBERT THOMAS.

When I came to this Congress 3 years ago, I discovered very quickly that I would need the almost daily counsel and wisdom of as many of my distinguished seniors as I could possibly get. To my everlasting gratitude, not one request for guidance on my part has ever been denied, no matter how small or unimportant the issue may have seemed.

ALBERT THOMAS lives in my memory as one of those who tried, at all times, to give me the benefit of his experience. He was a kind, courteous, considerate gentleman whose 30 years in this House have left a mark of distinction and impressive achievement.

Above all, he was a man of consummate courage.

Those final days of his life were a shining monument to an indomitable human spirit.

I think we all should take consolation in the fact that one man among us could confront the daily reminder of impending death with an invincible faith in his fellow man.

I am privileged to count myself as one of the numberless thousands whose lives have been enriched by ALBERT THOMAS, a dedicated public servant and a devoted friend.

Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. SILVIO O. CONTE
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, history has a way of pulling words out of our language and making them generic terms, single words that stand for a whole body of thought or a whole set of circumstances. This is especially true of wars and events of similar international impact.

The term "Waterloo," for example, is more than a place or even the name of a famous battle. It has come to mean a great deal more in terms of human events. Munich is another such word. We all know what it means when someone uses the term "another Munich."

"Hiroshima" conjures mental images far more complex than simply that of a small city in Japan. "Pearl Harbor" is a term symbolic of many things, of ideas that go far beyond the peaceful Polynesian paradise it once was.

There are countless other words and terms in the English language that bring to mind a whole complex flood of images and ideas that have no apparent relation to the literal term itself.

We are presently living in an era that is bound to produce another such generic term out of a rather awkward oriental word: "Vietnam."

History will use the word "Vietnam" to describe a complex, frustrating, see-saw kind of warfare with battle lines as indistinct as the shadows of the jungle in which they are being fought. It will include the background of uncertainty and displeasure voiced by dissident groups of citizens back home. And it will include the kind of lofty heroism shown by the fighting men themselves who, in spite of the morale-shattering debate back home, continue to face the enemy and to yield their lives on the battlefields.

The readers of the Berkshire Eagle in my hometown of Pittsfield, Mass., were recently treated to a penetrating summary of many of the aspects which compose the idea of Vietnam today. The column was written by Peter Potomac, a pen name obviously, whose delightful prose and incisive commentary on current events have long provided one of the most read columns in our paper.

Because I believe it contains in concise form most of the perplexing and seemingly contradictory ideas that are involved in the Vietnam situation today, as well as an important focus on the more promising trends in our debate over Vietnam, I respectfully commend the column to the attention of my colleagues.

The column follows:

[From the Berkshire Eagle, Feb. 28, 1966]

THE KENNAN-GAVIN POSITION

(By Peter Potomac)

WASHINGTON.—The great debate about Vietnam has escalated suddenly—with interesting results. Within the last few weeks,

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

House. He always stood in the aisle, alongside the majority committee table, never in the well, with his glasses either in his hand or shoved back high on his forehead, a smile on his face, always trying hard to meet the desires and wishes of questioning or critical Members. ALBERT THOMAS in action on this floor was a legislative wonder to behold, the kind of grace in motion that President Kennedy used to refer to. He represented for all of us, I am sure, the epitome of the effective legislator, something we all hope ultimately to become.

One more point, Mr. Speaker, and that is the fantastic courage which ALBERT THOMAS embodied. Few who watched him steering a bill through this House could have dreamed of the heavy burden he was carrying. Yet he always faced the future with confidence, with hope, and with good cheer. What an inspiration for us all. How much we shall miss his voice and his step in this Chamber in the days ahead.

Social Security May Soon Need New Revenue Source

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BOB WILSON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following:

[From the San Diego (Calif.) Evening Tribune, Feb. 28, 1966]

SOCIAL SECURITY MAY SOON NEED NEW REVENUE SOURCE

(By Lyle C. Wilson)

WASHINGTON.—The idea that social security benefits can be increased without raising taxes has the interested attention now of Great Society thinkers. They like the idea.

This idea is a prescription for a political painkiller. More precisely, it is a device to escape the discipline whereby Congress has voted always to accompany increased social security benefits with increased payroll taxes.

Politicians are galled by discipline, especially by any discipline that requires Congress to tax the voters for funds with which to pay for the Federal goodies provided for them.

The leftwing sodality called Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) is promoting a fly-now-crash-later plan whereby benefits would be much increased without a matching increase in taxes.

ADA is well represented in the Johnson administration. It has done much of the Great Society thinking and planning. The ADA would supplement the payroll tax with funds from the general revenue.

That means to draw upon the general fund of the U.S. Treasury for benefits. The general fund receives general tax revenue and also the proceeds of Treasury borrowing.

If benefits could be siphoned out of the general fund into the pockets of the pensioners, the level of benefits could be raised without the levy of additional taxes. Thus would come true the politician's dream of keeping the voters happy—and remaining in office—by giving the voters something for nothing.

More accurately, the politicians would delude the voters into believing they were getting something for nothing. The voters are shortsighted and easily deluded.

The liberals or leftwingers of both parties uniformly whoop it up for bigger and better borrowing and spending. The conservatives of both parties usually advocate balancing spending against revenue and reducing the public debt. The voters over the years have preferred the liberal free lunch to the conservative pay-as-you-go.

Thus it is that Social Security Commissioner Robert M. Ball recently told a U.S. Chamber of Commerce audience that social security costs were going up and were raising the possibility of a change in financing.

"A major public policy issue in the next 5 years," said Ball, "may be whether to tap general sources of revenue for social security. Payroll costs (for social security) are going to seem very large if benefits go much higher."

Costs now are shared between employer and employees. Ball said the Federal Government may have to share some of the cost as a social obligation. Conceding that self-financing had been a tremendous strength of the program, Ball noted that the British system, for instance, split costs three ways among employer, employee, and the British Government.

Ball also said that it would be necessary to increase the $3 monthly U.S. medicare premium which becomes effective July 1. He said costs surely would rise. Precedent would require that the pensioners increase their contribution one way or another.

Resolution of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN H. DENT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, I command to this body the following resolution of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. It calls for the establishment of a new national cemetary in the area of Valley Forge, Pa.

There is great need for another such cemetary and there certainly can be no quarrel about the area of Valleg Forge. I hope Members will give very serious consideration, and ultimate approval to this proposal.

The resolution follows:

RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Recently it was disclosed that the nearest national cemetery to Pennsylvania would soon be closed since it has no available space remaining.

In Tredyffrin Township which is in the Valley Forge State Park area there is presently available 510 acres of land that could be very well used as a site for a national cemetery. This land is ideal in that it could be made an integral part of our national heritage being so close to the place where many American soldiers died in order to make our country what it is today.

A national cemetery located at Valley Forge would be a truly symbolic and meaningful idea: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania memorializes the Congress of the United States to pass the necessary legislation needed to establish a new national cemetery in the Valley Forge area; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to each Member of Congress from Pennsylvania and to the Honorable HUGH SCOTT and the Honorable JOSEPH S. CLARK.

Attest:

ROBERT K. HAMILTON,
Speaker.
ANTHONY J. PETROSKY,
Chief Clerk.

Stanley Helzerman's 36 Years of Service to His Nation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WESTON E. VIVIAN
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. VIVIAN. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pride and pleasure that I rise today to call to the attention of my distinguished colleagues the work of an unsung hero. Mr. Stanley Helzerman, of Willis, Mich., in the Second Congressional District, which I am privileged to represent in this body, has been a cooperative weather observer with the U.S. Weather Bureau since 1929. For 36 years, Mr. Helzerman has made accurate daily weather observations from his farm in Willis, and by so doing has added immeasurably to the Nation's composite weather knowledge.

I am pleased to submit, at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, a description of, and tribute to, the work of our Nation's cooperative weather observers:

The Weather Bureau's more than 12,000 cooperative weather observers perform a public service that is surely unequaled anywhere. Freely, these volunteers devote a total of about 1 million hours each year to observing and recording the weather, and their records form a history of the climate of the United States.

Three decades ago, a group of outstanding scientists advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the work of the cooperative weather observers "is one of the most extraordinary services ever developed anywhere and probably nets the public more per dollar expended than any other Government service in the world."

Business and industry, agriculture, and aviation, and the general public rely on knowledge of climate. We all owe a great debt to the Weather Bureau's corps of observers whose unselfish efforts have built a national treasury of weather information.

JOHN T. CONNOR,
Secretary of Commerce.

The cooperative weather observers have a proud tradition of more than 100 years of voluntary public service. A number of families have kept weather records at the same place for several generations. Many individuals have observed the weather every day for 30, 40, or 50 years, and a dozen or so dedicated volunteers have served for more than 60 years.

A century ago, when Americans were settling western lands, they had little information on what to expect in the way of heat, cold, rain, or snow. In the act of 1890 establishing the Weather Bureau, Congress directed the Bureau to "record the climate of the United States."

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

the antiwar forces have unveiled two new allies—Gen. James Gavin, and George F. Kennan—around whom they have formed enclaves which are being defended with increased vigor. Interestingly enough, one of the principal achievements of Kennan and Gavin have been to destroy one of the earlier enclaves of the antiwar forces; namely, the idea that the war in Vietnam is a civil war in which we have no business interfering. The extent to which the antiwar group believes this was seen in a recent article in the Eagle by Edward K. Shanahan. He reported on a group of professors in Washington who gathered to discuss the war in Vietnam and said that underlying all of the meetings was the assumption that "the Vietnam war is a civil war, a case of internal revolution. In fact, this basic assumption was never seriously debated."

Well, the professors had better get back to the old seminar table and start debating it because their two new spokesmen—Kennan and Gavin—present their arguments with an underlying assumption, that the Vietcong is a subversive force directed from the north. "I see in the Vietcong," says Kennan "a band of ruthless fanatics, partly misled, perhaps, by the propaganda that has been drummed into them, but cruel in their purposes, dictatorial and oppressive * * * I think their claim to represent the people of South Vietnam is unfounded and arrogant and outrageous."

In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Kennan, of course, went on to state his opposition to the war in his quiet, articulate manner and managed to define once and for all the essence of the debate, to wit, should we make it our policy to contain Chinese imperialism in Asia as we contained Russian imperialism in Europe? Kennan's answer is that we should not. It is significant that Kennan is the man who has emerged as the leading spokesman (along with Walter Lippmann) of this view because he is one of the three men (the other two being President Truman and Dean Acheson) most closely associated with the policy of containing the Russians. However, he states flatly that we should not become entangled in the affairs of Asia and closes his presentation with a quote from John Adams to the effect that America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy."

The same reasoning, if applied to Europe, would have permitted the fall of Greece, Turkey, and West Berlin to the Communists and possibly all of Western Europe. But many who supported, and still support, America's containment of Russia in Europe oppose our containment of China in Asia, and Kennan has made a major contribution by centering the debate on this point. And it is hoped that we have heard the last of the peasant revolt nonsense.

Getting to the center of the debate, it is asking a lot of American people at this stage in history to abandon Asia to totalitarian power. We fought one major war to prevent Japanese imperialism from dominating Asia and we fought an unpopular smaller, but costly, war in Korea to resist Communist imperialism. So what it boils down to is that those who are counseling withdrawal in Vietnam are saying that we should let the forces of tyranny have by "wars of national liberation" what we would not let Japanese or Communists have by open aggression.

In fact, they go further: They say that we cannot defeat guerrillas (at least, not after stable local leadership is eliminated, which is one of the Communists' first objectives); that we cannot fight a land war in Asia; that we cannot continue to resist the Communists wherever they threaten the status quo, and that we cannot go on letting the Communists pick the battlefields.

The answers to these arguments are, it seems to me, (1) that we are fighting in Vietnam to prove we can successfully resist Communist guerrillas and that the issue has not been decided yet; (2) most U.S. military men agree we should not fight a large land war in Asia and we are not yet doing it; (3) we will not necessarily have to continue resisting Communists over and over again. Both the Russians and Chinese have shown they will go only so far in testing our determination to resist, but no further, and maybe we only have to win one war of national liberation to make our point. Of course, if we stay in Vietnam, the Communists may well open up another front, in Thailand, or Korea, or Cambodia, etc. But if they have the resources to do it, one wonders why they haven't done it already. The answer may be that they are even less anxious than we are to be involved in more than 1 war of liberation at a time; (4) as long as it is our policy to defend nations threatened by the Communists, we have no choice but to let them pick the battlefields. It is unreasonable to expect them to try to "liberate" a country where conditions are favorable to us.

Finally, there is the new argument that we should retreat to enclaves and sit tight until the Communists tire of trying to force us out. There is much to be said for this, but experience suggests that it would result in an endless conflict which in the long run would lead to the same political unrest in the country that exists now but with the opposition, coming from the hawks, rather than the doves. Lyndon Johnson obviously does not want to go into another presidential election with this unpopular war still going on, which is why, having made every effort to end it at the conference table, now appears to be making every effort to end it on the battlefield.

There are, in short, good arguments for withdrawing from Vietnam and good arguments for staying to fight it out—which is why this is one of the most complex situations any President has ever faced. Almost every day I ask someone new what they think the solution is and frankly, I have not yet received a satisfactory reply.

Love of Country

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. J. EDWARD ROUSH
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. ROUSH. Mr. Speaker, the following essay was written by Mr. Doug Carpenter, a student at Huntington College, Huntington, Ind. Mr. Carpenter's prize winning essay was read by him on the occasion of the Huntington College annual Washington birthday celebration. It was an inspiration to me and I take this opportunity to share it with my colleagues and the American people.

LOVE OF COUNTRY

(By Doug Carpenter)

Mr. Rudyard Kipling once told the story about "The Ship That Found Herself." He narrated the story of a ship, newly launched, starting out on her trial trip. At first every part of the ship was finding fault with every other part. Every girder and beam and brace, every rod and piston and rivet, was complaining against all the rest. But by and by the ship encountered a storm. The heavy winds began to blow, the great green billows rolled over the decks, and then, in the emergency, somehow all the parts of the vessel began to draw together. All those discordant voices melted into one great voice, which was the soul of the ship, and that voice spoke out in one triumphant cry, as the splendid craft realized that she was not a thousand discordant pieces, but one swift, beautiful, indestructible vessel.

In the year 1898 our country, the Republic of the United States, found herself. Until then we were not wholly united as a people. There were differences between the North and South; there were discordant voices between East and West. But in that year when Dewey's guns boomed out in the harbor of Manila, and when a little later Cervera's fleet lay riddled and stranded along the coast of Cuba, our country found herself. East and West, North and South, blended into one. Parties united; local differences and prejudices vanished.

It is a great blessing to be living at such a time. Hundreds and thousands of boys and young men have lived without hearing any call, on the part of their country, for sacrifice. They have, perhaps, never felt the patriotic thrill, or heard the call to repel an enemy. But most of us here tonight have seen the regiments marching down Broadway. And we have seen them come home again, worn, pale, and broken. There may be some here tonight may be enlisting themselves, in the near future. You have at least seen friends go, some of whom may never return. This country is in a unique position in the great world's arena tonight. Your role is patriotic love. If you do not love your country, who will love it? If you here tonight do not stand by this flag, who will stand by it? If you are not patriots, this land will never have them.

But what is it to love one's country? Is it to carry a banner in a procession? Is it to shout as we see the flag? Is it to fling confetti from the tops of the buildings, and send off skyrockets in the evening? Vastly deeper than that is love of country, deeper than any soldier's uniform, deeper than any pictures of missiles with which we adorn our walls. To love your country—is to love that for which your country stands: Freedom, education, and religion. The man who does this, and he alone, is the one who loves his country.

There are two figures guarding the Atlantic coast tonight that I trust may symbolize all of the life of our dear country.

In the harbor of New York rises the figures that you have seen on many a night—Liberty with her uplifted torch, enlightening all the world. And on the Massachusetts coast, in the harbor of old Plymouth, rises another statute, carved in the whitest of Massachusetts granite—the statue of Faith, looking out with unswerving eyes over the bay into which the *Mayflower* came, and with silent finger pointing upward unto God. The light from the Statue of Liberty shines out across land and sea toward the upturned face of Faith, and tonight those two symbolic figures together guard our coast.

So long as those figures do guard our shores and truly symbolize our life, this country is safe. So long as we believe in liberty and faith, freedom and religion, in widest possibility for everyone, and utmost allegiance unto our fathers' God, this country can never perish. God give us to understand more deeply the meaning of patriotism, and to love our country more deeply and worthily in the years that are to come.

Our Policy Is Not To Overthrow Reds

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BOB WILSON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following:

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

[From the San Diego (Calif.) Union, Feb. 28, 1966]

OUR POLICY IS NOT TO OVERTHROW REDS

EDITOR, THE UNION: President Johnson has finally revealed, in overt terms, the new American foreign policy. It was a long and contradictory succession of official statements from various Government sources that led up to his disclosure. Now it is official.

It is not the American way to seek victory for our fighting men, nor to seek the overthrow of any government, regardless of its crimes. We seek only to prove that we will not allow open aggression against helpless people.

This type of policy may prevent a war but it openly encourages bloodshed. What risk does the aggressor take? Will he be punished for inflicting terror, torture and even murder on his victims? No. Our policy says it is logical to negotiate with him in the interest of peace. We will even condone the Reds' having representation in the new government of the land they are plundering.

This proves the old cliche, "Two steps forward and one step back will eventually get you to all of the jack."

The President also stated that poverty is the root of all war. I disagree. A revolution yes, but not a war. A poor nation could not conduct a war. Men cause war. Not poor uneducated men, but rich, highly educated, power-hungry men. They use every means at hand.

Our no-win policy is nothing but expensive procrastination. That is an open invitation to worldwide anarchy by the evil elite.

ERIC H. SHERMAN.

LA JOLLA.

[From the San Diego (Calif.) Union, Feb. 28, 1966]

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR PATRIOTISM?

EDITOR, THE UNION: In a recent editorial, you said our greatest need at this time is patriotism.

I can remember a time when we didn't need it, because we had it. It was a time when the only dissenters were those who, through age limits or physical shortcomings, were rejected for military service in the fight to protect our type of democracy.

It was an era when the John MacCraes and the Joyce Kilmers already had left their indelible marks in poetry, their blood in Flanders fields. It was a time when the dieter filled up on bananas to make the weight limit; when the underage were unafraid and proud to forge birth certificates that fooled the recruiting stations.

Maybe this is a peculiar type of patriotism that leaves present-day shirkers cold, but I believe it is still something to make one's blood run warm, one's pulse vibrate. It is based on a faith that will prevail when all the enemies of our hard-earned freedom really have been left cold by their foreign deceivers.

As you say, most Americans realize, and will combat the present evils that beset us. For the others, one can only feel a sense of compassion that is somewhat akin to sorrow.

HARRY PERT.

LA JOLLA.

Estonian Independence Day

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, it is certainly in keeping with the American tradition to offer congratulations and best wishes when our friends celebrate a worthwhile achievement. Thus as our fellow Americans and the people of Estonia celebrated February 24 as that nation's independence anniversary, I extend to them my warmest congratulations.

The very fact that the Estonian nation ever came into existence is a clear example of determination and courage of the Estonian people. Their burdens under Russian domination date back as far as 1719, but they never lost sight of their goal of freedom and independence in their own country. Between 1721 and 1918 czarist Russia engaged in a severe program of Russification that met little success. Communist Russia today is having scant success in its own attempts to force a break in the Estonian people's ties to their own cultural heritage.

During its 22 years of independence Estonia was busily engaged in a program of industrial and agricultural progress and democratization. Under their own system of government as compared with that of the Communists Estonian domestic achievements were remarkable. But with the forced signing of the "Mutual Assistance Pact" of 1939 the days of Estonian freedom were dramatically lessened. The tragic end came in July 1940 when an Estonian Government handpicked by the Soviets declared Estonia a Soviet Socialist Republic.

Under Stalin mass deportations, executions, and intimidation were the order of the day. Hitler's Nazi regime provided no relief for the Estonians, and with Nazi expulsion in 1944 Russia resumed once more its illegal occupation.

It is perhaps a twist of irony that one of the states of Europe that was created after World War I as a direct result of the newly enunciated concept of self-determination should find itself a captive of one of the participants of the war—a war to save democracy.

The people of Estonia are unable to join us this week as we commemorate the 48th anniversary of their country's independence, but their example of tenacity, fortitude, and courage should serve to inspire us as we attempt to lead the way in man's constant struggle to better himself and his fellowman.

Rev. Dr. Bernard Braskamp, Chaplain

SPEECH
OF
HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 23, 1966

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, for 16 years the U.S. House of Representatives was privileged to have as its Chaplain the Reverend Dr. Bernard Braskamp. This servant of the Lord lived a life reflecting his profound belief in God and the principles He taught.

Reverend Braskamp's actions will long serve as an inspiration to each of us who knew him. His wise reflections and ministrations were sources of strength and courage to this House in many difficult times.

I would take this opportunity to express my sympathies to Dr. Braskamp's family. What a great sense of loss they must feel at this time. At the same time, they must also sense a feeling of pride and love knowing that God's work was furthered during Reverend Braskamp's lifetime.

Accomplished Wit, Serious Legislator

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CARLTON R. SICKLES
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, public service is not an easy profession. This is particularly true on a State level, where the low compensation for the hard work and long hours makes it very difficult for many capable citizens. It is with great pride, therefore, that I bring to the attention of my colleagues an article that appeared in the Baltimore Evening Sun on February 28 discussing the talents and dedication of a prominent Maryland delegate, a Talbot Countian, a sportsman, and a gentleman, Thomas Hunter Lowe. I think the article will be interesting reading for my colleagues.

NO COUNTRY BUMPKIN: ACCOMPLISHED WIT, SERIOUS LEGISLATOR

(By Jonathan Cottin)

ANNAPOLIS, February 28.—Thomas Hunter Lowe, a countryman who spent nearly half his life in the city, is really putting people on.

A huge cowlick forms a careless dark comma over his forehead. His collar is frequently unbuttoned. His shoes are often smudged.

But underneath the appearance of studied dishevelment is a Renaissance man whose family roots lie in the 17th century.

Among his many interests is the house judiciary committee, which he heads with hard-driving efficiency, churning more than 1,000 bills a session onto the floor for action.

RUNS A MILE A DAY

Given to quoting from Shakespeare and Jefferson, he runs a mile every morning on his 12-acre Wittman farm, then pounds away at a boxing bag in his garage before 7 a.m. breakfast.

But on the house floor, where he has the reputation of being a needler, or in the extracurricular give-and-take of legislative life in Annapolis, Mr. Lowe is by turns forceful and amusing—sometimes too funny for words.

Not long ago, he had a penchant for cocktail parties, although he neither drinks nor smokes. More than once he has sent out invitations across the State to a soiree in the hotel room occupied by a fellow lawmaker. He has even gone so far as to post notices of the dreamed-up affairs in Eastern Shore stores.

SCOLDS CITY DELEGATES

When the unsuspecting lawmaker begins receiving replies to the invitations he never sent, Mr. Lowe affects an innocent air.

On the floor the other day, Mr. Lowe rose, ostensibly to announce the next meeting of

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

FIVE TO TEN YEARS LEFT FOR RESERVE FLEET

This is the situation today: under present actions of our Government and with no policy for the future; within 5 years probably, and certainly within 10, we will have no useable reserve fleet. Our active fleet will still consist of at least two-thirds obsolete vessels, reaching the very end of their useful life, if not already consigned to the scrapyard.

Five to 10 years may sound ample to correct this situation—but decisions must be taken now—should have been taken 5 years ago if, in 1970 to 1975, we are to have the needed vessels in being. It does take time to plan, finance, and execute a shipbuilding program and time is rapidly running out.

If we do not resolve now to make the necessary effort, beginning immediately, we will not be able to avoid a period of some years during which our merchant shipping capability may be the limiting factor to our ability to project the military and economic power of our Nation in pursuit of national policy and goals.

Answers to written questions from floor

Question (John A. Rowe, Jr.). Does Secretary of Defense expect to use airlift in real emergency?

Answer. There's great reliance on anticipated capacity of new large cargo aircraft. But it's dangerous to get tied to one system of supply.

Question (J. R. Klawans). How long to build a modern ship? To acquire modern fleet?

Answer. Design, financing, to operation, about 3 years. Time to build fleet depends on yard capacity we've allowed to dwindle. If decided today—5 years.

Question (Caspar Zwierlein). How can companies like Matson operate without subsidy?

Answer. They're protected from foreign competition. Still operating with ships acquired at low cost. Some have gone into specialized transport fields.

Question. Will technological breakthrough obsolete proposed expansion program?

Answer. Obsolescence a continuing problem. Maritime Administration could well spend more for research and development. Still, our new ships are as good as any.

Question. (Edgar M. Kahn). Will Congress require greater safety on foreign-flag cruise ships?

Answer. Last year I stated *Yarmouth Castle* was unsafe—3 months later it burned to waterline. If international conferences do not improve standards, United States should act to protect citizens.

Question. (W. K. Potts). Until more restraint on maritime unions, isn't it premature to obtain more ships?

Answer. Unfortunate work stoppages sometimes due to interunion squabbles. Public has right to expect responsibility. I don't think seagoing wages are too high. We cannot expect Americans at sea to take less than those ashore.

Question. (Robert H. Fouke). Long-term policy for adequate merchant marine?

Answer. 1936 Merchant Marine Act still good. We've never used it. We talk of spending $2 billion for supersonic aircraft with 75 percent Government money—should do same with merchant marine.

Question. What effect on merchant marine of C–5A cargo aircraft?

Answer. Bulk movement must come by sea—98 percent of southeast Asia supplies go by sea. This might drop to 95 percent.

Question. Airfreight cost of 3 cents per ton per mile (anticipated for C–5A) undercut cost of sea transport?

Answer. Still only 5 to 1 ratio. Brings costs closer together. Time factor may make difference. Yet takes too much fuel to keep aircraft in air.

Freedom's Fight

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, our task in Vietnam is not only to achieve a victory over Communist aggression, but to convince the people that freedom not domination is the natural state of man.

The President's trip to Hawaii dramatized, in the words of the Chicago Sun Times, "not only the U.S. determination to achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam, but also the recognition that a political and ideological campaign to win the people of South Vietnam away from communism must be carried out."

Massive social and economic assistance programs will be necessary, the newspaper asserts, and it pointed out that for more than a decade the Communists have laid the groundwork of their effort to takeover South Vietnam.

The Communists work at the grassroots level, with the farmers and villagers. They meet simple needs with simple answers. And when all else fails the Communists use a familiar tactic, terror, to achieve dominance.

The Sun Times added that:

The United States must meet this challenge where the Communists conduct their campaigns, in the countryside.

I found this to be provocative, and I believe that others can benefit from its concise analysis. With this in mind I submit the editorial to the RECORD, to be printed therein:

FREEDOM AGAINST COMMUNISM

President Johnson's trip to Hawaii dramatizes not only the U.S. determination to achieve an honorable peace in Vietnam, but also the recognition that a political and ideological campaign to win the people of South Vietnam away from communism must be carried out.

To win that battle President Johnson has promised South Vietnam's Premier Ky that his programs of civil reform will be bolstered by massive U.S. programs of social and economic assistance.

Such programs are essential. The Communists have had 11 years in which to lay the groundwork of their effort to take over South Vietnam no matter which way the military struggle goes. Their approach is deceptively simple; it says, over and over, that communism is a better way of life. The Communists work at the grassroots level, with the farmers and villagers. They meet simple needs with simple answers. And when all else fails the Communists use a familiar tactic, terror, to achieve dominance.

The United States must meet this challenge where the Communists conduct their campaigns, in the countryside. If the effort is to be successful it must recognize that it is dealing with a culture and with people which more often than not place greater value on a simple plow than on a tractor, something the Communists have long understood. The United States must institute programs that are designed to convince those it seeks to influence that freedom and not domination—by Communists or by colonists—is the natural state of man. It will be a harder job than winning the military war in Vietnam, or the peace. But part of the battle is already won—the need has been recognized.

The rest of the job will be difficult. The South Vietnam Government is weak. About 75 percent of the nation, outside of Saigon, is either in the hands of Comunist guerrillas or "neutral"—not under Saigon's control and under pressure from the Communists. President Johnson's visit with Saigon's leaders should give them the prestige they badly need to extend their authority and influence.

The battle in Vietnam is not only for territory; it is, as always, for the minds of men. Victory is essential if the United States is not to be faced with the same fight in many other areas, including Latin America.

Cornelia Gyulahazi Becomes a Citizen

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, January 24, 1966, Cornelia Gyulahazi became a U.S. citizen. Miss Gyulahazi is employed in the Washington, D.C. office of Maupintour, a worldwide planned travel agency, with headquarters in Lawrence, Kans. A company newspaper, the Maupintour Echo, asked Miss Gyulahazi about her feelings and thoughts on the day she became a citizen. I commend her inspiring and well-written response to my colleagues in the Congress. It follows:

Thank you very much for your letter and congratulations on the occasion of my having been sworn as citizen of the United States. I have sworn to support the Government, to keep up the Constitution and even to take to arms in case of necessity for my new country. And I assure you I meant deadly earnestly every word of the oath.

Still, I confess, in a way I had a little uneasy, aching feeling. I was brought up in a very patriotic way. My mother was always a belligerent patriot and also my father, although in a more bashful way, felt by no means less attached and ardently about his fatherland. I will always remember two of my teachers who saturated by thinking and feeling with pride for my nation, its history, achievements and literature and I was thought to be proud and happy to be Hungarian. I don't seen any reasons to change my feeling toward Hungary now, nor do I feel a traitor or a rat leaving the sinking ship as some of my friends said I was when I left to come here. They said everybody should stay at home and work for freedom at home, but I am sure, that I can do more for Hungary in supporting the U.S. Government as by being at home and working for a government that I and most of the Hungarians loath, just to be able to earn my daily bread and the strict necessities of life. As to do anything for freedom at home? How can one fight as private citizen against a state which is employer, police force and god at the same time? I am convinced if ever Hungary will regain independence, it will be for the valiant fight the United States (so often misjudged, misunderstood and criticized by the whole world and even by her own citizens) puts in for the freedom of the whole world.

Living in this country for more than 5 years now and knowing it better day after day, I believe it is the greatest country in the

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

world today, I believe it is a model according to which the other nations should try to build their own in the future. I am convinced that the Constitution is a masterpiece of the concerted work of geniuses and I know I will be her loyal citizen as long as I live.

CORNELIA.

Estes Kefauver Union of the Free Award

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE W. GRIDER
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. GRIDER. Mr. Speaker, two of the leading citizens of Memphis, Edward J. Meeman and Edmund Orgill, were among the first to support the late Estes Kefauver in his first race for the Senate in 1948. In this month's issue of Freedom and Union, Clarence Streit recalls the support each also gave the idea of Atlantic Union.

This idea has led to a new award to be given every 3 years "to the person who has best served the cause of democracy by effective efforts to bring about the Union of the self-governing peoples of the world who guarantee the freedom of choice and action of the individual, in the spirit of Estes Kefauver who advanced this cause effectively, persistently, and nobly."

Under unanimous consent, I include the article.

[From Freedom & Union, February 1966]

TWO EDS THAT THINK AS ONE

The latest proof of the wonders that can be worked when two men in a U.S. city—a crusading editor and a business leader—think and work together came in the U.S. Senate Caucus Room January 17. There and then, at the reception sponsored by the Estes Kefauver Memorial Foundation, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY announced that the Edward J. Meeman Foundation has put up $50,000 to endow a triennial "Estes Kefauver Union of the Free Award" of $6,000.

The Vice President introduced Mr. Meeman to prolonged applause from the crowd of Kefauver devotees who filled the hall. He explained that the award would go every 3 years "to the person who has best served the cause of democracy by effective efforts to bring about the union of the self-governing peoples of the world who guarantee the freedom of choice and action of the individual, in the spirit of Estes Kefauver who advanced this cause effectively, persistently, and nobly."

Behind this hangs a heart-warming true story of two Eds who thought and worked as one for Federal Union of the Free, with astonishing results on city, State, National, and Atlantic government through the past 20 years. One wonders what great fruits their continued union will bear in the years ahead. One can be sure it will go on working wonders—if only because of the continuous incentive the new award gives men and women everywhere to make effective efforts, in any of the many ways that are needed in so vast an undertaking, to unite the free, in the persistent, noble spirit that characterized Senator Kefauver.

You have guessed the name of one of the two Eds—Mr. Meeman. He is the editor Ed—or rather, he is now editor emeritus of the Memphis (Tenn.) Press-Scimitar. At its helm he made a lengendary name for himself through 35 years as an outstandingly able and courageous editor, in the great but now declining tradition of crusading, constructive journalism.

Born in Evansville, Ind., too poor to go to college, he got a job at $4 a week on the Scripps-Howard daily, the Press, when he graduated from high school in 1907. In 1921 Robert Scripps sent him to Tennessee to found the Knoxville News. He succeeded so well that it was soon a decisive factor in preserving the beauties of the Great Smoky Mountains as a National Park—and conservation remains one of Ed's lifelong passions. In 1931 he was promoted to editor of the Press-Scimitar.

I first came in touch with him in the early 1940's through his interest in Union Now, but did not meet him until 1947. He and others invited me to speak that November in Memphis, a city I had not yet visited. I agreed, reluctantly. I was hard pressed with work and thought I could use the time much better elsewhere. Thus began the most fruitful speaking engagement I have ever had, one for which I have blessed our guardian angel ever since.

It turned out to be a weekend program of half a dozen talks, starting with a lunch. About a hundred leading citizens had been invited to it by the president of the chamber of commerce. He was the other Ed—Edmund Orgill, president of Orgill Bros. Wholesale Hardware Co. I met both Eds at that same lucky luncheon.

LUNCHEON PLATE AND UNION NOW

In the course of a few thousand speeches I have heard a variety of introductions, but the most memorable was Ed Orgill's that noon. He held up a copy of the 1941 edition of "Union Now" and explained that "attorney Lucius Burch over there"—another of his guests who became my lifelong friend—had loaned it to him, and "kept at" him until he finally gave in and read it. * * * But he "wasn't going to get it back" for "I'm going to ask our speaker to autograph it after this luncheon, and then I'm going to keep it myself * * * even though he should have written this book differently. He should have started with what he put at the end of it as an annex, entitled 'My Own Road to Union.' I'd advise you all to do as I did—start with that sort of postscript and then I'm sure you'll go back to his first chapter and read it all through, as I did."

There was placed at the plate of each guest a copy of "Union Now" as a gift from him. And this sort of thing, as I have had many occasions to know, is pure unadulterated Ed Orgill.

The weekend ended with one of Ed Meeman's famous Sunday steak dinners at his home in the country. It was, of course, preceded by the conservationist taking his guests on a hike through his surrounding forest, as an aperitif. (A teetotaler, he.) In the general discussion after the dinner, I learned that a number of those present, responsible for my being invited to Memphis had been thinking of organizing a "World Affairs Council" in the city. The aim was to broaden the interests of the people by bringing in speakers to discuss the pro and con of various issues in the foreign field, while the council and the audience remained neutral.

After the merits and demerits of this project had been battled back and forth with no visible progress toward a decision, host Meeman, who had said nothing, finally intervened. Speaking from the stairway where he had been standing, Ed said this:

"Let's stop horsing around. Instead of standing for nothing, let's stand for what we all believe in, and push it along. Let's form, not a world affairs council, but a Memphis chapter of Federal Union. I understand it takes only seven to start one, and there are enough of us here, if we agree, to form it right now."

That half-minute speech led to immediate action. Seven men signed up, and thus Memphis Chapter of Federal Union, Inc. (publisher of this magazine) began—with Ed Orgill as chairman. The seven soon came to prize the piece of paper they had signed.

Next spring one of them—Lucius Burch—told me that he and Ed Meeman admired Congressman Estes Kefauver as a man of exceptional courage, character, and interest in better free government at every level. I had met him and shared their view, though with much less basis for it. They wanted him elected to the Senate that November, but felt that his only hope of defeating the candidate of Boss Crump of Memphis—whose machine they also wished to break—was to get Ed Orgill's active support for Kefauver. Here lay the problem, for Ed was a conservative who did not like liberal Kefauver's opposition to the Taft-Hartley bill curbing labor unions.

The only thing that could get Ed Orgill to back Kefauver, Lucius rightly thought, was for Estes to back Atlantic Federal Union, which had become his No. I concern. Lucius had persuaded Estes to read "Union Now" from "kivver to kivver," as he put it, and it had convinced him. But Ed still balked, and did so for weeks thereafter. Private assurances of the candidate's support of Union of the Free were not enough for him, and he declined even to commit himself in the event of a public assurance. On the other side, various Kefauver advisers feared that a public commitment would be fatal in so uphill a race. The deadlock was broken by a characteristic Kefauver decision.

In announcing formally his candidacy for the Senate on June 5, 1948, Kefauver included this Federal Union plank—although he still had no commitment whatever from Ed Orgill:

"I have studied the matter very closely. I am convinced that the one real way that we can have peace in the world is to join in a kind of federation with the other freedom-loving peoples. * * * I feel that the statesmen of these democracies should work toward this program, just as the statesmen of our Union worked toward building 13 States into the Federation which grew into the great United States of America. * * * It is going to take work, a lot of prayerful thinking, and moral and religious regeneration. But it is not only possible. It must be done."

Thereupon, Ed Orgill promptly joined Ed Meeman and Lucius Burch in a Citizens Committee of Seven for Kefauver which he promptly set up—and which included two other believers in Atlantic Union. Led by one Ed's characteristic drive and the other Ed's shrewd press support, they "went to town" in a way that put fresh meaning in that tired phrase in Memphis.

Result: Boss Crump suffered his first defeat in 28 years. His machine was so effectively broken that within a few years another project dear to the heart of Ed Meeman and Lucius Burch was achieved: The commission form of city government was established in Memphis with Ed Orgill as its first mayor.

Meanwhile, with one Senator elected on an uncontested Atlantic Union plank, another project had been achieved. Federal Union Inc. being an educational organization could not take part in political campaigns or lobby for any legislation. A number of its members, including the two Eds and others, thought the time had come to get an Atlantic Union resolution in Congress and an independent political committee set up to back it.

Before Senator Kefauver was sworn in, he had driven in his car with Ed Orgill, Lucius Burch, Walden Moore and me to the farm of Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, near Valley Forge and asked if he

Footnotes at end of speech.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

by them. But such accomplishments can be brought about only if there is quiet and businesslike communication preparing the way for them. Above all, there is a continuing need to get behind the curtain of perhaps inevitable public utterances and public posturing to discover what is in fact behind it. To the extent that he has done this—or helped Mr. Kosygin to do it—Mr. Wilson has performed a service for us all.

Worthington Needs a Doctor

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. SILVIO O. CONTE

OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, with the rising draft call, and the increased need for medical doctors in the armed services, many small communities are having difficulty obtaining the services of a general practitioner.

One such community is Worthington, Mass., located in the beautiful western portion of the great Commonwealth in the First Congressional District, which I am privileged to represent in the Congress.

A community of 643 persons, Worthington is prepared to offer a completely furnished suit of offices, examining rooms, and laboratory free of charge. Modern equipment is also available free of charge. The practice yields a gross income of $12,000 to $14,000 with a growth potential up to $25,000.

Knowing that many young doctors are being called into the armed services, Worthington has drawn up an impressive prospectus which is being distributed not only to young internists, but also to doctors over 50 who may want a change of pace and would like to work in the relaxed atmosphere of the country.

I would like to conclude my remarks by inserting at this point an article which further explains the problem confronting the people of Worthington and their resourceful means of solving that problem.

The article follows:

[From the Berkshire Eagle, Feb. 21, 1966]

WORTHINGTON SEEKS DOCTOR IN MAIL CAMPAIGN

(By Lois Ashe Brown)

WORTHINGTON.—"What this community can offer a doctor" is the subject of a prospectus drawn up for the Worthington Health Center by Dr. Carl S. Joslyn, a former director and president of the center.

Now retired from the Springfield Welfare Department, Dr. Joslyn has volunteered his time to this undertaking. In addition to writing the prospectus, he has compiled a mailing list from a directory of doctors who are nearing the end of internships or for those over 50 who may be interested in a change of pace, and copies of the prospectus has been mailed to them.

WHAT POSITION OFFERS

The cover bears a pen and ink drawing of the new brick and frame health center on Old North Road. The drawing was contributed by local Artist George W. Humphrey. The three major attractions for a doctor in Worthington are listed as "fully equipped suite of offices, established practice with good growth potential and ideal living conditions for his family."

By way of explaining what the Worthington Health Association can offer a doctor, the prospectus says, "Through this nonprofit organization, the residents of five rural towns in western Massachusetts have combined their resources in order to obtain for themselves the best possible medical care. We already have on our staff a dentist who has been with us for the past 8 years and an optometrist who has been on our staff for 14 years.

"The physician who had been serving us was called to Germany for a family emergency."

According to the prospectus, the physician meeting Worthington's needs would fit the following description:

"He would like the advantages of country living and would be willing to put up with the disadvantages.

"He would prefer general practice to practice in a specialty.

"He would be able to qualify for a license to practice in Massachusetts.

"He would want to practice independently, rather than as an employee of an organization."

Further, it advises, "To get the kind of a man we want, this organization is prepared to offer the following inducements: A completely furnished suite of offices, examining rooms, and laboratory for his use, free of charge; modern equipment for the diagnosis and treatment of patients, also available free of charge; a going practice yielding a gross income of $12,000 to $14,000 a year with a growth potential up to $25,000, and the opportunity to conduct his practice with the same freedom he would have if he were using facilities of his own.

NEW BUILDING

"The offices for the use of our physician, dentist and optometrist are housed in a new building of brick and frame construction on the main road in Worthington. Office accommodations available for the physician include a large waiting room, a receptionist's office, a consulting room, three examining rooms, (two adult and one pediatric), a laboratory, an X-ray room, a dressing room and a utility room. All of these rooms, except that intended for X-ray work, are completely furnished and equipped. Actual purchase of the X-ray apparatus has been deferred until the doctor's wishes in the matter are known. Adjoining the X-ray room, which is leadlined, is a darkroom for the development of X-ray film.

The prospectus then gives a more detailed description of the equipment for a doctor's use at the health center and stresses the "freedom of practice." "In no sense," it says, "are the doctors at the health center employees of the association. Their relationship is, rather, that of lessors or tenants who pay a nominal rental ($1) for the use of its facilities."

Hospitals in Pittsfield, Northampton, and Westfield are then described in some detail, and the distance and roads leading to each are explained. The advantages of living in the Hampshire Hills are outlined along with a listing of the cultural opportunities offered. Educational advantages and housing accommodations are described, plus the assurance that every possible help will be extended to a doctor wishing to settle in Worthington.

The prospectus advises any interested doctor that he may call or write Donald I. Thompson in Worthington for an appointment. Hopes are high that somewhere soon, a copy of this prospectus will fall into the hands of just the right doctor for the Worthington Health Association. Meanwhile, the health center is being served by area doctors on a temporary basis.

Report From Saigon

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, it has to be pointed out over and over again that the aggressors in Vietnam are the Communists and that in addition they are the ones who are escalating the war.

The tide has turned, however, and as the following report from Saigon by the distinguished columnist, Joseph Alsop, indicates the Vietcong and their North Vietnamese allies are losing what support they did have within South Vietnam by their vicious behavior.

Mr. Alsop's article appeared in the February 21, 1966, edition of the New York Herald Tribune and follows:

IF WE WERE THERE

(By Joseph Alsop)

SAIGON.—In this ugly war, the South Vietnamese and Americans still have a lot of problems to solve—many of which have been handmade in Washington. But still another look at the war here teaches the lesson that General Westmoreland ought to thank God he is not Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap.

The inflation of the enemy's regular forces, by invasion from the north and press gang conscription in the south, is the prime challenge to the American-Vietnamese leadership. (When people at home gabble about "escalation," incidentally, they should bear in mind that it is the enemy who is doing the escalating.) But this is almost trifling compared to what the Vietcong commanders now have to worry about.

The best place to begin a list of the enemy's worries is the drastic change in the war's pattern during the last year. Only a year ago, above all, intelligence concerning the Vietcong was needed just as urgently as more troops to fight the Vietcong. But now the intelligence pours in at such a rate that the United States and Vietnamese high commands have had to organize a regular assembly line processing system for the masses of data.

In a single week in February, for example, no less than 1,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese prisoners of war and military defectors had to be interrogated on the assembly line. And more than 7 tons of captured documents were also in the works.

Just one Vietcong prisoner of war or defector used to be a 9-day wonder here. But in that first week of February, there were close to 500 prisoners (many of whom were really voluntary defectors, for hiding on the battlefield until discovery by our troops is the easiest way to escape from the constant espionage by which the Vietcong hold their weaker units together.) The payoff can be seen in the battle results.

In the big Masher-White Wing operation up in Binhdinh, General Westmoreland had ample warning from intelligence of an enemy concentration in divisional strength, which was meant to be employed in a drive southward. He mounted a brilliant spoiling attack, which not only aborted the planned enemy drive southward, but also spoiled the gizzard out of two enemy regiments and is now spoiling a third regiment.

Vietnamese operations rarely get reported nowadays, but in the same period they have ben equally successful. The count of Vietcong battalions located, pinned down, and

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

very severely mauled in the obscure delta fighting has already reached five this month.

Another very striking change in the pattern is the number of enemy dead now regularly left on the battlefield. Only a year ago, it was rare to find any.

In the starlight operation last summer, when the old battlefield discipline still held, the Vietcong dead were dragged with pork butchers' meat hooks to hidden burial trenches.

Now, in contrast, the gruesome body counts run to very high figures. The harvest guarding operation in Phuoc Tuy Province, jointly undertaken by Vietnamese, Korean, and American troops, has made no headlines and has indeed hardly gotten into the papers. But besides rescuing many thousands of tons of rice from the Vietcong, this single operation has already produced an enemy body count above 600—which means the equivalent of another regiment knocked out of the ring.

Nor are these indicators, grave as they are, the most painful and basic matters of concern for General Giap. The inflation of the North Vietnamese and VC regular forces is obviously intended to create a new balance in the war, and thus to secure a decision this year—probably as a result of the faintheartedness that is so freely displayed by so many people in Washington who would surely know better if they knew anything at all about the war.

But the price of this inflation has been inconceivably high. One can itemize. First, the old promise to take only voluntary contributions and levy no taxes was ruthlessly broken in 1964. The tax rates, already substantial, were then doubled and in some areas even tripled in 1965. It is now common to find poor peasants who were given land by the VC, but have fled the VC areas because they cannot pay their taxes. The refugee flow continues and the VC tax base therefore continues to shrink.

The VC promise that all military service would be strictly voluntary has also been flagrantly broken. In the spring of 1965, universal conscription was enforced by such press gang methods that in many villages, boys only 15 years old were marched off with the other recruits. In central Vietnam and one or two other areas the reserves of manpower available to the VC have already shrunk almost to zero. And whenever they get the chance most conscripts desert.

Yet if one may judge by the experience of November, December, and January, the inflation of VC and North Vietnamese regular units is still being obstinately pressed forward. Foreseeably, this continuous increase of regiments that must be supported and supplied with replacements will end by imposing far too heavy a burden on the VC infrastructure in the countryside.

Something must eventually give somewhere and give in a big way, too, if General Westmoreland is only enabled to keep the pressure on. That is really the main point to note about this war.

Tribute to the Honorable Albert Thomas of Texas

SPEECH
OF
HON. JAMES C. CORMAN
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 28, 1966

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join with my colleagues in expressing my deep regret and sorrow at the passing of ALBERT THOMAS.

History demonstrates that this House is a sound judge of men and their character. The respect, admiration, and devotion of the Members of this body are the surest test of greatness. During his 30 years of service in Congress, ALBERT THOMAS met that test. The sincerity of emotion which has marked his passing is but a final confirmation of ALBERT THOMAS' monumental achievements. ALBERT THOMAS firmly believed that the U.S. Congress must fulfill its role vigorously and responsibly.

His burden was great, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations, but his competence and dedication have earned him a prominent place in the annuals of our Nation.

It has been truly said that there could only be one ALBERT THOMAS and that we are much the lesser for his passing. But it is also true that his stirring example of courage and compassion will serve as an inspiration to all those aspiring to serve this Congress and the Nation.

Speech by Representative Bob Dole, of Kansas

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOE SKUBITZ
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, recently Congressman ROBERT DOLE of the 1st District of Kansas addressed the members of the Norton County Soil Conservation District at their 20th annual meeting. His remarks mirror the pride, concern, and significance which we Kansans attach to the various programs of soil conservation in our State.

Because of the wholehearted devotion our farmers and the State and local units of Kansas government have given to these programs, the Dust Bowl days of the thirties are a thing of the past. Nearly 24 million acres of our State are blanketed with basic soil conservation plans. Kansas has 23 small watershed projects in the works, 18 more on the drawing boards, and 72 applications for watershed development assistance are on file. In my district alone there are 72 rural water districts at latest count.

BOB DOLE'S remarks to the people from Norton County recount the past achievements in glowing terms. But this is not merely the satisfaction of a job well done and a time to stop and reflect on the merit of our laurels. As Congressman DOLE points out, there is much more to be done, and in many ways we have just begun. Bob's speech is a significant and important one, and with permission granted I place it in the RECORD for the benefit of my colleagues and others who might be interested.

SPEECH BY REPRESENTATIVE BOB DOLE, OF KANSAS

(Delivered before the 20th annual meeting of the Norton County Soil Conservation District, Norton, Kans., February 19, 1966)

I am happy to be here with you at this 20th annual meeting of the Norton County Soil Conservation District.

In 1946, the farmers and ranchers of Norton County began a new era of cooperative effort to control erosion and flooding on the land, and to develop the soil and water resources of the county.

Today, 626 Norton County landowners and operators are district cooperators. Of these, 596 have basic conservation plans on 236,000 acres of land. These cooperators, I understand, represent 58 percent of the farmers and ranchers in the county.

You have realized noteworthy accomplishments in the 20 years the Norton district has been in existence. I understand that 33 percent of the land in Norton County is adequately treated from a conservation standpoint. Your district ranks third highest in Kansas in the construction of terraces with 5,800 miles completed—70 percent of the conservation need.

Statewide, 105 organized soil conservation districts blanket Kansas. District cooperators number more than 87,000. Nearly 24 million acres of Kansas land is covered by basic soil conservation plans.

The State of Kansas has come a long way since the days of the Dust Bowl when the great need for soil and water conservation became dramatically evident across the Great Plains.

More than 2,100 Great Plains conservation program contracts have been completed in the State, embracing over 1,660,000 acres of land. I see that more than 67,000 acres of cropland will be converted to grass under Great Plains contracts, and that more than 140,000 acres of rangeland will be improved.

I note that soil surveys, basic to proper land-use planning and development, have been completed on more than 31 million acres in Kansas, over 60 percent of the State.

Local initiative and participation has been active in seeing to the completion of 5 projects under the pilot watershed program established in 1953, and in the many small watershed projects developed under Public Law 566, approved in 1954.

Kansas is one of the Nation's leading States in watershed project applications, planning, and construction. Kansas has 23 small watershed projects completed or under development, and four of these are multiple-purpose projects for municipal water supply and recreation, in addition to watershed protection and flood prevention. An additional 18 projects have been authorized for planning assistance.

Just as most of the soil conservation districts in Kansas have, admirably, broadened their conservation programs for better land-use planning and development to meet updated needs, so small watershed projects should be designed to take full advantage of their potential to serve a variety of needs in the watershed.

The small watershed project, I believe, offers the best opportunity for soil and water resource development within the soil conservation district. It is a basic program, designed to meet particular area needs. These projects are inspired and initiated by local people, and developed largely through local effort. The multiple purpose watershed project best serves the rural and urban demands upon the area's soil and water resources.

I think we Kansans can be proud of the interest in soil and water conservation thus far shown by the State and local governments.

A recent amendment to the State soil conservation district law makes State financial assistance available to districts, and the 1963 State Water Plan Act provides for further State participation in water conservation programs.

The Kansas Legislature has appropriated $120,000 for watershed planning in each of the past 4 fiscal years, an increase from $90,000 appropriated in fiscal years 1961 and 1962.

Total State appropriations for soil conservation work in fiscal year 1966 amounts

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

to $345,071. The value of local government contributions to help carry out the program of the local soil conservation districts in the current fiscal year is approximately $187,500.

These highly encouraging developments at the State and district levels are benchmarks that establish the progress being made in meeting soil and water conservation needs. We know that there is much more to be done.

For example, 236 of 305 small watersheds in Kansas have been found to need works of improvement. Yet, only 72 applications for watershed development assistance have been approved by the State and forwarded to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The 23 watershed projects under operations represent fewer than 10 percent of the needed projects in Kansas.

In Norton County, a total of 15 Great Plains contracts cover 6,700 acres of land. This represents only a beginning in a most important area of conservation here on the central plains.

While we may be proud of the 24 million acres covered by basic soil conservation plans in Kansas, this acreage represents less than half of the State's total area, and only 2,382,000 acres are covered by plans fully applied.

A shortage of technicians to assist landowners and operators develop and carry out conservation plans is partly responsible for this backlog. I believe more help can and should be provided by State and local agencies and organizations, in support of the substantial Federal effort.

The Federal commitment to soil and water conservation programs as a matter of deep national interest depends upon dynamic and farseeing State and local initiative and participation.

Congress, over the years, has displayed an admirable bipartisanship in supporting sound soil and water conservation development as a benefit to all the people.

I am proud to have supported much noteworthy legislation in this area of national concern. Last year, Congress passed, and the President signed into law:

The Water Resources Planning Act, which authorizes the President to establish river basin planning commissions and a Water Resources Council;

The Water Quality Act, which establishes a new water pollution control agency and authorizes additional funds for pollution control efforts;

The Rural Water Facilities Act, which makes possible the planning and building of community water supply and sanitation facilities in rural areas;

The Water Resources Recreation Act, which establishes a uniform policy for fish and wildlife enhancement and recreation in Federal water projects.

This, and other Federal legislation, has indicated the strong bipartisan support Congress is prepared to give sound resource conservation programs. But, I believe, and I think you will agree, that the soil and water conservation job will be done—in the Norton Soil Conservation District, in the State of Kansas, and in the Nation, only with wholehearted State and local cooperation.

This broad support is particularly necessary and justified because watershed protection and development serves the urban community as well as the rural countryside.

The watershed project that prevents a flood in the valley may provide a reservoir for municipal and industrial water storage; a site for swimming, boating and fishing; or a refuge for waterfowl.

Land under conservation plans that is not needed or suitable for growing crops may be converted to grass and trees and used for recreation or wildlife conservation, for the benefit of both the urban and rural resident.

I am told that 40,000 visitor-days of recreation have been provided by watershed projects in Kansas since the Food and Agriculture Act of 1962 made conversion of land to recreational purposes, as part of small watershed projects and on private land-holdings, more readily possible.

Also, 900 income-producing recreation enterprises established by nearly 300 landowners and operators benefit the rural economy and satisfy the growing urban need for more outdoor recreation opportunities.

Kansas is very much a town-and-country State, and we must strive to build a meaningful and mutually beneficial relationship between town and country living.

Kansas had only 107,000 people in 1860, and over 90 percent of these residents lived in rural areas. By 1960, the State's population had grown to more than 2 million, and rural residents accounted for only 39 percent of the people.

The total land area of Kansas still is 90 percent in farms and ranches, but the 15-percent increase in population between 1950 and 1960 represented urban growth. There has been a dramatic shift in numbers of people from the farm to the city in Kansas, as elsewhere in the Nation.

Soil and water conservation directly affects the growing urban development and the complex needs associated with it. Nearly 2,000 nonfarm landowners and operators in Kansas received technical assistance through soil conservation districts in fiscal year 1965.

There is a leading role to be played by soil conservation district leaders in this dual town-and-country responsibility. It is for you at the district level to promote sound conservation measures wherever possible.

The evidence is clear that the soil and water conservation message has spread in Norton County and throughout Kansas.

But you conservationists are evangelists, just as the late Hugh Bennett, the first administrator of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, was an evangelist as he sought—with outstanding success, I may add—to impart to the Nation's landowners and operators, to Members of Congress and to State legislators, and to officials and leaders in both public and private life the urgent need to bring dynamic soil and water conservation measures to the land.

And as evangelists you will not be content with a message half told, with a job half done.

I am convinced that no group in the Nation deserves higher praise than you soil conservation district supervisors and cooperators—for your dedication, your determination, and your accomplishments.

And that is why I am sure you will not be satisfied until every farmer, rancher, and other rural landowner—in Norton County and in the State—becomes an active participant in soil and water conservation district programs; until every acre of Kansas land is under a conservation plan—for the benefit of the agricultural economy, for the wise and necessary marshaling of our precious soil and water resources, and to assure sound land use planning and development in the growing urban corners of the State.

Your continued dedicated efforts are needed by the people of Norton County and the State of Kansas. Your efforts deserve the support required to spread the message and the good works of soil and water resource conservation throughout the land. You are assured of my continued, unwavering support of this most worthy endeavor.

President Presents Powerful Case on Vietnam Course

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOE L. EVINS
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, February 24, 1966

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, at the National Freedom Award ceremonies in New York recently, President Johnson reaffirmed our determination to halt the onrush and spread of communism in Vietnam.

The Washington Post on February 25, 1966, commented that the President's address was "powerful and persuasive." I have unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD, believing it to be of broad general interest to my colleagues and to the Nation.

The editorial follows:

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

The President made a powerful and persuasive defense of his policies in Vietnam in his address at the National Freedom Award ceremonies in New York Wednesday.

He disposed of the allegation that our objectives are unlimited with a flat "No." He dealt with the repeated expressions of anxiety about deliberate escalation of the war by voicing his own opposition to mindless escalation. He dealt with the hawks who have complained that not enough has been sent to General Westmoreland. He responded to the criticism that we fight alone by citing our allies. He made it plain we will not deliberately widen the war. He again emphasized the pacification program in which social and economic aids will parallel military efforts. He made it clear that we will not impose a coalition government—or any government on the South Vietnamese. He vigorously defended the peace offensive. He wisely put no time limit on American support to South Vietnam. He reviewed again the long train of commitments that brought us to South Vietnam. He closed with the stirring words of President Kennedy: "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

It was time that the President restated our ends and reaffirmed our determination. It is not to reproach the critics but only to state a fact of life to say that the ongoing debate over policies in South Vietnam has created an impression of irresolution and indecision. Whether it has given any aid to the enemy or not, it probably has given them some comfort. And it has helped confirm the favorite illusion of the Vietcong—that the United States is another broken and bankrupt France that can be driven out of South Vietnam by the collapse of morale at home.

It will not be sufficient to attack this illusion with occasional reassertions of purpose. By act and word we must make it plain, again and again, that we are ready for a long and hard struggle to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own government. The peace offensive and the internal debate no doubt have revived North Vietnam's hopes of imminent American default. It must be made clear to Hanoi that these hopes are false hopes.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

The Milwaukee Journal Commends Expansion of the Excellent Headstart Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HENRY S. REUSS
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, in a February 19 editorial the Milwaukee Journal joined in the general acclaim that has been won by Project Headstart and commended President Johnson for his decision to expand this highly successful facet of the war on poverty.

The Journal pointed out some of the heartening results achieved through Headstart programs in Milwaukee and other communities throughout the Nation. It also noted the need for continuing efforts to assure that the educational momentum given to the Headstart youngsters is not lost as they progress through school.

The editorial:

A GOOD HEADSTART

One shining success of the war on poverty is Project Headstart. This is the program that prepares 4- and 5-year-olds from poverty stricken families for kindergarten and first grade—children who may not even know their names may never have seen a picture book or learned such simple things as colors.

In his address to school administrators at Atlantic City the other day, President Johnson gave top priority to a doubling of Headstart funds for next year so that more than 700,000 children may be served. Recently, Sargent Shriver, Director of the antipoverty program, made an additional $30 million available for this year so that this summer programs will not have to be cut below last summer's level when 561,000 children were reached.

How effective has Headstart been? On Staten Island a test to measure intellectual ability showed a 14-month gain for Headstart children over those who were not in the program. University of Texas researchers found Headstart children entering first grade to be more proficient in learning, more intellectually curious, better adjusted to the classroom than non-Headstart children. One California test showed a 4- to 12-month gain in intelligence test performance by children during a 6-week Headstart program.

Physical examination revealed correctable defects. Among 1,442 Headstart children tested in Boston, two cases of congenital heart disease were found that required open heart surgery, and two cases of active tuberculosis.

Evaluation of Project Headstart in Milwaukee has shown that children drawn from disadvantaged homes make tremendous advances—as much as a 10-percent increase in achievement tests, for example. Their parents benefit, too, because Headstart makes every effort to involve adults.

During 8 weeks last summer, 690 Milwaukee children attended Headstart classes, and the program is continuing. In the school semester just ended, 624 children were prepared for kindergarten classes they have now entered. About the same number are enrolled in second semester Headstart classes.

While Headstart helps get children of the poor off to a better start, there is no assurance it enables them to keep up. Evaluation of this will continue. The belief is, however, that additional effort will be needed if Headstart children are to be kept from losing interest, falling victim to frustration and dropping out of the educational stream in which they made so good a beginning.

Jobless Pay Push

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES A. VANIK
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, a great deal of controversy has arisen concerning H.R. 8282, the unemployment compensation reform bill. In an effort to clarify some of the issues which have arisen in connection with this bill, I shall endeavor to present information during the next few weeks which might serve to clarify the various sections of these proposed amendments. In this connection, I insert in the RECORD an article from a recent edition of the Wall Street Journal which deals with this legislation:

JOBLESS PAY PUSH: EVEN AS IDLENESS FALLS, CONGRESS SEEKS WIDER BENEFITS FOR UNEMPLOYED—BIG REFORM OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION WOULD RAISE TAXES PAID BY EMPLOYERS—CAN'T FIX ROOF IN THE RAIN

(By Arlen J. Large)

WASHINGTON.—Amid sunny prosperity Congress is soon to put up a broader umbrella against future storms of unemployment and recession.

Joblessness is now at a 9-year low, so there's scant traffic these days to the State-Federal window that pays unemployment insurance benefits to those looking vainly for work. It's an incongruous backdrop indeed for the probable passage this year of an unemployment compensation reform bill providing:

"Federal standards—the first ever—governing the size of jobless benefits the States must pay, forcing most to lift their maximum weekly benefits.

"A standby mechanism for stretching the duration of benefits during recessions—perhaps 50 percent beyond present limits.

"And higher taxes on employers to pay for it all."

The final package could emerge still fatter, depending on the legislative twists and turns in the weeks ahead. Anyway while falling far short of the ambitious goals of the Johnson administration and organized labor, the coming changes will represent the first significant congressional overhaul of the unemployment compensation system in its 30-year history.

"CAN'T FIX ROOF IN RAIN"

"If times are so good, why is Congress doing anything at all?

"You can't fix the roof while it's raining," says Chairman WILBUR MILLS to colleagues on his House Ways and Means Committee. His group, which held weeks of hearings on the subject last year, is due to start closed-door meetings next month (March) to devise the actual shape of the package.

It's characteristics of the careful Mr. MILLS to prefer to legislate in the calm atmosphere of affluence, rather than a recession crisis. But statesmanship aside, there are wheels within wheels: A lot of cold cash is at stake in the coming collision between employer groups who must pay the cost of new jobless benefits and labor unions whose out-of-work members will be on the receiving end. Interestingly, each camp sees some advantage for itself in revising the system now.

"If anything's going to be done, I think it's to our advantage to have it come to a head now," says Stanley Rector, director of Unemployment Benefit Advisers, Inc. The Washington-based organization, sponsored by some 400 major corporations, has fought for years against union efforts to federalize the unemployment compensation system. Mr. Rector reasons that Congress will reject many of the administration's benefit-liberalization proposals in a year when labor shortages loom as a key problem.

LABOR SEES BETTER CHANCE

As for labor, the AFL–CIO now sees a chance of winning a basic sweetening-up of the system that has proved impossible to pass during a recession emergency. During the slumps of 1957–58 and 1960–61, recalls an AFL–CIO strategist, "We just couldn't get Congress interested in anything but improvising something to meet the immediate situation." Certainly another goal behind labor's push for action this year is its humiliating Senate defeat on repeal of State right-to-work laws. "After their licking on 14(b), they're going to be more interested than ever in getting a juicy unemployment compensation bill," says a Republican member of the Ways and Means Committee.

As in the past, this year's fight centers on imposition of "Federal standards" for State-administered unemployment compensation benefits. The battle already is taking some interesting twists.

State officials for years have allied themselves with employer groups in opposition to Federal rules governing the amount and duration of benefits. Late last month, however, a special conference of officials who administer State employment security programs made a significant concession. Meeting in Phoenix, the group abandoned its former stance against a Federal standard on benefit amounts and agreed to accept a requirement that the maximum weekly benefit be at least half the average wage paid within the State; by most accounts, the officials made their proposal after hearing that Representative MILLS himself desired it.

WOULD RAISE MANY PAYMENTS

This maximum would be well below the two-thirds ceiling sought by the administration, but it still would require 33 States, including New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, and Texas, to raise their top payment. Maximum weekly benefits now range from $30 in Mississippi to $65 in California; nationally the average benefit payment is about $37 a week.

"Conference action at Phoenix simply removes any doubt as to there being a Federal benefit standard in the prospective Ways and Means Committee bill," the Unemployment Benefit Advisers group glumly reported to its industrial sponsors. This organiaztion now is preparing a proposed standard, technically different, to offer as an alternative to the 50 percent of average wage yardstick. (The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, however, continues to stand fast against any Federal benefit standard at all.)

Chances are bright, too, for another "Federal standard" that's embroiled in a curious controversy. This standard—in effect requiring States to give unemployment-insurance tax credits to companies showing good employment stability—already is in the law, and it's being fiercely defended by employer groups. The administration bill seeks repeal of the requirement; instead it allows States to base an employer's tax on factors other than his "experience rating."

This repeal proposal has brought torrents of mail to Congress from employers. The present "experience rating" system, employers argue, gives them an incentive to keep their taxes low by challenging unjustified unemployment benefit claims of former em-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

The growing partition of Germany, the cold war and the whole problem of Stalinism in Eastern Europe pushed any thought of such confirmation far into the future.

Dr. Kurt Schumacher, former leader of West German Social Democratic Party, said in 1947 that the frontiers of 1937 have been "gambled away by Hitler's adventure." His compatriot, Mr. Jakob Kaiser, Christian Democrat Union, still represented the view at that time that the "Poles will of course receive German eastern territories as compensation." Yet both these West German politicians felt that at last part of the lost territories could be "regained."

When the measure of de-Stalinization of the fifties started off the process of disintegration within the Soviet bloc, there was yet another change in the attitude of the Western Allies:

1. In 1956 Mr. John McCloy advised the West German Government to consider "whether it would not be expedient to renounce any claim to a part of the former German territories so as to bring the reunification of East and West Germany closer."

2. On March 25, 1959, Charles de Gaulle advocated German reunification, "On condition that the present frontiers in the north, south, east, and west are not called in question." The French Prime Minister was more specific. On August 13, 1959, he said that, "The status quo—which should be maintained—also includes respect of frontiers, and thus applies to the so-called Oder-Neisse line as well." Mr. Roger Garreau, former French Ambassador, in 1962 said that all the milieus of the French public are unanimous in their support of the Oder and Neisse frontier. To question the validity of the frontier means to provide most dangerous events not excluding a universal war.

Again, unveiling the outline at his February 4 press conference, the general reminded the Germans of some unpleasant facts. Among them were: That they must accept their 1945 frontiers as final, that reunification without strings is impossible, that their country is divided as a result of the war they unleased in which 40 million people were killed and 10 million exterminated in concentration camps, and that reunification can only come when the fears of Germany's neighbors are put to rest.

3. In the summer of 1959 the American Vice President, Nixon, during his talks in Warsaw, assured the Polish Communist Party leader that the United States had no intention or desire to support any revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

4. Mr. Gordon Walker, the former British Foreign Secretary said in a television broadcast before the general elections, "The Labor Party is of the opinion that the problem of frontiers on the Oder-Neisse cannot be solved until there is a general settlement of relations. We have stated, however, that we found it hard to imagine that in the events of a settlement the frontiers on the Oder and Neisse would not be recognized. That is our view, it is the view of the present British Government, and of practically every government in the world."

5. The Chinese, in whom many leading politicians in Bonn and indeed many West Germans place their hopes, refer to the Bonn standpoint as "the dream of a lunatic" (Hsinhua, April 1964).

III

In 1955, the population of the discussed region reached the figure of about 6,940,000 which represents 25.5 percent of the total population of Poland. Today there are over 8 million Poles living there. Nearly 4 million of the Poles today were born there. These men and women, now inhabitants of the new lands, were forced to leave their homes and make a new life for themselves just as were the Germans from western Poland. They have lived and started their new life toiling and building for over 20 years now.

The integration, the fusion of those territories into the Polish sovereign territory has been an accomplished fact. All this was accomplished without outside help and despite the greatest material losses suffered by Poland owing to German depredation and senseless destruction. The present German-Polish frontier is an important contribution to the overall economic balance of Europe and Poland in particular.

History has lessons to teach us. We should bear them in mind as we shape a new life, and not delude ourselves that the character of nations and their methods of political actions change spontaneously from day to day, as it were. Such changes do arise but under the pressure of external circumstances; yet these stem from the situation of a given nation and from the durability of its political system. The United States certainly has no intention or desire of wasting the fruits of the victory to which she so greatly contributed. But intentions are of less account in the conduct of a policy than the situation which it produces.

There is one thing on which virtually all Poles agree, whether they are in Poland or in exile and whether supporters or opponents of Mr. Gomulka, that the Oder-Neisse territories belong to Poland. They are not inclined to listen to any argument regarding the Oder-Neisse line. The Poles know that, outside Germany, there is no government or power that has any serious doubts about the present state of affairs. They still, however, remain bound to communism. For the Polish Communists the Russian alliance is a matter of taste as well as of survival; for the rest of the country, probably the overwhelming majority, it is a matter of necessity.

Even if the Russians were to offer Poland freedom to abandon communism, which they show no sign of doing, fear of Germany would remain. The Poles and the rest of the Europeans cannot easily forget the horrors of the German "short visit" and must seek a guarantor for the Oder-Neisse frontier. What is more, they are strengthened in their determination by the leading spiritual force in the country—the Catholic Church.

German policy must take account of this will of the Polish nation. To renounce the use of force is not enough, if at the same time hopes are nourished of returning to those territories by West German politicians. For how is a return, without resort to force, feasible if the inhabitants of those territories refuse to be reasoned with and if what they already possess has long been guaranteed to them by the whole world?

The West-German revisionists are perfectly well aware of the fact that all nuances in the wording and in the juristic interpretations of the Potsdam protocol, which could be used in their unscrupulous campaign, lose all significance in the face of the Potsdam decisions to remove all the German population from Polish territory. The political leadership of the Federal Republic have lacked the civil courage to tell their people that the lands east of the Oder-Neisse are gone. Under these circumstances any propaganda within West Germany for the return of these lands by peaceful methods seems mere nonsense.

Is there realistic prospect that, in the coming years, any non-German state—U.S.S.R., United States, Britain, France—will place high in the cycle of its own desires the return of those territories to Germany?

Should, then, the frontier be recognized? If this means the formal act of signature, not even the Poles insist on that condition today. The chief problem confronting German policy at present is how to make its undertaking not to use force credible—with all the consequences involved. One of these is the sober, if painful, recognition of what really happened at Potsdam, and of what has since taken place in world public opinion and in the Oder-Neisse territories. But it involves in particular the willingness to stop spreading false hopes and to honestly ask oneself the question which many people—not only the Poles—put to themselves: If not by force, then how?

On a Theme From Kennan

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, Joseph Alsop presents in the following column from a February 23, 1966, edition of the New York Herald Tribune what must be a logical sequence of events if the United States follows the policy advocated by George F. Kennan at the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings. Mr. Kennan admitted that the effect on Thailand if the United States withdraws in Vietnam would be unfortunate. As Mr. Alsop points out "unfortunate" is a gross understatement.

The article follows:

ON A THEME FROM KENNAN

(By Joseph Alsop)

BANGKOK.—Nearly 16 years ago, George F. Kennan, working at fever heat, dashed off the first draft of a famous policy paper. On the basis of the arguments therein set forth, President Truman made his magnificently courageous Korean decision, and a long chain reaction of Asian disasters was thus averted, albeit at heavy cost.

If one can trust the transmitted version of Kennan's recent Senate testimony, he has by now forgotten just about all the arguments he assembled for presentation at the Korea meetings at Blair House. But with regard to this country, he is at least quoted as admitting than an American retreat and surrender in Vietnam would have an "unfortunate" effect.

"Unfortunate" is a pretty mild word for the reality. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, has quite openly described Thailand as next on the agenda after Vietnam to at least one Western visitor in Peiping. And the preparations for an assault on Thailand's independence are quite plain for anyone to see.

In order to grasp the nature of these preparations, it is first of all necessary to grasp the basic facts of Thailand's geography. Briefly, the mountainous northeastern part of the country and the southern Provinces on the Malay Peninsula are both fairly inaccessible from the center, and both regions have non-Thai populations.

The northeast, with its Lao and Vietnamese inhabitants, and the extreme south, with its Malays, have, therefore been selected as the prime targets by the Communist planners in Peiping and Hanoi. In the southern Provinces, a base was provided by the Communist guerrillas who fled into the Thai jungles after the failure of the assault on Malaya. In the northeast, the Vietnamese who fled to Thailand during the French war also offered useful human raw material.

A good deal has already been published about this Communist effort in Thailand. But its coldly calculated character has never been well conveyed. In the southern Prov-

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

pose the Soviet claims to eastern Poland, since the Soviet Union had between 1941 and 1944 borne the main burden of the war against Germany; they felt they could not deny to Stalin what Hitler had promised him in 1939, especially as the border along the Bug River largely corresponded with the so-called Curzon line which Western "experts" had after the First World War themselves recommended as an "equitable" eastern frontier of Poland.

When one member of the British Parliament expressed his doubts over the wisdom of this step, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, said it should be remembered that, "Germany has forcefully removed populations from vast tracts of territory, millions of people, and in many cases they are now dead." The realistic British mind was already aware of possible developments which were later confirmed at Yalta. We have a document in the form of a letter dated November 2, 1944, sent by Sir Cadogan, then permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, to Mr. Romer who was Foreign Minister in the Polish Government in exile, in London. The letter contains an official obligation by the British Government to advocate at the peace conference the changes of the Polish western border to the extent discussed in Moscow. * * * "You inquired whether His Majesty's government were definitely in favor of advancing the Polish frontier up to the line of the Oder to include the port of Stettin. The answer is, that His Majesty's government do consider that Poland should have the right to extend her territory to this extent." The British obligation is free of any reservation whatsoever. It is even reinforced by a promise to support the new frontier. "Even in the event of the U.S. Government finding themselves unable to agree to the changes." And the President of the United States, F. D. Roosevelt, suggested the expulsion of the Germans in a letter to the Polish Government in exile on November 17, 1944. He stated inter alia: "If the Polish government and the people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish state to bring about the transfer to and from the territory of Poland of national minorities, the U.S. Government will raise no objections and so far as practicable will facilitate such transfer."

Sir Winston Churchill put it even more bluntly when he advocated on December 15, 1944, "The total expulsion of the Germans from the area to be acquired by Poland in the west and in the north * * *. Expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble, as has been the case in Alsace-Lorraine."

On February 25, 1945, the British opposition leader, Mr. C. Attlee, expressed his agreement in the House of Commons. And again on March 1, 1945 Mr. Attlee, said at the House of Commons once again that: "I want to see this Polish question in the general picture of Yalta * * *. We have to look at these things from the point of view of the future of the people of Europe. You have to try to unravel a tangle that has grown up through the 18th century. There have been unprecedented movements of populations. I suggest that we should not always be thinking that it must necessarily settle down into the position of the past. One thing however is quite certain. If you ask who is responsible for these movements, this terrible thing that has smitten Europe, there is no doubt at all that it is the Nazi Germany, and the people of Germany who actively supported them and, in a lesser degree those who have acquiesced, and who have been quite satisfied as long as things went well. I do not suggest that you can draw an indictment against a whole people, but neither can you relieve of responsibility a whole people * * *. Therefore if it is necessary to take some German soil, to make it up to the Polish people, I shall not complain—and I do not think that the Germans have a right to complain."

In an address to Congress on March 1, 1945, President Roosevelt interpreted these decisions as follows: "The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was a compromise * * *. The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final peace conference. We know, roughly, that it will include in the new strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany." Hence the alteration of the German eastern frontier and the expulsion of the Germans had already been decided upon in principle as the victorious powers met in Potsdam. Five weeks earlier they had, in the Berlin Declaration of June 5, 1945, assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany." The allied commanders in chief emphasized that this did not effect "the annexation of Germany" and that the allied government will hereafter "determine the boundaries of Germany."

Thus, although the statement of June 5, 1945 refers to "Germany within her frontiers as they were on December 31, 1937" (the only document that makes such reference), it did not expressly define the future frontier, but merely traced out areas intended for military occupation. "Germany, within her frontiers as they were on December 31, 1937, will, for the purpose of occupation, be divided into four zones." In Potsdam, on August 2, 1945, this division was amended to the extent that the German territories, transferred to Poland, "should not be considered a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, within her borders as they were in 1937." The "supreme authority" accorded to the Allied Control Council at Potsdam; i.e., "in matters affecting Germany as a whole" extended only as far as the Oder and the Neisse. Poland, therefore, did not become an occupation power, nor was she given a seat on the Control Council. However, the following declaration was formulated in the Potsdam Protocol under the heading "Poland," and contained an express reference to the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference: "In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three heads of government have sought the opinion of the Polish provisional government of national unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive."

"The three heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The three heads of government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea, immediately west of Swinemunde, and hence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish state and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

"The conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it * * * subject to expert examination of the actual frontier."

Although the settlement with regard to the former German territories to the east of the Oder and the Neisse agreed upon at Potsdam seemed in form to be of a provision nature, this was in contradiction not only to the events leading up to the agreement, but indeed, also, to the attitude of the signatories themselves, who were under no illusions. In a nationwide radio broadcast on August 9, 1945, President Truman explained to the American people that, "Certain compromises about Poland had already been agreed upon at the Crimea conference. They obviously were binding upon us at Berlin. The territory the Poles are to administer * * * will provide a short and more easily defensible frontier between Poland and Germany. Settled by Poles, it will provide a more homogenous nation." Thus, although President Truman uses the definition accepted at Potsdam and mentions the territory the Poles are to administer, he speaks of the decision as of a settlement of Poland's frontiers in the sense of international law.

Yet it was the same Truman who, as present documents show, did not want to commit himself definitely at Potsdam, after the first signs of discord between Moscow and Washington had already become visible. President Truman especially was annoyed because Moscow had in the meantime begun to install a Communist regime in Warsaw. Sir Winston Churchill and his men, however, felt that any delay in reaching a final settlement would only serve to consolidate the Soviet position in Poland. Above all, however, the alleged provisional nature of the Oder-Neisse border was contradicted by Chapter XIII of the Postdam Protocol, which ordered the expulsion of millions of Germans from those territories. This fact cuts short all the discussions on the interpretation and the legal aspects of the frontier changes at Potsdam. The population transfers which then occurred make the decisions irreversible and render void any attempts at putting them in doubt. The state of things in which the transference of Germans from Poland could not be reversed was accepted by the Americans both de facto and de jure.

The 12th meeting of the Control Council under the chairmanship of Marshall Zhukov, Generals Clay, Robertson, and Koeltz confirmed the transfer plan.

The decisions made at Potsdam on the transfer of the German population had in them nothing precocious or sudden. On the contrary, they were the object of detailed studies and cautiously long considerations by the great powers and the statesmen of the particular countries. These investigations took into account the experiences with German minorities in the interwar period and during the war.

In his now "famous" speech in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes changed the tone. He said that at Potsdam the heads of government had agreed to support the Soviet desire for the transfer to Russia of northeast Prussia, but not the cession of East German territories to Poland. The extent of the area to be ceded, however, must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon. However, at the same time he emphasized that Poland had requested a revision of her frontier in the north and west, and that the United States would support a revision of this frontier, in Poland's favor.

Several days later the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov replied: "No one can take it into his head that the transference of Germans from these territories as well as the settlement of Poles on the territories was accepted only in the nature of a transitory experiment * * * The mere thought of such experiments with millions of people is incomprehensible, not to mention the cruelty both to the Poles and the Germans themselves." All this indicates that the decision signed by Attlee, Stalin, and Truman at the Potsdam Conference had already determined Poland's frontier in the west, and merely required rubber-stamping at the international conference regarding a peace treaty with Germany.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

inces, for instance, secret jungle camps were organized, where recruits from the villages were intensively trained by the refugees from the Malayan war.

Many scores of recruits from the northeastern Provinces were also conveyed in secret into the parts of Laos controlled by the North Vietnamese Army (from which solemn treaty obligations, of course, required the North Vietnamese troops to be totally withdrawn 4 years ago). A hundred or so of the most important agents were even taken by sea to Hong Kong, and thence into China, for advance training.

In this manner, quite serious though still limited guerrilla movements have by now been organized in both the target areas. The ruthless terrorism that is such a characteristic feature of "liberation" movements has begun on a considerable scale. In short, the pattern is clear, down to the last detail.

As of now, it is not an especially alarming pattern, since the Thai Government has organized energetic countermeasures. But let the United States take the advice of George Kennan and his friends. Let the Vietnamese war end in a retreat and a surrender. Then any one with the smallest knowledge of Asian affairs can foresee that the effect in Thailand will be quite dramatically "unfortunate."

To be sure, Senator FULBRIGHT's antiadministration witnesses do not seem to have included many persons with any knowledge whatever of Asia. If one may judge from this distance, a good specimen witness was Prof. Hans Morgenthau, whose errors of basic historical fact concerning southeast Asia have been so crude and glaring that his pose as an expert is in the nature of a comic turn.

Yet the double standard that now prevails is still a bit bewildering. Think, for instance, of the outcry that would be heard from people of Morgenthau's stamp if the CIA were discovered to be attempting in North Korea, or even in North Vietnam, anything comparable to what the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists are quite openly attempting here in Thailand.

Even more bewildering, one must add, is the total carelessness of consequences and the flat refusal to face unpleasant facts. For these preparations for an attempted takeover in Thailand, please remember, are undoubted, well established facts. And there can be no doubt that the shock of an American retreat and surrender in Vietnam would open the door wide for this attempted Communist takeover.

Chicago's Antipoverty Program

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues what I consider to be a highly significant statement on the war against poverty in Chicago. I refer to an article appearing in the February 2 edition of the Chicago Sun-Times, entitled "Antipoverty Units Report on Seven Innercity Programs."

The article described a progress report recently submitted by four outstanding private agencies on seven programs conducted under their auspices as part of Chicago's antipoverty effort.

The four agencies are the Boys Clubs of Chicago, the Chicago Federation of Settlements, Chicago Youth Centers, and the YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago. Together these distinguished organizations administer 7 massive antipoverty projects serving 38,725 impoverished residents of Chicago's innercity neighborhoods. Included are job training, preschool, special tutoring, work-study, Neighborhood Youth Corps, and neighborhood resources programs.

The article points out that of 1,384 staff members who operate the projects, 1,073 are residents of the poverty neighborhoods, and that over 5,000 volunteers are contributing their time and efforts to make the project succeed.

The article reports:

A panel of hired and volunteer workers who live in the poverty areas agreed that the poor have an active participation in the projects at both policy and program levels.

Of particular interest, in light of accusations made by certain critics of the Chicago program, is the observation that—

George Yozall, personnel manager of Inland Steel Co., who served as chairman of a federation committee that screened job applicants, said there has never been political interference with hiring.

Mr. Speaker, this article would seem to carry a clear message to all fair-minded readers, and I insert it at this point in the RECORD:

ANTIPOVERTY UNITS REPORT ON SEVEN INNER-CITY PROGRAMS

Four private agencies made a progress report Tuesday on seven programs in the war on poverty.

At a press conference in the Sheraton-Chicago Hotel, the agencies reported they have spent $3,541,867 in Federal and private funds, serving 38,725 persons in the seven Chicago inner-city projects.

The programs are being operated by 1,384 staff members—357 professional, and 1,027 nonprofessional—of whom 1,073 live in poverty areas. There are an additional 5,087 volunteers.

SEEK ADDITIONAL FUNDS

Joseph Clemens, executive director of the Chicago Boys Clubs, who was spokesman for the four agencies, said they are seeking an additional $3 million to $4 million to carry on the projects for 1966. Applications for Federal grant renewals have been filed with the Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity.

The four agencies are the Boys Clubs, the Chicago Federation of Settlements, Chicago Youth Centers and the YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago.

These are the projects they have undertaken or expanded under Federal financing:

Jobs: This is a project of the Boys Clubs, the Youth Centers and the YMCA working with a Federal grant of $332,163. It currently has 829 young men and women in job training. In the 3 years it has been in existence, first under private sponsorship and now with Federal help, the project has given 4,437 young people training and job assistance.

Streets: Taking its name from its aims of socialization, training, recreation, education, employment and technical services, this is a project of all four agencies. It is working with a grant of $1,194,433 and is serving 12,500 young people.

Learn: This is a preschool program for children 3½ to 5 and is run by the youth centers, the federation and the Y. Working with approximately $500,000 it is serving 1,424 children.

SHARE: Standing for student help with adult related education, this is a Y-sponsored tutoring program involving 2,000 young people and adults, currently financed with $94,108.

CWS, or college work-study: This project of the Boys Clubs and the Y provides part-time work to help students of low-income families through college. More than 100 students are working 15 hours a week and are paid with Federal funds disbursed by the schools they attend.

NYC, or Neighborhood Youth Corps: This program is administered by all four agencies and provides, with a Federal grant of $784,481, work for unemployed young people between the ages of 16 and 21. It currently serves 424 persons.

DNR, or development of neighborhood resources: With a grant of $648,217 and administered by the federation, this project is presently serving 23,000 persons. In the words of Mrs. Hazel S. Boswell, a DNR worker, the program teaches the poor "how to file complaints with the building department, to stand up in court with landlords. We're working to find an answer to rats and roaches, too."

POOR HAVE ROLE

Also at the conference, a panel of hired and volunteer workers who live in the poverty areas, agreed that the poor have an active participation in the projects at both policy and program levels.

George Yozall, personnel manager of Inland Steel Co. who served as chairman of a federation committee that screened job applicants said there has never been political interference with hiring.

Teenage Money

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GEORGE M. RHODES
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. RHODES of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include an interesting editorial from the Reading, Pa., Times regarding credit and young adults:

TEENAGE MONEY

If you're a graybeard or younger you can recall as a teenager having two bits in your pocket and treating "Sweetie" to a swell time over an ice cream soda—calling it a big date.

Today, a teenager with less than two pieces of paper money to rub together is almost broke.

From a standard of national economics, the teenage spenders pump about $11 billion a year into the goods market. Of course, it's mainly daddy's money, but that's beside the point for the moment.

There are serious thoughts today about whether youngesters are being adequately taught when to halt a spending spree.

Some high schools teach consumer education, but only a trifle of it. Evidence of increased bankruptcies among young adults points out that young people are not aware of the pitfalls of credit buying, or even cash buying.

Esther Peterson, special assistant to the President for consumer affairs, is a worried woman:

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

"My concern about consumer education, however, is heightened by the fact that while children are big spenders today, they will be far bigger consumers tomorrow, as heads of families."

So what is Mrs. Peterson doing about it? She is urging more high schools to step up teaching of household economics in much the same way as the National Defense Education Act was the end result of panic over Russia beating the United States in the first space venture.

The infusion of the new math and new science into high school curriculums will continue to pay off for generations.

But it's scary to imagine those little Einsteins riding around on motor scooters, listening to transistor radios advertising the latest styles of this and that at "new, low prices."

Teenage spending habits may be presently good for the economy, but it's those same habits which lead young adults on small incomes to disaster a few years later in life.

Legislative Program of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I would like to set forth at this point the legislative program of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York, adopted by the State legislative committee at a meeting on Saturday, January 8, at the Hotel Piccadilly in New York City.

The report of the committee follows:

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM OF THE AFFILIATED YOUNG DEMOCRATS, INC., OF NEW YORK STATE, ADOPTED AT A MEETING AT NEW YORK CITY ON JANUARY 8, 1966

The State legislative committee of the Affiliated Young Democrats of New York State at a meeting held Saturday afternoon, January 8, 1966, at the Hotel Piccadilly, 227 West 45th Street, New York City, called for active and positive leadership of Democrats in the assembly and State senate, with full responsibility to all the people of the State to assure reelection in 1966.

Demand a bipartisan committee in State and New York City to set up a long-range tax program for 25 years and not the yearly rush for expediency.

We urge the legislators to support the following proposals, which we consider important to the welfare of the people of this State.

The Affiliated Young Democrats pledge ourselves to devote every effort to the enactment of the following program.

We have always stated clearly and without equivocation our position on the vital issues, and we do so now.

"Raise drinking age to 21 years; primary election for all State officers; adopt new code of New York City Air Pollution Control Board for cleaner air; more housing; permanent personal registration be made Statewide, with two changes, (1) must vote at two consecutive national elections, (2) do not have to reregister if move in same county; vote at 18 years; stop turnstile justice by recodifying the status as it relates to juveniles, with the unison of Federal and State laws; more vocational camps, rehabilitation and training centers; favor two voting days for National elections, first Mondays and Tuesdays in November; more State aid to education; extend ban on racial discrimination in housing and protection against slum landlords; create more judges; legalized off-track betting by referendum; raise minimum wage to $1.50 an hour; mandatory free tuition at all State and city universities and all community colleges; outlaw boxing; permanent spring primary election day in June; stronger code of ethics; presidential preference primaries; legislature to at last ratify the 15th amendment; preserve our great natural resources; program to discourage drop-outs in schools; State aid to public museums; create statewide recreation department; bonus for Korean veterans; increase teachers' salaries; more and better aid to the aged and mentally ill; favor 3-day weekend plan to celebrate all holidays, except religious holidays, on Monday; help migrant workers; stronger law against dope peddlers; and finally, we strongly urge, again, that a printed record of all the proceedings verbatim of the 1965 State legislature be made, and be made available to the public, as the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio have."

The above legislative program for 1966 will be introduced in the State legislature by their 22 Members in the State Senate, of which the chairman is Senator Samuel L. Greenberg of Brooklyn, and their 47 members in the assembly, of which the chairman is Assemblyman Daniel M. Kelly of New York County.

Harold R. Moskovit, State president of the Affiliated Young Democrats, addressed this important State legislative committee meeting and Richard H. Wels, chairman of the committee, presided.

Canada Today

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, our Canadian neighbors will celebrate the 100th anniversary of their confederation next year. I hope that this important event will stimulate greater interest in Canada here in the United States an enable our two countries to solve the problems that arise even between neighbors with the great community of interest we share with Canada.

The managing editor of the Boston Globe, Thomas Winship, has rendered a service in this regard in an article which appeared on February 27, assessing Canada on the eve of its centennial celebration. He thoughtfully interprets problems of foreign policy, economic relations and the indefinable qualities of mutual respect which contribute to productive mutual relations.

With a number of colleagues here in the House, I joined last September in a statement urging the United States to make greater efforts to make our relations with Canada a model for the whole world. Mr. Winship has made a good start in bringing modern Canada to our attention. I ask unanimous consent to include his article in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Boston (Mass.) Sunday Globe, Feb. 27, 1966]

CANADA TODAY: A REPORT ON EVE OF CONFEDERATION'S 100TH BIRTHDAY

(By Thomas Winship)

OTTAWA.—Canada becomes 100 years old next year and has decided the best way to prepare for that grand event is to stop feeling sorry for itself.

This is just as well, for our young northern neighbor is in a state of high ferment. The mood of Canada is a conglomeration of healthy and unhealthy national problems, now all very much on the surface because its leaders are telling the world about them. Some of them:

Canada is troubled about Vietnam and is in a more awkward bind over the issue than is the United States, if this is possible.

Canada is in a trade squabble with the United States—so nettling that it has become maybe the top political issue of Canada.

The quiet revolution in the French-Canadian Province of Quebec, representing a rebellion against the Anglo-Saxon Federal rule of Ottawa and elsewhere, has all kinds of overtones of the Negro revolution of our South, of De Gaulle nationalism and of the emerging nations of Africa. This is shaping up as one of the great stories of North America.

Canada's little brother complex, everyone-takes-us-for-granted attitude, gets more under Canadian skins as their boom economy becomes increasingly muscular.

Canada, always self-conscious about its vast uninhabited, cold and rather dull acres of land, is coming to realize what a sensational asset it has in owning the greatest mineral-rich frontier in the Western Hemisphere. The resources development of the Canadian northland is the Oklahoma City romance story all over again.

And finally, next year its greatest city, Montreal, celebrates the centennial of the confederation of Canada with an international world's fair. The city hopes to show itself off to some 30 million visitors, mostly from the United States. Montreal possibly is the most successful example of big city renewal on the east coast.

Last week the Globe joined seven other newspapers from Washington, New York, Detroit and other points for 4 days of talks in Ottawa with top officials of the Government. We also spent a day in Montreal learning about the World's Fair—Expo 67.

VIETNAM, FOREIGN POLICY

The Canadian Government is uneasy about Vietnam on several counts. Prime Minister Lester Pearson's regime always has had a neutralist bent. Publicly Pearson has politely, if not loudly, supported the U.S. effort in Vietnam. Privately, the Government and the vast majority of Canadians, so the official polls say, think the United States has no business in Vietnam.

The Pearson government is uneasy about Vietnam also because it knows the United States is less than happy with Canada's passive support (no Canadian troops are in Vietnam nor are any contemplated). But officials say their policy really is quite strong in relation to Canadian public opinion.

Another point of embarrassment is the violent anti-American job the Canadian Broadcasting System is doing on the war. The viciousness of the CBC attack on the United States, with a barrage of GI horror photos and eyewitness accounts, is particularly unhappy for Canadian officials when they remember that the Government subsidizes CBC to the tune of $65 million a year.

American visitors are frequently given another reason for Canadian passivity on the Pacific war. Canada is a member of the International Truce Commission for Vietnam. An aggressive role would destroy its

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

are seriously interrupted—at the least. Their lives are given at the most. There can be little doubt but what the draft is one of the greatest intrusions on individual freedom in America today. There can also be little doubt, in the words of George Washington, "that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even his personal services in defense of it." Nevertheless, when the intrusion into private life is so great, this country cannot afford a selective service system that is inequitable and inefficient. I have long had my doubts about the equitability and efficiency of our system, and intensive research did not set aside those doubts. Twenty-nine Republican Members of Congress, listed below, joined me today in the following statement calling for an immediate investigation of the draft. I commend it to all my colleagues, in the House of Representatives and the Senate, for their serious consideration:

A STATEMENT BY 29 REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

(By ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH of Kansas, ROBERT T. STAFFORD of Vermont, JOHN B. ANDERSON of Illinois, MARK ANDREWS of North Dakota, JAMES F. BATTIN of Montana, ALPHONZO BELL of California, LAURENCE J. BURTON of Utah, WILLIAM T. CAHILL of New Jersey, BARBER B. CONABLE, Jr. of New York, THOMAS B. CURTIS of Missouri, PAUL FINDLEY of Illinois, PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN of New Jersey, CHARLES E. GOODELL of New York, WILLIAM H. HARSHA of Ohio, FRANK HORTON of New York, HASTINGS KEITH of Massachusetts, THEODORE KUPFERMAN of New York, CLARK MACGREGOR of Minnesota, WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD of California, CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr. of Maryland, JOSEPH M. McDADE of Pennsylvania, CHESTER L. MIZE of Kansas, F. BRADFORD MORSE of Massachusetts, ALBERT H. QUIE of Minnesota, OGDEN R. REID of New York, HOWARD W. ROBISON of New York, DONALD RUMSFELD of Illinois, HERMAN SCHNEEBELI of Pennsylvania, RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER of Pennsylvania, J. WILLIAM STANTON of Ohio)

There should be an immediate congressional investigation of the draft and the methods used to persuade our allies to supply manpower to Vietnam and southeast Asia. The contemplated hearings before the House Armed Service Committee take on added significance every day.

The search to provide manpower to fight the war in Vietnam should be equitable and efficient. We are concerned that it is neither.

1. There is mounting evidence of gross inefficiency in the National Selective Service and Defense Department administration of the draft. According to figures supplied by General Hershey to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, there are 545,902 men between 19 and 26 now classified I–A. Of these, 117,825 have not yet been examined and another 279,676 are "not available" for the draft because their papers are stalled in the bureaucratic pipeline between local draft boards and Army induction centers. The Congress should examine this redtape jungle immediately.

2. From among current I–A classifications and those new I–A classifications expected through present procedures, and after physical and mental examinations, Selective Service System estimates show that a pool of 444,793 men will exist to meet induction and enlistment quotas through June 30, 1966. A congressional inquiry should examine whether the contemplated reexamination of present deferments is necessary to supplement the I–A pool to meet draft requirements.

3. While there are some prescribed limits on age and mental and physical capacity, there does not appear to be a clear order of priority in which the administration is considering calling the various manpower groups for service. It is imperative that the administration, through the Department of Defense and the Selective Service System, establish an equitable procedure by which the I–A draft pool should be filled. A congressional inquiry could help establish that order of priority.

4. General Hershey testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor that local draft boards will in the future determine the availability of college students for the draft after taking under advisement all pertinent information including class rank and results of an optional qualification test, similar to the one used during the Korean conflict. The first tests will be offered in May. General Hershey agreed that this type of test inevitably works to the advantage of sicence students and to the disadvantage of liberal arts students. The congressional inquiry should examine thoroughly the equitability of current and contemplated Selective Service regulations.

5. On April 18, 1964, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to undertake a study of the Selective Service System and to provide precise recommendations on how the service manpower needs of the Nation could best be met. According to the Defense Department the study has been completed and is in Secretary McNamara's office. But the report has not been made public and General Hershey has testified that he has never seen it.

6. A recent report of the Comptroller General of the United States concludes:

"The Army, Navy, and Air Force were using the services of about 9,000 enlisted personnel in nonmilitary activities, such as officers' and noncommissioned officers' clubs, hobby shops, bowling alleys, golf courses, and commissary sales stores, rather than employ civilians."

This report considered only the most flagrant inefficiencies in the use of existing manpower by the services. It is ridiculous for the Department of Defense to insist upon drafting young men to be hurried into combat when it is not making maximum efficient use of the trained personnel it already has.

7. At the present time Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are supplying combat personnel to the United States-South Vietnamese military effort in Vietnam. Other countries are providing some noncombat personnel. The congressional inquiry should examine carefully the efforts made by the administration to secure both combat and noncombat manpower contributions from our allies. It should consider and recommend new means of securing expanded allied contributions.

All of these are proper subjects for a broad-ranging congressional inquiry. The administration may soon seek to increase substantially the number of U.S. forces in southeast Asia. Therefore the congressional investigation must not be delayed. We can no longer afford a haphazard approach toward the supply of personnel in support of the objectives of the United States in Vietnam and southeast Asia.

Correct Course

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the Chicago Sun Times is convinced that the course the administration is following in Vietnam is "the only correct one," and it hailed the clarification given the issues by General Taylor.

The newspaper points out:

There are certain principles at stake in Vietnam and the United States is committed to upholding those principles.

General Taylor pointed out that even though the United States will have to increase its forces in South Vietnam the limited objectives it seeks are being won. He said, speaking as a military expert, that North Vietnam's capacity to escalate the war is limited and may have reached its limit.

Mr. Speaker, because we are all interested in getting as much opinion on this subject as possible—and because this editorial is lucid and concise—I am offering it for publication in the RECORD.

The article follows:

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 21, 1966]

VIETNAM DIALOG

Last week one of the severest critics of the administration's Vietnam policy met one of the chief architects of that policy, the former ambassador to South Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, head on in hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The dialog between General Taylor and Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, was, at times, acrid. But the clash between the two did much to clarify the U.S. position in Vietnam, a clarification that has been needed.

General Taylor reminded the Senate committee that the United States does not intend to invade North Vietnam, bring down its government, drive for "unconditional" victory over North Vietnam or provoke war with Red China.

The United States, said General Taylor, is fighting a defensive action to halt an attempt by the North Vietnam Communists to take what is not theirs to take and to uphold the right of the people of South Vietnam to self-determination. In pursuing those two objectives the United States can, simultaneously, deny to Peiping an opportunity to use South Vietnam as a training ground for similar subversion and revolution in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

These objectives have been set forth before on many occasions. It is time they were said again. There are certain principles at stake in Vietnam and the United States is committed to upholding those principles.

General Taylor pointed out that even though the United States will have to increase its forces in South Vietnam the limited objectives it seeks are being won. He said, speaking as a military expert, that North Vietnam's capacity to escalate the war is limited and may have reached its limit.

Senator MORSE disagreed violently with everything General Taylor said. That is his privilege and it served a purpose. The Nation has been the beneficiary of the vigorous debate and those who listened with an open

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

effectiveness in the trucemaking effort, Americans are told.

Another sore point from the U.S. Government's view is Canada's failure so far to join the Organization of American States. Many in Ottawa think it is just a matter of time before Canada joins, but the stumbling blocks in the past have been disenchantment with our Santo Domingan policy, Cuba, and fear of more financial commitments in Latin America should it join OAS.

This is what must be said, with great emphasis, in regard to Canada and Vietnam: Prime Minister Pearson and his Secretary of External Affairs, Paul Martin, are giving great imagination and time to the peace effort and, second, no one can doubt the sincerity of their well-mannered disenchantment with U.S. handling of the Vietnam war.

If there was a theme that dominated talks with Americans in Ottawa last week it was "guidelines." Canadians, normally so phlegmatic, go into a terrible state at the mention of them.

Briefly, the guidelines, imposed by Executive order from Washington, ask U.S. companies with foreign (including Canadian) subsidiaries to hold to a minimum their American dollar investments and to return to the United States as large a share of income and undistributed profits as possible.

These were imposed 2 years ago by President Johnson in a successful effort to reduce our balance of payments deficit.

The Canadians have been successful in convincing Washington to cancel some of these guidelines because Canada does so much importing from the United States that the former is reducing, not increasing, the U.S. balance-of-payments problem.

Most eloquent spokesman against the guidelines in Minister of Finance Mitchell Sharp, a handsome redhead.

Canada is particularly sensitive about any such curbs of U.S. dollars and credit in Canada because the country is seventh in the world in manufacturing and exactly one-half of Canada's manufacturing is owned by U.S. firms.

But what really peeves the Canadians is that these guidelines are voluntary and are vague. Outright regulations, above board, would be easier to deal with and it would be easier to gage their effect.

There is no end to fears Canadians have about these economic guidelines.

"Presidential arm twisting across the border."

"A man in Washington sending orders through the parent company telling the subsidiary across the border what he can and cannot do in Canada."

"A blow to our national pride."

"This gives substance to all the anxiety about U.S., dominance following U.S. investment."

"Resentment over the U.S. guidelines is the greatest unifying force we have in Canada today."

Some U.S. Commerce and Treasury Dept. officials who evolved these regulations would counter by saying: (1) Everyone would rather have "guidelines" than regulations that carried penalty provisions; (2) Some exceptions were made to Canada, and (3) There have been some irregularities in the past in Canadian securities and some people were hurt by them.

QUEBEC VERSUS CANADA

A quarter of Canada's total population, coast-to-coast, the Great Lakes to the Hudson Bay and Alaska, are French-Canadians living in the Province of Quebec.

The French of Quebec have been feeling their oats the past 5 years, and there are no signs that their spirit of independence is waning. The French of Quebec versus the Anglo-Saxons of Ottawa is what the Canadians call "The French Fact."

First of all, this visitor had to be reminded that the central government of Canada is not nearly so powerful as our Federal Government; that the provinces are far stronger than our 50 sovereign States.

Against this background, the Province of Quebec, under a liberal government, is undergoing a dramatic modernization on all fronts. It is fighting the Ottawa government every inch of the way; demanding a greater share of the tax revenue, insisting that it handle its own social welfare programs and insisting that an end be put to Anglo-Saxon dominance of both big jobs in Government and big jobs in private business.

Many call it the "quiet revolution," but Quebec's liberal premier, Jean Lesage, says he prefers to call it a "fast revolution." The economy is in high gear; schools, long under a heavy church hand, are improving under a new generation of clergymen.

The Quebec movement was and is fed by a strong intellectual group from the universities. Some are pushing even harder and are insisting that the only solution for French Canadians is to secede from Canada. This, the separatist movement, is a serious fact of Canadian politics and no one, write most students of Canadian history, believes they hold real strength.

This is how serious the stir in Quebec is held by one of its respected intellectuals, Claude Ryan: "The Quebec First point of view must not be dismissed too lightly. It rides upon the new wave of nationalism which has swept so many colonized people in recent years.

"It has the advantage of logic and clarity. * * * It also finds negative support in the numerous abuses which are still heaped every day upon French Canadians by their old economic masters."

Looking to the future, Ryan concludes: "A dialog is now in progress in most influential circles of both Canadas. The dialog has merely begun. It has yet to come to grips with specific difficult issues which still divide English and French Canadians No new tangible consensus is yet in sight. But the high caliber of many of the men who have chosen this course is in itself an encouraging omen for the future."

ECONOMY AND THE FRONTIER

Except for the Maritime Provinces, most of the figures that spell boom are present in Canada. The airplane and sophisticated technology have done for the chilly wastes of Canada what the covered wagon did for the West.

The natural resources development chapter is a fine one. Overall, Canada's gross national product is running at a 10-percent gain, compared to our 7 percent, and Canadian unemployment is at an alltime low.

Some touches on the Canadian frontier economy:

A railroad has finally been completed into Churchill Falls on the Hamilton River in Labrador. Here will be built a 10-million-horsepower electric power complex capable of producing the biggest single source of cheap power for eastern Canada and New England.

Calgary is becoming the oil center of the world, a transplanted American city.

In northern Alberta are oil sand deposits richer than Arabia's.

British Columbia is developing more and more immense low-grade copper mines.

The potash fields in Saskatchewan are burgeoning.

Without airplanes and electronic devices for mine detection the Canadian frontier boom would not be the business drama it is today.

The total U.S. direct investment in Canada today is $12 billion, $9 billion in South America, and $8 billion in Europe.

MONTREAL'S WORLD'S FAIR

Then you move to Canada's great seaport city—Montreal on the St. Lawrence. The city's pace should be noticed by New York and Boston.

Its redevelopment program is further advanced relatively than any city on the east coast. Its new subway opens this year. Next year Montreal reaps the benefits of the World's Fair and in 1972 it hopes to win the Olympic games. That's not hay.

If Boston has any serious hope of wooing the World's Fair to Boston Harbor, a delegation should practically be in residence studying the Montreal effort.

The Montreal fair will locate on two islands in the middle of the St. Lawrence and directly in front of the city. The islands have been doubled in size by some ingenious fill work from the bottom of the river. The fair management thus has produced 1,000 acres for the exhibition. Boston has talked about 400 acres (not enough) on its beautiful islands in the harbor.

Montreal fair operators are grateful to have the New York experience—generally considered a disaster—from which to learn. They are locating the big attractions on perimeters of the grounds, rather than clustering them. High speed subways connect all points on the grounds and run directly from parking lots and downtown. A computer at the entrance tells you in advance where the big crowds are—so you can avoid them.

Out of the Fair, Montreal is reaping $130 million in capital contracts, acres of new park land, an exotic new waterfront apartment complex on one of the fair islands, an aquarium, a bridge, a subway tunnel and several office buildings.

The city, in addition, expects 400 million extra tourist dollars from the 30 million visitors it expects in the 6 months from April 28, 1967, to October 27, 1967.

The directors of operations of the Montreal World's Fair is DeGaspe Beaubien. He knows Boston well and is a brother-in-law of Boston lawyer Gael Mahoney. He told us:

"During my years at Harvard, about the only mention I heard of my country was the morning report: 'There's a cold front coming down from Canada.'"

Not so any more.

It takes a lot of understanding living next to big brother who means so much more to you than you do to him.

Canada is growing bigger and apparently plans to make big brother more Canada-conscious, one way or another.

Thirty Republican Congressmen Call for Draft Investigation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, most of us in Congress support American efforts to stem the tide of Communist aggression in a faraway land. Today we authorized $4.8 billion for additional military support in Vietnam. Yet, to me, the most important cost of this war is the human cost. When young men are drafted into the service, their private lives, their education, and their careers

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

mind should be persuaded that the course the United States is following is, all thing considered, the only correct one.

Statement by L. Eldon James

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. THOMAS N. DOWNING

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 1, 1966

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Speaker, as a Member of the House of Representatives and a member of the American Legion, I had a unique pleasure this morning and a privilege that chance will probably bring to relatively few of my colleagues.

This morning I was able to introduce to our House Veterans' Affairs Committee a man whose counseling voice has been close to me for 20 years and who is now the voice of the 2½ million members of the American Legion.

L. Eldon James, who will serve as national commander of the American Legion throughout 1966, lives in Hampton, Va., and—aside from being one of my close friends and neighbors—he is one of my most prominent constituents. I have known the commander of the American Legion for 20 years, and I can assure you that he brings a highly developed sense of patriotism and a deeply felt set of convictions to the leadership of the world's largest veterans organization. He is a man who has always taken responsibilities seriously and I was frankly proud to be present this morning to hear my friend and constituent review the American Legion's legislative goals for 1966.

Veterans affairs have been a continuing concern to the U.S. House of Representatives, and the interests of the veteran have always ranked high among our Government's priorities. The Veterans' Affairs Committee and the membership of the House generally have, therefore, always been deeply interested in the American Legion's own legislative recommendations.

Today, Eldon James came to Capitol Hill to ask Congress to join with the American Legion in developing solutions to the many rehabilitation problems facing our Nation's disabled and needy veterans.

It is clear to me, Mr. Speaker, that our Nation's commitments in Vietnam must be reflected in the field of veterans affairs. Eldon James' views on his organization's legislative requirements will most certainly be of deep interest to my colleagues. I only wish every Member of the House could have been present to hear his statesmanlike presentation before the Veterans' Affairs Committee this morning. But for the benefit of my colleagues who could not be present, I insert his statement in the Appendix of the RECORD.

Mr. James' statement follows:

STATEMENT BY L. ELDON JAMES, NATIONAL COMMANDER, THE AMERICAN LEGION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 1966

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, there is no way I can adequately express to you my appreciation, and the appreciation of over 2½ million members of the American Legion and approximately 1 million members of the Legion Auxiliary, for the understanding you have shown; for the devotion you have and for your determination in establishing the legislative policy of our Government in the field of veterans affairs. The American Legion has always found this committee receptive where the interests of the needy and disabled veteran, his widow, and orphan are concerned. I believe the cooperative relationship that has developed between our organization, your committee, and your highly competent and energetic staff has been outstanding.

For 43 years now Legionnaires have met in Washington to consider problems in the field of veterans affairs. Today, as we appear before you, over 1,500 members of our organization have gathered here in our Nation's Capital to participate in our annual winter conference. This conference will also be considering matters of vital interest to our country in the fields of national security and foreign relations. Some special matters, such as the desirability of opening up eligibility for membership in our organization to veterans serving during the Vietnam period, will also be discussed. Many of the representatives are present here in this room today. Certainly we want to express our thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to the members of this committee, and to your staff for giving us this time and for making available these facilities and for accommodating this large crowd.

One of the major concerns of our conference here in Washington this week is what we refer to as rehabilitation matters. Through the means of this conference, practicing service officers of the American Legion, who work day in and day out with the hard realism of specific cases of disabled and needy veterans, will exchange ideas and will try to find solutions so that inequities may be corrected. Through such efforts as this we are continually uncovering conditions that require legislation. Based on such work as this we come to you from time to time seeking legislative changes.

A major nonbusiness event—in fact, I might call it a social event—of our conference will be the annual banquet held in honor of the Congress. It will take place tomorrow night at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. Many of you and your wives have accepted our invitation and we look forward to visiting with you at that time and have you visit with your constituents who will be here in sizable numbers.

I have referred briefly to your staff. It is a real temptation to me to call them by name and express to you our deep sense of obligation to them for their diligent work on our common goals. I will not mention names for fear that I might omit some deserving member of your staff. In fact, each of them has our eternal gratitude. I commend you for retaining such skilled and understanding individuals.

Down through the years this committee has done a magnificent job of maintaining and improving the veterans benefits program. An inventory of your accomplishments would be far too voluminous to even outline here. The most recent dramatic accomplishment was the enactment of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefit Act of 1966. I believe it is of more than ordinary significance that this veterans legislation was the first piece of major legislation to be enacted by this session of the 89th Congress. Certainly this fact reflects your committee's understanding of our country's concern and gratitude for those who bear arms in defense of our country.

With your permission, I would like now to direct our joint attention to five specific areas in which we believe further legislation concerning veterans affairs is warranted.

I. WARTIME BENEFITS FOR VIETNAM PERIOD VETERANS

The first is in the area of wartime benefits for veterans in our armed services during the Vietnam era. At our national convention in Portland, Oreg., in 1965, resolution No. 125, adopted by the convention, mandated our organization to sponsor and support legislation to provide a program of wartime benefits for those who have served on or after August 5, 1964. These benefits would be similar to those provided to veterans of other wartime periods. This position was reasserted by resolution No. 22 of our national executive committee last fall. The Veterans Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, on which this committee did such wonderful work, provides many needed benefits in a very fine legislative package. We feel, however, that there are certain deficiencies that should be corrected.

For example, Vietnam period veterans should be made eligible for war compensation rates; death and disability pension; and burial allowances, to cite only some. The American Legion bill, H.R. 12186—which, incidentally, you, Mr. Chairman, so graciously introduced for us—would provide for our Vietnam period veterans, benefits now available and granted to other wartime veterans. As an aside, I might say this. I know that you, Mr. Chairman, have recently been to Vietnam. I believe, twice. I was there myself for 6 short days last October. My brief experience there does not make me an expert but I was convinced by everything that I saw that our military personnel in Vietnam are doing a magnificent job. As a minimum, they deserve to know that Americans back home recognize that they serve well the cause of freedom under what must be described as full wartime conditions. All the members of our Armed Forces are today subject to exposure to maximum risk in defense of our system of government and could be called to the shooting front at any time. Our legislative policy in the field of veterans affairs must reflect that this country recognizes these facts and the service the members of our Armed Forces perform.

In the field of educational assistance, we believe this committee should consider again the adequacy of rates provided in the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. We know that it is not the intent of this act to completely subsidize the cost of the veteran's education or training. We are aware that if the veteran has to contribute something from his own resources, his interest in obtaining an education may be greater. Induction into the military service has in so many instances disrupted the veteran's attempt to gain an education, while others not called into service have been permitted to complete their education without interruption. I think the question of adequacy of rates for education benefits to veterans may be well illustrated by drawing the comparison with those who received training in the war on poverty program. In the latter, our Federal Government is paying at the rate of $375 a month, while the monthly educational assistance for veterans under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act is $100 per month for a single man. We cite this example not as a criticism of any program but only as a suggestion that the educational assistance rates could stand a modest increase.

II. EXPANSION OF BENEFITS FOR SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITIES AND DEATH

The second area in which we believe legislation is needed is improvement in the benefits for service-connected disabilities or death. Our Government's obligation to those who have incurred a service disability, or to their survivors where death has resulted, is one of the highest priority. Presidential pronouncements on this subject go all the way back to at least Mr. Lincoln. We would seek legislative modifications to correct several inequities that now exist. For example—

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5

1. Under present law, the rate paid for total disability is $300 per month. Partial disability should be compensated by a portion of $300 equal to the percentage of total disability the person actually suffers. Under present law this is not true, for a person with 50-percent disability does not receive $150 a month, the equivalent of 50 percent of $300, but actually receives only $113 per month. We believe logic and sound reasoning suggest a change is needed.

2. Veterans with a rated disability of 50 percent or more receive, in addition to their compensation, supplementary allowances if they have dependents. Under present law, if that veteran's disability is reduced to anything under 50 percent, he is no longer entitled to supplementary compensation because of his dependents.

For example, consider this case which is typical of many others: Veteran X has a 40-percent rating, for a below-the-knee amputation, and a 10-percent rating, for arthritis of the spine. These ratings combine to 50 percent and, under present law, he receives an additional allowance for his wife and three children. VA examines him, concludes that the arthritis is no longer disabling, and reduces his rating to 40 percent. Not only does he lose his 10-percent compensation, he also loses all allowances for his family—as though they had disappeared. The veteran does not understand this, nor do we. We believe logic and sound reasoning suggest a change is needed.

3. Steps should be taken to increase the rates of death compensation payable to widows, children, and dependent parents. They were last increased in 1952.

4. The dependency and indemnity compensation program for dependent parents needs improvement. We are aware that H.R. 168, as originally reported by this committee, did provide for higher income limits. We understand the Veterans' Administration has this matter under study. We would urge that the study be completed as soon as possible and that survivors be awarded increased benefits necessary to meet the increased cost of living.

III. IMPROVEMENT OF THE DEATH AND DISABILITY PENSION PROGRAM

Legislation is needed in order to improve the death and disability pension program. The American Legion for years has supported the principle that entitlement to receive death and disability pensions should be determined by a test of individual need. We have consistently supported the principle that the standard of need for a war veteran is and should be higher than the test of indigency for public assistance. For this reason, we support the enactment of legislation to improve the pension program in the following ways:

1. Substitute a two-step table of rates and income limitation for the present three-step table;

2. Increase the maximum annual income limitation by $600;

3. Expand the list of "incomes" that may be excluded from determinations of annual income;

4. Restore the provision that would permit recoupment of amounts contributed to retirement plans before payments from them are considered income; and

5. Permit the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to pay a pension to a wife or child when the veteran disappears and was, at the time of disappearance, receiving or entitled to receive disability pension. With reference to the question of need, there have been many discussions of the level of annual income below which poverty is considered to exist. Some have set the figure at $3,000; others believe it should be higher. We are convinced that the existing income limitations controlling payment of disability and death pension are too low.

In addition, we have been struggling to find some solution to the unfortunate result which occurs when a pensioner receives a small increase in his outside income, say from some retirement plan, but he suffers a large decrease in the amount of VA pension payable. We believe our proposal to substitute a two-step table for the present three-step one, and to increase the income limitations by $600, would go a long way toward insuring that pensioners in financial need would continue to receive adequate allowances from the Government.

IV. APPROPRIATION OF SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF VA PROGRAMS

Appropriation of sufficient funds to permit the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to effectively carry out the veterans' benefits programs is essential. We are aware of the need for economy in Government. Failure on the part of Government to meet its obligations to the needy and disabled veterans, who in their own individual ways have accepted their responsibility to Government, is not the way to accomplish it.

I will not trespass upon the time of this committee to recite facts or statistics to prove the economic soundness of veterans' programs in the past. Through your support you have underscored their importance. Sound business practice will dictate that any program worthy of continuation must be adequately supported by proper staff, equipment, and facilities. No matter how wonderful a program may look on paper, it is ineffective until staff, equipment, and facilities are available and are blended together to produce an effective result. In other words, gentlemen, if our programs are to be carried out, you must see that adequate funds are appropriated. We take confidence for the moment in the President's budget for this purpose. We believe it does reflect our Government's proper concern for its obligation to those who have served in uniform.

V. THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Our national policy on veterans affairs should be molded by the Veterans' Administration under the direction of the President and established by the Congress. The dangerous tendency of the Bureau of the Budget to usurp these powers should be terminated. We recognize the need of a central agency such as the Bureau of the Budget, and the functions it must serve in assisting the President in the preparation of the budget and the administration of fiscal programs. This agency has a role to play in the efficient operation of Government. However, we feel compelled to call to the attention of this committee the growing tendency of the Bureau to exercise autocratic authority in molding top-level policy where our veterans programs are concerned. We believe it is essential that the Congress not permit its responsibility and its authority to slip away by default in this vital area of Government administration. To underscore the critical nature of this situation, we need only refer back to January 13, 1965, when 31 Veterans' Administration facilities were ordered closed. Reliable information available to us indicates that this unfortunate major policy determination came directly from the Bureau of the Budget. The wisdom and determination of this committee, other committees of the Congress and the Congress generally, all responsive to our efforts and similar efforts of like-minded people throughout the land, fortunately resulted in at least a partial reversal of that unwarranted decision. We cannot afford to discount the seriousness of this usurpation of authority merely because a partial reversal resulted. Although there have been no recent dramatic efforts of which we have any knowledge, we feel sure the philosophy has not changed. We were gravely concerned over the Bureau efforts to force the Veterans' Administration to reverse a long-standing position by compelling the VA to accept responsibility for conducting within its system a hospital program for merchant seamen, commercial fishermen and certain other nonveterans. No matter how we look at such an effort, the result is that the Bureau of the Budget in this instance is attempting to establish the national policy with respect to the hospitalization of veterans. We do not believe such action is in accordance with the intent of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, or the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, as amended. We urge that the Congress take such steps as may be necessary to curtail and limit such action on the part of the Bureau of the Budget in its efforts to originate and influence policies.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I have discussed briefly the five major legislative objectives of our National Rehabilitation Commission as determined by our policy bodies, commencing with our 1964 national convention. As this committee knows, these legislative proposals mandated from the delegates to our national convention will remain in force until the adjournment of the 89th Congress. We respectfully seek your well-considered attention to these problems. As has been the practice of my predecessors, I have taken the liberty of attaching to my statement a résumé of those resolutions that seek legislative action. I request, Mr. Chairman, this addendum be made a part of the record.

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, on behalf of the American Legion, we want you to know that we are so very grateful for the opportunity you have given us this morning to present our views on these important matters of mutual concern to all of us. As you so well know, it is in the interest of the disabled and needy veteran, his widow and his orphan, that we come to you on matters affecting veterans benefits. Your record is a clear demonstration of your enlightened concern for those who have borne the burden of our national defense and those who bear it at this very moment. We salute your effort and pledge our continuing and untiring support in their behalf.

REHABILITATION RESOLUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGION THAT REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE ACTION

POLICY

A. Burial benefits

1. The 1965 convention Resolution 46 (Rhode Island) seeks legislation to increase the VA burial allowance from $250 to $350 (H.R. 2657).

B. Burial allowance when interred in a national cemetery

1. The 1965 convention Resolution 467 (New York) requests we oppose those legislative proposals which would reduce the VA burial allowance payable on the burial and funeral expenses where a deceased veteran is buried in a national cemetery.

C. Burial flags

1. The 1966 convention Resolution 158 (Ohio) requests that the American Legion continue to support legislation to provide that the burial flag issued by the VA shall be 5 by 9½ feet.

Accomplished administratively. The Deputy Administrator of the Veterans' Administration has advised us that the agency is implementing the intent of this resolution through administrative regulation.

D. Reduction and closing of VA facilities

1. The 1965 convention Resolution 19 (Florida) urges that the American Legion continue to record its protest against the closing of facilities; that the President, the Congress, and the Administrator of the VA establish and maintain a VA hospital system of not less than 125,000 beds and not less than one regional office in each State; that the VA hospital system be restricted to the care of veterans and those members of the Armed Forces mutually agreed to; and that we use every means at our disposal to fore-